STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – FINAL EXAM

ATTY. TUALLA
1ST SEM, SY 2017-2018

Part I. Statutory Construction Rules on Associated Words (Chapter V)

1. Noscitur a sociis (a thing is known by its associates). This maxim states

that where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made
clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated. The reason for this is because a
word or phrase in a statute is often used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the
latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.

Examples:
a. RA 7160 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special
Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and
for other purposes), Section 31 (c)

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(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum
period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent guardian,
stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment
which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been
revoked;

In People of the Philippines vs Lagua (2012), to avoid the maximum

period of penalty the respondent argued he could not be considered a
guardian in the context of the above provision. The listing contained in
the above constitutes circumstances of relationship between the
perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the
maximum penalty. It should be noted that the words with which
"guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship.
From this description it can be safely deduced that the guardian
envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward.
This relationship may be established either by being the ward’s
biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian).
Appellant is neither the victim’s (biological parent nor is he the
victims’s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian"
contemplated by law. Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of
being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Informations. What
was clearly stated was that appellant was the "adopting father" of the
victim, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish. For
failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of
relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two (2) counts of
simple rape, and not qualified rape.

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b. Section 8 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution·

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision
of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.

In Chavez vs JBC (2012), it was debated whether or not the current

practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members,
two (2) of whom are members of Congress, ran counter to the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution. It was held that that the word "Congress"
used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that,
in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in
the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in
voting.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers

to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of
laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each
house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of
JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in
the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

2. Ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species). This principle states that
where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or
of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. The rule is based
on the obvious reason that if the legislature had intended the general words
to be used in their unrestricted sense they would have made no mention of
the particular classes. General words, which standing alone might have a
wide and comprehensive meaning, when joined with an enumeration of
articles, things, and entities will be interpreted in their narrower sense and
understood to refer only to articles, things and entities fairly similar in
kind, class and nature to those set forth in the associated list of
enumeration.

Examples:
a. Section 1 of P.D. 1216 (Defining “Open Space” in Residential
Subdivisions and Amending Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957

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Requiring Subdivision Owners to Provide Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks
and Reserve Open Space for Parks or Recreation Use)

For purposes of this Decree, the term "open space" shall mean an area
reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools,
roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers
and other similar facilities and amenities.

In Liwag vs Happy Glen (2012), a parcel of land, which includes a water

facility, is the subject of the case, in particular, whether or not it can be
considered an “open space” as defined in P.D. 1216. The court ruled
that the subject parcel of land is considered an “open space” using the
principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area falls under
“other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no
specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Applying that
principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas
reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the
phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in
like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the
benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which,
survival in the community would be impossible.

b. Section 140 of the Local Government Code

Amusement Tax – (a) The province may levy an amusement tax to be

collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of
amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross
receipts from admission fees.
(b) In the case of theaters of cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and
withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the
provincial treasurer before the gross receipts are divided between said
proprietors, lessees, or operators and the distributors of the
cinematographic films.
(c) The holding of operas, concerts, dramas, recitals, painting and art
exhibitions, flower shows, musical programs, literary and oratorical
presentations, except pop, rock, or similar concerts shall be exempt
from the payment of the tax herein imposed.
(d) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may prescribe the time, manner,
terms and conditions for the payment of tax. In case of fraud or failure
to pay the tax, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan may impose such
surcharges, interests and penalties.
(e) The proceeds from the amusement tax shall be shared equally by the
province and the municipality where such amusement places are
located.

In Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of Appeals, the former

Petitioner Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) contended that it
was subject to the imposition by LGUs of amusement taxes (as opposed
to amusement taxes imposed by the national government). Applying
the principle of ejusdem generis, the Supreme Court rejected PBA's
assertions and noted that: In determining the meaning of the phrase

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'other places of amusement', one must refer to the prior enumeration of
theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic
expression as their common characteristic. Professional basketball
games do not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms
of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming.

3. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius (the express mention of one person,
thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others). A variation of
which is expressium facit cessare tacitum, which means that what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied. What it states is that where a
statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation
or construction, be extended to other matters. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations
in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Examples:
a. Sections 232, 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines)

In Malinias v Comelec (2002), the former requested the COMELEC and

its Law Department to investigate and prosecute private respondents for
alleged violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and
261 (i) of B.P. 881. Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to
prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P.
Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act. Section 232 of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in
Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically
states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the
canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally
punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act
involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal
election offense.

b. Section 24, 26 and 29 under Article IX on Constitutional Commissions

(The 1987 Constitution)

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional

Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall
enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the
Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human
Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national
police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress
may establish an independent economic and planning agency.

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In CHREA vs.CHR (2004), CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission based on RA 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions
Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The
Court held that the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the
CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional
Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. It clear that
the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As
expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all
others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied.

4. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted
from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. This needs two laws. In expressio unius, it is just the
enumeration you are looking at, not another law.

Examples:
a. R. A. No. 5447 (Special Education Fund) and Sections 235, 272 and
100 (c) of the Local Government Code

The case of COA of the Province of Cebu v Province of Cebu is about the
effects of a new law on an old law. The Special Education Fund (SEF)
allowed the use of part of the realty and cigarette taxes for extension
programs and scholarships. When the Cebu provincial office used it to pay
for salaries of teachers and scholars, COA said those were not chargeable
to the SEF since RA 5447, which created the SEF, was deemed repealed
by the Local Govt Code. Because the two retained sections in the LGC
omitted the scholarship grants, the court ruled that what was omitted must
have been omitted intentionally, and so may not be included.

b. Section 2 of Act 3326 (An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for

Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run), and Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of

prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without

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the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine Archipelago.

In his concurring opinion in the case of Rep. of the Phils vs. Cojuangco
(2012), Assoc Justice Bersamin held that that interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to be
adopted. This was his reaction to the dissenting opinion that respondent
Cojuangco, Jr.’s purported absence from the country interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, which pertinently provides that the term of prescription shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. Assoc Justice
Bersamin argue that that the omission by the Legislature from Act No.
3326 of the effect on the running of the prescriptive period of the absence
of the accused from the country was an inadvertent drafting error on the
part of the Legislature. As such, the omission does not give to the Court
the license to apply Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code at will in order
to supply the omission applying the doctrine of Casus omissus pro
habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a
statute must be held to have been intentionally omitted. It is settled that if
cases should arise for which Congress has made no provision, the courts
cannot supply the omission. A casus omissus does not justify judicial
legislation, most particularly in respect of statutes defining and punishing
criminal offenses.

5. Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguerie Debemos. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

Examples:
a. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ”An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and
Other Purposes,”

It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.

In Ramirez v CA, the petitioner argued that the phrase “private

communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private
conversations.” The court held that the law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication.

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b. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ”An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and
Other Purposes,”

Cebu Institute of Medicine v Cebu Institute of Medicine Employees’

Union-National Federation of Labor: “Other benefits” may refer to
SSS, Medicare, Pagibig and may be taken from the 70% tuition increase
since the law only says that money from this may be given to employees
in the form of salaries and other benefits. Since the law did not
distinguish between “other benefits” and SSS, etc, these may be
deducted from the 70% increase in tuition charged by the school.

6. Reddendo singular singulis (referring each to each, or referring each

phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its
proper place). What it states is that the words should be taken
distributively to effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to
which it appears by context most appropriate related and to which it is most
applicable.

Examples:
a. 1987 Constitution, Article IX, Section 3, paras 1 and 5

(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to

initiate all cases of impeachment.
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(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.

In Gutierrez vs House of Representative (2011), the House argued that

the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle
of reddendo singula singulis by equating impeachment cases with
impeachment proceeding. During the oral arguments, Father Bernas
clarified that the word initiate in the above Constitutional provisions
refers to two objects, impeachment case and impeachment
proceeding. Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the
common verb is to initiate. The object in the first sentence is
impeachment case. The object in the second sentence is impeachment
proceeding. Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the
term cases must be distinguished from the term proceedings. An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a
vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It
is in that sense that the House has exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision
is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed
to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be initiated. To initiate,
which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the
other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House.

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b. 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, para 3

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(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

In Dizon vs CA (2003), the respondent argues that the Resolution

denying its Motion to Suspend the Rules of Procedure and to admit
Motion for Reconsideration was not concurred in by the required
three votes, as only two of Members of the Court voted to deny the
motion and one voted to grant the same. As such, the assailed
Resolution is void.

In response, it was held that the framers intended to draw a distinction

between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such
that cases are "decided" while matters, which include motions, are
"resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases";
while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters", applying the rule
of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation
of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other
provisions of the Constitution where these words appear. With the
aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required
number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply
where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the
resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence
of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not "matter".
The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3)
pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the
voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then
is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has
already been decided by the division and the losing party files a
motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the
motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case
undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the
failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for
its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the
motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed.

Part II. Provisos (Chapter V)

About Provisos. The operation of a proviso is to restrict or vary the operation

of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear
indication to the contrary. The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is to

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except something from the enacting clause; to limit, restrict, or qualify the
statute in whole or in part; or to exclude from the scope of the statute that
which otherwise would be within its terms.

Examples:
a. Section 168 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

Sec. 168. x x x x Provided, finally, that credit for any sales, miller's
or excise taxes paid on raw materials or supplies used in the milling
process shall not be allowed against the miller's tax due, except in the
case of a proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory as
provided hereunder.

In CIR vs CA and Central Vegetable Manufacturing Company, Inc (1999), the

private-respondent requested for reconsideration of deficiency miller's tax
assessments, contending that the final provision of Section 168 of the Tax
Code does not apply to sales tax paid on containers and packaging materials,
hence, the amount paid therefor should have been credited against the miller's
tax assessed against it. The Court affirmed CA decision that containers and
packages cannot be considered "raw materials" utilized in the milling
process. The raw materials used by Cenvoco in manufacturing edible oil are
copra and/or coconut oil. In other words, the term "used" in the final proviso
of Section 168 of the NIRC refers or is strictly confined to "raw materials" or
supplies fed, supplied or put into the apparatus, equipment, machinery or its
adjuncts that cause or execute the milling process.

b. Art. 280 of the Labor Code

Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to

the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the
parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee
has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such
activity exists.

In Leyte Geothermal vs PNOC (2011), the issue was whether or not employees
who were involved in an illegal strike could be considered regular employees.
The petitioner contended that proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 is
applicable to their case and that the Labor Arbiter should have considered
them regular by virtue of said proviso. The court found the contention without
merit. It clarified that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the
phrase immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause
that it immediately follows. Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be

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construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision
to which it is attached, and not to the statute itself or to other sections thereof.
The only exception to this rule is where the clear legislative intent is to restrain
or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding it (the proviso) but also
earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole.

The court then mentioned DOLE’s Policy Instruction No. 12 which discloses
that the concept of regular and casual employees was designed to put an end
to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been abused by many
employers to prevent so – called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular
employees or to prevent casuals from joining unions. It pointed out that the
same instructions show that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280
was not designed to stifle small-scale businesses nor to oppress agricultural
land owners to further the interests of laborers, whether agricultural or
industrial. What it seeks to eliminate are abuses of employers against their
employees and not, as petitioners would have us believe, to prevent small-
scale businesses from engaging in legitimate methods to realize profit. Hence,
the proviso is applicable only to the employees who are deemed "casuals" but
not to the "project" employees nor the regular employees treated in paragraph
one of Art. 280.

Part III. Strict or Liberal Interpretation (Chapter VII)

1. Strict Interpretation of a Statute. It is a method of construction which

refuses to expand the law by implication, interference or construction, but
confines its operation to cases which are clearly within its letter, as well as
within its spirit and reason.

Examples:
a. Section 9 of R.A. 7294 (An act granting Smart Information
Technologies, Inc. a franchise to establish, maintain, lease and operate
integrated telecommunications/computer/ electronic services, and
stations through the Philippines for public domestic and international
telecommunications, and for other purposes)

Tax Provisions. – The grantee, is successors or assigns shall be liable

to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal
property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations
which are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition
thereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax
equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the business
transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns
and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or
earnings thereof: Provided, That the grantee, its successors or assigns
shall continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II of the
National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 72 unless the latter enactment is amended or repealed, in
which case the amendment or repeal shall be applicable thereto.

In SMART vs City of Davao (2008), Smart contends that its telecenter in

Davao City is exempt from payment of franchise tax to the City, on the
following grounds: (a) x x x x; (b) x x x x; (c) the power of the City of Davao

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to impose a franchise tax is subject to statutory limitations such as the in
lieu of all taxes clause found in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294; x x x x. The
respondent invoked the power granted by the Constitution to local
government units to create their own sources of revenue. The RTC
ratiocinated that tax exemptions are construed in strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority and, thus, those
who assert a tax exemption must justify it with words too plain to be
mistaken and too categorical not to be misinterpreted. The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court decision.

b. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea (The act itself does not make a
man guilty unless his intentions were so)

In Lili Sy vs. Hon Merceditas Gutierrez, et al (2012), the issue was

whether private-respondent being a co-owner with the petitioner of the
subject property can be charged of robbery? The court held there was no
robbery. The court noted that what is involved was a dispute between and
among members of a family corporation, the Fortune Wealth Mansion
Corporation. Petitioner Lily Sy and respondents Merry, Jennifer, and
Glenn, all surnamed Sy, are the owners-incorporators of said corporation,
which owns and manages the Fortune Wealth Mansion where petitioner
allegedly resided and where the crime of robbery was allegedly
committed. As part-owners of the entire building and of the articles
allegedly stolen from the 10th floor of said building … the very same
properties that are involved between the same parties in a pending estate
proceeding, the respondents cannot, as co-owners, be therefore charged
with robbery. The fact of co-ownership negates any intention to gain, as
they cannot steal properties which they claim to own.petitioner accused
private-respondents, who are her close relatives, of stealing personal
properties from her.

2. Liberal Interpretation of a Statute. It is a method of construction that

enlarges the letter of a statute to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out
its intent, or promote justice. It does not mean enlargement of a provision
which is clear, unambiguous and free from doubt, for a statute is which is
plain and clear is not subject to construction.

Examples:
a. Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of
the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended
Article 223. In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in
an amount equivalent to the monetary award.

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In JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos
(1993), the issue was the validity of the order of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a
decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the
ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. The court held that in
interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as
an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions
(Ut res magis valeat quam pereat – statutes should be read as a whole..
that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.) Under the
petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier
bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect
nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but the Court does not see any such
redundancy; on the contrary, the Court finds that Section 6 complements
Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render
a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts
of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

b. Salus populi est suprema lex (The voice of the people is the supreme
law).

In Restituto Ynot vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (1987), the

constitutionality of the Executive Order No. 626-A (E. O. 626-A) issued
in 1980 prohibiting the inter-provincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos was raised when petitioner was accused of
violating the EO after he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo, and the same was confiscated by the police station
commander. The government invoked the police power of the state to
justify the EO. However, the court finds that the EO is an invalid exercise
of the police power. The Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual interests to the benefit of the greater number, cannot be applied
to justify the EO. Thus, the court held that the EO is not constitutional. The
executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to
the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
bond. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

I certify that this paper is my own work, except where indicated by proper
citation and referencing, and that I have not plagiarized the work of others.

CHRISTIAN OLIVER C. MERCADO

Student No. 17-00200

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