General Principles

Concept of Remedial Law

They are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.

They refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice.

They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. (Tan, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No.
136368, January 16, 2002). (2006 Bar)

It plays a vital role in the administration of justice.

It lies at the very core of procedural due process, which means a law which hears
before it condemns, one which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial, and contemplates an opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered (Albert v. University Publishing, G.R. No. L-19118, January 30,
1965).

Nature of Remedial Law

Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law;
and

Rules of Court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business.

Strict compliance with the rules has been held mandatory and imperative, so that
failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme Court, within the period fixed for that
purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal (Fredesvindo S. Alvero v. M.L.
De La Rosa et. al. G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946)

SUBSTANTIVE LAW v. REMEDIAL LAW

Substantive Law Remedial Law

Definition Part of the law which Prescribes the methods
creates, defines or of enforcing those rights
regulates rights and obligations created
concerning life, liberty or by substantive law

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property (Primicias v. (Bustos v. Lucero, 81 would not be feasible or
Ocampo, 81 Phil 650) Phil 640). would work injustice;
or the powers of agencies
or instrumentalities for 3. If to do so would
the administration of involve intricate
public affairs, which when problems of due process
violated gives rise to a or impair the
cause of action (Bustos v. independence of the
Lucero, 81 Phil 640) courts (Tan Jr. v. CA,
Nature Creates vested rights Does not create vested G.R. No. 136368,
rights January 16, 2002).
Application Generally prospective in GR: May be applied Creation Enacted by Congress The SC is expressly
application retroactively empowered to
promulgate procedural
NOTE: A person has no rules
vested right in any
particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on NOTE:
the application to the
trial of his case, whether If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural.
civil or criminal, of any
other than the existing If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as
rules of procedure (Tan substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right,
Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. then the rule deals merely with procedure (Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742,
136368, January 16, September 16, 1998)
2002).
Procedural Laws Applicable to Actions Pending at the Time of
XPNs: Promulgation

1. The statute itself

expressly or by
necessary implication Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable
provides that pending to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. This retroactive
actions are excepted application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected (Panay
from its operation To Railways, Inc. v. Heva Management And Development Corporation et. Al.,G. R. No.
apply it to pending 154061, January 25, 2012).
proceedings would
impair vested rights; Principal sources of remedial law

2. Under appropriate 1. Constitution;

circumstances, courts 2. Different laws creating the judiciary, defining and allocating jurisdiction to courts
may deny the different levels;
retroactive application of 3. Procedural laws and rules promulgated by the SC;
procedural laws in the 4. Circulars;
event that to do so 5. Administrative orders;

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6. Internal rules; The principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est
7. Court decisions. (Herrera, 2007) optimus interpretendi, or that every statute must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence applies in
Object of remedial law interpreting both sets of Rules such as the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and the
Rule on Summary Procedure regarding the finality of judgments (Banares II v.
The object is not to cause an undue protraction of the litigation, but to facilitate Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000; Herrera, 2007).
the adjudication of conflicting claims and to serve, rather than to defeat, the ends
of justice (Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, et al., G.R. No. 129718, RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
August 17, 1998, referring to Continental Leaf Tobacco, Inc. v. IAC, 140 SCRA
269). Extent of the rule-making power of the SC

Objective of Rules of Court It has the power to promulgate rules concerning:

To secure a: (JuSI) 1.The protection and enforcement of constitutional rights;

1. Just; 2. Pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
2. Speedy; 3. The admission to the practice of law;
3. Inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding (Sec. 6, Rule 1). 4. The integrated bar; and
5. Legal assistance to the underprivileged (Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5), 1987 Constitution).
Implementation of remedial laws in our system of government (2006 Bar)
The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or to
They are implemented through the judicial system, including the prosecutory except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when
service of courts and quasi-judicial agencies. the purpose of justice requires it (Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Mirant
Pagbilao Corporation, G.R. No. 159593, October 12, 2006).
Interpretations of the provisions of the Rules of Court (1998 Bar)
Rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice. When a strict and
GR: The Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification will result in
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding a patent denial of substantial justice, these may be liberally construed (SM Land,
(Sec. 6, Rule 1). Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc. and Watsons Personal Care Stores, v. City of Manila
G.R. No. 197151, October 22, 2012).
XPNs: The following shall be strictly construed: The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure necessarily carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on points
1. Reglementary periods; of remedial law through the amendment of the Rules of Court. (Edgardo Pinga V.
2. Rule on forum shopping; and The Heirs Of German Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, June 30, 2006).
3. Service of summons.
LIMITATIONS ON THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
The liberal construction of the rules may only be invoked in situations where there (SIU-DIM)
is an excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same
does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a 1. It shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules (Felix Martos, Et Al. V. New San of cases; 2. The rules must be uniform for all the courts of the same grade;
Jose Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 192650, October 24, 2012). 3. The rules must not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights (Cruz, 2002).

Rule on Uniform Interpretation POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO AMEND AND SUSPEND PROCEDURAL
RULES

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Functions of court (DAI)
Power of the SC to amend the Rules of Court
1. Decide actual controversies and not to give opinions upon abstract propositions
The SC has the power to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more (Guarduno v. Diaz, 46 Phil. 472);
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases (Makati 2. Apply the law;
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 167403, August 6, 2008). 3. Interpret the law.

Power of the SC to suspend the application of the Rules of Court and NOTE: It does not formulate public policy, which is the province of the legislative
exempt a case from its operation and executive branches of government (Electromat Manufacturing and Recording
Corporation v. Hon. Ciriaco Lagunzad, G.R. No. 172699, July 27, 2011, citing
The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or to Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Honorable Trajano, et al., G.R. No. 133215, July 15,
except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when 1999).
the purpose of justice requires it (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Migrant Court Judge
Pagbilao Corporation, G.R. No. 159593, October 12, 2006). NATURE It is a tribunal officially Simply an officer of such
assembled under tribunal (Wagenhorst v.
Reasons that would warrant the suspension of the Rules of Procedure authority of law. Philadelphia Life
Insurance Co., 358 Pa.
1. The existence of special or compelling circumstances; 55, cited by Black’s 5th
2. The merits of the case; ed.).
3. A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored Disqualification of a judge May be disqualified.
does not affect the court.
by the suspension of rules;
4. A lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
It is a being in imagination Physical person (People
and comparable to a ex rel. Herndon v. Opekl,
5. The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby (Sarmiento v. Zaratan, corporation. 188 III 194, 58 NE 1996,
G.R. No. 167471, February 5, 2007). cited by Blacks 5th ed.).

Power to stay proceedings and control its processes

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to CLASSIFICATION OF PHILIPPINE COURTS
control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort,
and that of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be 1. Regular courts:
done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, a. Supreme Court;
conflicting judgments, and confusion between litigants and courts (Security Bank b. Court of Appeals;
Corp. v. Judge Manuel Victorio, 468 SCRA 609). c. Regional Trial Courts;
d. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
NATURE OF PHILIPPINE COURTS Courts , Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

MEANING OF A COURT 2. Special courts:

a. Sandiganbayan;
Court is an organ of the government, belonging to the judicial department, whose b. Court of Tax Appeals;
function is the application of laws to controversies brought before it and the public c. Shari’a District Courts, Shari’a Circuit Courts;
administration of justice (Black’s Law Dictionary, 8thed.).

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3. Quasi-Courts or Quasi-Judicial Agencies. a constitutionally-mandated court since, although its existence is provided under
Constitution, its creation was by statutory enactment. NOTE: All courts in the
COURTS OF ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION Philippines except the SC are statutory courts. They have been created by statutory
enactments (Riano, 2011). The Sandiganbayan is only a constitutionally-mandated
Courts of Original Courts of Appellate court since, although its existence is provided under Constitution, its creation was
jurisdiction jurisdiction by statutory enactment.

Courts exercising Superior courts reviewing COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY

jurisdiction in the first and deciding cases
instance previously decided by a Courts of Law Court of Equity
lower court (21 CJS Courts Any tribunal duly Any tribunal administering
3) administering the laws of justice outside the law,
the land being ethical rather than
COURTS OF GENERAL AND SPECIAL JURISDICTION jural and belonging to the
sphere of morals rather
Courts of General Courts of Special than of law. It is grounded
jurisdiction jurisdiction on the precepts of
conscience and not on any
Those with competence to Those which have only a sanction of positive law,
decide on their own special jurisdiction for a for equity finds no room
jurisdiction and to take particular purpose or are for application where there
cognizance of all cases, clothed with special is law (Herrera, 2007).
civil and criminal, of a powers for the Decides a case according Adjudicates a controversy
particular nature (21 CJS performance of specified to the promulgated law according to the common
Courts 3). duties beyond which they precepts of what is right
have no authority of any and just without inquiring
kind (21 CJS Courts 3). into the terms of the
statute
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY COURTS

Constitutional Court Statutory Court

Created by the Created by law other than Courts of Record
Constitution, e.g. SC. Constitution, e.g. CA,
Sandiganbayan, CTA, RTC, These are courts whose proceedings are enrolled and which are bound to keep
MTC, MeTC, MCTC, MTCC. written records of all trials and proceedings handled by them (Luzano v. Romero,
et al., G.R. No. L-33245, September 30, 1971). RA 6031 mandates all MTCs to be
Cannot be abolished by May be abolished by courts of record.
Congress without Congress by just simply
amending the repealing the law which
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
Constitution created those courts
The principle provides that lower courts shall initially decide a case before it is
considered by a higher court. A higher court will not entertain direct resort to it
NOTE: All courts in the Philippines except the SC are statutory courts. They have
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts (Santiago
been created by statutory enactments (Riano, 2011). The Sandiganbayan is only
v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993).

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DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
The rule on hierarchy of courts determines the venue of appeals. Such rule is STABILITY
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's precious time and
attention which are better devoted to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and GR: No court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another
to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket.(Audi Ang v. Hon. Jules A. court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007). injunction (Atty. Cabili v. Judge Balindog, A.M. No. RTJ10-2225, September 6,
2011).
NOTE: The rationale is two-fold:
XPN: The doctrine does not apply where a third party claimant is involved (Santos
1. It would be an imposition upon the limited time of the Supreme Court; v. Bayhon, G.R. No. 88643, July 23, 1991).
2. Inevitable result in a delay, intended or otherwise, in adjudication of
cases, which in some instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court NOTE: The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court
as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
the issues because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts (Heirs of Bertuldo jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for
Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005). its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment (De Leon v.
The SC is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform Hon. Salvador, et al., 146 Phil. 1051).
the duty assigned to it.
Settled is the rule that where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of
Principle of Judicial Hierarchy is NOT absolute administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that
such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and
In several cases, the court has allowed direct invocation of the SC’s original stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Philippine Sinter
jurisdiction on the following grounds: Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power And Light Co. Inc., G.R. No. 127371, April
25, 2002).
1. Special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition;
2. When dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
3. When demanded by the broader interest of justice; JURISDICTION
4. When the challenged orders were patent nullities; or - the power to hear and decide a case
5. When analogous, exceptional and compelling circumstances called for
and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case (Republic of the Requisites for the EXERCISE of jurisdiction:
Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, et al., G.R. No. 174385, February 20, 2013).  Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner
o acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory
NOTE: The SC may disregard the principle of hierarchy of courts if warranted by pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner
the nature and importance of the issues raised in the interest of speedy justice and  Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent
to avoid future litigations (Riano, 2011). o acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the
defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron- clad dictum. Endowed with a issued by the court to him, generally by service of summons
broad perspective that spans the legal interest of virtually the entire government  Jurisdiction over the subject matter
officialdom, the OSG may transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client o conferred by law; unlike jurisdiction over the parties, CANNOT
agency and instead, promote and protect the public wealth. (Commission On be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of
Elections V. Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, G. R. No. 151992, September 18, the parties
2002).  Jurisdiction over the issues of the case

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o determined and conferred by the pleadings or by agreement
during pretrial or by the parties’ implied consent such as when
they fail to object to the admissibility in evidence JURISDICTION VENUE
 Jurisdiction over the res (property/ thing subject of litigation) the authority to hear and determine the place where the case is to be
o acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the a case heard
thing in question, thus placing it in custodial legis or by provision matter of substantive law matter of procedural law
of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the establishes a relation between the establishes a relation between the
property or subject matter within in its territorial jurisdiction. court and the subject matter plaintiff and defendant or petitioner
and respondent
CLASSES/KINDS fixed by law and cannot be may be conferred by the act or
conferred by the parties agreement of the parties
AS TO NATURE
COURTS AND JUDGES
GENERAL SPECIAL/LIMITED
the power to adjudicate all restricts the court's jurisdiction only
controversies except those to particular cases and subject to Kind of Court Description Example
expressly withheld from the such limitations as may be provided those competent to
plenary powers of the court by the governing law courts of general decide their own RTC
ORIGINAL APPELLATE jurisdiction jurisdiction and take
the power of the court to take the authority of a court higher in cognizance of all kinds
judicial cognizance of a case rank to reexamine the final order of of cases
instituted for judicial action for the judgment of a lower court which
first time under conditions provided tried the case now elevated for courts of limited those which have no MTC, Juvenile and
by law judicial review jurisdiction power to decide their Domestic Relations
EXCLUSIVE Exclusive Concurrent/ own jurisdiction and Court (under BP 129,
Confluent/ Coordinate can only try cases JDRC has been
the power to adjudicate a case or the power conferred upon different permitted by statute integrated into the RTC
proceeding to the exclusion of all courts, whether of the same or to form a branch
other courts at that stage different ranks, to take cognizance thereof
of the same case in the same or
different judicial territories courts of original those which, under
OTHER KINDS jurisdiction the law, actions may
originally be
under BP 129, the grant of
commenced
authority to inferior courts to hear
Delegated and determine cadastral and land
registration cases under certain courts of appellate those which have the
conditions (See Sec 34) jurisdiction power to review on
appeal the decisions
under BP 129, the power of inferior
or orders of a lower
courts to hear and decide petitions
court
Special for a writ of habeas corpus or
applications for bail in the absence
of RTC judges in the trial or city
superior courts those which have the
Territorial refers to the geographical area
power of review or
within which its powers can be
supervision over
exercise

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another and lower
court
1. Supreme Court
2. Court of Appeals
inferior courts those which, in now called "lower 3. Regional Trial Court
relation to another courts" under the 1987 a. Regular RTC
court are lower in Consti b. Special Criminal Courts
rank and subject to
c. Family Courts
review and
d. Intellectual Property Courts
supervision by
another e. Special Commercial Courts
4. Inferior Courts
a. Metropolitan Trial Courts
courts of record those whose all inferior courts are b. Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
proceedings are now courts of record c. Municipal Trial Courts
enrolled and which (prior to RA 6031, they d. Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
are bound to keep a were courts not of 5. Sandiganbayan
written record of all record) 6. Court of Tax Appeals
trials and proceedings 7. Quasi-Judicial Bodies
handled by them 8. Quasi-Courts
9. Military Courts or Tribunal

courts not of record those which are not

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 978
required to keep a
August 17, 1976
written record or
transcript of
proceedings held AMENDING THE APPELLATE REVIEW PROCEDURE IN MILITARY
therein TRIBUNAL CASES AS PROVIDED IN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 39, AS
AMENDED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 566, AND IN COURTMARTIAL
CASES AS PROVIDED IN COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408, AS AMENDED
Constitutional those which owe their SC and SB only (BUT
courts creation and existence the better view is that Section 1. Initial Action on Record. (a) Review by Staff Judge Advocate/Legal
to the Consi hence the SB is ONLY a Officer or AFP Board of Review Every record of trial by military commission or
cannot be legislated constitutionalmandated provost court shall be forwarded to the staff judge advocate/legal officer of the
out of existence or court since its creation convening authority for review before the latter acts thereon. The staff judge
deprived by law of was by statutory advocate/legal officer shall submit his opinion in writing to the convening authority
their jurisdiction and enactment ALTHOUGH
regarding the legal sufficiency of the record of trial in which there has been a finding
powers which were its existence is
of guilty, the appropriateness of the sentence, and any errors of law which may
unqualifiedly vested provided for by the
to them by the Consti Consti have been committed injuriously affecting the substantial rights of the accused. If
the trial resulted in a finding of not guilty or acquittal of all the charge or charges
statutory courts those which were all courts except SC and specification or specifications, the review shall be limited to questions of
created, organized and SB jurisdiction.
and with jurisdiction a) For purposes of this initial review, the Judge Advocate General,
exclusively AFP shall, as may be directed by the Chief of Staff, AFP, create
determined by law in his office as many AFP Boards of Review as he may deem

8
proper to conduct the review of a record of trial for the Chief of Provided, however, That, except in death sentences, all sentences of military
Staff, AFP, in lieu of the review of his staff judge advocate. The commissions and provost courts based solely upon findings of guilty of a charge or
Judge Advocate General, AFP, shall prescribe uniform rules of charges and a specification or specifications to which the accused pleaded guilty
procedure for the AFP Boards of Review. shall, upon approval thereof by the convening authority, not be subject to further
b) Action by the Convening Authority The convening authority may review by the Court of Military Appeals as herein provided.
approve the findings of guilty and the sentence or such part
thereof as he finds correct in law and fact. As used in this decree, The Judge Advocate General, AFP, shall likewise refer to the Court of Military
the term "convening authority" refers to the person who Appeals for review every record of trial by military commission on provost court
convened the court, a commissioned officer commanding for the
time being, or a successor in command. 1. in which the sentence as disapproved, without a rehearing being
c) Rehearing Where the convening authority disapproves the order, by the convening authority
findings of guilty of the military commission or provost court, he a. involves suspension or dismissal of a cadet, flying cadet or
may order a rehearing, except where the disapproval is based on midshipman of the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
lack of legally sufficient evidence to support the findings and b. involves dismissal of a probationary second lieutenant of
sentence. If he does not order a rehearing, he may order the the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
dismissal of the case: Provided, that such a dismissal shall not c. extends to dishonorable discharge or bad conduct discharge;
be final with respect to the cases which are required to be d. extends to confinement of more than one (1) year; and
reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals and/or the President of e. involves fine of more than P1,000.00; o
the Philippines as provided in Sec. 2(a) and 4 of this decree. 2. upon petition of the accused within thirty (30) days from the date he is
Where the military commission or provost court had no notified by the Judge Advocate General, AFP, of the promulgation of the military
jurisdiction over the offense and person of the accused, the commission or provost court order.
convening authority shall take the appropriate action.
d) Sentence Immediately Executory All sentences of military (b) Scope of Court's Review - The Court of Military Appeals may act only with
commissions and provost courts shall immediately executory respect to the findings of guilty by the military commission or provost court as
upon approval thereof by the convening authority, except those approved or disapproved by the convening authority. It shall determine the
which are required to be reviewed by the Court of Military appropriateness of the sentence imposed by the military commission or provost
Appeals and/or the President of the Philippines as provided in court as approved or disapproved by the convening authority. In considering the
Sec. 2(a) and 4 of this decree. records, it may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and
Sec. 2. Review by Court of Military Appeals. (a) Where Required The Judge determine controverted questions of fact and any errors of law which may have
Advocate General, AFP, shall refer to the Court of Military Appeals every record of been committed injuriously affecting the substantial rights of the accused.
trial by military commission or provost court in which the sentence as approved,
or disapproved without a rehearing being ordered, by the convening authority (c) Rehearing The Court of Military Appeals may disapprove the findings of guilty
by the military commission or provost court, as approved or disapproved by the
i. extends to death; convening authority, and order a rehearing, except where the disapproval is based
ii. affects a general or flag officer of the Armed Forces of the on lack of legally sufficient evidence to support the findings. If it does not order a
Philippines; rehearing, it may dismiss the case.
iii. involves dismissal of a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines; (d) Action in Accordance with Decision of Court After the Court of Military Appeals
iv. confinement of more than six (6) years; o v. fine of more than has acted on a case, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, shall advise the convening
P6,000.00; and authority to take action in accordance with the decision of the court, unless there
v. those affecting any civilian person: is further action by the President of the Philippines as herein below provided.

9
(e) Annual Survey of Appellate Review Operations The Judge Advocate General, disability of a justice may elect to receive the emoluments and benefits of a justice
AFP, and the Court of Military Appeals shall meet annually to make a of the court or of his position in the civilian judiciary.
comprehensive survey of appellate review operations and report to the President
of the Philippines the number and status of cases reviewed and pending and any Sec. 4. Confirmation of Approval by the President.
recommendation relating to uniformity of policies as to bail or release pending (a) No sentence of military commission involving death or affecting a
appellate review, sentences, service of sentences, and any other matters general or flag officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
considered appropriate. ordered executed until approved or confirmed by the President of the
Philippines.
(f) Creation Composition of Court. There is hereby created a Court of Military (b) In any case requiring approval or confirmation by the President as
Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice and at least four (4) Associate provided herein, the President shall have the power to reverse,
Justices to be appointed by the President of the Philippines from retired justices of confirm, increase the penalty imposed or otherwise modify any
the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court of the Philippines and/or individuals not decision of the military tribunal or court-martial.
less than forty (40) years old and who have practiced law for not less than ten (10)
years at the time of appointment or have held during a like period an office in the Sec. 5. Review of Records of Trial by Court-Martial. The Court of Military Appeals
Philippine government service requiring admission to the practice of law in the herein created shall review every record of trial by general court- martial or special
Philippines as an indispensable requisite. The President shall designate from time court-martial where the sentence, as approved by the convening authority,
to time one of the justices to acts as Presiding Justice. The court shall prescribe its requires confirmation by the President of the Philippines as provided in Article of
own rules of procedure and determine the number of justices to constitute a War 47. With respect to such cases, except as provided in the next preceding Sec.
quorum, provided, however, that the affirmative vote of at least five (5) of the 4(a) of this decree, they shall become final and immediately executory when the
justices is required to sustain a death sentence. findings of guilty and the sentence are approved, or disapproved, without a
rehearing being ordered, by the Court of Military Appeals.
(g) Tenure, Removal, Rank and Emoluments of Justices The justices of the Court JURISDICTION
of Military Appeals shall hold office until they reach the age of sixty-five years,
except the retired justices of the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court of the The power and authority of a court to try, hear, and decide a case and the power
Philippines who are appointed therein, who shall hold office for the period to enforce its determination (21 CJS, 9).
designated in their appointments, renewable for the same period. They may be
removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, only for neglect of duty or NOTE: It derived from the Latin words “juris” and “dico,” which literally means “I
malfeasance in office, or for mental or physical disability rendering them speak of the law.”
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. If a justice is temporarily
unable to perform the functions and duties of his office because of illness or other Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law
physical disability, the President may, upon recommendation of the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, detail a member of the civilian judiciary or appoint a member Only jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by substantive law.
of the Philippine Bar who possesses the qualifications mentioned in subparagraph Jurisdiction over the parties, issues and res is governed by procedural laws (Riano,
(f) of this section to fill the office for the period of the disability. The Presiding 2011).
Justice and associate justices of the court shall have the rank and receive the
emoluments, retirement and other benefits corresponding to those of the Presiding JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES
Justice and Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, respectively: Provided,
however, That retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are HOW JURISDICTION OVER THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT IS
appointed to the court may at their option, receive the emoluments and benefits ACQUIRED
corresponding to their former positions in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals
or their retirement pay: Provided, further, That members of the civilian judiciary Jurisdiction over the plaintiff and defendant
who are detailed to the court to fill any vacancy therein caused by the temporary

10
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
Acquired when the action 1. By his voluntary 1. In civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
is commenced by the filing appearance in court and over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are
of the complaint. This his submission to its included;
presupposes payment of authority
the docket fees. 2. By valid service of 2. In criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack
summons of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and
3. Other coercive process
3. Motions to quash a warrant of arrest.
upon him (arrest in
criminal cases)
The first 2 are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a
NOTE: Jurisdiction over waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
the defendant is not
essential in actions in rem The 3rd is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process
or quasi in rem as long as forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a
the court has jurisdiction motion to quash a warrant of arrest (Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No.158763, March 31,
over the res (Herrera, 2006).
2007)
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Voluntary appearance
MEANING OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Voluntary appearance is any appearance of the defendant in court, provided he
does not raise the question of lack of jurisdiction of the court (Flores v. Zurbito, 37 It is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
Phil. 746; Carballo v. Encarnacion, 92 Phil. 974). It is equivalent to service of proceedings in question belong (Herrera, 2007).
summons (Sec. 20, Rule 14).
It is the power or authority to hear and determine cases to which the proceeding
An appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of in question belongs (Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil 484).
the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person. It may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. If his GR: Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived, enlarged or diminished
motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over by stipulation of the parties (Republic v. Estipular, 336 SCRA 333).
his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court (Busuego v.
CA, No. L-48955, June 30, 1987; La Naval Drug Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 103200, XPN: Estoppel by laches by failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court for a
August 31, 1994). long period of time and by invoking its jurisdiction in obtaining affirmative relief
(Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968).
Filing of pleadings seeking affirmative reliefs constitutes voluntary
appearance Jurisdiction over the subject matter vs. Jurisdiction over the person

GR: Seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the Jurisdiction over the Jurisdiction over the
consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. subject matter person

XPNs: In the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the GR: Determined by the Acquired by the filing of
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings allegations of the the petition in case of the
are: complaint (Riano, 2011). plaintiff or by arrest (Rule

11
113), by valid service of et al., G.R. No. 115044, in the case is but an
XPN: Where the real summons or voluntary September 1, 1994). exercise of jurisdiction
issues are evident from submission to the court’s (Herrera v. Baretto, 25
the record of the case, authority in case of the Phil. 245; Palma v. Q&S,
jurisdiction over the defendant (Ibid.). Inc., G.R. No. L-20366,
subject matter cannot be May 16, 1966).
made to depend on how
the parties word or ERROR OF JURISDICTION AS DISTINGUISHED FROM ERROR OF
phrase their pleadings JUDGMENT
(Herrera, 2007), e.g. in
ejectment cases in which
ERROR OF ERROR OF JUDGMENT
the defendant averred the
JURISDICTION
defense of the existence
One where the court, officer One that the court may
of tenancy relationship
or quasi-judicial body acts commit in the exercise of
between the parties
without or in excess of jurisdiction; it includes
(Ibid.).
jurisdiction, or with grave errors of procedure or
abuse of discretion. mistakes in the court’s
NOTE: Tenancy
findings
relationship is not
presumed and it is not
Renders a judgment void or Does not make the court’s
enough that it is alleged.
at least voidable (Sec. decision void.
There must be evidence
1(a)&(b), Rule 16; Rule 65)
to prove that it exists and
that all its elements are
The only exception is when
established (Salmorin v.
the party raising the issue is
Zaldivar, G.R. No.
barred by estoppel.
169691, July 23, 2008).

Conferred by law which It is sometimes made to

There is an exercise of The court acted with
may be either the depend, indirectly at
jurisdiction in the absence jurisdiction but
Constitution or a statute least, on the party’s
of jurisdiction. An error of committed procedural
volition
jurisdiction is one where the errors in the appreciation
act complained of was of the facts or the law.
issued by the court without
JURISDICTION vs. THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION or in excess of jurisdiction, An error of judgment is
or with grave abuse of one which the court may
Jurisdiction Exercise of Jurisdiction discretion, which is commit in the exercise of
It is the authority to hear It is any act of the court tantamount to lack or in its jurisdiction. (First
and decide cases. It does pursuant to such excess of jurisdiction and Corporation V. Former
not depend upon the authority, which includes which error is correctible Sixth Division Of The
regularity of the exercise making decisions. If there only by the extraordinary Court Of Appeals, G.R.
of that power or upon the is jurisdiction over the writ of certiorari. (First No. 171989, July 4, 2007)
rightfulness of the person and subject Corporation V. Former Sixth
decision made (Lim, et al. matter, the resolution of Division Of The Court Of
v. Hon. Felipe Pacquing, all other questions arising

12
Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, NOTE: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
July 4, 2007 controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. For instance, in agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is
HOW JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED AND DETERMINED vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform; more specifically, in the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) (Spouses Jesus Fajardo and Emer
It is conferred by law, that is, BP 129, otherwise known as “Judiciary Fajardo v. Anita Flores, G.R. No. 167891, January 15, 2010).
Reorganization Act.” It does not depend on the objection or the acts or omissions
of the parties or anyone of them (Republic v. Sangalang, 159 SCRA 515; PNB v. Doctrine of Ancillary Jurisdiction
Florendo, 206 SCRA 582).
It involves the inherent or implied powers of the court to determine issues
Instances when jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be conferred incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

1. By the administrative policy of any court; NOTE: Under its ancillary jurisdiction, a court may determine all questions relative
2. A court’s unilateral assumption of jurisdiction; to the matters brought before it, regulate the manner in which a trial shall be
3. An erroneous belief by the court that it has jurisdiction; conducted, determine the hours at which the witnesses and lawyers may be heard,
4. By the parties through a stipulation,e.g. contract; and grant an injunction, attachment or garnishment.
5. The agreement of the parties acquired through, or waived, enlarged or
diminished by, any act or omission of the parties; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
6. Parties’ silence, acquiescence or consent (Riano, 2011).
It states that recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such
Determination of jurisdiction over the subject matter administrative remedies have first been exhausted. The non-observance of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action
It is determined by the allegations of the complaint (Baltazar v. Ombudsman, 510 (National Electrification Administration v. Val L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March
SCRA 74) regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to his claims asserted 9, 2010).
therein (Gocotano v. Gocotano, 469 SCRA 328).
NOTE: The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies and doctrine of primary
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION jurisdiction applies only when the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function (Associate Communications and Wireless Services v.
The court cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is Dumalao, G.R. No. 136762, November21, 2002).
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion Rationale of Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining technical and
intricate matters of fact. (Vincent E. Omictin v. Hon. Court Of Appeals (Special The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out
Twelfth Division) And George I. Lagos, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007). their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence (Caballes v. PerezSison, G.R. No. 131759, March 23,
Objective of Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction 2004). The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also
The objective is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some redress has been completed (Universal Robina Corporation v. Laguna Lake
question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the Authority, G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011).
court (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development, G.R. Nos.
197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013, citing Fabia v. CA, 437 Phil. 389). Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

13
1. When respondent official acted in utter disregard of due process; 1. Where a subsequent statute expressly prohibits the continued exercise
2. When the questions involved are purely judicial or a legal one; of jurisdiction;
3. When the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without 2. Where the law penalizing an act which is punishable is repealed by a
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; subsequent law;
4. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; 3. When accused is deprived of his constitutional right such as where the
5. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage; court fails to provide counsel for the accused who is unable to obtain one and does
6. When the respondent is a Department Secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of not intelligently waive his constitutional right;
the President bears the implied or assumed approval of the latter unless actually 4. Where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that
disapproved by him; it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment;
7. When to require administrative remedies would be unreasonable; 5. When the proceedings in the court acquiring jurisdiction is terminated,
8. When the insistence in its observance would result in the nullification of the abandoned or declared void;
claim being asserted; 6. Once appeal has been perfected; and
9. When the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; 7. Curative statutes (Herrera, 2007).
10. When it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
11. Where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is finally resolved or
(Paat v. CA, G.R. No. 111107, January 10, 1997); adjudicated does not apply when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character
12. Exhaustion of administrative remedies may also be considered waived if there (Gabriel Abad Et. Al. V. Rtc, G.R. No. L-65505, October 12, 1987).
is a failure to assert it for an unreasonable length of time (Rep. v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996); Effect of retroactivity of laws on jurisdiction
13. A civil action for damages may, however, proceed notwithstanding the
pendency of an administrative action (Escuerte v. CA, G.R. No. L-53485, February Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that
6, 1991); the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines
14. When the claim involved is small; jurisdiction (Herrera, 2007).
15. When strong public interest is involved; and
16. In quo warranto proceedings (Castro v. Gloria, G.R. No. 132174, August 20, OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
2001).
GR: The prevailing rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
Effect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies raised at any stage of the proceedings and even for the first time on appeal (Riano,
2011).
The ground should not be lack of jurisdiction but lack of cause of action as it renders
the action premature (Carale v. Abarintos, G.R. No. 120704, March 3, 1997; XPNs:
Pestanas v. Dyogi, 81 SCRA 574).
1. Estoppel by laches. SC barred a belated objection to jurisdiction that
DOCTRINE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION (CONTINUITY OF JURISDICTION) was raised only after an adverse decision was rendered by the court against the
party raising the issue of jurisdiction and after seeking affirmative relief from the
GR: Jurisdiction, once attached, cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or court and after participating in all stages of the proceedings (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
events although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968).
attaching in the first instance, and the court retains jurisdiction until it finally
disposes of the case. 2. Public policy – One cannot question the jurisdiction which he invoked,
not because the decision is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but because it
XPNs: cannot be tolerated by reason of public policy (Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v.
Dumlao, G.R. No. L44888, February 7, 1992).

14
3. A party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative The ruling in Tijam that a party is estopped from questioning the
relief against his opponents cannot repudiate or question the same after failing to jurisdiction applies only to exceptional circumstances. What is still controlling is
obtain such relief (Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L48907& 49035, January 19, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may
1982). not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties (Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R.
No. L-34362, November 19, 1982).
NOTE: Under the Omnibus Motion Rule, a motion attacking a pleading like a motion
to dismiss shall include all grounds then available and all objections not so included JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES
shall be deemed waived (Sec. 8, Rule 115). Even in the absence of lack of
jurisdiction raised in a motion to dismiss, a party may, when he files an answer, The power of the court to try and decide issues raised in the pleadings of
still raise the lack of jurisdiction as an affirmative defense because such defense is the parties (Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil 484) or by their agreement in a pre-trial order
not barred under the omnibus motion rule. or those tried by the implied consent of the parties (Sec. 5, Rule 10).

How jurisdiction is conferred and determined It may also be conferred by waiver or failure to object to the presentation
of evidence on a matter not raised in the pleadings. The issues tried shall be treated
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject in all respect as if they had been raised in the pleadings (Sec. 5, Rule 10).
matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or Jurisdiction over the issues of the case is determined and conferred by the
some of the claims asserted therein (Fe V. Rapsing, Et Al. v. Hon. Judge Maximino pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order
R. Ables, Et Al., G.R. No. 171855, October 15, 2012). or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to
object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec.
Effect of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court (Chester De Joya v. Judge Placido C. Marquez et
al. G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006).
When it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the claim (Sec. JURISDICTION OVER THE RES OR PROPERTY IN LITIGATION
1, Rule 9).
How jurisdiction over the res is acquired
There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the
proceedings, of a possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to It is acquired either by:
raise said objection, but failed to do so, even on appeal (Delfin Lamsis v. Dong-E,
G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010). 1. The seizure of the property under legal process;
2. As a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court
EFFECT OF ESTOPPEL ON OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION is recognized and made effective (Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 291);

The active participation of a party in a case and seeking of affirmative 3. The court by placing the property of thing under its custody (custodia legis).
reliefs is tantamount to recognition of that court’s jurisdiction and will bar a party Example: attachment of property;
from impugning the court’s jurisdiction. This only applies to exceptional
circumstances (Francel Realty Corp. v. Sycip, 469 SCRA 424; Concepcion v. 4. The court through statutory authority conferring upon it the power to deal with
Regalado, G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007). the property or thing within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Example: Suits
involving the status of the parties or suits involving the property in the Philippines
The Doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on estoppel by laches is NOT the of nonresident defendants (Riano, 2011).
general rule

15
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES
NOTE: Where no employer-
HOW JURISDICTION OVER THE PLAINTIFF IS ACQUIRED employee relationship exists
between the parties and no issue
HOW JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED involved may be resolved by
reference to the Labor Code, other
labor statutes or any collective
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either
bargaining agreement, it is the
by service of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and
regular courts that has jurisdiction
submission to its authority (Optima Realty Corporation V. Hertz Phil. Exclusive
(Jaguar Security Investigation
Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035, January 9, 2013). Agency v. Sales, G.R. No. 162420,
April 22, 2008)
JURISDICTION OF COURTS 4. Forcible entry and unlawful The MTC has exclusive original
1. Boundary dispute between RTCs are courts of general detainer jurisdiction.
municipalities jurisdiction.
NOTE: In such cases, when the
NOTE: Since there is no legal defendant raises the question of
provision specifically governing ownership in his pleadings and the
jurisdiction over boundary disputes question of possession cannot be
between a municipality and an resolved without deciding the
independent component city of the question of ownership, the issue of
same province, it follows that RTCs ownership shall be resolved only to
have the power and authority to determine the issue of possession.
hear and determine such All ejectment cases are covered by
controversy (Municipality of the Rule on Summary Procedure
Kananga v. Madrona, G.R. No. and are within the jurisdiction of
141375, April 30, 2003). the MTCs regardless of whether
2. Expropriation It is within the jurisdiction of the they involve questions of
RTC because it is incapable of ownership. The courts in ejectment
pecuniary estimation. It does not cases may determine questions of
involve the recovery of sum of ownership whenever necessary to
money. Rather, it deals with the decide the question of possession
exercise by the government of its (Gayoso v. Twenty-Two Realty
authority and right to take property Development Corp., G.R. No.
for public use 147874, July 17, 2006; Santiago v.
3. Labor dispute An action for damages for abuse of Pilar Development Corp., G.R. No.
right as an incident to dismissal is 153628, July 20, 2006).
within the exclusive jurisdiction of 5. Authority to conduct It is entrusted to the Secretary of
the labor arbiter. But the labor administrative investigations Local Government and concurrent
arbiter has no jurisdiction for claims over local elective officials with the Ombudsman upon
of damages based on quasi-delict enactment of RA 6770. There is
which has no reasonable nothing in the Local Government
connection with the employer- Code of 1991 to indicate that it has
employee relations claims under repealed, whether expressly or
the Labor Code (Ocheda v. CA, G.R. impliedly, the pertinent provisions
No. 85517, October 16, 1992). of the Ombudsman Act (Hagad v.

16
Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, 1. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
December 12, 1995). agreement, or law;
6. Appeals involving orders It may be appealed to the SC by
arising from administrative filing a petition for certiorari within 2. Cases involving the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential
disciplinary cases originating 10 days from receipt of the written decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations;
from the Office of the notice of the order, directive or
Ombudsman decision or denial of the motion for 3. A case where the required number of vote in a division is not obtained;
reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Sec.
4. A doctrine or principle laid down in a decision rendered en banc or by division is
27, RA 6770).
modified, or reversed;
7. Public school teachers Generally, the Ombudsman must
yield to the Division School
Superintendent in the investigation 5. All other cases required to be heard en banc under the Rules of Court (Sec. 5,
of administrative charges against Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
public school teachers
(Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No. Constitutional Basis of the RoC [Article VII Section 5 (5), 1987 Consti]
167711, October 10, 2008).
8. Enforcement of a money COA has the primary jurisdiction to  Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
claim against a local pass upon the money claim. It is constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
government uni within the COA's domain to pass admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
upon money claims against the to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
government or any subdivision inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
thereof as provided for under Sec.
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
26 of the Government Auditing
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
Code of the Philippines. Courts may
raise the issue of primary quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
jurisdiction sua sponte (on its own Supreme Court.
will or motion; means to act
spontaneously without prompting Powers of the SC [Section 5 Article VII, 1987 Consti]
from another party) and its
invocation cannot be waived by the Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
failure of the parties to argue it as
the doctrine exists for the proper Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
distribution of power between ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
judicial and administrative bodies quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
and not for the convenience of the
parties (Euro-Med Laboratories,
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas,
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006).

SUPREME COURT All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
Cases to be decided by SC En Banc ordinance, or regulation is in question.

All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.

17
a. CA; perpetua, life
All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. b. CTA en banc (Sec. imprisonment or a
11 R.A.9282) (2006 lesser penalty, the
All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. Bar); judgment may be
c. SB; appealed to the SC by
All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. d. RTC, in cases notice of appeal filed
involving: with the CA (A.M. No.
i. If no question of 00-5-03-SC,
Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
fact is involved and the September 28, 2004);
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the
case involves:
consent of the judge concerned. a) Constitutionality 2. Automatic review
or validity of treaty, for cases of death
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. international or penalty rendered by
executive agreement, the CA (A.M. No. 00-5-
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional law, presidential 03-SC, September 84,
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice decree, proclamation, 2004);
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules order, instruction,
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of ordinance or NOTE: Where the
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, regulation; b) Legality judgment also
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and of tax, impost, imposes a lesser
assessments, or toll, penalty for offenses
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
or penalty in relation committed on the
Court.
thereto; c) Cases in same occasion or
which jurisdiction of which arose out of the
Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil lower court is in issue; same occurrence that
Service Law. gave rise to the more
ii. All cases in which severe offense for
only errors or which the penalty of
CIVIL CASES CRIMINAL CASE questions of law are death is imposed, and
Exclusive Original Petitions for issuance Petitions for issuance involved; the accused appeals,
of writs of certiorari, of writs of certiorari, the automatic review
prohibition and prohibition and 2. Special civil action from the CA to the SC
mandamus against the mandamus against the of certiorari – filed shall include such
following: following: within 30 days against lesser offense (A.M.
the COMELEC/COA. No. 00-5-03-SC,
1. CA; 1. CA; September 28, 2004)
2. Court of Tax 2. Sandiganbayan
Appeals; 3.Petition for review
3. Commission on on certiorari (Rule 45)
Elections En Banc; from the SB if penalty
4. Commission on is less than death, life
Audit; imprisonment or
5. reclusion perpetua in
Sandiganbayan. criminal cases, and, in
Apellate 1. Petitions for review 1. In cases where the civil cases (A.M. No.
on certiorari against: CA imposes reclusion

18
005-03-SC, October appealable to the
12, 2004); Supreme Court (Sec.
14 R.A. 6770) (2006
3. Petition for review Bar)
on certiorari (Rule 45)
from the SB if penalty 7. Automatic review
is less than death, life whenever the
imprisonment or Sandiganbayan, in the
reclusion perpetua in exercise of its
criminal cases, and, in appellate jurisdiction,
civil cases (A.M. No. finds that the penalty
005-03-SC, October of death, reclusion
12, 2004); perpetua or life
imprisonment should
4. Notice of appeal be imposed (A.M. No.
from the 00-5-03-SC, October
Sandiganbayan if it 12, 2004);
imposes life
imprisonment or 8. Appeals from RTC in
reclusion perpetua or which only errors or
where a lesser penalty questions of law are
is imposed involving involved.
offenses committed on CONCURRENT
the same occasion or With CA 1. Petitions for Petitions for issuance
which arose out of the issuance of writs of of writs of certiorari,
same occurrence that certiorari, prohibition prohibition and
gave rise to the more and mandamus mandamus against the
serious offense for against the following: RTC and lower courts.
which the penalty of
death, reclusion a. NLRC under the
perpetua of life Labor Code;
imprisonment is
imposed (A.M. No. 00-
5-03-SC, October 12,
2004); NOTE: The petitions
must first be filed with
5. Automatic review of the CA, otherwise,
death penalty imposed they shall be
by the Sandiganbayan dismissed (St. Martin
in the exercise of its Funeral Homes v. CA,
original jurisdiction G.R. No. 130866,
(A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, September 16, 1998).
October 12, 2004);
b. Civil Service
6. Criminal case from Commission;
the Ombudsman are

19
c. Quasi-judicial BATAS PAMBANSA Blg. 129
agencies (file with the
CA first); AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
d. RTC and lower
courts; PRELIMINARY CHAPTER
2. Petitions for
Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
issuance of writ of
1980."
Kalikasan (Sec. 3,
Rule 7, A.M. No. 09-6-
8-SC). Section 2. Scope. – The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of
With CA and RTC 1. Petitions for habeas Petitions for issuance Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
corpus and quo of writs of certiorari, Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
warranto; and prohibition and Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.
mandamus against the
2. Petitions for lower courts or bodies. CHAPTER I
issuance of writs of COURT OF APPEALS
certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus Section 3. Organization. – There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which
against the lower consists of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justice who shall be appointed by
courts or other bodies
the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his
With CA, SB and RTC 1. Petitions for the Petitions for the
appointment, and the Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the
issuance of writ of issuance of writ of
amparo; amparo and writ of dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more
habeas data of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their
2. Petition for writ of appointments were issued by the President. Any member who is reappointed to
habeas data, where the Court after rendering service in any other position in the government shall
the action involves retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and
public data or his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as
government office. continuous and uninterrupted. (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33,, July 28, 1986.)

With RTC With SB Actions affecting Petitions for Section 4. Exercise of powers and functions. – The Court Appeals shall exercise its
ambassadors and mandamus, powers, functions, and duties, through seventeen (17) divisions, each composed
other public ministers prohibition, certiorari, of three (3) members. The Court may sit en banc only for the purpose of exercising
and consuls. injunctions and administrative, ceremonial, or other non-adjudicatory functions. (as amended by
ancillary writs in aid of
Exec. Order No. 33,.)
its appellate
jurisdiction including
quo warranto arising Section 5. Succession to Office of Presiding Justice. – In case of a vacancy in the
or that may arise in absence of inability to perform the powers, functions, and duties of his office, the
cases filed under EOs. associate Justice who is first in precedence shall perform his powers, functions, and
1, 2, 14 and 14-A duties until such disability is removed, or another Presiding Justice is appointed
and has qualified.
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980

20
Section 6. Who presides over session of a division. – If the Presiding Justice is
present in any session of a division of the Court, he shall preside. In his absence, Section 11. Quorum – A majority of the actual members of the Court shall
the Associate Justice attending such session who has precedence shall preside. constitute a quorum for its session en banc. Three members shall constitute a
quorum for the session of a division. The unanimous vote of the three members of
Section 7. Qualifications. – The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justice shall a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision of final resolution,
have the same qualifications as those provided in Constitution for Justice of the which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of the opinion by any
Supreme Court. members of the division. In the event that the three members do not reach a
unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall request the Raffle Committee of the
Section 8. Grouping of Divisions. – (Expressly repealed by Section 4, Exec. Order Court for the designation of two additional Justice to sit temporarily with them,
No. 33, July 28, 1986.) forming a special division of five members and the concurrence of a majority of
such division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or final
Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise: resolution. The designation of such additional Justice shall be made strictly by
raffle.
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid A month for reconsideration of its decision or final resolution shall be resolved by
of its appellate jurisdiction; the Court within ninety (90) days from the time it is submitted for resolution, and
no second motion for reconsideration from the same party shall be entertainment.
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33, July 28, 1986.)
Regional Trial Courts; and
Section 12. Internal Rules. – The court en banc is authorized to promulgate rules
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or or orders governing the constitution of the divisions and the assignment of
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, Appellate Justices thereto, the distribution of cases, and other matters pertaining
boards or commission, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the to the operations of the Court of its divisions. Copies of such rules and orders shall
Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the be furnished by the Supreme Court, which rules and orders shall be effective fifteen
Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of (15) days after receipt thereof, unless directed otherwise by the Supreme Court.
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this CHAPTER II
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby created thirteen
The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, (13) Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions:
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the The First Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte,
power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and must be Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mountain Province, and Pangasinan, and cities of Baguio,
completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. (as Dagupan, Laog and San Carlos;
amended by R.A. No. 7902.)
The Second Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Batanes, Cagayan,
Section 10. Place of holding sessions. – The Court of Appeals shall have its Ifugao, KalingaApayao, Nueva Viscaya, and Quirino;
permanent station in the City of Manila. Whenever demanded by public interest,
the Supreme Court, upon its own initiative or upon recommendation of the The Third Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan (except
Presiding Justice, may authorize a division of the Court to hold sessions outside the municipality of valenzuela), Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales, and
Manila, periodically, or for such periods and at such places as the Supreme Court the cities of Angeles, Cabanatuan, Olongapo, Palayan and San Jose;
may determine, for the purpose of hearing and deciding cases.

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The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, administrative field organization of the various departments and agencies of the
Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, government, the composition of the judicial regions herein constituted shall be
San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, deemed modified accordingly.
Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela;
Section 14. Regional Trial Courts.
The Fourth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna,
Marinduque, Mindoro Occidental, Mindoro Oriental, Palawan, Quezon, Rizal (except (a) Fifty-seven Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the First Judicial
the cities and municipalities embraced within the National Capital Judicial Region0, Region. There shall be.
Romblon, and Aurora, and the cities of Batangas, Cavite, Lipa, Lucena, Puerto
Princessa, San Pablo, Tagaytay, and Trece Martires; Two branches (Branches III ans II) for the province of Abra, with seats at Bangued;

The Fifth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Sur, Eight branches (Branches III to X) for the province of Benguet and the city of
Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon, and the cities of Legaspi, Baguio, Branches III to VII with seats at Baguio City, and Branches VIII to X at La
Naga and Iriga; Trinidad;

The Sixth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Nine branches (Branches XI to XIX) for the province of Ilocos Norte and the city of
Iloilo, La Calota, Roxas, San Carlos, and Silay, and the subprovince of Guimaras; Laoag, Branches XI to XVI with seats at Laoag City, Branches XVII and XVIII at
Batac, and Branch XIX at Bangui;
The Seventh Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Negros
Oriental, and Siquijor, and the cities of Bais, Canlaon, Cebu, Danao, Dumaguete, Six branches (Braches XX to XXV) for the province of Ilocos Sur, Branches XX and
Lapu-lapu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran, and Toledo, XXI with seats at Vigan, Branch XXII at Narvacan, Branch XXIII at Candon, Branch
XXIV at Cabugao, and Branch XXV at Tagudin;
The Eighth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces or Eastern Samar, Leyte,
Northern, Samar, Southern Leyte, Ormoc, and Tacloban: Nine branches (Branches XXVI to XXXIV) for the province of La Union, Branches
XXVI to XXX with seats at San Fernando, Branches XXXI and XXXII at Agoo, Branch
The Ninth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, XXXIII at Bauang, and Branch XXXIV at Balaoan;
Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Dapitan, Dipolog, Pagadian, and Zamboanga;
Two branches (Branches XXXV and XXXVI) for the province of Mountain province,
The Tenth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan with seats at Bontoc; and
del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Occidental, Misamis Oriental, and Surigao
del Norte, and the cities of Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Gingoog, Ozamis, Oroquieta, Twenty-one branches (Branches XXXVII to LVII) for the province of Pangasinan
Surigao, and Tangub; and the citie sof dagupan and san Carlos, Branches XXXVII to XXXIX with seats at
Lingayen, Branches XL to XLIV at dagupan, Branches XLV to XLIX at Urdaneta,
The Eleventh Judicial Region, consistingnof the provinces of Davao del Norte, Branch L at Villasis, Branches LI and LII at Tayug, Branch LIII at Rosalaes,
Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Surigao del Sur, and the cities Branches LIV and LV at Alaminos, and Branch LVI and LVII at san Carlos.
of Davao, and General Santos; and
(b) Thirty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Second Judicial
The Twelfth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao region. There shall be:
del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of
Cotabato, Iligan, and Marawi. Twelve branches (Branches I to XII) for the province of Cagayan, Branches I to V
with seats at Tuguegarao, Branches VI to X at Aparri, Branch XI at Tuao, and
In case of transfer or redistribution of the provinces, subprovinces, cities or Branch XII at Sanchez Mira;
municipalities comprising the regions established by law of purposes of the

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One branch (Branch XIII) for the province of Batanes, with seat at Basco; Seven branches (Branches LXIX to LXXV) for the province of Zambales and the city
of Olongapo, Branches LXIX to LXXI with seats at Iba and Branches LXXII to LXXV
Two branches (Branches XIV and XV) for the province of Ifugao, Branch XIV with at Olongapo City
seat at Lagawe, and Branch XV at Potia;
(d) One hundred seventy-two (172) Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned
Nine branches (Branches XVI to XXIV) for the province of Isabela, Branches XVI to for the National Capital Judicial Region. There shall be:
XVIII with seats at Ilagan, Branches XIX and XX at cauayan, Branch XXI at
Santiago, Branch XXII at Cabagan, Branch XXIII at Roxas, and Branch XXIV at Fifty-five branches (Branches 1 to 55) for the City of Manila, wit seats thereat;
Echague;
Thirty-two branches (Branches 76 to 107) for Quezon City, with seats thereat;
Two branches (Branches XXV and XXVI) for the province of kalinga-Apayao, Branch
XXV with seat at Tabuk, and Branch XXVI at Luna; Twelve branches (Branches 108 to 119) for Pasay City, with seats thereat;

Four branches (Branches XXVII to XXX) for the province of Nueva Vizcaya, Twelve branches (Branches 120 to 131) for Caloocan City, with seats thereat;
Branches XXVII to XXIX with seats at Bayombong, and Branch XXX at Bambang;
Fifty-eight branches (Branches 56 to 74 and 132 to 170) for the Municipalities of
Two branches (Branches XXXI and XXXII) for the province of Quirino, with seats Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Madaluyong, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig,
at Cabarroguis. Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, and Muntinlupa; Branches 67 to 71 and 151 to
168 at Pasig; and Branches 72 to 74, 169 and 170 at Malabon; and
(c) Seventy-five Regional Trial judges shall be commissioned for the Third Judicial
Region. There shall be: Three branches (Branches 75, 171 and 172) for the municipality of Valenzuela,
with seats thereat. (As amended by EO No. 33, July 30, 1986.)
Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Bataan, Branches I to III with
seats at Balanga, Branch IV at Mariveles, and Branch V at Dinalupihan; (e) Eihty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Fourth Judicial
Region. There shall be:
Seventeen branches (Branches VI to XXII) for the province of Bulacan (except the
municipality of Valuenzuela), with seats at Malolos; Fourteen branches (Branches I to XIV) for the province of Batangas and the cities
of Lipa and Batangas, Branches I to VI with seats at Batangas City, Branch V at
Eighteen branches (Branches XXIII to XL) for the province of Nueva Ecija and the Lemery, Branches VI to VIII at Tanuan, Branches IX to XI at Balayan, Branches
cities of Cabanatuan, San Jose and Palayan, Branches XXIII to XXX with seats at XII and XIII at Lipa, and Branch XIV at Nasugbu;
Cabanatuan City, Branches XXXI to XXXIII at Guimba, Branches XXXIV to XXXVI
at Gapan, Branch XXXVII at Sto. Domingo, Branches XXXVIII and XXXIX at San Nine branches (Branches XV to XXIII) for the province of Cavite and the cities of
Jose, and Branch XL at Palayan. Cavite, Tagaytay and Trece Matires, Branch XV with seat at Naic, Branches XVII at
Cavite City, Branch XVIII at Tagayatay City, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Branches XX to
Twenty-two branches (Branches XLI to LXII) for the province of Pampanga and the XXII at Imus, and Branch XXIII at Trece Martires;
city of Angeles, Branches XLI to XLVIII with seats at San Fernando, Branches XLIX
to LIII at Guagua, Branches LIV and LV at Macabebe, and Branches LVI to LXII at Fourteen branches (Branches XXIV to XXXVII) for the province of Laguna and the
Angeles City; city of San Pablo, Branches XXVIII at Sta. Cruz, Branches XXIX to XXXII at San
Pable City, Branch XXXIII at Siniloan, and Branches XXXIV to XXXVI at Calamba;
Six branches (Branches LXIII to LXVIII) for the province of Tarlac, Branches LXVI
at Capas, Branch LXVII at Paniqui, and Branch LXVIII at Camiling; and One branch (Branch XXXVIII) for the province of Marinduque, with seat at Boac;

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Five branches (Branches XXXIX to XLIII) for the province of Mindoro Oriental, Seven branches (Branches XLIV to L) for the province of Masbate, Branches XLIV
Branches XXXIX to XL with seats at Calapan, Branches XLI and XLII at to XLVIII with seats at Masbate, Branch XLIX at Cataingan, and Branch L at San
Pinamalayan, and Branch XLII at Roxas; Jacinto; and

Three branches (Branches XLVII to XLVI) for the province of Mindoro Occidental, Five branches (Branches LI to LV) for the province of Sorsogon, Branches LI to LIII
Branch XLIV with seat at Mamburao, and Branches XLV and XLVI at San Jose; with seats at Sorsogon, Branch LVI at Gubat, and Branch LV at Irosin.

Six branches (Branches XLVII to LII) for the province of Palawan and the city of (g) Sixty-three Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Sixth Judicial
Puerto Princesa, with seats at Puerto Princesa City; Region. There shall be:

Thirteen branches (Branches LIII to LXV) for the province of Quezon and the city Nine branches (Branches I to IX) for the province of Aklan, with seats at Kalibo;
of Lucena, Branches LIII to LX with seats at Lucena City, Branches LXI and LXII at
Gumaca, Branch LXIII at Calauag, Branch LXIV at Mauban, Branch LXV at Infanta; Four branches (Branches X to XIII) for the province of Antique, Branches X to XII
with seats at San Jose, and Branch XIII and Culasi;
One branchj(Branch LXVI) for the province of Aurora, with seat at Baler;
Eighr branches (Branches XIV to XXI) for the province of Capiz and the city of
Fourteen branches (Branches LXVII to LXXX) for the province of Rizal except the Roxas, Branches XIV to XIX with seats at Roxas City and Branches XX and XXI at
cities and municipalities embraced within the National Capital Judicial Region, Mambusao;
Branches LXVII to LXX with seats at Binangonan, Branches LXXI to LXXIV at
Antipolo, Branches LXXV to LXXVII at San Mateo, and Branches LXXVIII to LXXX Eighteen branches (Branches XXII to XXXIX) for the province of Iloilo, the
at Morong; and subprovince of Guimaras, and the city of Iloilo, with seats at Iloilo City; and

Two branches (Branches LXXXI and LXXXII) for the province of Romblon, Branch Twenty-four branches (Branches XL to LXIII) for the province of Negros Occidental,
LXXXI with seat at Romblon, and Branch LXXXII at Odiongan. and the cities of Bacolod,Bago, Cadiz, La Carlota, San Carlos and Silay, Branch XL
with seat at Silay City, Branches XLI to LIV at Bacolod City, Branches LV and LVI
(f) Fifty-five Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Fifth Judicial at Himamaylan, Branches LVII to LIX at Kabankalan, Branch LXII at Bago City, and
Region. There shall be: Branch LXII at La Carlota City.

Eighteen branches (Branches I to XVIII) for the province of Albay and the city of (h) Forty-six Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Seventh Judicial
Legaspi, Branches I to X with seats at Legaspi City, Branches XI to XIV at Ligao, Region. There shall be:
and Branches XV to XVIII at Tabaco;
Four branches (Branches I to IV) for the province of Bohol and the city of
Nineteen branches (Branches XIX to XXXVII) for the province of Camarines Sur Tagbilaran, with seats at Tagbilaran City;
and the cities of Naga and Iriga, Branches XIX to XXVIII with seats at Naga City,
Branch XXIX at Libmanan, Branch XXX at Tigaon, Braches XXXI to XXXIII at Pili, Twenty-five branches (Branches V to XXIX) for the province of Cebu and the cities
and Branches XXXIV to XXXVII at Iriga City; of Cebu, Danao, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue and Toledo, Branches V to XXIV with seats
at Cebu City, Branch XXV at Danao City, Branch XXVI at Argao, Branch XXVII at
Four branches (Branches XXXVIII to XLII) for the province of Camarines Norte, Lapu-Lapu City, Branch XXVIII at Mandaue City, and Branch XXIX at Toledo City;
with seat at Daet;
Sixteen branches (Branches XXX to XLV) for the province of Negros Oriental and
Two branches (Branches XLII and XLII) for the province of Catanduanes, with seats the cities of Dumaguete, Bais and Canlaon, Branches XXX to XLIV with seats at
at Virac; Dumaguete City, and Branch XLV at Bais City; and

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One branch (Branch XLVI) for the province of Siquijor, with seat at Larena. Zamboanga City, Branches, XVIII to XXII at Pagadian City, Branch XXIII at Molave,
and Branch XXIV at Ipil.
(i) Thirty-three Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Eighth Judicial
Region. There shall be: (k) Thirty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Tenth Judicial
Region. There shall be:
Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Eastern Samar, Branches I and
II with seats at Borongan, Branch III at Guiuan, Branch IV at Dolores, and Branch Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Agusan del Norte and the city
V at Oras; of Butuan, with seats at Butuan City;

Thirteen branches (Branches VI to XVIII) for the province of Leyte, the sub- Two branches (Branches VI and VII) for the province of Agusan del Sur, Branches
province of Biliran, and the cities of Ormoc and Tacloban, Branches VI and IX with VI with seat at Prosperidad and Branch VII with seat at Bayugan;
seats at Tacloban City, Branch X at Abuyog, Branch XI at Calubian, Branch XII at
Ormoc City, Branch XIII at Carigara, Branch XIV at Baybay, Branch XV at Burauen, Four branches (Branches VIII to XI) for the province of Bukidnon, Branches VIII to
Branch XVI at Naval, Branch XVII at Palompon, and Branch XVIII at Hilongos; X with seats at Malaybalay and Branch XI at Manalo Fortich;

Five branches (Branches XIX to XXIII) for the province of Northern Samar, Five branches (Branches XII to XI) for the province of Misamis Occidental and the
Branches XIX and XX with seats at Catarman, Branches XXI and XXII at Laoang, cities of Oroquieta, Ozamis, and Tangub, Branches XII to XIV with seats at
and Branch XXIII at Allen; Oroquieta City, Branch XV at Ozamis City, and Branch XVI at Tangub City;

Three branches (Branches XXIV to XXVI) for the province of Southern Leyte, Eleven branches (Branches XVII to XXVII) for the province of Misamis Oriental and
Branches XXIV and XXV with seats at Maasin, and Branch XXVI at San Juan; and the cities of Cagayan de Oro and Gingoog, Branches XVII to XXV with seats at
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXVI at Medina, and Branch XXVII at Gingoog City;
Seven branches (Branches XXVII to XXXIII) for the province of Samar and the city
of Calbayog, Branches XXVII to XXIX with seats at Catbalogan, Branch XXX at One branch (Branch XXVIII) for the province of Camiguin, with seat at Mambajao;
Basey, Branches XXXI and XXXII at Calbayog City, and Branch XXXIII at Calbiga. and

(j) Twenty-four Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Ninth Judicial Four branches (Branches XXIX to XXXII) for the province of Surigao del Norte and
Region. There shall be: the City of Surigao, Branches XXIX and XXX with seats at Surigao City, Branch
XXXI at Dapa, and Branch XXXII at Dinagat, Dinagat Island.
Two branches (Branches I and II) for the province of Basilan, with seats at Isabela;
(l) Twenty-nine Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Eleventh
Two branches (Branches III and IV) for the province of Sulu, Branch III with seat Judicial Region. There shall be
at Jolo, and Branch IV at Parang;
Four branches (Branches I to IV) for the province of Davao del Norte, Branches I
One branch (Branch V) for the province of Tawi-Tawi, with seat at Bongao; and II with seats at Tagum, Branch III at Nabunturan, and Branch IV at Panabo;

Six branches (Branches VI to XI) for the province of Zamboanga del Norte, and the Three branches (Branches V to VII) for the province of Davao Oriental, Branches
cities of Dipolog and Dapitan, Branches VI to X seats at Dipolog City, and Branch V and VI with seats at Mati and Branch VII at Banganga;
XI at Sindangan; and
Fourteen branches (Branches VIII to XXI) for the province of Davao del Sur and
Thirteen branches (Branches XII to XXIV) for the province of Zamboanga del Sur the city of Davao, Branches VIII to XVII with seats at Davao City, Branches XVIII
and the cities of Pagadian and Zamboanga Branches XII to XVII with seats at and XIX at Digos, Branch XX at Malinta, and Branch XXI a Bansalan;

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Five Branches (Branches XXII to XXVI) for the province of South Cotabato and the Section 17. Appointment and assignment of Regional Trial Judges. – Every Regional
city of General Santos, Branches XXII and XXIII with seats at General Santos City, Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station,
Branches XXIV and XXV at Koronadal, and Branch XXVI at Surallah; and and his appointment shall state the branch of the court and the seat thereof to
which he shall be originally assigned. However, the Supreme Court may assign
Three branches (Branches XXVII to XXIX) for the province of Surigao del Sur, temporarily a Regional Trial Judge to another region as public interest may require,
Branch XXVII with seat at Tandag, Branch XXVIII at Lianga, and Branch XXIX at provided that such temporary assignment shall not last longer than six (6) months
Bislig. without the consent of the Regional Trial Judge concerned.

(m) Twenty Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Twelfth Judicial A Regional Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or
Region. There shall be: city or municipality within the same region as public interest may require, and such
assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station within the
Seven branches (Branches I to VII) for the province of Lanao del Norte and the meaning of this section.
city of Iligan, Branches I to VI with seats at Iligan City, and Branch VII at Tubod;
Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The
Five branches (Branches VIII to XII) for the province of Lanao del Sur and the city Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial
of Marawi, Branches VIII to X with seats at Marawi City, and Branches XI and XII Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be
at Malabang; the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue
of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining
Three branches (Branches XIII to XV) for the province of Maguindanao and the city the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
of Cotabato, Branches XIII and XIV with seats at Cotabato City, and Branch XV at Courts over the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein
Maganoy; granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to
the people of the different parts of the region and making the attendance of
Three branches (Branches XVI to XVIII) for the province of North Cotabato, Branch litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible.
XVI with seat at Kabacan, Branch XVII at Kidapawan, and Branch XVIII at
Missayap; and Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
Two branches (Branches XIX and XX) for the province of Sultan Kudarat, Branch
XIX, with seat at Isulan, and Branch XX at Tacurong. (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
Section 15. Qualifications. – No persons shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
age, and for at least ten years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Philippines or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
practice of law as an indispensable requisite. such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
Section 16. Time and duration of sessions. – The time and duration of daily sessions which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
of the Regional Trial Courts shall be determined by the Supreme Court: Provided, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
however, That all motions, except those requiring immediate action, shall be heard
in the afternoon of every Friday, unless it falls on a holiday, in which case, the (3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim
hearing shall be held on the afternoon of the next succeeding business day: exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where
Provided, further, That the Supreme Court may, for good reasons, fix a different such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
motion day in specified areas

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(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima
matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a
pesos (200,000.00); reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations; Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme Court may
designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land
or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; agencies, and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in
the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional Trial Court takes
Relations as now provided by law; and cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases and/or agrarian cases, the
special rules of procedure applicable under present laws to such cases shall
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of continue to be applied, unless subsequently amended by law or by rules of court
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the promulgated by the Supreme Court.
property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in
such other abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos CHAPTER III METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND
(200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*) MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise Section 25. Establishment of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. – There shall be created a Metropolitan Trial Court in
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the each metropolitan area established by law, a Municipal Trial Court in each of the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter other cities or municipalities, and a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each circuit
be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. comprising such cities and/or municipalities as are grouped together pursuant to
law.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise original jurisdiction: Section 26. Qualifications. – No person shall be appointed judge of a Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court unless he is a
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least
habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective five years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has held
regions; and a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite.
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.
Section 27. Metropolitan Trial Courts of the National Capital Region. – There shall
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate be a Metropolitan Trial Court in the National Capital Region, to be known as the
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, which shall be composed of eighty-two
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (82) branches. There shall be:
Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted Thirty branches (Branches I to XXX) for the city of Manila with seats thereat;
by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional
Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the Thirteen branches (Branches XXXI to XLIII) for Quezon City with seats thereat;

27
Section 29. Municipal Trial Courts in cities. – In every city which does not form part
Five branches (Branches XLIV to XLVIII) for Pasay City with seats thereat; of a metropolitan area, there shall be a Municipal Trial Court with one branch,
except as hereunder provided:
Five branches (Branches XLIX to LIII) for Caloocan City with seats thereat;
Two branches for Laoag City;
One branch (Branch LIV) for Navotas with seat thereat;
Four branches for Baguio City;
Two branches (Branches LV and LVI) for Malabon with seats thereat;
Three branches for Dagupan City;
Two branches (Branches LVII and LVIII) for San Juan with seats thereat;
Five branches for Olongapo City;
Two branches (Branches LIX and LX) for Mandaluyong with seats thereat;
Three branches for Cabanatuan City;
Seven branches (Branches LXI and LXVII) for Makati with seats thereat;
Two branches for San Jose City;
Five branches (Branches LXVIII to LXXII) for Pasig with seats thereat;
Three branches for Angeles City;
One branch (Branch LXXIII) for Pateros with seat thereat;
Two branches for Cavite City;
One branch (Branch LXXIV) for Taguig with seat thereat;
Two branches for Batangas City;
Two branches (Branches LXXV and LXXVI) for Marikina with seats thereat;
Two branches for Lucena City;
Two branches (Branches LXXVII and LXXVIII) for Parañaque with seats thereat;
Three branches for Naga City;
One branch (Branch LXXIX) for Las Piñas with seat thereat;
Two branches for Iriga City;
One branch (Branch LXXX) for Muntinlupa with seat thereat;
Three branches for Legaspi City;
Two branches (Branches LXXXI and LXXXII) for Valenzuela with seats thereat;
Two branches for Roxas City;
Section 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. – The Supreme Court shall constitute
Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other metropolitan areas as may be established Four branches for Iloilo City;
by law whose territorial jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the cities and
municipalities comprising the metropolitan area. Seven branches for Bacolod City;

Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan area which Two branches for Dumaguete City;
shall be his permanent station and his appointment shall state branch of the court
and the seat thereof to which he shall be originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial Two branches for Tacloban City;
Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch within said
metropolitan area as the interest of justice may require, and such assignment shall Eight branches for Cebu City;
not be deemed an assignment to another station within the meaning of this section.
Three branches for Mandaue City;

28
Two branches for Tagbilaran City;
Two branches each for Antipolo and Binangonan, both in Rizal.
Two branches for Surigao City;
Section 31. Municipal Circuit Trial Court. – There shall be a Municipal Circuit Trial
Two branches for Butuan City; Court in each area defined as a municipal circuit, comprising one or more cities
and/or one or more municipalities. The municipalities comprising municipal circuits
Five branches for Cagayan de Oro City; as organized under Administrative Order No. 33, issued on June 13, 1978 by the
Supreme Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537, are hereby constituted as
Seven branches for Davao City; municipal circuits for purposes of the establishment of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, and the appointment thereto of Municipal Circuit Trial Judges: Provided,
Three branches for General Santos City; however, That the Supreme Court may, as the interests of justice may require,
further reorganize the said courts taking into account workload, geographical
Two branches for Oroquieta City; location, and such other factors as will contribute to a rational allocation thereof,
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 537 which shall be applicable
Three branches for Ozamis City; insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Act.

Two branches for Dipolog City; Every Municipal Circuit Trial Judge shall be appointed to a municipal circuit which
shall be his official station.
Four branches for Zamboanga City;
The Supreme Court shall determine the city or municipality where the Municipal
Two branches for Pagadian City; and Circuit Trial Court shall hold sessions.

Two branches for Iligan City. Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. – Except in cases falling within the
Section 30. Municipal Trial Courts. – In each of the municipalities that are not exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
comprised within a metropolitan area and a municipal circuit there shall be a the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Municipal Trial Court which shall have one branch, except as hereunder provided: Courts shall exercise:

Two branches for San Fernando, La Union; (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
Four branches for Tuguegarao;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
Three branches for Lallo, and two branches for Aparri, both of Cagayan; not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
Two branches for Santiago, Isabela; from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
Two branches each for Malolos, Meycauayan and Bulacan, all of Bulacan Province; through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
(as amended by R.A, No. 7691)
Four branches for San Fernando and two branches for Guagua, both of Pampanga;
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Two branches for Tarlac, Tarlac; Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
Two branches for San Pedro, Laguna; and

29
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate habeas corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where
and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the absent Regional Trial Judges sit.
the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such Section 36. Summary procedures in special cases. – In Metropolitan Trial Courts
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred and Municipal Trial Courts with at least two branches, the Supreme Court may
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, designate one or more branches thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be unlawful detainer cases, those involving violations of traffic laws, rules and
specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of regulations, violations of the rental law, and such other cases requiring summary
action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the disposition as the Supreme Court may determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical
transactions; rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits
may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: shall be non-extendible.
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding Section 37. Preliminary investigation. – Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine those in the National Capital Region, of Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
the issue of possession. Trial Courts shall have authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes
alleged to have been committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does prescribed in Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of Presidential Decree
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of No. 911: Provided, however, That if after the preliminary investigation the Judge
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value finds a prima facie case, he shall forward the records of the case to the
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information with the proper
(as amended by R.A. No. 7691) court.

Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases. – No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection with any criminal
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts complaint filed with him for preliminary investigation, unless after an examination
may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, he
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or finds that a probable cause exists Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance
contested lots the where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand herewith may be served anywhere in the Philippines.
pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant
or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from Section 38. Judgments and processes. –
the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these
cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial (1) All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing, stating clearly
Courts. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691) the facts and the law on which they were based, signed by the Judge and filed with
the Clerk of Court. Such judgment shall be appealable to the Regional Trial Courts
Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of all the Regional in accordance with the procedure now prescribed by law for appeals to the Court
Trial Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial of First Instance, by the provisions of this Act, and by such rules as the Supreme
Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of Court may hereafter prescribe.

30
(2) All processes issued by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Section 43. Staffing pattern. – The Supreme Court shall submit to the President,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in cases falling within their jurisdiction, may be within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this Act, a staffing pattern
served anywhere in the Philippines without the necessity of certification by the for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the
Judge of the Regional Trial Court. implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the
immediately succeeding section.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 44. Transitory provisions. – The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President.
Section 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to
appealed from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the
appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such
from. declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old Courts
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act,
record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the
together with an index of the contents thereof. necessary personnel.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate courts
wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary from the
Court. funds for organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said
funding shall thereafter be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. – Every decision of final resolution
of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact Section 45. Shari'a Courts. – Shari'a Courts to be constituted as provided for in
and the conclusions of law on which it is based, which may be contained in the Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the "Code of Muslim Personal
decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in Laws of the Philippines," shall be included in the funding appropriations so provided
the decision, order, or resolution appealed from. in this Act.

Section 41. Salaries. – Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Section 46. Gratuity of judges and personnel separated from office. – All members
Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges of the judiciary and subordinate employees who shall be separated from office by
shall receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the reason of the reorganization authorized herein, shall be granted a gratuity at a rate
President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 equivalent to one month's salary for every year of continuous service rendered in
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. any branch of the government or equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to
1597. them on the basis of the highest salary received: Provided, That such member of
the judiciary or employee shall have the option to retire under the Judiciary
Section 42. Longevity pay. – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the Retirement Law or general retirement law, if he has met or satisfied the
monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein requirements therefor.
created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service
rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Section 47. Repealing clause. – The provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise
Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179 as
the Justice or Judge next in rank. amended, of the Rules of Court, and of all other statutes, letters of instructions

31
and general order or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are 5. Violations of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972; and
hereby repealed or accordingly modified.
6. All others offenses defined in the Revised Penal Code or Special Laws where the
Section 48. Date of Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect immediately imposable is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or higher, whether simple or
complex, and other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the
CIRCULAR NO. 20 August 7, 1987 same occurrence or were committed by the accused on the same occasion as that
which is punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, whether the accused are
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS charge as principal, accomplice or accessory; Provided, however, that where the
offense charged is a complex crime and only the lesser offense which is punishable
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL by a penalty less than reclusion perpetua is proved, the Court shall not dismiss the
TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN same and impose the corresponding penalty.
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A
DISTRICT COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS Special rules shall govern the trial and disposition of these cases. These rules are
as follows:
SUBJECT: Designation of certain Branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle
exclusively certain Criminal Cases. 1. The trial of these cases shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until
terminated, and judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from
The trial judge has the primary responsibility to minimize delay and to dispense the time the case is submitted for decision, unless a shorter period is otherwise
swift justice. This is specially true in criminal cases involving serious offenses where provided by law, such as the fifteen-day period provided in the Dangerous Drugs
a strong and adequate response from the courts by way of speedy trial and Act. The filing of the memoranda after trial shall not be required or allowed.
judgment can serve to deter criminal elements.
2. Upon issuance of the designations, the SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURTS so
The Circuit Criminal Courts which were set up on September 8, 1967 under designated shall not be assigned cases other than the criminal cases herein above
Republic Act No. 5179 served this purpose. Accordingly, under the authority of enumerated and all other cases pending in these branches, whether civil or
Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, certain branches of the Regional Trial criminal, shall be redistributed by raffle to other branches by the Executive Judge,
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region and of such other regions where the except those already submitted for decision and those criminal cases covered by
need therefor may arise shall be designated as SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURTS to try this Circular which are already pending trial in said branches.
exclusively the following criminal cases:
3. All the criminal cases covered by this Circular wherein trial has already
1. Violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866, codifying the laws on illegal/unlawful commenced shall remain in their respective branches where they were originally
possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or disposition of, firearms, assigned. In appropriate cases, however, when the interests of justice so require,
ammunitions, explosives or instruments used in the manufacture of firearms, the case may be transferred to the SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURTS after study and
ammunitions or explosives; favorable recommendation by the Executive Judge.

2. Violations of Executive Order No. 276 known as the "Anti-Subversion Act", where 4. Whenever necessary to carry out the objectives of this Circular, the Court may
the imposable penalty for the offense charged is prison correccional or higher; assign any other Regional Trial Court Judge to another judicial region to assist in
the trial and disposition of any of the above enumerated criminal cases.
3. Crimes against public order (e.g. rebellion, sedition, etc.), defined in the Revised
Penal code, as amended; 5. Where no specified branch is designated as a SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT, the
above enumerated cases shall be raffled among the branches of the same station
4. Violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, cognizable by which shall try and decide the same, subject to Rule No. 1 hereof.
Regional Trial Courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129;
This Circular shall take effect immediately.

32
3. Appeals from Civil
August 7, 1987. Service Commission; Automatic review in
cases of death penalty
COURT OF APPEALS 4. Appeals from rendered by the RTC,
quasi-judicial agencies in which case, it may
under Rule 43; decide on whether or
a. Administrative not to affirm the
CIVIL CASES CRIMINAL CASES
cases by the penalty of death. If it
Exclusive Original Actions for annulment 1. Actions for
Ombudsman are affirms the penalty of
of judgments of RTC annulment of
appealable to the CA death, it will render a
based upon extrinsic judgments of RTC
under Rule 43 (Sec. decision but will not
fraud or lack of (Sec. 9, BP 129).
14 R.A. 6770) (2006 enter the judgment
jurisdiction (Sec. 9,
Bar). because it will then be
BP 129; Rule 47, 2. Crimes of Terrorism
5. Appeals from the forwarded to the SC.
1997 Rules of Civil under the Human
National Commission
Procedure). Security Act of 2007
on Indigenous Peoples NOTE: Death penalty
or RA 9372
(NCIP); and imposed by the RTC is
elevated to the CA by
Appellate 1. Final judgments, Judgments or
6. Appeals from the automatic review
decisions, resolutions, decisions of RTC via
Office of the while death penalty
orders, awards of: notice of appeal
Ombudsman in imposed by the
a. RTC (original (except those
administrative Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction or appealable to the SC
disciplinary cases whether in its original
appellate jurisdiction); or SB):
(Mendoza-Arce v. or appellate
1. Exercising its
Office of the jurisdiction is elevated
b. Family Courts; original jurisdiction;
Ombudsman, G.R. No. to the SC for
RTC on the questions
149148, April 5, automatic review.
of constitutionality, 2. Exercising its
2002).
validity of tax, appellate jurisdiction;
CONCURRENT
jurisdiction involving and Where the
With SC 1. Petitions for Petitions for issuance
questions of fact, imposable penalty is:
issuance of writs of of writs of certiorari,
which should be a. life
certiorari, prohibition prohibition and
appealed first to the imprisonment or
and mandamus mandamus against
CA; reclusion perpetua;
against the following: the RTCs and lower
courts.
c. Appeals from RTC b. a lesser penalty
a. NLRC under the
in cases appealed for offenses
Labor Code;
from MTCs which are committed on the
not a matter of right; same occasion or
b. Civil Service
which arose from the
Commission;
2. Appeal from MTC in same occurrence that
the exercise of its gave rise to the
c. Quasi-judicial
delegated jurisdiction offense punishable
agencies;
(RA 7691); reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment
d. RTCs and other
(Sec. 3, Rule 122).
lower courts;

33
tried by the regular
2. Petitions for courts and the
issuance of writ of jurisdiction of the CTA
Kalikasan (Sec. 3, shall be appellate).
Rule 7, A.M. No. 09-6- Appellate In tax collection cases 1. Over appeals from
8SC).Q involving final and the judgment,
With SC and RTC 1. Petitions for habeas Petitions for issuance executory resolutions or orders
corpus and quo of writs of certiorari, assessments for taxes, of the RTC in tax cases
warranto; and prohibition and fees, charges and originally decided by
mandamus against penalties where the them, in their
2. Petitions for the the lower courts or principal amount of respective territorial
issuance of writs of bodies. taxes and fees, jurisdiction.
certiorari, prohibition exclusive of charges
and mandamus and penalties claimed 2. Over petitions for
against the lower is less than Php 1M review of the
courts tried by the proper judgments,
With SC, SB, and 1. Petitions for the Petitions for the MTC, MeTC and RTC resolutions or orders
RTC issuance of writ of issuance of writ of of the RTC in the
amparo; amparo and writ of exercise of their
habeas data appellate jurisdiction
2. Petition for writ of over tax cases
habeas data, where originally decided by
the action involves the MeTCs, MTCs, and
public data or MCTCs in their
government office respective jurisdiction
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal (Sec.7, RA
COURT OF TAX APPEALS 9282)
From Commissioner 1. Decisions in cases involving disputed
Tax Cases Criminal Case of Internal Revenue assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,
Exclusive Original In tax collection cases All criminal cases fees or other charges, penalties in relation
involving final and arising from violation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC
executory of the NIRC of the TCC or other laws administered by BIR;
assessments for taxes, and other laws, part of
fees, charges and laws, or special laws 2. Inaction by CIR in cases involving disputed
penalties where the administered by the assessments, refunds of IR taxes, fees or other
principal amount of BIR or the BOC where charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other
taxes and fees, the principal amount matters arising under the NIRC or other laws
exclusive of charges of taxes and fees, administered by BIR, where the NIRC or other
and penalties claimed exclusive of charges applicable law provides a specific period of
is not less than Php and penalties claimed action, in which case the inaction shall be
1M. is less that Php 1M or deemed an implied denial via petition for review
where there is no under Rule 42.
specified amount From RTC Decisions, orders or resolutions of the in local
claimed (the offenses taxes originally decided or resolved by them in
or penalties shall be the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction via petition for review under Rule 43.

34
From Commissioner 1. Decisions in cases involving liability for WHEREAS, to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers
of Customs customs duties, fees or other charges, seizure, and employees, Section 5, Article XIII of the New Constitution provides for the
detention or release of property affected, fines, creation of a special court to be known as Sandiganbayan;
forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto;
or NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree
2. Other matters arising under the Customs law
as follows:
or other laws, part of laws or special laws
administered by BOC; (via petition for review
Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and
under Rule 42).
From Central Board Decisions in the exercise of its appellate composition. A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and
of Assessment jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known as the
Appeals and taxation of real property originally decided Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a Presiding Justice and eight
by the provincial or city board of assessment Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President.
appeals via petition for review under Rule 43.
From Secretary of Decision on customs cases elevated to him No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the
Finance automatically for review from decisions of the Sandiganbayan; unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40
Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to years of age and for at least ten years has been a judge of a court of record or
the government under Sec. 2315 of the TCC via been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held office requiring
petition for review under Rule 42. admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period.
From Secretary of Decisions of Secretary of Trade and Industry in
Trade and Industry the case of non-agricultural product, commodity The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other
and the Secretary or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the
Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective
of Agriculture case of agricultural product, commodity or
commissions, or, when the commissions of two or more of them shall bear the
article, involving dumping duties and
counterveiling duties under Secs. 301 and 302, same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been issued by
respectively, of the TCC, and safeguard the President.
measures under RA 8800, where either party
may appeal the decision to impose or not to The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall not be removed from office
impose said duties (via petition for review under except on impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in
Rule 42). Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1606 December 10, 1978 The Presiding Justice shall receive an annual compensation of P60,000.00 and each
Associate Justice P55,000.00 which shall not be diminished during their
REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL continuance in office. They shall have the same rank, privileges and other
COURT TO BE KNOWN AS "SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER emoluments, be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy
PURPOSES the same retirement and other benefits as those provided for under existing laws
of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREAS, the new Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust and
ordains that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times Court of Appeals are increased, such increases in salaries shall be correspondingly
accountable to the people; extended to and enjoyed by the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan.

35
They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 years or become incapacitated In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
to discharge the duties of their office. with the public officers or employees including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
Section 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. The Sandiganbayan shall and employees.
have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for
the trial and determination of all cases filed with it irrespective of the place where Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is
they may have arisen; Provided, however, that the Presiding Justice may authorize insufficient to establish the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and
any division or divisions of court to hold sessions at any time and place outside sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged.
Metro Manila to hear and decide cases emanating from any of the existing judicial
districts. Whenever necessary, the Sandiganbayan may require the services of the Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
personnel and the use of the facilities of any agency of the Government, national criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
or local, including the courts of first instance of the province where any of the arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with,
divisions is holding session, and those personnel of such agencies or courts shall and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing
be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan. of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized;
Section 3. Divisions of the Courts; Quorum. The Sandiganbayan shall sit in three Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the same time. Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a
regular court but judgment therein has not yet been rendered and the criminal
Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for session in division; Provided, that when case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred
the required quorum cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal
disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the President shall, upon action, otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the
recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice of the Court of Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may
Appeals or Judge of the Court of First Instance or of the Circuit Criminal Court of be filed and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction;
the judicial district concerned to sit temporarily therein. Provided, further, that, in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over: first filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the
case may be, shall only be filed with the regular courts of competent jurisdiction.
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the
AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379; Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases
against officers and members of the armed forces in the active service.
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Section 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required. The unanimous vote of the
Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and three justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.
In the event that the three justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including Judge shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence
their office. of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.

The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense Section 6. Maximum period for termination of cases. As far as practicable, the trial
charged is punishable by a penalty higher than prision correccional, or its of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuos until
equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the
the regular courts. date the case was submitted for decision.

36
Section 7. Form, finality and enforcement of decisions. Decisions and final orders
of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of facts on all issues properly Section 1. Title of the Rules. These Rules shall be known and cited as the Rules of
raised before it. the Sandiganbayan.

A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision maybe filed within (15) Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment, and such petition promote their objectives and to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive
for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission determination of every action and proceeding before the Sandiganbayan.
thereon.
RULE II
Decisions and final orders shall be subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme
Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court shall CONTROL OF FUNCTIONS AND SUCCESSION
decide any case on appeal promptly and without the necessity of placing it upon
the regular calendar. Whenever, in any case decided, the death penalty shall have Section 1. Exclusive Control. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution and
been imposed, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court, whether the Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive control,
accused shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment, as law and justice direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its internal affairs and the
shall dictate. operation of its business.

Final judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced Section 2. Succession in the Office of the Presiding Justice. In case of vacancy in
in the manner provided by law. the position of Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan or his temporary incapacity
to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his office, the same shall devolve
Section 8. Transfer of cases. As of the date of the effectivity of this decree, any upon the qualified most senior Associate Justices until such incapacity is removed
case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where none or another Presiding Justice is appointed and has duly qualified.
of the accused has been arraigned shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan.
RULE III
Section 9. Rule-making Power. The Sandiganbayan shall have the power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure and, pending such promulgation, the Rules COMPOSITION OF DIVISIONS
of Court shall govern its proceedings.
Section 1. How Divisions Constituted. The Sandiganbayan shall consist of three
Section 10. Authority over internal affairs. The Sandiganbayan shall administer its divisions which shall be known as the First Division, Second Division, and Third
own internal affairs and may adopt such rules governing the constitution of its Division, and shall each be composed of Presiding Justice and the first two
divisions, the allocation of cases among them, the rotation of justices and other Associate Justices in the order of precedence as the respective Chairmen; the next
matters relating to its business. three Associate Justices in the order of precedence as the respective senior
members; and the last three Associate Justices in the order of precedence as the
respective junior members. However, until the entire complement of the
RULES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN Sandiganbayan shall have been appointed and qualified, the Presiding justice and
the two Associate Justices first appointed and qualified shall constitute the First
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Division.
Philippines, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan
hereby adopts and promulgates the following rules to govern the conduct of its Section 2. Vacancy; How Filled. In case of any vacancy in the composition of a
business. division, whether permanent or temporary, the Presiding Justice may designate an
Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of
RULE I the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with
TITLE AND CONSTRUCTION all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and

37
determination of cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the other divisions cases with the same number of cases transferred to it to the end that all divisions
of the Court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case, the procedure provided in shall, as much as possible, receive more or less the same number of cases filed
Section 3, Rule VIII of these Rules shall apply. with the Sandiganbayan.

RULE IV Section 3. Assignment of Cases Permanent. Cases assigned to a division of the

FILING OF CASES Sandiganbayan in accordance with these Rules shall remain with said division
notwithstanding changes in the composition thereof and all matters raised therein
Section 1. Proceedings Free of Charge. All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan be shall be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all
conducted at no cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses. of the Justices who are members of the division aforesaid at the time said matters
are taken up, irrespective of whether they were or were not members of the
Section 2. Preliminary Investigation Necessary. No criminal information or division at the time the case was first assigned thereto: Provided, however, That
complaint shall be entertained by the Sandiganbayan except upon a certification only Justices who are members of the division at the time a case is submitted for
by the investigating Prosecutor of the existence of a prima facie case to be decision shall take part in the consideration and adjudication of said case, unless
determined after a preliminary investigation conducted in accordance with any such member thereafter ceases to be a member of the Sandiganbayan for any
applicable laws and approved by the Chief Special Prosecutor. reason whatsoever in which case any Justice chosen to fill the vacancy in
accordance with the manner provided in Section 2, Rule III, of these Rules shall
Section 3. Where Cases Filed. All cases to be filed with the Sandiganbayan shall be participate in the consideration and adjudication of said case; Provided, lastly, that
filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Sandiganbayan which shall be open the Sandiganbayan en banc may, for special or compelling reasons, transfer cases
for the purpose of receiving complaints, information, motions and the like from from one division thereof to another.
eight to twelve o'clock in the morning and twelve thirty to four-thirty o'clock in the
afternoon, on Mondays to Fridays, except on public or special holidays. RULE VI
PROCESSES
RULE V
DISTRIBUTION AND CONSOLIDATION OF CASES Processes and writs of the Sandiganbayan which by their nature or by provision of
existing laws or the Rules of Court are to be issued under the signature of a Judge
Section 1. Distribution of Cases. All cases filed with the Sandiganbayan shall be or a Justice shall be signed by the Chairman of the division concerned: Provided,
allotted among the three divisions for hearing and decision by raffle to be That if there is an urgent necessity for the issuance thereof before the case is
conducted by a Raffle Committee composed of the Presiding Justice and the two raffled to a division, the same shall be signed by the Presiding Justice. In the
most senior Associate Justices available, on such days as may hereafter be fixed absence of the Presiding Justice or the Chairman aforesaid, the process or writ
by the Presiding Justice depending upon the need for such raffle to be made in shall be signed by the senior Associate Justice in the Sandiganbayan or in the
view of the number of cases filed, with notice to the interested parties who may, if divisions concerned, respectively. All other processes or writs issued upon authority
they so desire, be present therein by themselves or through counsel. of the Sandiganbayan or a division thereof shall be signed by the Clerk of Court or,
in his absence, by the Deputy Clerk of Court of the division concerned.
Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. Cases arising from the same incident on series
of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may, in the discretion RULE VII
of Sandiganbayan, be consolidated in only one division. Should the propriety of BAIL
such consolidation appear upon the filing of the cases concerned and before they
are raffled, all such cases shall be considered as one case for purposes of the raffle; Section 1. How Amount Fixed; Approval. The amount of bail to be posted in cases
but, should the propriety of such consolidation may be affected upon motion of an in the Sandiganbayan shall be fixed by the Chairman of the division thereof to
interested party filed with the division taking cognizance of the case to be which they are assigned; and such bail may be approved by any Justice of the
consolidated and, if granted, consolidation shall be made in the division before Sandiganbayan, but preferably by a Justice of the division concerned: Provided,
which the case with the lowest number is pending. In either case, the division in however, That where the accused is arrested, detained or otherwise placed in
which consolidation is effected shall be entitled to be credited in the distribution of custody outside the Metropolitan Manila area, any judge of the Court of First

38
Instance or Circuit Criminal Court may accept and approve the bail for his therefrom. For this purpose and whenever necessary, the Sandiganbayan may
appearance before the division to which his case is assigned and release him, and require the services of the personnel and the use of the facilities of any agency of
shall inform the division issuing the order of arrest of his action, forwarding thereto the Government, national or local, including the Courts of First Instance or Circuit
the papers in this case. Criminal Court of the province or city where any of the divisions is holding session,
and those personnel of such agencies or courts shall be subject to the orders of
Section 2. Condition of the Bail. The condition of the bail is that the accused shall the Sandiganbayan.
appear and answer the complaint or information in the division of the
Sandiganbayan to which it is assigned or transferred for trial and submit himself Section 5. Time of Holding Sessions. Sessions of the Sandiganbayan en banc may
to the orders and processes thereof and, after conviction, if the case is appealed be called at any time by the Presiding Justice or at the instance at least five
to the Supreme Court, that he will surrender himself for the execution of such Associate Justices. Sessions for the trial of cases cognizable by it shall be held on
judgment as the Supreme Court may render; or, that, in case the cause is to be such days and at such times as the divisions thereof may, by order and upon notice
tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the division to which it to the parties concerned, fix.
may be remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof.
Section 6. Pre-trial Inquest. After the arraignment of an accused who pleads not
RULE VIII guilty, the division concerned shall, without prejudice to the invocation by the
SESSIONS AND TRIAL accused of his constitutional rights, direct the prosecutor and the accused and his
counsel to appear before any of the Justices thereof for a conference to consider;
Section 1. How Sessions Held. The Sandiganbayan shall for administrative
purposes, sit en banc; and, for the trial and determination of cases, sit in three (a) Admissions of facts about which there can be no dispute;
divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the same time.
(b) Marking for identification of documentary or real evidence of the parties;
Section 2. Presiding Officer. Sessions of the Sandiganbayan en banc shall be
presided by the Presiding Justice; whereas sessions in division shall be presided by (c) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
the respective Chairman of each division. In the absence of the Presiding Justice
or the Chairman of a division, as the case may be, the Associate Justice attending (d) Procedure on objections where there are multiple counsel;
the session en banc or in division who is first in the order of precedence and able
to preside, shall do so. (e) Order of presentation of evidence and arguments where there are multiple
accused;
Section 3. Quorum. Five Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc,
and three Justices for sessions in division: Provided, That when a quorum and/or (f) Order of cross-examination where there are multiple accused; and
the votes required for a resolution or decision of the Sandiganbayan, either en banc
or in division, or the trial or hearing of cases cannot be had due to the legal (g) Such other matter as will promote a fair and expeditious termination of the
disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring trial.
therein, the President shall, upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice,
designate any Justice of the Court of Appeals, Judge of the Court of First Instance After the pre-trial inquest, a pre-trial order shall be issued by the Associate Justice
or of the Circuit Criminal Court to sit temporarily therein. presiding the conference reciting the actions and/or proceedings taken thereat, the
admissions of facts made, the documents and real evidence marked, and the
Section 4. Place of Holding Sessions. Sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en agreement entered into by the parties as to any of the matters taken up therein.
banc or in division, shall be held in the place of its principal office in the Metropolitan Such order shall limit the issues for trial to those not disposed of by the admissions
Manila area where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it irrespective of or agreements of the parties and when entered shall blind the parties and control
the place where they may have arisen: Provided, however, That the Presiding the course of the action during the trial, on appeal, and in post conviction
Justice may authorize any division or divisions of the Court to hold sessions at any proceedings, unless modified by the division concerned before trial to prevent
time and place outside Metropolitan Manila to hear and decide cases emanating manifest injustice.

39
RULE XI
RULE IX PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT
MOTIONS
A judgment of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be promulgated by reading
Section 1. Motion Day. The first hours of the morning session of the divisions every the judgment or sentence in the presence of the accused and any Justice of the
Friday shall be devoted to the hearing of motions, unless, upon motion of an division which rendered the same: Provided, That, if the accused is confined or
interested party and for special reasons, the division concerned shall fix another detained in a place outside Metropolitan Manila or of the city or province in which
day for the hearing of any particular motion. any division of the Sandiganbayan is sitting at the time of such promulgation, the
judgment may, upon delegation by the division concerned be promulgated by any
Section 2. Resolution on Interlocutory or Incidental Motions. Rulings on all written judge of the Court of First Instance or Circuit Criminal Court having jurisdiction
motions submitted to the Sandiganbayan or any division thereof for resolution shall over the place of confinement or detention, in which event the Court so
be reached in consultation among the Justices participating in the consideration promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept and approve the appeal
thereof: Provided, however, That rulings on oral motions or on objections made in bond.
the course of the trial or hearing shall be handed down by the Chairman of the
division concerned. RULE XII
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
RULE X
JUDGMENT Within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of a judgment or final
order of a division of the Sandiganbayan, unless said judgment or order had in the
Section 1. Votes Necessary to Decide. The unanimous vote of three Justices in a meantime otherwise attained finality, a petition for the reconsideration thereof may
division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order. In the event be filed upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions
that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall for new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, and such
designated by raffle two Justices from among the other members of the petition for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30 days from submission
Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them forming a thereof.
special division of five Justices, and the vote of a majority of such special division
shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order. RULE XIII
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS
Section 2. Procedure in Deciding Cases. The conclusions of a division of the
Sandiganbayan in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in Section 1. Method of Review. A party may appeal from a judgment or final order
consultation before the case is assigned to a Justice for the writing of the opinion of a division of the Sandiganbayan by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for
of the division. Any Justice dissenting from a judgment shall state the reasons for certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of Rules of Court and by serving a copy thereof
his dissent. to the Sandiganbayan.

Section 3. Maximum Period to Decide Cases. The judgment or final order of a Whenever, in any case decided, the death penalty shall have been imposed, the
division of the Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3) months from the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court, whether the accused shall have
date the case was submitted for decision. appealed or not, for review and judgment, as law and justice shall dictate.

Section 4. Form of judgment and final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan Section 2. Bail Pending Appeal. An accused who has been released on bail shall not
shall contain complete findings of fact and a statement of the law on all issues committed to jail upon conviction pending the expiration of the period for appeal
properly raised before it. or pending an appeal seasonably taken, except when the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or death, in which case, the accused may forthwith be
committed to jail after promulgation of the sentence. The division of the
Sandiganbayan concerned, however, may, for good cause, cancel the bond or

40
increase the amount of bail and commit the accused into custody pending appeal, RULE XVIII
unless he gives bail in the increased amount. The surely shall also be responsible EFFECTIVITY
for the surrender or the accused after judgment shall have become final.

RULE XIV The Rules shall take effect upon approval.

PUBLICATION OF DECISIONS
Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of January, in the year of Our Lord,
With the consent of the respective writers thereof, the decisions of the nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.
Sandiganbayan may be published in the Official Gazette in the language in which
they have been originally written. The syllabi for the decisions shall be prepared REPUBLIC ACT No. 7975
by the Clerk of Court in consultation with writers thereof.
AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL
RULE XV ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF COURT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED

Except as otherwise herein provided or as may hereafter be modified from time to Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Executive
time by the Sandiganbayan and insofar as practicable, the Rules of Court shall Order No. 184, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
govern proceedings in the Sandiganbayan.
"Sec. 3. Division of the Court; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5)
RULE XVI divisions of three justices each. The five (5) may sit at the same time.
SEAL OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
"The first three divisions shall be stationed in the Metro Manila area, the fourth
The seal of the Sandiganbayan shall be of standard size, circular in form, consisting division shall be in Cebu City for cases coming from the Visayas region, and the
of two concentric circles as its margin, with the inscription, running from left to fifth division shall be in Cagayan de Oro City for cases coming from the Mindanao
right, on the upper margin of the word "Sandiganbayan" and on the lower margin region.
of the words "Republika ng Pilipinas"; with 16 stars, representing the existing 16
judicial districts, immediately along the outer edge of the inner circle; and with a "Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That
design at the center of a triangle, with a trisected area composed of the national when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal
colors of white on its upper part, blue on the left and red on the right, with the disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring
words "KATAPATAN" on the right side, "KAPANAGUTAN" on the left side, and therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to
"KARANGALAN" on the base; a star in each corner of the triangle representing be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence,
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao; and a bolo inside the triangle on which is to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a
superimposed a balance. regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases
assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in
RULE XVII which case, the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice,
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein."

If, for any reason, any section or provision of these Rules shall be held to be Section 2. Section 4 of the same Decree is hereby further amended to read as
unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision thereof shall be effected follows:
thereby.
"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

41
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, "b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the "c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
offense: Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director "In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
department heads; provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused
are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27", or not otherwise covered by
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; the preceding enumeration.

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
rank; issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
"(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; jurisdiction: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; "The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals shall
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
foundations; elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court,
the office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up people of the Philippines except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 1,
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; 2, 14 and 14-A.

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
Constitution; accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
the provisions of the Constitution; and jurisdiction over them.

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under "Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising

42
from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and "Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure,
carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the
however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but internal operations of the court which shall be inforced until repealed or modified
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter by the Supreme Court."
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for Section 5. Section 10 of the same Decree is hereby repealed.
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." Section 6. Presidential Decrees Nos. 1486, 1606 and 1861, Executive Orders Nos.
101 and 184 and all other laws, decrees, orders and rules of which are inconsistent
Section 3. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows: therewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

"Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders Section 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not
determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on
which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
deciding the case. Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within Republic Act No. 8249
fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment, and February 5, 1997
such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from
submission thereon. AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
"Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in PURPOSES
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by
the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher is imposed, the Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Congress assembled:
Rules of Court. In case the penalty imposed is death, review by the Supreme Court
shall be automatic, whether or not the accused filed an appeal. Section 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in
the manner provided by law. "SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications; Tenure; Removal and
Compensation. - A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and
"Decisions and final orders of other courts, in cases cognizable by said courts under possessing all the inherent powers of a court ofjustice, to be known as the
this Act shall be appealable to the Sandiganbayan within fifteen (15) days from Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding justice and fourteen
promulgation or notice to the parties." associate justices who shall be appointed by the President."

Section 4. Section 9 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

43
"SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. - The Sandiganbayan shall
have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for "(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That cases provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
originating from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from
Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
except only when the greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
other compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case
originating from one geographical region may be heard in another geographical "(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -
region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall authorize controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
any divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro foundations;
Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may require the services of the "(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under
personnel and the use of facilities of the courts or other government offices where the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
any of the divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices
shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan." "(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
Section 3. The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is hereby deleted.
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as the provisions of the Constitution; and
follows:
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti- the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are "b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the section in relation to their office.
offense:
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
department heads; trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads; "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; their own original jurisdiction orof their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
rank; issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,

44
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate "A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order on judgment, and
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from
1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these submission thereon.
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
"Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is
appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner
to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the prescribed in the Rules of Court.
Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People
of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 "Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in
and 14-A, issued in 1986. the manner provided by law.

"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or "Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in this decree as well as those rendered by them in the exercise of their appellate
govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive manner provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of the Court.
jurisdiction over them.
"In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial
"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdictions, is death, review by the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not accused files an appeal."
shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the Section 6. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current fiscal year
and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as may be needed for
action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations
therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, Act.
and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate Section 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any
court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Section 8. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason any provision of this Act is
Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts or portions not affected thereby
follows: shall remain in full force and effect.

'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, general orders and circulars, or
orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and modified accordingly.
the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and
necessary in deciding the case. Section 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

45
SANDIGANBAYAN thereby, in which case
the President shall,
On February 25, 2015, R.A. 10660 was passed amending P.D. 1606, upon the
which created the special court known as the “Sandiganbayan”. The law recommendation of
was approved on April 16, 2015 by President Benigno S. Aquino III. the Presiding Justice,
RA 10660 PD 1606, as designate any Justice
(New Law) amended or Justices of the Court
(Old Law) of Appeals to sit
temporarily therein.
Section 3. The Sandiganbayan The Sandiganbayan Section 4. Section 4 c. Provided,
Constitution of the shall sit in seven (7) shall sit in five (5) Jurisdiction that the Regional Trial
Divisions; Quorum divisions of three (3) divisions of three Court shall have
members each. Justices each. The five exclusive original
(5) may sit at the jurisdiction· where the
same time. information: (a) does
Two (2) members shall Three Justices shall not allege any damage
constitute a quorum constitute a quorum to the government or
for sessions in for sessions in any bribery; or (b)
divisions: Provided, divisions: Provided, alleges damage to the
that when the required that when the required government or bribery
quorum for the quorum for the arising from the same
particular division particular division or closely related
cannot be had due to cannot be had due to transactions or acts in
the legal the legal qualification an amount not
disqualification or or temporary disability exceeding One million
temporary incapacity of a Justice or of a pesos
of a member or a vacancy occurring (P1,000,000.00).
vacancy therein, the therein, the Presiding
Presiding Justice may Justice may designate Subject to the rules
designate a member an Associate Justice of promulgated by the
of another division to the Court, to be Supreme Court, the
be determined by determined by strict cases falling under the
strict rotation on the rotation on the basis of jurisdiction of the
basis of the reverse the reverse order of Regional Trial Court
order of precedence, precedence, to sit as a under this section shall
to sit as a special special member of said be tried in a judicial
member of said division with all the region other than
division with all the rights and where the official
rights and prerogatives of a holds office.
prerogatives of a regular member of SEC. 5. Proceedings, All three (3) members The unanimous vote of
regular member of said division the trial How Conducted; of a division shall the three justices in a
said division in the trial and determination of a Decision by Majority deliberate on all division shall be
and determination of a case or cases assigned Vote. matters submitted for necessary for the
case or cases assigned thereto, unless the judgment, decision, pronouncement of a
thereto. operation of the court final order, or judgment. In the
will be prejudice resolution. event that the three

46
justices do not reach a where gross value of 4, P.D. 1606, as
The concurrence of a unanimous vote, the estate exceeds Php amended by RA 8249).
majority of the Presiding Justice shall 300,000 or Php
members of a division designate two other 400,000 in Metro 2. Cases where the
shall be necessary to justices from among Manila; only penalty provided
render a judgment, the members of the by law is a fine
decision, or final Court to sit 5. Cases not within the exceeding Php 4,000;
order, or to resolve temporarily with them, exclusive jurisdiction 3. Other laws which
interlocutory or forming a division of of any court, tribunal, specifically lodge
incidental motions. five justices, and the person or body jurisdiction in the RTC:
concurrence of a exercising judicial or
majority of such quasi-judicial a. Law on written
division shall be function; defamation or libel;
necessary for
rendering judgment. 6. Civil actions and b. Decree on
special proceedings Intellectual Property;
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS falling within exclusive
original jurisdiction of c. Violations of
Civil Cases Criminal Cases Juvenile and Domestic Dangerous Drugs Act
Exclusive Original 1. Actions in which the 1. Criminal cases not Relations Court and regardless of the
subject of litigation is within exclusive Court of Agrarian imposable penalty
incapable of pecuniary jurisdiction of any Reforms; except when the
estimation; court, tribunal or body offender is under 16
(Sec. 20, BP 129). 7. Other cases where and there are Juvenile
2. Actions involving the demand, exclusive and Domestic
title to or possession a. Includes criminal of interest, damages, Relations Court in the
of real property or any cases where the attorney’s fees, province;
interest therein where penalty provided by litigation expenses
the assessed value law exceeds 6 years and costs, or value of 4. Cases falling under
exceeds Php 20,000 or imprisonment property in the Family Courts in
Php 50,000 in Metro irrespective of the fine controversy exceeds areas where there are
Manila, except forcible (RA 7691). P300,000 or Php no Family Courts (Sec.
entry and unlawful 400,000 in Metro 24, BP 129);
detainer; b. Includes criminal Manila (Sec. 19, BP
cases not falling within 129 as amended by RA 5. Election offenses
3. Actions in admiralty the exclusive original 7691); and (Omnibus Election
and maritime jurisdiction of the Code) even if
jurisdiction where Sandiganbayan where 8. Intra-corporate committed by an
demand or claim the imposable penalty controversies under official with salary
exceeds Php 300,000 is imprisonment more Sec. 5.2 of the grade of 27 or higher
or Php 400,000 in than 6 years and none Securities and
Metro Manila; of the accused is Regulation Code.
occupying positions CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
4. Matters of probate, classified as “Grade With SC, SB and CA 1. Writ of amparo; 2. Petitions for the
testate or intestate, 27” and higher (Sec. Writ of habeas data. issuance of writs of

47
amparo and habeas However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
data of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
With SC Actions affecting principal relief sought like specific performance suits and in actions for support, or
ambassadors and for annulment of a judgment or foreclosure of mortgage, such actions are incapable
other public ministers of pecuniary estimation, and are cognizable exclusively by the RTCs (Barangay
and consuls (Sec. Piapi v. Talip, G.R. No. 138248, September 7, 2005).
21(2), BP 129).
With SC and CA 1. Certiorari, Intra-corporate controversies that are within the jurisdiction of the RTC
prohibition and
mandamus against
1. Devices or schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors, business
lower courts and
bodies; associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or misrepresentation which
may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders,
2. Habeas corpus and partners, or members of any corporation, partnership, or association;
quo warranto;
With MTC Cases involving 2. Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association
enforcement or relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; and
violations of between, any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association of
environmental and which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively;
other related laws,
rules and regulations 3. Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or
(Sec. 2, Rule 1, A.M. managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations;
No. 09-6-8-SC).
Special SC may designate certain branches of RTC to try
4. Derivative suits; and
exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and
domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban
land reform cases not falling within the 5. Inspection of corporate book (Rule 1, IRR of RA 8799).
jurisdiction of any quasi-judicial body and other
special cases in the interest of justice (Sec. 23, Republic Act No. 8369
BP 129). October 28, 1997
Appellate GR: All cases decided by lower courts in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. AN ACT ESTABLISHING FAMILY COURTS, GRANTING THEM EXCLUSIVE
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CHILD AND FAMILY CASES, AMENDING
XPN: Decisions of lower courts in the exercise of BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 129,AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
delegated jurisdiction. ACT OF 1980, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Test to determine whether an action is capable of pecuniary estimation Congress assembled::

The criterion is the nature of the principal action or the remedy sought. If it is Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997".
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the MTCs or in the RTCs would Section 2. Statement of National Policies. - The State shall protect the rights and
depend on the amount of the claim. promote the welfare of children in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution
and the precepts of the United Nations Convention on the rights of the Child. The

48
State shall provide a system of adjudication for youthful offenders which takes into The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant
account their peculiar circumstances. to Ptesidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare
Code";
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. The courts shall preserve the b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the
solidarity of the family, provide procedures for the reconciliation of spouses and latter;
the amicable settlement of family controversy.
c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;
Section 3. Establishment of Family Courts. - There shall be established a Family
Court in every province and city in the country. In case where the city is the capital d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and
of the province, the Family Court shall be established in the municipality which has those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those
the highest population. living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution
of conjugal partnership of gains;
Section 4. Qualification and Training of Family Court Judges. - Sec. 15 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;

"Sec. 15. (a) Qualification. - No person shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge or f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order
Presiding Judge of the Family Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines";
Philippines, at least thirtyfive (35) years of age, and, for at least ten (10) years,
has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a public office g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent o
in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as indispensable neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children;
requisite. the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases
cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of
"(b) Training of Family Court Judges. - The Presiding Judge, as well as the court 1986), and other related laws;
personnel of the Family Courts, shall undergo training and must have the
experience and demonstrated ability in dealing with child and family cases. h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;

"The Supreme Court shall provide a continuing education program on child and i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;
family laws, procedure and other related disciplines to judges and personnel of
such courts." j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended
Section 5. Jurisdiction offamily Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive by Republic Act No. 7658; and
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years
of age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of 1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to
age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other
of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a
promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and
incurred.
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to
their development.

49
and provide technical supervision and monitoring of all SSCD in coordination with
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to the judge.
criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties.
Section 10. Social Services and Counseling Division Staff. - The SSCD shall have a
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in staff composed of qualified social workers and other personnel with academic
any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that preparation in behavioral sciences to carry out the duties'of conducting intake
court. assessment, social case studies, casework and counseling, and othersocial services
that may be needed in connection with cases filed with the court: Provided,
Section 6. Use of Income. - All Family Courts shall be allowed the use of ten per however, That in adoption cases and in petitions for declaration of abandonment,
cent (10%) of their income derived from filing and other court fees under Rule 141 the case studies may be prepared by social workers of duly licensed child caring or
of the Rules of Court for research and other operating expenses including capital child placement agencies, or the DSWD. When warranted, the division shall
outlay: Provided, That this benefit shall likewise be enjoyed by all courts of justice. recommend that the court avail itself of consultative services of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and other qualified specialists presently employed in other
The Supreme Court shall promulgate the necessary guidelines to effectively departments of the government in connection with its cases.
implement the provisions of this Sec.
The position of Social Work Adviser shall be created under the Office of the Court
Section 7. Special Provisional Remedies. - In cases of violence among immediate Administrator, who shall monitor and supervise the SSCD ofthe Regional Trial
family members living in the same domicile or household, the Family Court may Court.
issue a restraining order against the accused of defendant upon verified application
by the complainant or the victim for relief from abuse. Section 11. Alternative Social Services. - In accordance with Sec. 17 of this Act, in
areas where no Family Court has been established or no Regional Trial Court was
The court may order the temporary custody of children in all civil actions for their designated by the Supreme Court due to the limited number of cases, the DSWD
custody. The court may also order support pendente lite, including deduction from shall designate and assign qualified, trained, and DSWD accredited social workers
the salary and use of conjugal home and other properties in all civil actions for of the local government units to handle juvenile and family cases filed in the
support. designated Regional Trial Court of the place.

Section 8. Supervision of Youth Detention Homes. - The judge of the Family Court Section 12. Privacy and Confidentiality of Proceedings. - All hearings and
shall have direct control and supervision of the youth detention home which the conciliation of the child and family cases shall be treated in a manner consistent
local government unit shall establish to separate the youth offenders from adult with the promotion of the child's and the family's dignity and worth, and shall
criminals: Provided, however, That alternatives to detention and institutional care respect their privacy at all stages of the proceedings. Records of the cases shall be
shall be made available to the accused including counseling, recognizance, bail, dealt with utmost confidentiality and the identity of parties shall not be divulged
community continuum, or diversions from the justice system: Provided, further, unless necessary and with authority of the judge.
That the human rights of the accused are fully respected in a manner appropriate
to their well-being. Section 13. Special Rules of Procedure. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate
special rules of procedure for the transfer of cases to the new courts during the
Section 9. Social Services and Counseling Division. - Under the guidance ofthe transition period and for the disposition of family cases with the best interests of
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), a Social Services and the child and the protection of the family as primary consideration taking into
Counseling Division (SSCD) shall be established in each judicial region as the account the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Supreme Court shall deem necessary based on the number of juvenile and family
cases existing in such jurisdiction. It shall provide appropriate social services to all Section 14. Appeals. - Decisions and orders of the court shall be appealed in the
juvenile and family cases filed with the court and recommend the proper social same manner and subject to the same conditions as appeals from the ordinary
action. It shall also develop programs, formulate uniform policies and procedures, Regional Trial Courts.

50
Section 15. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of of children, habeas below 18 years of age
this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following in corpus in relation to but not less than 9
its enactment into law and thereafter. minor; years of age;

Section 16. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court, in 2. Petitions for 2. When one or more
coordination with the DSWD, shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations adoption of children of the victims is a
and its revocation; minor at the time of
for the effective implementation of the social aspects of this Act.
the commission of the
3. Complaints for offense (RA 8369, Act
Section 17. Transitory Provisions. - Pending the establishment of such Family
annulment and Establishing the
Courts, the Supreme Court shall designate from among the branches ofthe declaration of nullity of Family Courts);
Regional Trial Court at least one Family Court in each of the cities of Manila, marriage and those
Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag, Baguio, relating to marital 3. Cases against
Santiago, Dagupan, Olongapo, Cabanatuan, San Jose, Angeles, Cavite, Batangas, status and property minors cognizable
Lucena, Naga, Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo, Bacolod, Dumaguete, Tacloban, Cebu, relations of spouses or under the Dangerous
Mandaue, Tagbilaran, Surigao, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General Santos, those living together Drugs Act, as
Oroquieta, Ozamis, Dipolog, Zamboanga, Pagadian, Iligan, and in such other under different status amended;
places as the Supreme Court may deem necessary. and agreements; and
petitions for 4. Violations of RA
Additional cases other than those provided in Sec. 5 may be assigned to the Family dissolution of conjugal 7610 or the Special
partnership of gains; Protection of Children
Courts when their dockets permit: Provided, That such additional cases shall not
Against Child Abuse,
be heard on the same day family cases are heard.
4. Petitions for support Exploitation and
and/or Discrimination Act, as
In areas where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to in Sec. 5 of this acknowledgment; amended by RA 7658;
Act shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court. and
5. Summary judicial
Section 18. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared proceedings under the 5. Cases of domestic
unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect. Family Code of the violence against:
Philippines;
Section 19. Repealing Clause. - All other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or a. Women –
regulations inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed, amended or modified 6. Petitions for involving acts of
accordingly. declaration of status of gender based violence
children as that result, or likely to
abandoned, result in physical,
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
dependent or sexual or
publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
neglected children, psychological harm or
petitions for voluntary suffering to women;
Approved October 28, 1997. or involuntary and other forms of
commitment of physical abuse such as
children, the battering or threats
FAMILY COURTS suspension, and coercion which
termination, or violate a woman’s
Civil Cases Criminal Cases restoration of parental personhood, integrity
Exclusive Original 1. Petitions for 1. Where one or more authority and other and freedom of
guardianship, custody of the accused is/are cases cognizable movement;

51
under PD 603, EO 56 "(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim
(Series of 1986) and b. Children – which exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where
other related laws; include the such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
and commission of all
forms of abuse, "(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of
7. Petitions for the neglect, cruelty, the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate
constitution of the exploitation, violence
matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand
family home (rendered and discrimination and
pesos (P200,000.00);
unnecessary by Art. all other conditions
153, Family Code) prejudicial to their
(Sec. 5, RA 8369). development (Sec. 5, "(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
RA 8369).
"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
Republic Act No. 7691 judicial or quasijudicial functions;
March 25, 1994
"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL Relations as now provided by law; and
COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF "(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
1980" whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
Congress assembled:: abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the
original jurisdiction. exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary Courts shall exercise:
estimation;
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."

52
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these
cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Courts."
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional
amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos
testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional
such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which
must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the shall be considered amended or modified accordingly.
determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where there are several
claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may
same or different transactions; "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative procedure of
defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and
Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos Approved: March 25, 1999
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of SC-AO No. 113-95
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots." RIGHTS

Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

In the interest of an efficient administration of justice and to ensure speedy
"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. – disposition of cases involving violation of Intellectual Property Rights, the following
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts Branches of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial
may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land Courts in Cities, presently presided over by their respective trial judges as herein
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or below indicated, are hereby specially designated to try and decide cases for
contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand violations of Intellectual Property Rights such as, but riot limited to, violations of
pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant Art. 188 of the Revised Penal Code (Substituting and Altering Trademarks, Trade
or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from Names, or Service Marks), Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code (Unfair Competition,

53
Fraudulent Registration of Trade Name, Trademark or Service Mark, Fraudulent 52 Kalookan City Hon. Ma. Luisa Q. Padilla 60 Mandaluyong City Hon. Ernesto T.
Designation of Origin, and False Description), Presidential Decree No. 49 Trinidad 63 Makati City Hon. Alex L. Quiroz 69 Pasig City Hon. Alex E. Ruiz 76
(Protection of Intellectual Property Rights), Presidential Decree No. 87 (An Act Marikina
Creating-the Videogram Regulatory Board), Republic Act No. 165 "as amended
(The Patent Law), and Republic Act 166 as amended' (The Trademark Law) REGION III Hon. Orlando C. Paguio 1 Meycauayan, Bulacan Hon. Mario B.
committed within their respective territorial areas: Capellan 1 Malolos, Bulacan Hon. Rodrigo R. Flores 2 San Fernando , Pampanga
Hon. Aida E. Layug 3 Angeles City Hon. Eduardo D. Alfonso, Jr. 5 Olongapo City
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
REGION IV Hon. Ruben A. Galvez 1 Batangas City Hon. Amalia S. Cuapiaco 1
National Capital Region Cavite City
Name Branch Station
Hon. Rebecca de GuiaSalvador
1 Manila REGION VI Hon. Alfredo D. Hilario 1 Bacolod City Hon. Alexis A. Zerrudo 4 Iloilo ,
City
Hon. Reynaldo B. Daway 90 Quezon City Hon. Nemesio S. Felix 56 Makati City
Hon. Alfredo C. Flores 167 Pasig City Hon. Aurora K Reciña 119 Pasay City Hon. REGION VII Hon. Antonio F. Paraguya 6 Cebu City
Jaime T. Hamoy 130 Kalookan City Hon. Benjamin T. Antonio 170 Malabon Hon.
Ruben P. dela Cruz 272 Marikina Hon. Raul E. de Leon 258 Parañaque Hon. REGION IX Hon. Efren S. Mariano 2 Zamboanga City
Florentino M. Alumbres 255 Las Piñas Hon. Alberto L. Lerma 256 Muntinlupa Hon.
Floro P. Alejo 172 Valenzuela REGION III Hon. Arturo G. Tayag 79 Malolos, REGION X Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo 3 Cagayan de Oro City
Bulacan Hon. Hermin E. Arceo 43 San Fernando, Pampanga Hon. Eliezer R. delos
Santos 59 Angeles City REGION XI Hon. Roberto Q. Cañete 5 Davao City

REGION IV Hon. Mario V. Lopez 2 Batangas City Hon. Jane Aurora C. Lantion 13 All single sala courts with which cases for violation of Intellectual Property Rights
Lipa City Hon. Francisco D. Pano 93 San Pedro, Laguna Hon. Marivic B. Umali 30 are or may be filed shall take cognizance of them as if they have been designated
San Pablo City Hon. Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. 34 Calamba, Laguna Hon. Rodrigo V. as special courts, and for that matter, shall give them priority in their trial
Cosico 24 Biñan, Laguna calendars.

REGION VI Hon. Jose G. Abdallah 39 Iloilo City Hon. Anastacio I. Lobaton 44 The trial of cases for violation of Intellectual Property Rights covered by this
Bacolod City Administrative Order shall be immediately commenced and shall continue from
day to day to be terminated as far as practicable within sixty (60) days from
REGION VII Hon. Benignc G. Gaviola 9 Cebu City initial trial. Judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from date
of submission for decision.
REGION IX Hon. Vicente L. Cabatingan 15 Zamboanga City
All cases referred to herein where trial has already started shall remain in the
REGION X Hon. Arcadio O. Fabria 21 Cagayan de Oro City branches where they are presently assigned. However, cases where pre-trial has
not yet commenced shall be transferred immediately to the branches herein
REGION XI Hon. Augusto V. Branch 10 Davao City designated.

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT/MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES The Executive Judges of the Special Courts herein designated may exclude such
courts from the raffle of new cases whenever in their judgment the caseloads of
National Capital Region Hon. Amelia A. Fabros 9 Manila Hon. Susanita M. Parker said Courts so designated shall not allow them to try these special cases with
40 Quezon City Hon. Estrellita M-. Paas 44 Pasay City Hon. Delfina H. Santiago efficiency and dispatch.

54
of real property or any b. Violations of the
This Order shall take effect immediately and shall continue in effect until further interest therein where rental law;
orders from this Court. 2 October 1995. the value or amount
does not exceed Php c. Violations of
(SGD.) FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO 20,000 or, in Metro municipal or city
Acting Chief Justice Manila Php 50,000 ordinances;
exclusive of interest
damages, attorney’s d. Violations of BP
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS/MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
fees, litigation 22 (A.M. No. 00-1101-
expense, and costs; SC);
Civil Cases Criminal Cases (2008 Bar)
Exclusive Original 1. Actions involving 1. All offenses 5. Maritime claims e. All other criminal
personal property punishable with where the demand or cases where the
where the value of the imprisonment not claim does not exceed penalty is
property does not exceeding 6 years Php 300,000 or, in imprisonment not
exceed Php 300,000 irrespective of the Metro Manila Php exceeding 6 months
or, in Metro Manila Php amount of fine and 400,000 (Sec. 33, BP and/or a fine of Php
400,000; regardless of other 129, as amended by 1,000 irrespective of
imposable accessory RA 7691); other penalties or civil
2. Actions for claim of or other penalties; liabilities arising
money where the 2. In offenses 6. Inclusion or therefrom;
demand does not involving damage to exclusion of voters
exceed Php 300,000 property through (Sec. 138, BP 881);
or, in Metro Manila Php criminal negligence 5. All offenses
400,000; where the imposable 7. Those covered by committed by public
fine does not exceed the Rules on Summary officers and
3. Probate Php 10,000 (Sec. 32, Procedure: employees in relation
proceedings, testate BP 129 as amended by to their office,
or intestate, where the RA 7691); 8. Forcible entry and including government-
value of the estate unlawful detainer; owned or – controlled
does not exceed Php 3. Where the only corporations, and by
300,000 or, in Metro penalty provided by 9. Those covered by private individuals
Manila Php 400,000; law is a fine not the Rules on Small charged as co-
exceeding Php 4,000 Claims, i.e. actions for principals,
NOTE: In the (Admin. Circular No. payment of money accomplices or
foregoing, claim must 09-94, June 14, where the claim does accessories,
be exclusive of 1994); not exceed Two punishable with
interest, damages, Hundred Thousand imprisonment not
attorney’s fees, 4. Those covered by Pesos (P200,000.00) more than 6 years or
litigation expense, and the Rules on Summary exclusive of interest where none of the
costs (Sec. 33, BP 129 Procedure, i.e.: and costs (as accused holds a
as amended by RA amended A.M. No. 08- position classified as
7691). a. Violations of 8-7-SC, effective “Grade 27” and higher
traffic laws, rules and February 1, 2016). (Sec. 4, P.D. 1606, as
4. Actions involving regulations; amended by RA 8249).
title to or possession

55
Delegated Cadastral or land counterclaim in the amount of Php 400,000 (Albano, 2007, citing Agustin v.
registration cases Bacalan, No. L-46000, March 18, 1985).
covering lots where: 1.
There is no
controversy or
opposition; Shar’iah Courts
a. Appellate
2. Contested but the
b. District
value does not exceed
c. Circuit
Php 100,000 (Sec. 34,
BP 129, as amended
by RA 7691).  Equivalent to the Regional Trial Courts in rank are the Shari'a District
Courts which were established in certain specified provinces in Mindanao
NOTE: The value shall where the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines is being
be ascertained by the enforced.
affidavit of the  There are five Shari'a District Courts and fifty one Shari'a Circuit Courts
claimant or agreement in existence.
of the respective  A Shari'a District Court is of limited jurisdiction. It was created under
claimants (Sec. 34, BP Presidential Decree No. 1083. Cases falling within the exclusive
129 as amended by RA jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Courts primarily pertain to family rights
7691).
and duties as well as contractual relations of Filipino Muslims in the
Special Petition for habeas Application for bail in
Mindanao.
corpus in the absence the absence of all RTC
 It has exclusive original jurisdiction over the following:
of all RTC judges in the judges in the province
province or city (Sec. or city. 1. All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy,
35, BP 129). paternity and filiation arising under Presidential Decree No. 1083;
With RTC Cases involving 2. All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of
enforcement or the estate of a deceased Muslim, probate of wills, issuance of letters of
violations of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless
environmental and of the nature or the aggregate value of the property;
other related laws, 3. Petitions for declaration of absence and death and for
rules and regulations cancellation and correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned
(Sec. 2, Rule 1, A.M. in Title VI, Book Two of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
No. 09-6-8SC). 4. All actions arising from customary contracts in which the
parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their
Q: A filed a complaint for sum of money against B in the MTC of Manila, relations;
seeking for the award of Php 300,000. B, the defendant filed an answer 5. All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari,
with counterclaim alleging that A is liable to him in the amount of Php habeas corpus, and all auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
500,000. Assume that Judge C would hold A liable, how much can be jurisdiction;
awarded to B by way of his counterclaim? Why?
 It has concurrent original jurisdiction over the following:
A: The judge can award Php 400,000 only, because that limit is the court’s 1. Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of the family home,
jurisdiction. When B submitted his claim against A, he voluntarily submitted the change of name and commitment of insane person to any asylum;
same to the jurisdiction of MTC, and he is bound thereby. He is deemed to have 2. All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph
waived the excess of his claim beyond Php 400,000. It is as if B set up a 1(d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible

56
entry and unlawful detainer which shall fall under the exclusive original Concurrent 1. Petitions by Muslim for the constitution of a family
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Courts; and (with all civil home, change of name and commitment of an insane
3. All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief courts) person to an asylum;
where the parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively 2. All other personal and legal actions not mentioned
to a Muslim. in paragraph 1(d) wherein the parties involved are
Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive
The Shari'a District Court has appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
in the Shari'a Circuit Courts within their territorial jurisdiction.
1. It shall decide every case on the basis of the evidence and the
3. All special civic actions for interpleader or
records transmitted as well as such memoranda, briefs or oral declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or
arguments as the parties may submit. the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.
2. The decisions of the Shari'a District Courts, whether on appeal
from the Shari'a Circuit Courts or not, shall be final.
The Supreme Court shall, however, continue to exercise original and appellate LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
jurisdiction over certain issues as provided by the Constitution. RANDOLPH C. LIMJOCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167702
March 20, 2009 THIRD DIVISION
SHARI’A COURTS
FACTS:
Exclusive 1. All cases involving custody, guardianship,  Petitioner is residential lot owner in Urdaneta Village.
Original legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under the  Respondents Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre were the former president and
Code of Muslim Personal Laws; chairman of the board of governors (or "board"), construction committee
chairman and village manager of Urdaneta Village Association Inc. (UVAI),
2. All cases involving disposition, distribution and
respectively, an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village.
settlement of estate of deceased Muslims, probate of
 Petitioner started constructing a house on her lot with "concrete canopy
wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors directly above the main door and highway"
regardless of the nature or aggregate value of the  Petitioner brough an action before the RTC against said respondents on
property; the ff grounds: o that for alleged violation of its Construction Rules and
Regulations (or "CRR") on "Set Back Line" vis-a-vis the canopy easement,
3. Petitions for the declaration of absence and death UVAI imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00 and barred her workers
for the cancellation or correction of entries in the and contractors from entering the village and working on her property;
Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI, Book Two of  that the CRR, particularly on "Set Back Line," is contrary to law; and that
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws; the penalty is unwarranted and excessive
 Respondents filed an MD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
4. All actions arising from the customary contracts in subject matter. It is the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (or
which the parties are Muslims, if they have not
"HIGC")2 which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving
specified which law shall govern their relations; and
homeowners associations, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 535, Series of
5. All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, 1979, as amended by Exec. Order No. 90, Series of 1986. RTC - denied
certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs the MD - ratiocinated that [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] may not
and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. assail its jurisdiction "after they voluntarily entered their appearance,
sought reliefs therein, and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an

57
undertaking to desist from prohibiting (Eristingcol’s) workers from  At the outset, we note that the relationship between the parties is not in
entering the village." CA - reversed RTC’s order denying the MD dispute and is, in fact, admitted by Eristingcol in her complaint.
Nonetheless, Eristingcol is adamant that the subject matter of her
ISSUE: Which court/ tribunal has jurisdiction over the present case? complaint is properly cognizable by the regular courts and need not be
filed before a specialized body or commission. o Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s
HELD: complaint, designated as one for declaration of nullity, falls within the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) regular courts’ jurisdiction. However, we have, on more than one
The present petition could have been dismissed outright for failure to implead all occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of
parties. the nature of the action.
 A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint reveals
 Before anything else, we note that the instant petition impleads only that the nature of the question subject of this controversy only
Limjoco as private respondent. The rest of the defendants sued by superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s Construction Rules.
Eristingcol before the RTC, who then collectively filed the petition for  The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application
certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC’s Order, were, curiously, not of UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the
included as private respondents in this particular petition. conflict between the parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of
 Eristingcol explains that only respondent Limjoco was retained in the UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the application of the canopy
instant petition as her discussions with UVAI and the other defendants requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction Rules.
revealed their lack of participation in the work-stoppage order which was  Significantly, Eristingcol does not assail the height restriction of UVAI’s
supposedly single-handedly thought of and implemented by Limjoco. Construction Rules, as she has readily complied therewith.
 The foregoing clarification notwithstanding, the rest of the defendants  Distinctly in point is China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, which upheld
should have been impleaded as respondents in this petition considering the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over
that the complaint before the RTC, where the petition before the CA and the suit and recognized its special competence to interpret and apply
the instant petition originated, has yet to be amended. Furthermore, the Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc.’s (VGCCI’s) by-laws.
present petition maintains that it was serious error for the CA to have  We ruled, thus:
ruled that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over a complaint for o Applying the foregoing principles in the case at bar, to ascertain
declaration of nullity of UVAI’s Construction Rules. Clearly, UVAI and the which tribunal has jurisdiction we have to determine therefore
rest of the defendants should have been impleaded herein as respondents. whether or not petitioner is a stockholder of VGCCI and whether
 Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, requires that the petition shall or not the nature of the controversy between petitioner and
"state the full name of the appealing party as petitioner and the adverse private respondent corporation is intra-corporate.
party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges  As to the first query, there is no question that the purchase of the subject
thereof either as petitioners or respondents." As the losing party in share or membership certificate at public auction by petitioner (and the
defendants’ petition for certiorari before the CA, Eristingcol should have issuance to it of the corresponding Certificate of Sale) transferred
impleaded all petitioners, the winning and adverse parties therein. o On ownership of the same to the latter and thus entitled petitioner to have
this score alone, the present petition could have been dismissed outright.5 the said share registered in its name as a member of VGCCI. x x x.
However, to settle the issue of jurisdiction, we have opted to dispose of  By virtue of the aforementioned sale, petitioner became a bona fide
this case on the merits. stockholder of VGCCI and, therefore, the conflict that arose between
 In determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should petitioner and VGCCI aptly exemplifies an intra-corporate controversy
consider not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the between a corporation and its stockholder under Sec. 5(b) of P.D. 902-A.
nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. To  An important consideration, moreover, is the nature of the controversy
determine the nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts between petitioner and private respondent corporation. VGCCI claims a
must look at the averments of the complaint or petition and the essence prior right over the subject share anchored mainly on Sec. 3, Art. VIII of
of the relief prayed for. its by-laws which provides that "after a member shall have been posted
as delinquent, the Board may order his/her/its share sold to satisfy the

58
claims of the Club…" It is pursuant to this provision that VGCCI also sold  In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is
the subject share at public auction, of which it was the highest bidder. necessary to resolve preliminarily— on the basis of the allegations in the
VGCCI caps its argument by asserting that its corporate bylaws should Complaint— whether [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the
prevail. The bone of contention, thus, is the proper interpretation and SCHA.
application of VGCCI’s aforequoted by-laws, a subject which irrefutably  [SCHA] contend[s] that because the Complaint arose from intra-corporate
calls for the special competence of the SEC. relations between the SCHA and its members, the HIGC therefore has
 We reiterate herein the sound policy enunciated by the Court in Abejo v. jurisdiction over the dispute. To support their contention that
De la Cruz: [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the association, [SCHA]
 6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest cite[s] the SCHA’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws which provide
jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power to that all landowners of the Sta. Clara Subdivision are automatically
resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations, public members of the SCHA.
transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the  We are not persuaded. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
Industrial Court’s intervention in the resolution of labor-management association includes the freedom not to associate. The right to choose with
controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that
be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees the right to
held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to form
jurisdiction … the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy or join one.
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative  More to the point, [respondent-spouses Gaston] cannot be compelled to
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate consent. x x x. In the present case, however, other than the said Articles
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that [respondent
purposes of the regulatory statute administered. spouses Gaston] have agreed to be SCHA members.
 In this case, the need for the SEC’s technical expertise cannot be over-  It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
emphasized involving as it does the meticulous analysis and correct by the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas
interpretation of a corporation’s by-laws as well as the applicable or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to
provisions of the Corporation Code in order to determine the validity of dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
VGCCI’s claims. The SEC, therefore, took proper cognizance of the instant upon the whims of the defendant.
case.11  The Complaint does not allege that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are
 Likewise in point is our illuminating ruling in Sta. Clara Homeowners’ members of the SCHA. In point of fact, they deny such membership. Thus,
Association v. Sps. Gaston,12 although it ultimately held that the question the HIGC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
of subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint of respondent- spouses  In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case
Gaston for declaration of nullity of a board resolution issued by Sta. Clara is well-established. Given this admitted relationship, the privity of contract
Homeowners’ Association (SCHA) was vested in the regular courts. In Sta. between UVAI and Eristingcol is palpable, despite the latter’s deft
Clara, the main issue raised by SCHA reads: "Whether [the CA] erred in phraseology of its primary cause of action as a declaration of nullity of
upholding the jurisdiction of the [RTC], ‘to declare as null and void the UVAI’s Construction Rules. In short, the crux of Eristingcol’s complaint is
resolution of the Board of SCHA, decreeing that only members [in] good UVAI’s supposed arbitrary implementation of its construction rules against
standing of the said association were to be issued stickers for use in their Eristingcol, a member thereof. o Moreover, as in Sta. Clara (had
vehicles.’" In holding that the regular courts had jurisdiction over respondent-spouses Gaston been members of SCHA), the controversy
respondent-spouses Gaston’s complaint for declaration of nullity, we which arose between the parties in this case partook of the nature of an
stressed the absence of relationship and the consequent lack of privity of intra-corporate dispute. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 535,14 which
contract between the parties, thus: amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC
the regulatory and administrative functions over homeowners’

59
associations originally vested with the SEC. Section 2 of E.O. No. 535  To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO hearing was
provides in pertinent part: held on February 9, 1999, a day after the filing of the complaint. On
2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home even date, the parties reached a temporary settlement reflected in the
Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among others, the following Undertaking. Fifteen days thereafter, defendants, including Limjoco, filed
additional powers: a Motion to Dismiss. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of
(a) x x x; and exercise all the powers, authorities and events cannot be characterized as laches as would bar defendants from
responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction.
Commission with respect to home owners association, the provision of Act  In fine, based on the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint, it
1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding; is the HLURB, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this case.
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all
houseowners association registered in accordance therewith. GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner, vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and
By virtue thereof, the HIGC likewise assumed the SEC’s original BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents. G.R. No. 131282
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving controversies January 4, 2002
arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations. SECOND DIVISION
Thereafter, with the advent of Republic Act No. 8763, the
foregoing powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to FACTS:
homeowners’ associations, were transferred to the HLURB.  Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession
As regards the defendants’ supposed embrace of the RTC’s and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against PR and 2
jurisdiction by appearing thereat and undertaking to desist from other persons, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.
prohibiting Eristingcol’s workers from entering the village, suffice it to  Petitioner alleged that PR entered and occupied petitioner’s property and
state that the invocation of the doctrine in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, when asked to leave the premises, refused to do so and threatened said
et al.16 is quite a long stretch. petitioner with bodily harm.
The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in the case at bench  Petitioner then entered into an agreement with the Ruenas which
are worlds apart. As found by the CA, defendants’ stipulated, among others, that the latter shall respect petitioner’s
appearance before the RTC was pursuant to, and in compliance with, a subpoena ownership and possession over the subject property.
issued by that court in connection with Eristingcol’s application for a Temporary  PR was not a party to said agreement
Restraining Order (TRO). On defendants’ supposed agreement to sign the  PR failed to file his answer and was thus declared in default RTC in favor
Undertaking allowing Eristingcol’s workers, contractors, and suppliers to enter of petitioner; ordered PR to vacate the subject property
and exit the village, this temporary settlement cannot be equated with full  PR - filed an MNT alleging that he was a tenant of one Laurente and that
acceptance of the RTC’s authority, as what actually transpired in Tijam. he turned over the complaint and summons to the latter in the honest
 The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, onl y an exception to the general belief that said Laurente was the property party to receive the same
rule that an objection to the court’s jurisdiction over a case may be  During this time, an administrative case was pending before herein
raised at any stage of the proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects petitioner and the Laurentes before the RD of DENR, which was
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of a case . subsequently forwarded to DENR RO
 In that case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising  PR - then filed a petition for relief from judgment with the same
the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time—fifteen years after allegations in the MNT
the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu.  He alleged that the judgment was void inasmuch as the Laurentes, as
Indeed, in several stages of the proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the alleged owners of the property, were not impleaded therein o The
CA, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain Laurentes then filed a Motion for Intervention
affirmative relief, and even submitted its case for a final adjudication on  RTC - denied the petition for relief from judgment
the merits. Consequently, it was barred by laches from invoking the  PR filed an MR - private respondent alleged that the RTC had no
CFI’s lack of jurisdiction. jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240
and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.

60
 RTC - denied the MR  He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the
 PR - filed a petition for certiorari same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of
 CA - granted the petition o private respondent is not estopped from the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time
assailing the jurisdiction 'of the RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del the RTC's lack of jurisdiction.
Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his Motion for  This motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the
Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal,
but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default,
ISSUE # 1: Whether RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and
HELD # 1: NO. denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still
refused to reconsider the denial of private respondent's motion for relief
ISSUE # 2: Whether PR may still question such jurisdiction. from judgment, it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and
HELD # 2: YES. Was private respondent estopped from questioning the a writ of execution.
jurisdiction of the RTC?  Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in
 In this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not
not. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief,  The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an
effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court's action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
jurisdiction, we note that estoppel has become an equitable defense that acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may
is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
right and not merely its equitable enforcement. proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in
 Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction
the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional over the action. Even if private respondent actively participated in the
because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice. proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be
 In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction
in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.
petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two  Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not
other parties before the said court, believing that the RTC had a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of
jurisdiction over his complaint. conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall
 But by then, Republic Act 769117 amending BP 129 had become apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and
effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the exceptional circumstances. The Court of Appeals found support for its
MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled ruling in our decision in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error in
late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take
Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient
anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or
private respondent was declared in default. of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to
 He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame
he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby
his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the
to prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an
of his long, continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
tenant-lessee of the land. But his motion was denied. He tried an subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render
alternative recourse. a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or

61
annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) HELD # 3: NO.
years from the finality of the same. The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
Indeed, "...the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that
of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its private respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC
decision a 'lawless' thing."25 after he had filed several motions before it. The secondary issue is whether the
Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, Court of appeals erred in holding that private respondent's failure to file an
it could logically never become final and executory, hence appeal answer to the complaint was justified.
therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through counsel submitted to this
private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals Court pleadings that contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his
was in order . petition,8 we find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in
In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to Annex E9 of his
from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated petition which supposedly is the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of
the doctrine that estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as San Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the notation, "Note: Subject for
its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice. Here, we find General Revision Effective 1994."
that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his But it appears that Annex E of his petition is not a Certification but a xerox copy
complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction. Defendant, a of a Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the document contain a notation,
farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before the proper "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner also asked this
administrative agency concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the Court to refer to Annex F,10 where he said the zonal value of the disputed land
case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the
could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction
issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not to be of the municipal court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake when he However, we find that these annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are
initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that obviously without evidentiary weight or value.
the controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within the
jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper OF APPEALS, Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR,
resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region, Iloilo City, and LUCKY
sustained, he would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON JESENA, JR., as Manager,
Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a Respondents. G.R. No. 144025 December 27, 2002 THIRD DIVISION
technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that
he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee. FACTS:
Having determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the  Petitioners purchased from PR Lucky Homes a parcel of land
appellate court in ruling that private respondent was not estopped from denominated in the subsequently issued TCT as Lot 18, instead of Lot
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in 19, due to the mistake of PR
detail the second issue. Suffice it to say that, given the circumstances in  Petitioners had already started making improvements on said Lot 18
this case, no error was committed on this score by respondent appellate when PR informed the former of its mistake
court. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, private  Petitioners instead offered to buy Lot 18 and continued making
respondent had justifiable reason in law not to file an answer, aside from improvements on the same
the fact that he believed the suit was properly his landlord's concern.  Due to petitioners’ default in payment of Lot 19, the same was
foreclosed by SSS, thus prompting them to offer PR to swap it with Lot
ISSUE # 3: Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that PR 18, to which PR refused
was not estopped from questioning RTC’s jurisdiction.  Petitioners then instituted before the RTC an action for reformation of
contract and damages

62
 RTC - dismissed the complaint for lack of merit Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa vs. Court of
 Petitioners continued staying on Lot 18 but likewise subsequently Appeals;7 Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals;8 Salva vs. Court of Appeals;9 National
defaulted in the payment thereof thereby resulting in its foreclosure in Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals;
favor of SSS, similar to Lot 19 Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals;
 Petitioners then filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution issued PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,12 this Court
by RTC, contending that RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was affirmed the rule that a partys active participation in all stages of the case before
vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative
to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree) relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same court’s
They then filed a new complaint before the HLURB jurisdiction.
 They likewise filed before the CA - petition for annulment of judgment, In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of
premised on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private
decide said case respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners
 CA - denied the petition relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners
estoppel as laid down in the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy; likewise ever raise the issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which
denied petitioners’ MR lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and
issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue
ISSUE: Whether CA correctly ruled that petitioners were estopped from of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them.
questioning the jurisdiction of RTC. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s jurisdiction
over the case they themselves filed
HELD: Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to
YES. At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us the profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent.
annulment of a trial court judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Because it is not This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
an appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not in issue here. Accordingly, there decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for
is no need to delve into the propriety of the decision rendered by the trial court. lack of jurisdiction if not.
Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double dealing by
the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent
positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good faith.
We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners never raised the issue of
an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they
assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It
rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. is now too late in the day for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking
As we held in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy: all along.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA,
for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez,
record, and of estoppel by laches. o It has been held that a party cannot invoke Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval,
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same N. Nueca, respondents. G.R. No. 124644
jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the February 5, 2004
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases SECOND DIVISION
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order
of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

63
FACTS: Information. Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case
continues until the case is terminated.[20]
Petitioner is a graduate of PMA and a member of AFP, PH Constabulary, and the Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the
Intelligence Group of PNP. Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
A shootout occurred during a surveillance operation conducted by him and his (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
team. known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Petitioner and one Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias “Jun Bombita” were then indicted Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
for murder before the RTC. (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
RTC then issued a warrant and petitioner posted bail. RTC also issued an order employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-
preventively suspending petitioner. He was then arraigned and pleaded not owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
guilty. crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
Petitioner, after arraignment, filed an motion to quash the information on the imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….However, for the
ground that the court martial, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over criminal cases Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes
involving PNP members and officers. committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts
Pending the reso of said motion, petitioner filed another motion for the lifting of showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the
his suspension. He also filed an MD averring that since the offense was discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.
committed in the performance of his duties, it was the Sandiganbayan which had It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime
exclusive jurisdiction over the same charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that
RTC - denied motion to lift suspension would be a conclusion of law.The amended Information filed with the RTC against
RTC - initially denied MD upon preliminary investigation, finding that the offense the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation
was not committed in the performance of petitioner’s duties between his office and the discharge of his duties.
However, upon MR, RTC reversed itself and declared that based on the Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on
petitioner’s evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include
concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office.
It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nueca’s admission in her complaint before the The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened. Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606
RTC then issued an order directing the prosecutor to transmit the case to the SB was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:
PJ of Sandiganbayan - ordered the remand of the case to the RTC on the ff In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
grounds: considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of “23.” corresponding to salary grade “27” or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or
commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal
judgment therein after trial Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
ISSUE: Which court/ tribunal has jurisdiction over the murder charge against Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in
petitioner? relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade
below “27,” the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case
HELD: RTC. may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade “23.”
in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence,
commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7691.

64
The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied case, can only be resorted to when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a remedy for the party in the ordinary course of law.
substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively. In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,41 this Court elucidates that –
Although Rule 65 does not specify any period for the filing of a petition for certiorari
ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT and mandamus, it must, nevertheless, be filed within a reasonable time. In
OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO R. certiorari cases, the definitive rule now is that such reasonable time is within three
MENDOZA and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, months from the commission of the complained act. The same rule should apply to
respondents. G.R. No. 169914 April 18, 2008 mandamus cases.
The unreasonable delay in the filing of the petitioner's mandamus suit unerringly
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF negates any claim that the application for the said extraordinary remedy was the
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and MANILA most expeditious and speedy available to the petitioner. (Emphasis ours.)
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF As the revised Rules now stand, a petition for certiorari may be filed within 60 days
APPEALS and SALACNIB BATERINA, respondents. G.R. No. 174166 from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed.
April 18, 2008 EN BANC Reasonable time for filing a petition for mandamus should likewise be for the same
period. The filing by the AEDC of its petition for mandamus 20 months after its
FACTS: supposed right to the project arose is evidently beyond reasonable time and
Petitioner AEDC alleges that it is the recognized and unchallenged original negates any claim that the said petition for the extraordinary writ was the most
proponent of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger expeditious and speedy remedy available to AEDC.
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III), hence, has exclusive, clear and vested statutory right AEDC contends that the "reasonable time" within which it should have filed its
to be awarded the said project petition should be reckoned only from 21 September 2005, the date when AEDC
Banking on SC's declaration in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to received the letter from the Office of the Solicitor General refusing to recognize the
PIATCO is null and void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC) filed before rights of AEDC to provide the available funds for the completion of the NAIA IPT
this Court the present Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition (with Application for III Project and to reimburse the costs of the structures already built by PIATCO. It
Temporary Restraining Order) has been unmistakable that even long before said letter – especially when the
Government instituted with the RTC of Pasay City expropriation proceedings for
ISSUE: Whether SC may properly take cognizance of the present petition for the NAIA IPT III on 21 December 2004 – that the Government would not recognize
mandamus and prohibition. any right that AEDC purportedly had over the NAIA IPT III Project and that the
Government is intent on taking over and operating the NAIA IPT III itself.
HELD: NO. Another strong argument against the AEDC's Petition is that it is already barred by
AEDC revived its hope to acquire the NAIA IPT III Project when this Court res judicata.
promulgated its Decision in Agan on 5 May 2003. The said Decision became final In Agan,43 it was noted that on 16 April 1997, the AEDC instituted before the RTC
and executory on 17 February 2004 upon the denial by this Court of the Motion of Pasig City Civil Case No. 66213, a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the
for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration submitted by PIATCO. It is Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction, against the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC
this Decision that declared the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO as Chairman and members.
null and void; without the same, then the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to AEDC, however, invokes the purported pressure exerted upon it by then President
PIATCO would still subsist and other persons would remain precluded from Joseph E. Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by the DOTC, and paragraph 2 in
acquiring rights thereto, including AEDC. Irrefutably, the present claim of AEDC is the afore-quoted Joint Motion to Dismiss to justify the nonapplication of the
rooted in the Decision of this Court in Agan. However, AEDC filed the Petition at doctrine of res judicata to its present Petition.
bar only 20 months after the promulgation of the Decision in Agan on 5 May The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment, are as
2003. follows:
It must be emphasized that under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the revised Rules (1) the former judgment or order must be final;
of Civil Procedure, petitions for prohibition and mandamus, such as in the instant

65
(2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered in the future. Logically also, there was no more need for the parties to admit to
after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the any liability considering that they already agreed to absolutely discharge each other
trial of the case; therefrom, without necessarily conceding to the other's position. For AEDC, it was
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the a declaration that even if it was not conceding to the Government's position, it was
subject matter and the parties; and nonetheless waiving any legal entitlement it might have to sue the Government on
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of account of the NAIA IPT III Project. Conversely, for the Government, it was an
parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.46 All of the elements are present avowal that even if it was not accepting AEDC's stance, it was all the same
herein so as to bar the present Petition. relinquishing its right to file any suit against AEDC in connection with the same
First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was project. That none of the parties admitted liability or conceded its position is
issued on 30 April 1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise without bearing on the validity or binding effect of the compromise agreement,
agreement, once approved by the court is immediately executory and not considering that these were not essential to the said compromise.
appealable. Third, there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the
Second, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing Civil Case No. 66213 subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 66213. The RTC can exercise original
pursuant to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties constitutes a judgment jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
on the merits. mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.51 To recall, the Petition
The Joint Motion to Dismiss stated that the parties were willing to settle the case of AEDC before the RTC of Pasig City was for the declaration of nullity of
amicably and, consequently, moved for the dismissal thereof. It also contained a proceedings, mandamus and injunction. The RTC of Pasig City likewise had
provision in which the parties – the AEDC, on one hand, and the DOTC Secretary jurisdiction over the parties, with the voluntary submission by AEDC and proper
and PBAC, on the other – released and forever discharged each other from any and service of summons on the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members.
all liabilities, whether criminal or civil, arising in connection with the case. It is
undisputable that the parties entered into a compromise agreement, defined as "a Lastly, there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the RTC of Pasig City and the
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation Petition now pending before this Court, an identity of parties, of subject matter,
or put an end to one already commenced. and of causes of action.
" Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested There is an identity of parties. In both petitions, the AEDC is the petitioner. The
by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which respondents in Civil Case No. 66213 are the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC
are to constitute the contract. Once an agreement is stamped with judicial Chairman and members. The respondents in the instant Petition are the DOTC, the
approval, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having DOTC Secretary, and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). While it
the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it may be conceded that MIAA was not a respondent and did not participate in Civil
has the force and effect of any other judgment.49 Article 2037 of the Civil Code Case No. 66213, it may be considered a successor-in-interest of the PBAC. When
explicitly provides that a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority Civil Case No. 66213 was initiated, PBAC was then in charge of the NAIA IPT III
of res judicata. Project, and had the authority to evaluate the bids and award the project to the
Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there was accordingly one offering the lowest or most advantageous bid. Since the bidding is already
a judicial settlement of the controversy, and the Order, dated 30 April 1999, of the over, and the structures comprising NAIA IPT III are now built, then MIAA has
RTC of Pasig City was no less a judgment on the merits which may be annulled taken charge thereof. Furthermore, it is clear that it has been the intention of the
only upon the ground of extrinsic fraud. AEDC to name as respondents in their two Petitions the government agency/ies
Thus, the RTC of Pasig City, in the same Order, correctly granted the dismissal of and official/s who, at the moment each Petition was filed, had authority over the
Civil Case No. 66213 with prejudice. NAIA IPT III Project.
A scrutiny of the Joint Motion to Dismiss submitted to the RTC of Pasig City would There is an identity of subject matter because the two Petitions involve none other
reveal that the parties agreed to discharge one another from any and all liabilities, than the award and implementation of the NAIA IPT III Project.
whether criminal or civil, arising from the case, after AEDC was furnished with a There is an identity of cause of action because, in both Petitions, AEDC is asserting
copy of the 1997 Concession Agreement between the DOTC and PIATCO. This the violation of its right to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project as the original
complete waiver was the reciprocal concession of the parties that puts to an end proponent in the absence of any other qualified bidders. As early as in Civil Case
the present litigation, without any residual right in the parties to litigate the same No. 66213, AEDC already sought a declaration by the court of the absence of any

66
other qualified proponent submitting a competitive bid for the NAIA IPT III Project, Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties in Civil Case No. 66213 was issued on
which, ultimately, would result in the award of the said project to it. 30 April 1999, yet AEDC only spoke of the alleged fraud which vitiated its consent
AEDC attempts to evade the effects of its compromise agreement by alleging that thereto in its Petition before this Court filed on 20 October 2005, more than six
it was compelled to enter into such an agreement when former President Joseph years later. It is obvious that the assertion by AEDC of its vitiated consent to
E. Estrada asserted his influence and intervened in Civil Case No. 66213. This the Joint Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 66213 is nothing more than an after-
allegation deserves scant consideration. Without any proof that such events did thought and a desperate attempt to escape the legal implications thereof, including
take place, such statements remain mere allegations that cannot be given weight. the barring of its present Petition on the ground of res judicata. It is also
One who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a contract must irrelevant to the legal position of AEDC that the Government asserted in Agan that
establish the same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not merely by the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO was void. That the Government
preponderance thereof.52 And, even assuming arguendo, that the consent of AEDC eventually took such a position, which this Court subsequently upheld, does not
to the compromise agreement was indeed vitiated, then President Estrada was affect AEDC's commitments and obligations under its judiciallyapproved
removed from office in January 2001. AEDC filed the present Petition only on 20 compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 66213, which AEDC signed willingly,
October 2005. The four-year prescriptive period, within which an action to annul a knowingly, and ably assisted by legal counsel. In addition, it cannot be said that
voidable contract may be brought, had already expired.53 there has been a fundamental change in the Government's position since Civil Case
The AEDC further claims that the DOTC committed fraud when, without AEDC's No. 66213, contrary to the allegation of AEDC. The Government then espoused
knowledge, the DOTC entered into an Amended and Restated Concession that AEDC is not entitled to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project. The Government
Agreement (ARCA) with PIATCO. The fraud on the part of the DOTC purportedly still maintains the exact same position presently. That the Government eventually
also vitiated AEDC's consent to the compromise agreement. It is true that a judicial reversed its position on the validity of its award of the project to PIATCO is not
compromise may be set aside if fraud vitiated the consent of a party thereof; and inconsistent with its position that neither should AEDC be awarded the project.
that the extrinsic fraud, which nullifies a compromise, likewise invalidates the
decision approving it.54 However, once again, AEDC's allegations of fraud are
unsubstantiated. There is no proof that the DOTC and PIATCO willfully and DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR., JOSEPH B. CATAHAN, JOSE MARI B. REUNILLA,
deliberately suppressed and kept the information on the execution of the ARCA MANUEL ANTONIO B. BOÑE, MAMERTO S. CLARA, REUEL E. DIMALANTA, MORY
from AEDC. The burden of proving that there indeed was fraud lies with the party V. DOMALAON, CONRADO G. DIMAANO, LOLITA R. HIZON, REMEDIOS P.
making such allegation. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. The ADOLFO, BIENVENIDO C. HILARIO, MIASCOR WORKERS UNION - NATIONAL
burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU), and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
on either side. In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed.55 Moreover, a (PALEA), petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.,
judicial compromise may be rescinded or set aside on the ground of fraud in MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
accordance with Rule 38 of the Rules on Civil Procedure on petition for relief from TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY LEANDRO M.
judgment. Section 3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
relief must be filed: o SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A Communications, respondents, MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION,
petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be DNATA-WINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, MACROASIA-EUREST
verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, SERVICES, INC., MACROASIAMENZIES AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION,
final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR AIRCRAFT
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken, and MAINTENANCE CORPORATION, and MIASCOR LOGISTICS CORPORATION,
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident constituting the petitioners-in-intervention G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003 EN BANC
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
According to this Court's ruling in Argana v. Republic,56 as applied to a judgment FACTS: Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited
based on compromise, both the 60-day and six-month reglementary periods within proposal to DOTC for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal
which to file a petition for relief should be reckoned from the date when the decision III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement, which was
approving the compromise agreement was rendered because such judgment is then endorsed by DOTC to NEDA DOTC then created the Prequalification Bids
considered immediately executory and entered on the date that it was approved and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project
by the court. In the present case, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City granting the PBAC determined that the challenger, Paircargo, which later on incorporated as

67
herein respondent PIATCO, had prequalified to undertake the project PBAC involves significant legal questions. The facts necessary to resolve these legal
formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted by the questions are well established and, hence, need not be determined by a trial
Paircargo Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 working days or until November 28, court. The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from
1996 within which to match the said bid, otherwise, the project would be assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when
awarded to Paircargo, which AEDC failed to do, thus resulting in the submission the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
by NEDA of the concession agreement for the second-pass approval of the NEDA- exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
ICC AEDC filed before RTC Pasig a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the and calling for the exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction.[19] It is easy to
Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against the Secretary of the DOTC, the discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the
Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D. relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these cases
Alvarez, in his capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee DOTC are of transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation
issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO Government and PIATCO of the country’s premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues
signed an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) MIAA which submitted for resolution are of first impression and they entail the proper legal
is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its
had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger controversy before the Court, procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the
handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo speedy disposition of the instant cases. In Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court
handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at of Appeals,[20] even after finding that the arbitration clause in the
the NAIA. Some of these service providers are the Miascor Group, DNATA-Wings Distributorship Agreement in question is valid and the dispute between the
Aviation Systems Corp., and the MacroAsia Group. Miascor, DNATA and parties is arbitrable, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying
MacroAsia, together with Philippine Airlines (PAL), are the dominant players in petitioner’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings pursuant to the arbitration clause
the industry with an aggregate market share of 70%. o the workers of the under the contract. In so ruling, this Court held that as contracts produce legal
international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, only the parties to the
employment upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed before Distributorship Agreement are bound by its terms, including the arbitration clause
this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of said agreements stipulated therein. This Court ruled that arbitration proceedings could be called
respondent PIATCO informed the Court that on March 4, 2003 PIATCO for but only with respect to the parties to the contract in question. Considering
commenced arbitration proceedings before the International Chamber of that there are parties to the case who are neither parties to the Distributorship
Commerce, International Court of Arbitration (ICC) by filing a Request for Agreement nor heirs or assigns of the parties thereto, this Court, citing its
Arbitration with the Secretariat of the ICC against the Government of the previous ruling in Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty Corporation,[21] held that to
Republic of the Philippines acting through the DOTC and MIAA. Respondent tolerate the splitting of proceedings by allowing arbitration as to some of the
PIATCO further alleges that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the instant parties on the one hand and trial for the others on the other hand would, in
cases as factual issues are involved which this Court is ill effect, result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary
equipped to resolve. Moreover, PIATCO alleges that submission of this delay.[22] Thus, we ruled that the interest of justice would best be served if the
controversy to this Court at the first instance is a violation of the rule on trial court hears and adjudicates the case in a single and complete proceeding.
hierarchy of courts. They contend that trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction It is established that petitioners in the present cases who have presented
with this Court with respect to a special civil action for prohibition and hence, legitimate interests in the resolution of the controversy are not parties to the
following the rule on hierarchy of courts, resort must first be had before the trial PIATCO Contracts. Accordingly, they cannot be bound by the arbitration clause
courts. provided for in the ARCA and hence, cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration
proceedings. A speedy and decisive resolution of all the critical issues in the
ISSUE: Whether the arbitration steps taken by respondent PIATCO ousted SC of present controversy, including those raised by petitioners, cannot be made before
jurisdiction over the present cases. an arbitral tribunal. The object of arbitration is precisely to allow an expeditious
determination of a dispute. This objective would not be met if this Court were to
HELD: NO. After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues allow the parties to settle the cases by arbitration as there are certain issues
involved, this Court is of the view that the crux of the instant controversy

68
involving non-parties to the PIATCO Contracts which the arbitral tribunal will not in the sanggunians for the immediate ventilation, articulation, and crystallization
be equipped to resolve. of issues affecting barangay government administration o Respondents (1)
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing; (2) the petition
should not be entertained by this Court in view of the pendency before the
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF Regional Trial Court of Manila of two actions or petitions questioning the subject
MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, ordinance and executive order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; and
respondents. G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004 EN BANC (4) the act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli.

FACTS: Petitioner Liga, the national organization of all the barangays in PH ISSUE: Whether the present petition for certiorari may be taken cognizance of by
constituting of duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial SC.
chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision
chapters, adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its HELD: NO. First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial
internal organization and thereafter adopted and ratified its own Election Code: o capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial
Liga ng mga Barangay Provincial, Metropolitan, HUC/ICC Chapters. There shall be prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
nationwide synchronized elections for the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal,
chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule
month when the synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held. The 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: o SECTION 1. Petition for
incumbent Liga chapter president concerned duly assisted by the proper certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
government agency, office or department, e.g. Provincial/City/NCR/Regional judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
Director, shall convene all the duly elected Component City/Municipal Chapter grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
Presidents and all the current elected Punong Barangays (for HUC/ICC) of the no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
respective chapters in any public place within its area of jurisdiction for the law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
purpose of reorganizing and electing the officers and directors of the provincial, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
metropolitan or HUC/ICC Liga chapters. Said president duly assisted by the or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
government officer aforementioned, shall notify, in writing, all the above incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. Elsewise stated, for a writ of
concerned at least fifteen (15) days before the scheduled election meeting on the certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed
exact date, time, place and requirements of the said meeting. Respondent City against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of
City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
the barangay elections Learning that said Ordinance was forwarded to the City remedy in the ordinary course of law. o A respondent is said to be exercising
Mayor, petitioner sent a letter to said City Mayor, requesting the latter to veto judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what
the same, on the ground it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these
the Liga through legislation City Mayor, however, signed and approved the questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.[11] o Quasi-judicial
assailed city ordinance and issued on 15 August 2002 Executive Order No. 011, function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion,
Series of 2002, to implement the ordinance. Petitioner then instituted a etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or
petition for certiorari before the SC and prayed for a TRO o Petitioner assailed ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them
ordinance and EO contradict the Liga Election Code and are therefore invalid o as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
OSG While Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction nature.”[12] o Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or
over cases of this nature to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the exigency of the quasijudicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some
present petition, however, calls for the relaxation of this rule. Section 496 specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights
(should be Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991 primarily are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal,
intended that the Liga ng mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and

69
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.[13] o The respondents prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the over-crowding of the Court’s docket. As we have said in Santiago v.
enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the Vasquez,[17] the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of
issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put
the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie. this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be
essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a
the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only trier of facts. Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not
appellate, not original, jurisdiction.[14] Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
provides: o Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[18] Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v.
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2) Review, revise, Aguirre[19] is misplaced because the nonobservance of the hierarchy-of-courts
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court rule was not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the President of the
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive Philippines, which would have greatly affected all local government units. We
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, reiterated therein that when an act of the legislative department is seriously
or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied). As such, this petition must alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the
necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for duty of this Court. The same is true when what is seriously alleged to be
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.[15] Third, even unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is
granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of coequal with Congress.
certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special
and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been
adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
should be allowed. We have held that this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas THIRD DIVISION
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. FACTS: Petitioner, appointed as student regent of UP, discussed with then
Cuaresma:[16] o This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as President Erap the proposed renovation of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman She, with
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom her siblings and relatives, then registered with the SEC the Office of the Student
of choice of the court to which application therefor0 will be directed. There is Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI) OSFRI then received an amount of Php 15M
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of from Pres. Erap as financial assistance for the proposed renovation, the source of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for which, according to the information, was the Office of the President The
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy project, however, did not materialize Petitioner’s successor, Kristine Clare
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, U.P. filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner. Ombudsman found probable
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set Petitioner filed an MQ on the ground that Sandiganbayan does not have any
out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP

70
student regent o Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public
(Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the
RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. o it was President Estrada, not people.29 P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received the promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of
P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the the Sandiganbayan.30 P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on
government. o the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606,
peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of
capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Upon the
as a student regent. She further contended that she had no power or authority to other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The
receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
(BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to
her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should
connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32 R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan. Ombudsman enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact,
Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the
phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals.
charges against petitioner Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s MQ o As Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not
correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting
the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. The
single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
by a public official in relation to his office. o It is unmistakably evident that the construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio
Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accusedmovant inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan,
undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa. Every
vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to
occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The
and Position Classification Act of 1989. o accused-movant’s contention that the intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and
same of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from the every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner’s
coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case Petitioner filed an MR interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is
which was denied by SB the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang
batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng
ISSUE # 1: Whether SB has jurisdiction over the subject matter. prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: o B. Other offenses or felonies whether
HELD # 1: YES. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended. A brief legislative history of employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

71
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a
the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and board of trustees of a nonstock corporation.45 By express mandate of law,
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
the offense is committed in relation to their office. Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47
ISSUE # 2: Whether SB has jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment
in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
HELD # 2: YES. Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer. In Khan, Jr. be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was
officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different not committed in relation to her office. According to petitioner, she had no
statutes and jurisprudence. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no
that: o A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then
law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of in relation to public office. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a averments in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by
public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53 In
thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner,
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of
office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881). In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office: o "A public office is the right, SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied) Clearly,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the did not quash the information based on this ground.
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual
so invested is a public officer."42 Petitioner claims that she is not a public
officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175457 July 6, 2011
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over
other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 Respondent. G.R. No. 175482
and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose
positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express FACTS: This is a consolidation of 2 cases arising from the same facts. Atty.
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls David B. Loste, President of IBP Easter Samar, wrote a letter addressed to the
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation on the transfer of hen
provision of law.44 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accusedfor murder, from the provincial jail of Samar

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to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. o NBI all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
recommended the filing of criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
violation of Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended Petitioners Ambil, Jr. and where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. (Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar) were in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch
Felipe A. Balano o Office of Ombudsman recommended that the charge against occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Balano be dismissed and that the Information against other accused be amended Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
as to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 156 of RPC Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: o (a) Provincial
Petitioners admitted charges during pre-trial. o HOWEVER, such transfer, governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
according to petitioners, was justified considering the imminent threats upon provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department
Adalim’s person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. heads[;] In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
SB First Division found petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. correspondin g to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
3019 Petitioner Ambil argues, among others, that Section 3(e), R.A. No. Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
3019 does not apply to his case because the provision contemplates only jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a public officer who trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public officer OSG 129, as amended. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner
points out the absence of jurisprudence that restricts the application of Section Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr.
3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains that As to him, a Certification29 from the Provincial Government Department Head of
it is enough to show that in performing their functions, petitioners have accorded the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary
undue preference to Adalim for liability to attach under the provision. Further, the Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying
OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private party for purposes of applying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the unwarranted benefit redounded, not to be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-
his person as a mayor, but to his person as a detention prisoner accused of principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has
murder jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in
the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them – the
ISSUE: Whether Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 may apply to non-pecuniary Sandiganbayan. Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as
transactions as against Petitioner Ambil, hence, cognizable by SB. a "provincial jailer." Said petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not to
mention his open and willful defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a
HELD: YES. n order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following former political party mate,41 betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad
elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging faith that attended his actions. Likewise amply established beyond reasonable
administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest doubt is the third element of the crime. As mentioned above, in order to hold a
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action person liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any act constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted
his functions.26 As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official,
are public officers discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay administrative or judicial functions. In the case at hand, the Information
with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to
charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his release from
Presidential Decree No. 1606,27 as amended by R.A. No. 8249.28 The pertinent prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner
portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows: o SEC. 4. Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on
Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the last

73
sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall apply to officers and Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his
licenses, permits or other concessions" and he is not such government officer or official, administrative or judicial functions.48 The word "unwarranted" means
employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without
private party but to a public officer. However, as regards his first contention, it justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or
appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from
unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada Sandiganbayan42 where we held that a some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or
prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of desirability; choice or estimation above another.49 Without a court order,
whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other than the
permits or other concessions." Following is an excerpt of what we said in provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters,
Mejorada, Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch
practices of any public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere
public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts representation of his lawyers that the mayor’s life would be put in danger inside
declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the provincial jail. As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were
the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the unable to establish the existence of any risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the
inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or government corporations latter would not be alone in having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we
which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the treat Akyatan’s gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of
term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying aggression, the same would still not constitute a special and compelling reason to
exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits warrant Adalim’s detention outside the provincial jail. For one, there were nipa
or other concessions.43 (Italics supplied.) In the more recent case of Cruz v. huts within the perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to
Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a prosecution for violation of said provision separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while the isolation cell was
will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is charged with the grant undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have exceeded the 85 days
of licenses or permits or other concessions.45 Meanwhile, regarding petitioner that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More importantly, even if
Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a "public Adalim could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to
officer" to include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or petitioners, a court order was still indispensable for his transfer. The foregoing,
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances claimed by
receiving compensation, even nominal from the government. Evidently, Mayor petitioners.
Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the
giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party, does the fact CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC
that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners’ case OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. G.R. No. 170122 October 12, 2009
beyond the ambit of said law? o We believe not. In drafting the Anti-Graft Law,
the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private person" to CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC
describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. G.R. No. 171381 THIRD DIVISION
reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal
parlance46 as distinguished from "person" which, in general usage, refers to a FACTS: This is a consolidation of 2 cases arising from the same facts.
human being.47 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public Republic filed the first petition for forfeiture of properties against petitioner
officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a Clarita, wife of retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, and their children in relation to
private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his the alleged unlawfully acquired funds and properties (Forfeiture 1) o This was
personal interest. In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor raffled off to SB 4th Division Republic subsequently charged the Garcias with
Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s another forfeiture suit (Forfeiture 2) Prior to Forfeiture 2 but after Forfeiture 1
residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a Ombudsman charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080
mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying (plunder) o This was raffled off to 2nd Division SB
the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.

74
o Garcias filed an MD on the ground of the SB’s lack of jurisdiction over no less than petitioner’s husband questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I
separate civil actions for forfeiture. o SB denied MD and declared Garcias in case. Petitioner’s posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the
default o Garcias moved that Forfeiture 1 and plunder cases be consolidated o plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the
SB denied o Garcias filed another MD: (a) the filing of the plunder case civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption
ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of
the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20,
entanglements. Petitioner Clarita before SC her first special civil action for 2005 Resolution,13 the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the
mandamus and/or certiorari o SB has not acquired jurisdiction over their persons commission of a criminal offense, thus: o Such liability is based on a statute that
for lack of proper service of summons o SB 4th Division was ousted of jurisdiction safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. The
upon the filing of the plunder case against them o the forfeiture law (RA No. action of forfeiture arises when a "public officer or employee [acquires] during his
1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his
with automatic forfeiture mechanism Upon filing of Forfeiture 2 sheriff salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x."14 Such amount of property is
stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.15 Thus "if the
Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia [The general signed respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that
his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare
Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the
note: "I’m receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy – but property aforesaid shall become property of the State.16 x x x (Citations in the
these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named] o Garcias original.) Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986,
filed an MD for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter albeit defining only the jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of
thereof which is now covered by the plunder case Petitioner then filed her 2nd former President Marcos, his immediate family and business associates,
first special civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari authorizes under its Sec. 317 the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which
will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the plunder case absorbed the 2 forfeiture cases thereby Sandiganbayan,18 interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential
ousting SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction over said forfeiture cases, in favor of SB Commission on Good Government to file independent civil actions separate from
2nd Division. the criminal actions. Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate
Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature while the Latter Is Criminal It
HELD # 1: NO. Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb the bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises
Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 Petitioner maintains that the out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating
SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures I and II the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs
as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against the the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be
Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main plunder established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the
case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for
event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction over the subject purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is "sufficient to establish beyond
matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these wealth]." On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by
premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4th preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s
Division for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the two forfeiture properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he
petitions and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the
ground. Petitioner’s contention is untenable. And in response to what she forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not
suggests in some of her pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the
jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.19
thereunder is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan12 involving Given the foregoing considerations, petitioner’s thesis on possible double

75
jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,20 suggesting that double jeopardy of business with some competent person in charge thereof It is basic that a
presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its
to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by
1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction
under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in over a person.22 In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for
Crim. Case 28107 for plunder. Moreover, given the variance in the nature and Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia,
subject matter of the proceedings between the plunder case and the subject who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof
forfeiture cases, petitioner’s apprehension about the likelihood of conflicting by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of
decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children
forfeiture as a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said in this regard through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted
merits approving citation: o On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective. In Manotoc
respondents argue that the division where the plunder case is pending may issue v. Court of Appeals,23 we broke down the requirements to be: o (1) Impossibility
a decision that would collide or be in conflict with the decision by this division on of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the
the forfeiture case. They refer to a situation where this Court’s Second Division sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
may exonerate the respondents in the plunder case while the Fourth Division impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being
grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent
vice versa. Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that
does not give rise to a conflict. After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to
the attendance of facts and circumstances separate and distinct from that in the the other party."24 Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show
forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases, there is no causal connection in the several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two
facts sought to be established and the issues sought to be addressed. As a result, (2) different dates o (2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must
the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the other. There is describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the attempted personal service.
forfeiture of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the o (3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion
plunder case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not recovered by the residing at defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge
forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption that the of defendant’s office or regular place of business. From the foregoing
information on plunder and the petition for forfeiture cover the same set of requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made
properties on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did
not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid
ISSUE # 2: Whether SB has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not
and her children in the forfeiture cases, considering the means employed in the strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioner’s
service of summons. house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is
detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid
HELD # 2: NO. On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the substituted service of summons was made. The stringent rules on valid service
SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioner’s defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily
contention. Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief.25 In
provides for the requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus: o the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning
SEC. 7. Substituted service.—If the defendant cannot be served within a improper service of summons since the improvident service of summons in both
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings

76
filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel
cannot subscribe to the Republic’s views. or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and
such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE # 3: Whether petitioner’s special appearance is tantamount to voluntary Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily
appearance thereby curing the defect in the service of summons and vesting appeared before the SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons.
jurisdiction on SB over the persons of the Garcias. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over
their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of
HELD # 3: NO. The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons
of Civil Procedure clearly provides: o Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.—The made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her
defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside and
appearance. (Emphasis ours.) Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the
assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve
raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner and her three children in
the rule on voluntary appearance—the first sentence of the above-quoted rule— order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without
qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons. The PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. JOSE M.
pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show PANLILIO, respondent. G.R. No. 133365. September 16, 2003 THIRD DIVISION
that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following
pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration
and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to FACTS: Petitioner Platinum filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages
consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida Galvez
quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash RTC Makati Branch 62 rendered a judgment in default in favor of petitioner,
Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration. The foregoing ordering PATC and Galvez to solidarily pay said petitioner (Civil Case No. 941634)
pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for A writ of execution was issued in favor of petitioner o Manila Polo Club
special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was
her person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did levied upon and sold for P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo
not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid Respondent filed a Motion to Intervene, claiming that Galvez executed in his
service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both favor a chattel mortgage over her shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to
Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock
she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their certificates valued at P5 million RTC denied respondent’s MI RTC then
attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the conduct
forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent thereof Respondent filed against Galvez a collection case with application
pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction for a writ of preliminary attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares o The
due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. case was raffled to Branch 146 RTC Makati (Civil Case No. 96365) Respondent
Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil again filed an MI in the sum of money suit, this time invoking that the 2
Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB actions should be consolidated Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146
constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons. Moreover, the leading La granted the motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of
Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to the instant case. Said case Branch 62 would not object thereto o Judge Diokno allowed such consolidation by
elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before issuing an Order o Petitioner filed an MR but was denied Petitioner filed a
the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to petition for certiorari before the CA o assailing, among others, the July 23, 1996

77
order of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and case in his own sala. Moreover, we find the instant petition premature and
Civil Case No. 94-1634. CA annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno decided on what to do with
Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been spared the trouble and the
Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket and decide it as a separate case expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn would have had one
Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration, praying that Civil Case No. 96365 petition less in its docket. The unfounded fear that Civil Case No. 96-365
be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati o CA would unduly delay the final resolution of Civil Case No. 94-1634, if the former
denied the MPR Petitioner insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no were retained by Branch 62, made Platinum act with haste. In so doing, it
jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 96-365. It argues that, when Judge Diokno’s July wasted the precious time not only of the parties but also of this Court.
23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of the two cases was annulled and set
aside, RTC Branch 62’s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96-365 MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EDDY NG KOK
was likewise extinguished. WEI, respondent. G.R. No. 139791. December 12, 2003 THIRD DIVISION

ISSUE: Whether the Order consolidating the 2 subject cases extinguished the FACTS: Respondent, Singaporean businessman, sent a letter of intent to
jurisdiction of RTC Makati Branch 62 over Civil Case No. 96-365. petitioner expressing his intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde
Terraces December 5, 1988 respondent paid a reservation fee of Php
HELD: NO. Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and 50,000 January 16, 1989 he then paid 90% of the purchase price in the
decide a case.[6] In general, jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the sum of P729,830.00 Petitioner then executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the
action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the respondent o contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit “shall
issues framed in the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and substantially be completed and delivered” to the respondent “within fifteen (15)
subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the months” from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that “(S)hould there be
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon no substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a
all or some of the claims asserted therein.[7] Jurisdiction over the person of the penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged against
plaintiff is acquired from the time he files his complaint; while jurisdiction over (petitioner)” April 5, 1990 petitioner informed respondent of the substantial
the person of the defendant is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and completion of his condominium unit, however, due to various uncontrollable
his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal processes forces (such as coup d‘ etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage),
exerted over his person. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990 July 5, 1990 respondent went
a particular case, it does not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the back to Manila but found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric
court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions. In the case at bar, facilities Petitioner then sent a letter to respondent informing the latter that he
there is no doubt that Panlilio’s collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 can move on by August 22, 1990 Respondent, however, later on found out
falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the that the unit is still unlivable Respondent then sent a letter to petitioner
Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Diokno’s order granting the demanding payment for the damages he sustained, but the same was ignored
consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 941634, did not affect Respondent then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before
the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order. “Jurisdiction” should RTC Makati Respondent then finally accepted the condominium unit and on
be distinguished from the “exercise of jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction refers to the April 12, 1991 and occupied the same thereby limiting his cause of action to
authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. damages only RTC in favor respondent CA affirmed in toto Petitioner
Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject filed an MR but the same was denied by CA Petitioner RTC has no
matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the case jurisdiction over the case o Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as
is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in amended, provides: “SECTION 1. – In the exercise of its functions to regulate
the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and
jurisdiction over the case. We find no reversible error on the part of the Court Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)][4] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
of Appeals when it left to Judge Diokno of Branch 62 the discretion on whether to and decide cases of the following nature: “C. Cases involving specific
return Civil Case No. 96365 to Branch 146 or to decide the same as a separate performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of

78
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, disapproved by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The sold properties
broker or salesman. were then returned to petitioner Upon said reacquisition, petitioner started
disposing of the same, including the ones excluded Zulueta then transferred all
ISSUE # 1: Whether RTC validly took cognizance of respondent’s complaint. his rights and interests over the excluded lots to respondent Eduardo who then
HELD #1: NO. sent a demand letter to petitioner Respondent then filed a complaint for
reconveyance of real estate against petitioner before RTC Pasig Petitioner
ISSUE # 2: Whether petitioner may still question before the SC the jurisdiction of action was barred by the statute of limitations and/or laches and that the
RTC. HELD # 2: NO. Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which complaint stated no cause of action RTC in favor of respondent CA
has jurisdiction over the instant case. We have consistently held that complaints affirmed Petitioner action for reconveyance instituted by the respondent had
for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer already prescribed after the lapse of ten years from November 25, 1975 when
against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the the petitioner consolidated its ownership over the subject lots o takes exception
HLURB.[5] While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over to the holding of the trial court and the CA that it (the petitioner) failed to apprise
the case, petitioner’s active participation in the proceedings estopped it from or return to the Zuluetas, the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, the seventy-
assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party eight lots excluded from the foreclosure sale because the petitioner had no such
participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then obligation under the pertinent loan and mortgage agreement
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse.[6] Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction ISSUE # 1: Whether SC may decide on the factual issues raised by petitioner.
before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and
ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel HELD # 1: NO. At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this
and can no longer question the trial court’s jurisdiction. On petitioner’s claim Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. Time and amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of
again, we have ruled that “the factual findings of the trial court are given weight facts. Case law has it that the findings of the trial court especially when affirmed
when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Although there are
by the Court of Appeals.”[7] Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, exceptions to the said rule, we find no reason to deviate therefrom.[6] By
liable to pay damages as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions. The assailing the findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed by the CA, that it acted
jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the in bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised questions of facts in its petition.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of Nonetheless, even if we indulged the petition and delved into the factual issues,
law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by we find the petition barren of merit. That the petitioner acted in bad faith in
evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of consolidating ownership and causing the issuance of titles in its name over the
facts.[8] These exceptions are not present here. subject lots, notwithstanding that these were expressly excluded from the
foreclosure sale was the uniform ruling of the trial court and appellate court.
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the trial court and the CA.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO M. The petitioner is not an ordinary mortgagee. It is a government financial
SANTIAGO, substituted by his widow ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO, institution and, like banks, is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in
respondent. G.R. No. 155206. October 28, 2003 SECOND DIVISION its dealings, including those involving registered lands.[8] The Court’s ruling in
Rural Bank of Compostela v. CA[9] is apropos: Banks, indeed, should exercise
FACTS: Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained a loan more care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands, than private
from petitioner secured by real estate mortgages over parcels of land For their individuals, for their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust
failure to pay the loan, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and were sold money belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by not
on public auction to one Yorkstown Development Corporation 91 lots were committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which
expressly excluded, however, since the sale of the other lots was sufficient for they would be denied the protective mantle of land registration statute, Act [No.]
the payment of the loan However, the excluded lots were included in the 496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as well as to
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership Subsequently, the sale was mortgagees of the same character and description.[10] Due diligence required

79
of banks extend even to persons, or institutions like the petitioner, regularly respondents’ claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955.
engaged in the business of lending money secured by real estate mortgages.[11] While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years, reckoned
In this case, the petitioner executed an affidavit in consolidating its ownership from the date of the registration of the property, we, as we said, are not
and causing the issuance of titles in its name over the subject lots despite the prepared to count the period from such a date in this case. We note the
fact that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale. By so doing, petitioner’s sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself
the petitioner acted in gross and evident bad faith. It cannot feign ignorance of beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of
the fact that the subject lots were excluded from the sale at public auction. At extrajudicial settlement that he is “the only heir and child of his mother Feliza
the least, its act constituted gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Further, as with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name [alone].”
found by the CA, the petitioner’s acts of concealing the existence of these lots, its Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private respondents commenced from
failure to return them to the Zuluetas and even its attempt to sell them to a third the time they actually discovered the petitioner’s act of defraudation. According
party is proof of the petitioner’s intent to defraud the Zuluetas and appropriate to the respondent Court of Appeals, they “came to know [of it] apparently only
for itself the subject lots. during the progress of the litigation.” Hence, prescription is not a bar.[16] The
above ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Samonte. In this case, as
ISSUE # 2: Whether prescription has already ousted RTC of its jurisdiction to established by the CA, the respondent actually discovered the fraudulent act of
decide on the case. the petitioner only in 1989: o ... [T]he prescriptive period of the action is to be
reckoned from the time plaintiff-appellee (then Eduardo M. Santiago) had
HELD # 2: NO. On the issue of prescription, generally, an action for actually discovered the fraudulent act of defendant-appellant which was, as borne
reconveyance of real property based on fraud prescribes in four years from the out by the records, only in 1989. Plaintiff-appellee Eduardo M. Santiago
discovery of fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the categorically testified (TSN of July 11, 1995, pp. 14-15) that he came to know
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Registration of real property that there were 91 excluded lots in Antonio Village which were foreclosed by the
is a constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the four-year period shall be GSIS and included in its consolidation of ownership in 1975 when, in 1989, he
counted therefrom.[12] On the other hand, Article 1456 of the Civil Code and Antonio Vic Zulueta discussed it and he was given by Zulueta a special power
provides: o Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the of attorney to represent him to recover the subject properties from GSIS. The
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for complaint for reconveyance was filed barely a year from the discovery of the
the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. fraud.[17] Following the Court’s pronouncements in Adille and Samonte, the
An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in institution of the action for reconveyance in the court a quo in 1990 was thus well
ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the within the prescriptive period. Having acted in bad faith in securing titles over
certificate of title over the property.[13] The petitioner’s defense of the subject lots, the petitioner is a holder in bad faith of certificates of title over
prescription is untenable. As held by the CA, the general rule that the discovery the subject lots. The petitioner is not entitled to the protection of the law for the
of fraud is deemed to have taken place upon the registration of real property law cannot be used as a shield for frauds.[18] Contrary to its claim, the
because it is “considered a constructive notice to all persons” does not apply in petitioner unarguably had the legal duty to return the subject lots to the
this case. The CA correctly cited the cases of Adille v. Court of Appeals[14] and Zuluetas. The petitioner’s attempts to justify its omission by insisting that it had
Samonte v. Court of Appeals,[15] where this Court reckoned the prescriptive no such duty under the mortgage contract is obviously clutching at straw. Article
period for the filing of the action for reconveyance based on implied trust from 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that “every person who, through an act of
the actual discovery of fraud. In ruling that the action had not yet prescribed performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
despite the fact that more than ten years had lapsed between the date of of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
registration and the institution of the action for reconveyance, the Court in Adille return the same to him.”
ratiocinated: o It is true that registration under the Torrens system is
constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN,
title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents. G.R. No. 151149.
the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was September 7, 2004 THIRD DIVISION
one, notwithstanding the longstanding rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title. For the same reason, we cannot dismiss private

80
FACTS: Petitioner filed a request before the District Office of the Bureau of neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of
Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of a these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the
certain real property During the investigation, it was found that the property right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2,
had no occupants but was planted with some coconut trees by petitioner and Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory
respondent Palanca who went there from time to time to undertake some 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new
development work and that respondents have been issued homestead patents for rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
certain portions of said land Assistant Director of District Office then informed pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
the Director of Lands that the subject land has been certified and released as matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act Petitioner then filed for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
an action before RTC seeking to nullify the homestead patents and original statute of limitations. x x x.”[12] (Italics supplied) On the other hand,
certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of “residual jurisdiction” is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor as follows: o “SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by
o claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of
patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion appeal in due time. o “A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected
from forest land to agricultural land Respondents after filing their Answer, as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
filed an MD on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s record on appeal filed in due time. o “In appeals by notice of appeal, the court
Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango RTC granted MD and denied time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. o “In appeals
petitioner’s MR CA affirmed RTC’s dismissal BUT not on the grounds relied by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter
upon by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of jurisdiction thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its “residual expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. o “In either case, prior to
prerogatives” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue
proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do
to him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with
of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.” (Italics supplied)
court. The “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court
is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
ISSUE: Whether RTC had jurisdiction over the case, considering the allegations involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals
set forth in the complaint filed by petitioner. by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the
transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.[13] In either
HELD: NO. Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its “residual instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue
prerogatives” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the “residual protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
jurisdiction” of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA. Under Section 1 of order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. The
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based,
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as
four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss
In Gumabon v. Larin[11] we explained thus: o “x x x [T]he motu proprio an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1[14] of the same rules.
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the
during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or Complaint motu proprio “on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the

81
lower court’s lack of jurisdiction”[15] and for prescription of the action. Indeed, bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.[23]
when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also
to dismiss the action.[16] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or title thereto is
law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously
the relief sought.[17] In his Complaint for “Nullification of Applications for registered in the defendant’s name.[24] As with an annulment of title, a
Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to
Title,”[18] petitioner averred: o “2. That on November 10, 1965, without the recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the
knowledge of [petitioner, Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioner’s] cousin, land, and (2) that the defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the
in connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x fraudulently and property.[25] Therefore, the defendant who acquired the property through
in bad faith: 2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre- mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the plaintiff the property or the
requisite to the filing of an application for homestead patent in his name and that title thereto.[26] In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner
of his Co[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware that [Petitioner] allege that he had previously held title to the land in question. On the contrary,
KATON had previously applied or requested for re-classification and certification he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land,[27] that it had never
of the same land from forest land to agricultural land which request was been privately titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a homestead
favorably acted upon and approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic under the provisions of the Public Land Act.[28] This Court has held that a
fraud and misrepresentation; 2.3. In stating in his application for homestead complaint by a private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained
patent that he was applying for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero Island where by fraudulent means, and who consequently prays for its annulment, does not
there was none, the same constituted another clear case of fraud and state a cause of action; hence, such complaint must be dismissed. [29]
misrepresentation; o “3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and Neither can petitioner’s case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public Land
OCT No. G-7089 in the name of [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. and the filing of Act categorically declares that only the solicitor general or the officer in his stead
Homestead Patent Applications in the names of [respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, may institute such an action.[30] A private person may not bring an action for
Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,] having been done fraudulently and in bad reversion or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free
faith, are ipso facto null and void and of no effect whatsoever.”[19] o “x x x. By patent and its derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered would
a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects with natural again form part of the public domain.[31] Thus, when the plaintiff admits in
necessity arise knowing from such act or omission, [Respondent Palanca] on the complaint that the disputed land will revert to the public domain even if the
account of his blood relation, first degree cousins, trust, interdependence and title is canceled or amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party
intimacy is guilty of intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x.”[20] Thereupon, petitioner who may bring action is the government, to which the property will revert.[32] A
prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has no cause of
applications of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as action in a suit for reconveyance.[33] As it is, vested rights over the land applied
Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of Respondent for under a homestead may be validly claimed only by the applicant, after
Palanca; and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to approval by the director of the Land Management Bureau of the former’s final
reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner.[21] The question is, did the proof of homestead patent. [34] Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint
Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the utter
and certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely absence of a cause of action,[35] a defense raised by respondents in their
for reversion? o The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such Answer.[36] Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court[37] ordains that every
actions, over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction. In an action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest,
action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one
contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned who has no right or interest to protect has no cause of action by which to invoke,
by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.[38] Finally, assuming that
defendant; and 2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its
mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the reconveyance, the case should still be dismissed for being time-barred.[39] It is
plaintiff.[22] In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original Certificate of Title was
the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to issued to Palanca on February 21, 1977,[40] while the Complaint was filed only

82
on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years from the election protest before the RTC RTC declared that petitioner won by a
date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of margin of 1,139 votes PR filed a Notice of Appeal o The ff day, RTC noted the
fraudulently registered real property.[41] It must likewise be stressed that appeal and payment of fees and directing the transmittal of the records of the
Palanca’s title -- which attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC
issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no longer Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal
open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Ybanez v. Intermediate Appellate invoking Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests o RTC
Court[42] ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an administrative granted the Urgent Motion via Special Order BUT suspended the actual
proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, is as indefeasible as one issued issuance of writ of execution for 20 days PR filed an MR with the RTC; then
under a judicial registration proceeding one year from its issuance; provided, filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary Injunction with
however, that the land covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case. Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/ TRO with Prayer for Immediate Raffle arguing,
In Aldovino v. Alunan,[43] the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own among others, that RTC had constructively relinquished its jurisdiction by the
complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be issuance of the Order dated November 27, 2007 directing the transmittal of the
dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the records of the case COMELEC 2nd Division issued a 60-day TRO directing:
defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato,[44] we also explained thus: o "x x x [T]rial (1) the RTC to cease and desist from issuing or causing the issuance of a writ of
courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of execution or implementing the Special Order; and (2) Cunanan to continue
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be performing the functions of Mayor of Magalang. Petitioner Filed an
indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 Answer/Opposition with Prayer for Immediate Lifting of TRO o (1) preliminary
O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; injunction cannot exist except as part or incident of an independent action, being
Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 a mere ancillary remedy that exists only as an incident of the main proceeding;
SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule (2) the "petition for application of preliminary injunction," as an original action,
16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative should be dismissed outright; and (3) Cunanan is guilty of forum shopping, as he
defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the filed a motion for reconsideration of the Special Order simultaneously with the
merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or petition filed with the COMELEC. COMELEC 2nd Division denied PR’s petition
even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is o (1) the resolution of the motion for execution pending appeal is part of the
found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents; the motion was filed
Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or prior to the expiration of the period to appea l and while the RTC was still in
where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). possession of the original
What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the record ; and (2) there is good reason to justify the execution of the Decision
prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the pending appeal, as Pecson's victory was clearly and manifestly established
record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise COMELEC En Banc reversed ruling of 2nd Division and affirmed the authority of
established by the evidence."[45] (Italics supplied) Clearly then, the CA did the RTC to order execution pending appeal; o it however nullified the March 11,
not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when they are able to do 2008 writ of execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer issue the writ
so, courts must endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and
future litigations.[46] the perfection of the appeals of both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the
lapse of Pecson's period to appeal)

ROMULO F. PECSON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT ISSUE: Whether RTC still had the jurisdiction in issuing the writ of execution
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT and LYNDON A. CUNANAN, respondents. considering the transmittal of the records to ECAD-COMELEC.
G.R. No. 182865 December 24, 2008 EN BANC
HELD: YES. Because this case is essentially about the implementation of an
FACTS: Petitioner Pecson and PR Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty RTC decision pending appeal, we must first dwell on the writ the RTC issued. o
position in Magalang, Pampanga where PR was proclaimed winner by a margin of The COMELEC ruled in this regard that the writ of execution the RTC issued on
61 votes After PR took his oath and assumed position, petitioner filed an March 11, 2008 was void; the RTC could no longer issue the writ because of the

83
lapse of the period for appeal, and because the RTC no longer held the records of FACTS: Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession
the election contest which had then been transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC. and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against PR and 2 other
Cunanan argues in his Comment that this ruling has become final and executory persons, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner alleged that PR entered
because Pecson did not question it in the present petition. In Cunanan's view, the and occupied petitioner’s property and when asked to leave the premises,
finality of this aspect of the COMELEC ruling renders the issue of the nullification refused to do so and threatened said petitioner with bodily harm Petitioner
of the Special Order moot and academic, as any ruling we shall render would then entered into an agreement with the Ruenas which stipulated, among others,
serve no practical purpose; it can no longer be implemented since the means that the latter shall respect petitioner’s ownership and possession over the
(obviously referring to the writ the RTC issued on March 11, 2008) of executing subject property. o PR was not a party to said agreement PR failed to file his
the RTC decision (i.e., seating Pecson as Mayor of Magalang) has, to all intents answer and was thus declared in default o RTC in favor of petitioner; ordered
and purposes, been nullified and rendered ineffective. We see no merit in PR to vacate the subject property PR filed an MNT alleging that he was a
Cunanan's argument. The writ of execution issued by the RTC is a mere tenant of one Laurente and that he turned over the complaint and summons to
administrative enforcement medium of the Special Order - the main order the latter in the honest belief that said Laurente was the property party to
supporting Pecson's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ itself receive the same o During this time, an administrative case was pending before
cannot and does not assume a life of its own independent from the Special Order herein petitioner and the Laurentes before the RD of DENR, which was
on which it is based. Certainly, its nullification does not carry with it the subsequently forwarded to DENR RO PR then filed a petition for relief from
nullification of the Special Order. This consequence does not of course hold true judgment with the same allegations in the MNT o He alleged that the judgment
in the reverse situation - the nullification of the Special Order effectively carries was void inasmuch as the Laurentes, as alleged owners of the property, were not
with it the nullification of its implementing writ and removes the basis for the impleaded therein o The Laurentes then filed a Motion for Intervention RTC
issuance of another implementing writ. In the present case, the reality is that if denied the petition for relief from judgment o PR filed an MR private
and when we ultimately affirm the validity of the Special Order, nothing will respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value
thereafter prevent the RTC from issuing another writ. Another legal reality is of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the
that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could no longer actually municipal trial court. o RTC denied the MR PR filed a petition for
issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no longer had jurisdiction to do so certiorari CA granted the petition o private respondent is not estopped from
after the appeal period lapsed and after the records were transmitted to the assailing the jurisdiction 'of the RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when
ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is still in possession of the records and that the private respondent filed with said court his Motion for Reconsideration And/Or
period to appeal (of both contending parties) must have not lapsed are important Annulment of Judgment.
for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the RTC to grant a
Special Order allowing execution pending appeal; they are requisite elements for ISSUE # 1: Whether RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
the exercise by the RTC of its residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution HELD # 1: NO.
pending appeal, not for the issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from
the cited provision of the Rules which does not require the issuance of the ISSUE # 2: Whether PR may still question such jurisdiction. HELD # 2: YES.
implementing writ within the above limited jurisdictional period. The RTC cannot Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC? In
legally issue the implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1) this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was not. While
the cited twenty-day waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of
immediate transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under Section its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel
10 of the Rules. from challenging the court's jurisdiction,13 we note that estoppel has become an
equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful
UPDATED CASE LIST ON JURISDICTION AS OF 2015 invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement.14 Hence,
estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving
GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner, vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel
BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents. G.R. No. 131282 January 4, may become a tool of injustice. In the present case, private respondent
2002 SECOND DIVISION questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds.
Recall that it was petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent

84
and two other parties before the said court,16 believing that the RTC had basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of
jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 769117 amending BP divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed
129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the
but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that
farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty
Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no
of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the jurisdiction over the
summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a
in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for
that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the
landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to prove that finality of the same. Indeed, "...the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial
he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his long, notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its
continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the decision a 'lawless' thing."25 Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is
land.18But his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed null and void, it could logically never become final and executory, hence appeal
before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by private
his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order .
Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from questioning
motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of the RTC's jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel
jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a
still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as miscarriage of justice. Here, we find that petitioner, who claims ownership of a
well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for parcel of land, filed his complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction.
reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of private Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before the proper
respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for administrative agency concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case on
entry of judgment and a writ of execution. Under these circumstances, we jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein could not be expected
could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This farmer, who is now
private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the the private respondent, ought not to be penalized when he claims that he made
regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before
court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within the
silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent.19 Further, a party may jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did
assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case.
and even on appeal.20 The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from
should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved.
respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later
of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of found that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.
lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.21 Having determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the
Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a appellate court in ruling that private respondent was not estopped from
question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in detail the
matter of law.22 Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer second issue. Suffice it to say that, given the circumstances in this case, no error
jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional was committed on this score by respondent appellate court. Since the RTC had
circumstances.23 The Court of Appeals found support for its ruling in our decision no jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable reason in law not
in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus: o x x x The point simply is that when a party to file an answer, aside from the fact that he believed the suit was properly his
commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to landlord's concern.
take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient

85
ISSUE # 3: Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that PR MeTC rendered a judgment against the 23 non-answering defendants
was not estopped from questioning RTC’s jurisdiction. following the Rule on Summary Procedure ordering them to vacate; BUT
sustained the rights of the 20 answering defendants RTC sustained MTC
HELD # 3: NO. The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals decision Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA CA dismissed
gravely abused its discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had the petition on 2 grounds: o (a) the certification of non-forum shopping was
jurisdiction, and that private respondent was not estopped from assailing the signed by petitioner’s counsel and not by petitioner himself, in violation of
jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it. The secondary Revised Circular No. 28-91;[9] and, o (b) the only annex to the petition is a
issue is whether the Court of appeals erred in holding that private respondent's certified copy of the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and other
failure to file an answer to the complaint was justified. At the outset, however, material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition
we note that petitioner through counsel submitted to this Court pleadings that are not annexed, contrary to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised
contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition,8 we find that to Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA) Petitioner filed an MR
bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding that the RTC had no attaching thereto a photocopy of the certification of non-forum shopping duly
jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to Annex E9 of his petition which supposedly is the signed by him
Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically
containing the notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." But ISSUE # 1: Whether petitioner is assailing the jurisdiction of MTC thereby
it appears that Annex E of his petition is not a Certification but a xerox copy of a warranting the resort to Rule 65.
Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the document contain a notation,
"Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner also asked this HELD # 1: YES. The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of
Court to refer to Annex F,10 where he said the zonal value of the disputed land the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion
of the municipal court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
However, we find that these annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As
obviously without evidentiary weight or value. enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:[19] o Anent the first issue, in
order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is
necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
ANTONIO T. DONATO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FILOMENO ARCEPE, jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
TIMOTEO BARCELONA, IGNACIO BENDOL, THELMA P. BULICANO, ROSALINDA exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On
CAPARAS, ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE LOS REYES, the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
ROGELIO GADDI, PAULINO GAJARDO, GERONIMO IMPERIAL, HOMER IMPERIAL, issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
ELVIRA LESLIE, CEFERINO LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL, NIMFA PIMENTEL, jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
AURELIO G. ROCERO, ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO VALLESPIN, AND NARCISO excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
YABUT, respondents. G.R. No. 129638. December 8, 2003 SECOND DIVISION certiorari.[20] (Emphasis supplied). Inasmuch as the present petition
principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws
FACTS: Petitioner, the registered owner of the subject parcel of land, filed a involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within
complaint for unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and “all unknown the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
occupants” thereof, alleging that said defendants had oral contracts of lease Court. At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17,
which expired at the end of each month but were renewed by tolerance, that the 1997, the prevailing rule is the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
latter stopped paying rent sometime in 1992, and that he sent a demand letter to However, considering that the CA Resolution being assailed was rendered on
them on April 7, 1994 Only 20 of said defendants filed an Answer they March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-month reglementary period,
cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of established by jurisprudence.[21] Petitioner received notice of the assailed CA
tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property and while they were in Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April 4, 1997. He filed his motion
the process of negotiating, they were tendering the rentals to petitioner’s counsel reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only thirteen days of the 90-day

86
period. Petitioner received the CA Resolution denying his motion on July 3, 1997 Appeals[37] is worth echoing: “cases should be determined on the merits, after
and fourteen days later, or on July 17, 1997, he filed a motion for 30-day full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather
extension of time to file a “petition for review” which was granted by us; and than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of
petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15, 1997, which is well-within the justice would be better served.”[38] Thus, what should guide judicial action is
period of extension granted to him. that a party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor or property on mere
ISSUE # 2: Whether the filing of petitioner of an MR with the attached certificate technicalities.[39] This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has
of non-forum shopping signed by himself was sufficient compliance thereby satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion for
vesting upon the CA jurisdiction over the issues of the petition. reconsideration,[40] as in this case. In addition, petitioner prays that we
decide the present petition on the merits without need of remanding the case to
HELD # 2: YES. We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which the CA. He insists that all the elements of unlawful detainer are present in the
were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of case. He further argues that the alleged “priority right to buy the lot they
justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its occupy” does not apply where the landowner does not intend to sell the subject
own ultimate and legitimate objective[26] which is simply to prohibit and property, as in the case; that respondents cannot be entitled to protection under
penalize the evils of forum-shopping.[27] The subsequent filing of the P.D. No. 2016 since the government has no intention of acquiring the subject
certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed property, nor is the subject property located within a zonal improvement area;
substantial compliance, pro hac vice. In like manner, the failure of the and, that assuming that there is a negotiation for the sale of the subject property
petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to or a pending case for consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of
append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the respondents. We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the
records as would support the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of foregoing issues in the present petition for certiorari. The issues involved are
the petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a factual issues which inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are
certain leeway to require parties to submit additional documents as may be matters that are beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for
necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of certiorari. These issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for review
Rule 3 of the RIRCA,[28] the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes filed before it. As an appellate court, it is empowered to require parties to submit
as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may additional documents, as it may find necessary, or to receive evidence, to
require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 9, B.P.
Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA.[29] At any rate, petitioner attached Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to wit:
copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records below with his The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct
motion for reconsideration.[30] In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals,[31] the Court hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve
reiterated the doctrine laid down in CusiHernandez vs. Diaz[32] and Piglas- factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission[33] that subsequent submission including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.
We find no cogent reason to depart from this doctrine. Truly, in dismissing the SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to APPEALS, Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC,
lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region, Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC.,
resolution of the case. represented by WILSON JESENA, JR., as Manager, Respondents. G.R. No. 144025
Needless to stress, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities."[34] When December 27, 2002 THIRD DIVISION
technicality deserts its function of being an aid to justice, the Court is justified in
exempting from its operations a particular case.[35] Technical rules of procedure FACTS: Petitioners purchased from PR Lucky Homes a parcel of land
should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of denominated in the subsequently issued TCT as Lot 18, instead of Lot 19, due to
court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an even more the mistake of PR Petitioners had already started making improvements on
urgent ideal.[36] The Court’s pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of said Lot 18 when PR informed the former of its mistake Petitioners instead

87
offered to buy Lot 18 and continued making improvements on the same Due to Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals;10 Province of Bulacan vs. Court of
petitioners’ default in payment of Lot 19, the same was foreclosed by SSS, thus Appeals;11 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,12
prompting them to offer PR to swap it with Lot 18, to which PR refused this Court affirmed the rule that a partys active participation in all stages of the
Petitioners then instituted before the RTC an action for reformation of contract case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant
and damages o RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit Petitioners affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same
continued staying on Lot 18 but likewise subsequently defaulted in the payment courts jurisdiction. In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who
thereof thereby resulting in its foreclosure in favor of SSS, similar to Lot 19 invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation
Petitioners then filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution issued by RTC, of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings
contending that RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree) o They then filed a new during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the
complaint before the HLURB o They likewise filed before the CA petition for trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in
annulment of judgment, premised on the ground that the trial court had no 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because
jurisdiction to try and decide said case CA denied the petition relying mainly said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their
on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid down in the case of Tijam vs. right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed
Sibonghanoy; likewise denied petitioners’ MR Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to
profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether CA correctly ruled that petitioners were estopped from This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
questioning the jurisdiction of RTC. decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction if not. Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly
HELD: YES. At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking condemn any doubledealing by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts
from us the annulment of a trial court judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. by deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the elementary
Because it is not an appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not in issue here. principles of justice and good faith.14 There is no denying that, in this case,
Accordingly, there is no need to delve into the propriety of the decision rendered petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire
by the trial court. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted
already abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.5 We do not themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for them
agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.
order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
assailed at any stage active participation in the proceedings in the court which ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding
rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of
As we held in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy: o A party may be Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the
estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents. G.R.
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and No. 124644 February 5, 2004 SECOND DIVISION
of estoppel by laches. o It has been held that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after FACTS: Petitioner is a graduate of PMA and a member of AFP, PH
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same Constabulary, and the Intelligence Group of PNP A shootout occurred during a
jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the surveillance operation conducted by him and his team Petitioner and one
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias “Jun Bombita” were then indicted for murder before
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or the RTC RTC then issued a warrant and petitioner posted bail. RTC also issued
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason an order preventively suspending petitioner. He was then arraigned and pleaded
that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy. not guilty Petitioner, after arraignment, filed an motion to quash the
Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa vs. Court of information on the ground that the court martial, not the RTC, has jurisdiction
Appeals;7 Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals;8 Salva vs. Court of Appeals;9 National over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers. Pending the reso of

88
said motion, petitioner filed another motion for the lifting of his suspension. He The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not
also filed an MD averring that since the offense was committed in the contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the
performance of his duties, it was the Sandiganbayan which had exclusive discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged
jurisdiction over the same o RTC denied motion to lift suspension o RTC when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to
initially denied MD upon preliminary investigation, finding that the offense was include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to
not committed in the performance of petitioner’s duties However, upon MR, office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
RTC reversed itself and declared that based on the petitioner’s evidence, he was Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606
on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law: o In cases where none of
failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade “27”
Nacario Nueca’s admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
was on official mission when the shooting happened. RTC then issued an order occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
directing the prosecutor to transmit the case to the SB jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court,
PJ of Sandiganbayan ordered the remand of the case to the RTC on the ff Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
grounds: o considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of “23.” o as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had Pambansa Blg. 129. Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime
commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary
of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render grade below “27,” the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the
judgment therein after trial case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the
petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade “23.” He was charged
ISSUE: Which court/ tribunal has jurisdiction over the murder charge against with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive
petitioner? jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691. The
HELD: RTC. The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has
the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural
the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a law which may be applied retroactively.
retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged
in the Information.[19] Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR., JOSEPH B. CATAHAN, JOSE MARI B. REUNILLA,
the case continues until the case is terminated.[20] Under Section 4(a) of P.D. MANUEL ANTONIO B. BOÑE, MAMERTO S. CLARA, REUEL E. DIMALANTA, MORY
No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive V. DOMALAON, CONRADO G. DIMAANO, LOLITA R. HIZON, REMEDIOS P.
jurisdiction in all cases involving the following: o (1) Violations of Republic Act ADOLFO, BIENVENIDO C. HILARIO, MIASCOR WORKERS UNION - NATIONAL
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU), and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised (PALEA), petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.,
Penal Code; o (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government- TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY LEANDRO M.
owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or Communications, respondents, MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION,
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….[21] However, for the DNATA-WINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, MACROASIA-EUREST
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes SERVICES, INC., MACROASIAMENZIES AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION,
committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR AIRCRAFT
showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the MAINTENANCE CORPORATION, and MIASCOR LOGISTICS CORPORATION,
discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough petitioners-in-intervention G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003 EN BANC
to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the
offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.[22]

89
FACTS: Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited ISSUE: Whether the arbitration steps taken by respondent PIATCO ousted SC of
proposal to DOTC for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal jurisdiction over the present cases.
III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement, which was
then endorsed by DOTC to NEDA DOTC then created the Prequalification Bids HELD: NO. After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues
and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project involved, this Court is of the view that the crux of the instant controversy
PBAC determined that the challenger, Paircargo, which later on incorporated as involves significant legal questions. The facts necessary to resolve these legal
herein respondent PIATCO, had prequalified to undertake the project PBAC questions are well established and, hence, need not be determined by a trial
formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted by the court. The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from
Paircargo Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 working days or until November 28, assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when
1996 within which to match the said bid, otherwise, the project would be the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
awarded to Paircargo, which AEDC failed to do, thus resulting in the submission exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
by NEDA of the concession agreement for the second-pass approval of the NEDA- and calling for the exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction.[19] It is easy to
ICC AEDC filed before RTC Pasig a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the
Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against the Secretary of the DOTC, the relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these cases
Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D. are of transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation
Alvarez, in his capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee DOTC of the country’s premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues
issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO Government and PIATCO submitted for resolution are of first impression and they entail the proper legal
signed an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) MIAA which interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its
is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the
had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer controversy before the Court, procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger speedy disposition of the instant cases. In Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court
handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo of Appeals,[20] even after finding that the arbitration clause in the
handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at Distributorship Agreement in question is valid and the dispute between the
the NAIA. Some of these service providers are the Miascor Group, DNATA-Wings parties is arbitrable, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying
Aviation Systems Corp., and the MacroAsia Group. Miascor, DNATA and petitioner’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings pursuant to the arbitration clause
MacroAsia, together with Philippine Airlines (PAL), are the dominant players in under the contract. In so ruling, this Court held that as contracts produce legal
the industry with an aggregate market share of 70%. o the workers of the effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, only the parties to the
international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their Distributorship Agreement are bound by its terms, including the arbitration clause
employment upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed before stipulated therein. This Court ruled that arbitration proceedings could be called
this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of said agreements for but only with respect to the parties to the contract in question. Considering
respondent PIATCO informed the Court that on March 4, 2003 PIATCO that there are parties to the case who are neither parties to the Distributorship
commenced arbitration proceedings before the International Chamber of Agreement nor heirs or assigns of the parties thereto, this Court, citing its
Commerce, International Court of Arbitration (ICC) by filing a Request for previous ruling in Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty Corporation,[21] held that to
Arbitration with the Secretariat of the ICC against the Government of the tolerate the splitting of proceedings by allowing arbitration as to some of the
Republic of the Philippines acting through the DOTC and MIAA. Respondent parties on the one hand and trial for the others on the other hand would, in
PIATCO further alleges that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the instant effect, result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary
cases as factual issues are involved which this Court is illequipped to resolve. delay.[22] Thus, we ruled that the interest of justice would best be served if the
Moreover, PIATCO alleges that submission of this controversy to this Court at the trial court hears and adjudicates the case in a single and complete proceeding.
first instance is a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. They contend that It is established that petitioners in the present cases who have presented
trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court with respect to a special legitimate interests in the resolution of the controversy are not parties to the
civil action for prohibition and hence, following the rule on hierarchy of courts, PIATCO Contracts. Accordingly, they cannot be bound by the arbitration clause
resort must first be had before the trial courts. provided for in the ARCA and hence, cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration
proceedings. A speedy and decisive resolution of all the critical issues in the

90
present controversy, including those raised by petitioners, cannot be made before over cases of this nature to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the exigency of the
an arbitral tribunal. The object of arbitration is precisely to allow an expeditious present petition, however, calls for the relaxation of this rule. Section 496
determination of a dispute. This objective would not be met if this Court were to (should be Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991 primarily
allow the parties to settle the cases by intended that the Liga ng mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga
arbitration as there are certain issues involving non-parties to the PIATCO in the sanggunians for the immediate ventilation, articulation, and crystallization
Contracts which the arbitral tribunal will not be equipped to resolve. of issues affecting barangay government administration o Respondents (1)
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing; (2) the petition
should not be entertained by this Court in view of the pendency before the
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF Regional Trial Court of Manila of two actions or petitions questioning the subject
MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, ordinance and executive order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; and
respondents. G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004 EN BANC (4) the act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli.

FACTS: Petitioner Liga, the national organization of all the barangays in PH ISSUE: Whether the present petition for certiorari may be taken cognizance of by
constituting of duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial SC.
chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision
chapters, adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its HELD: NO. First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial
internal organization and thereafter adopted and ratified its own Election Code: o capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial
Liga ng mga Barangay Provincial, Metropolitan, HUC/ICC Chapters. There shall be prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
nationwide synchronized elections for the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal,
chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule
month when the synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held. The 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: o SECTION 1. Petition for
incumbent Liga chapter president concerned duly assisted by the proper certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
government agency, office or department, e.g. Provincial/City/NCR/Regional judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
Director, shall convene all the duly elected Component City/Municipal Chapter grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
Presidents and all the current elected Punong Barangays (for HUC/ICC) of the no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
respective chapters in any public place within its area of jurisdiction for the law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
purpose of reorganizing and electing the officers and directors of the provincial, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
metropolitan or HUC/ICC Liga chapters. Said president duly assisted by the or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
government officer aforementioned, shall notify, in writing, all the above incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. Elsewise stated, for a writ of
concerned at least fifteen (15) days before the scheduled election meeting on the certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed
exact date, time, place and requirements of the said meeting. Respondent City against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of
City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
the barangay elections Learning that said Ordinance was forwarded to the City remedy in the ordinary course of law. o A respondent is said to be exercising
Mayor, petitioner sent a letter to said City Mayor, requesting the latter to veto judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what
the same, on the ground it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these
the Liga through legislation City Mayor, however, signed and approved the questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.[11] o Quasi-judicial
assailed city ordinance and issued on 15 August 2002 Executive Order No. 011, function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion,
Series of 2002, to implement the ordinance. Petitioner then instituted a etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or
petition for certiorari before the SC and prayed for a TRO o Petitioner assailed ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them
ordinance and EO contradict the Liga Election Code and are therefore invalid o as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
OSG While Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction nature.”[12] o Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or

91
quasijudicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.[13] o The respondents prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the over-crowding of the Court’s docket. As we have said in Santiago v.
enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the Vasquez,[17] the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of
issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put
the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie. this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be
essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a
the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only trier of facts. Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not
appellate, not original, jurisdiction.[14] Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
provides: o Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public availment of the
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, jurisdiction.[18] Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre[19] is misplaced
or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, because the nonobservance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue
final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, prohibition therein was an act of the President of the Philippines, which would
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or have greatly affected all local government units. We reiterated therein that when
regulation is in question. (Italics supplied). As such, this petition must an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the
necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. The same
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.[15] Third, even is true when what is seriously alleged to be unconstitutional is an act of the
granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of President, who in our constitutional scheme is coequal with Congress.
certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special
and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been
adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EDDY NG KOK
should be allowed. We have held that this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue WEI, respondent. G.R. No. 139791. December 12, 2003 THIRD DIVISION
a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial FACTS: Respondent, Singaporean businessman, sent a letter of intent to
Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. petitioner expressing his intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde
Cuaresma:[16] o This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as Terraces December 5, 1988 respondent paid a reservation fee of Php
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom 50,000 January 16, 1989 he then paid 90% of the purchase price in the
of choice of the court to which application therefor0 will be directed. There is sum of P729,830.00 Petitioner then executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of respondent o contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit “shall
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for substantially be completed and delivered” to the respondent “within fifteen (15)
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy months” from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that “(S)hould there be
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs no substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a
against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged against

92
(petitioner)” April 5, 1990 petitioner informed respondent of the substantial when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed
completion of his condominium unit, however, due to various uncontrollable by the Court of Appeals.”[7] Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus,
forces (such as coup d‘ etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage), liable to pay damages as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions. The
the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990 July 5, 1990 respondent went jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
back to Manila but found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of
facilities Petitioner then sent a letter to respondent informing the latter that he law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by
can move on by August 22, 1990 Respondent, however, later on found out evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of
that the unit is still unlivable Respondent then sent a letter to petitioner facts.[8] These exceptions are not present here.
demanding payment for the damages he sustained, but the same was ignored
Respondent then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE AGUSTIN T.
RTC Makati Respondent then finally accepted the condominium unit and on SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, respondent. A.M.
April 12, 1991 and occupied the same thereby limiting his cause of action to No. MTJ-01-1370. April 25, 2003
damages only RTC in favor respondent CA affirmed in toto Petitioner
filed an MR but the same was denied by CA Petitioner RTC has no FACTS: Private complainant Teresita Aguirre Magbanua accused Judge
jurisdiction over the case o Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as Hurtado, Oscar Pagunsan and Danilo Ong of the crime of “Falsification by Private
amended, provides: “SECTION 1. – In the exercise of its functions to regulate Individual and Use of Falsified Document” . This arose from the sale made by
the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in private complainant to Davao Realty Development Corporation, represented by
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and accused Ong, with co-accused Pagunsan, as broker, and accused Judge Hurtado
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)][4] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear as notary public and then Branch Clerk The case was raffled off to respondent
and decide cases of the following nature: “C. Cases involving specific Judge of MTC Koronadal Judge Hurtado filed an MD contending that the case
performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of against him should be forwarded to SC o Judge Hurtado claimed that Circular
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, No. 3-89 dated 6 February 1989 requires “all cases involving justices and judges
broker or salesman. of the lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently
unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of immorality,
ISSUE # 1: Whether RTC validly took cognizance of respondent’s complaint. estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc.” to be forwarded to the
HELD #1: NO. Supreme Court. Judge Hurtado asserted that since the case against him is one
involving a judge of a lower court, the same should be forwarded to the Supreme
ISSUE # 2: Whether petitioner may still question before the SC the jurisdiction of Court pursuant to Circular No. 3-89. MTC excluded Juge Hurtado o this
RTC. HELD # 2: NO. Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which Court cannot and shall not try this case as against Judge Hurtado, unless the
has jurisdiction over the instant case. We have consistently held that complaints Honorable Supreme Court would order otherwise A letter was then sent to OCA
for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer who then answered that: o Circular No. 3-89 refers only to administrative
against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the complaints filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The
HLURB.[5] While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over Circular does not apply to criminal cases filed before trial courts against such
the case, petitioner’s active participation in the proceedings estopped it from justices and judges.
assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then ISSUE: Whether MTC Koronadal, where respondent judge was presiding, had
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the case filed against Judge Hurtado.
when adverse.[6] Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction
before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and HELD: YES. The Court issued Circular No. 3-89 in response to a letter dated 19
ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel December 1988 by then IBP President Leon M. Garcia, seeking clarification of the
and can no longer question the trial court’s jurisdiction. On petitioner’s claim Court’s En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1998 in RE: Letter of then Acting
that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. Time and Presiding Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon[3] and Associate Justices Reynato Puno[4]
again, we have ruled that “the factual findings of the trial court are given weight and Alfredo Marigomen[5] of the Court of Appeals. A certain Atty. Eduardo R.

93
Balaoing had filed a complaint against Court of Appeals Justices Nocon, Puno and Court. The case filed against Judge Hurtado is not an administrative case filed
Marigomen relating to a petition filed before their division. In its En Banc with the IBP. It is a criminal case filed with the trial court under its jurisdiction as
Resolution of 29 November 1988, the Court required the IBP to refer to the prescribed by law. The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the
Supreme Court for appropriate action the complaint[6] filed by Atty. Balaoing same time both a criminal act and an administrative offense. Whether the
with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The Court stated that the power to criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed before or after
discipline justices and judges of the lower courts is within the Court’s exclusive he became a judge is of no moment. Neither is it material that an MTC judge will
power and authority as provided in Section 11, Article VII of the 1987 be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney
Constitution.[7] The Court Administrator publicized the En Banc Resolution of 29 or judge is distinct and separate from an administrative case against him. The
November 1988 by issuing Circular No. 17 dated 20 December 1988. The dismissal of the criminal case does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative
Court issued Circular No. 3-89 on 6 February 1989 clarifying the En Banc case arising from the same set of facts. The quantum of evidence that is
Resolution of 29 November 1988. Circular No. 3-89 provides in part as follows: required in the latter is only preponderance of evidence, and not proof beyond
o (1) The IBP (Board of Governors and Commission on Bar Discipline) shall reasonable doubt which is required in criminal cases.[10] As held in Gatchalian
forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza:[11] o Administrative cases against
and judges of lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. o The burden of proof for these
immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc. x x x. (Emphasis types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
supplied) Circular No. 3-89 clarified the second paragraph, Section 1 of Rule necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, ‘clearly
139-B of the Rules of Court which states that: o The IBP Board of Governors preponderant evidence’ is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will
may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are
of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper attendant in the administrative proceedings. o It should be emphasized that a
charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service. finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of
(Emphasis supplied). As clarified, the phrase “attorneys x x x in the liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not
government service” in Section 1 of Rule 139-B does not include justices of necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s
appellate courts and judges of lower courts who are not subject to the disciplining finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar
authority of the IBP. All administrative cases against justices of appellate courts finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable
and judges of lower courts fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The
Court However, Rule 139-B refers to Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
which is administrative and not criminal in nature. The cases referred to in administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
Circular No. 389 are administrative cases for disbarment, suspension or discipline inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to
of attorneys, including justices of appellate courts and judges of the lower courts. remember the Court’s ruling in In re Almacen, which we quote: o “x x x
The Court has vested the IBP with the power to initiate and prosecute Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
administrative cases against erring lawyers.[8] However, under Circular No. 3- purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
89, the Court has directed the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court for appropriate investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
action all administrative cases filed with IBP against justices of appellate courts intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
and judges of the lower courts. As mandated by the Constitution, the Court Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
exercises the initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective,
exclusive power to discipline administratively justices of appellate courts and and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
judges of lower courts. Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
against erring justices of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. Trial courts disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by justices of for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
appellate courts[9] and judges of lower courts. This is clear from the Circular purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
directing the IBP, and not the trial courts, to refer all administrative cases filed by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
against justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts to the Supreme

94
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of
pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x” jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4)
prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the
four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.
GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, In Gumabon v. Larin[11] we explained thus: o “x x x [T]he motu proprio
JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents. G.R. No. 151149. dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly
September 7, 2004 THIRD DIVISION had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear
during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or
FACTS: Petitioner filed a request before the District Office of the Bureau of neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of
Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of a these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the
certain real property During the investigation, it was found that the property right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2,
had no occupants but was planted with some coconut trees by petitioner and Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory
respondent Palanca who went there from time to time to undertake some 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new
development work and that respondents have been issued homestead patents for rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
certain portions of said land Assistant Director of District Office then informed pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
the Director of Lands that the subject land has been certified and released as matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act Petitioner then filed for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
an action before RTC seeking to nullify the homestead patents and original statute of limitations. x x x.”[12] (Italics supplied) On the other hand,
certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of “residual jurisdiction” is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor as follows: o “SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by
o claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of
patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion appeal in due time. o “A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected
from forest land to agricultural land Respondents after filing their Answer, as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
filed an MD on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s record on appeal filed in due time. o “In appeals by notice of appeal, the court
Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango RTC granted MD and denied time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. o “In appeals
petitioner’s MR CA affirmed RTC’s dismissal BUT not on the grounds relied by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter
upon by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of jurisdiction thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its “residual expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. o “In either case, prior to
prerogatives” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue
proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do
to him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with
of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.” (Italics supplied)
court. The “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court
is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
ISSUE: Whether RTC had jurisdiction over the case, considering the allegations involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals
set forth in the complaint filed by petitioner. by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the
transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.[13] In either
HELD: NO. Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its “residual instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue
prerogatives” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the “residual protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
jurisdiction” of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA. Under Section 1 of order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. The
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based,

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therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of actions, over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction. In an
dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must
parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned
residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the
an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the defendant; and 2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a
Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1[14] of the same rules. mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the plaintiff.[22] In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from
Complaint motu proprio “on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to
lower court’s lack of jurisdiction”[15] and for prescription of the action. Indeed, bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.[23]
when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also
to dismiss the action.[16] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or title thereto is
law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously
the relief sought.[17] In his Complaint for “Nullification of Applications for registered in the defendant’s name.[24] As with an annulment of title, a
Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to
Title,”[18] petitioner averred: o “2. That on November 10, 1965, without the recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the
knowledge of [petitioner, Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioner’s] cousin, land, and (2) that the defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the
in connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x fraudulently and property.[25] Therefore, the defendant who acquired the property through
in bad faith: 2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre- mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the plaintiff the property or the
requisite to the filing of an application for homestead patent in his name and that title thereto.[26] In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner
of his Co[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware that [Petitioner] allege that he had previously held title to the land in question. On the contrary,
KATON had previously applied or requested for re-classification and certification he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land,[27] that it had never
of the same land from forest land to agricultural land which request was been privately titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a homestead
favorably acted upon and approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic under the provisions of the Public Land Act.[28] This Court has held that a
fraud and misrepresentation; 2.3. In stating in his application for homestead complaint by a private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained
patent that he was applying for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero Island where by fraudulent means, and who consequently prays for its annulment, does not
there was none, the same constituted another clear case of fraud and state a cause of action; hence, such complaint must be dismissed. [29]
misrepresentation; o “3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and Neither can petitioner’s case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public Land
OCT No. G-7089 in the name of [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. and the filing of Act categorically declares that only the solicitor general or the officer in his stead
Homestead Patent Applications in the names of [respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, may institute such an action.[30] A private person may not bring an action for
Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,] having been done fraudulently and in bad reversion or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free
faith, are ipso facto null and void and of no effect whatsoever.”[19] o “x x x. By patent and its derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered would
a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects with natural again form part of the public domain.[31] Thus, when the plaintiff admits in
necessity arise knowing from such act or omission, [Respondent Palanca] on the complaint that the disputed land will revert to the public domain even if the
account of his blood relation, first degree cousins, trust, interdependence and title is canceled or amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party
intimacy is guilty of intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x.”[20] Thereupon, petitioner who may bring action is the government, to which the property will revert.[32] A
prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has no cause of
applications of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as action in a suit for reconveyance.[33] As it is, vested rights over the land applied
Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of Respondent for under a homestead may be validly claimed only by the applicant, after
Palanca; and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to approval by the director of the Land Management Bureau of the former’s final
reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner.[21] The question is, did the proof of homestead patent. [34] Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint
Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the utter
and certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely absence of a cause of action,[35] a defense raised by respondents in their
for reversion? o The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such Answer.[36] Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court[37] ordains that every

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action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008 THIRD
who has no right or interest to protect has no cause of action by which to invoke, DIVISION
as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.[38] Finally, assuming that
petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its FACTS: Petitioner was charged with reckless imprudence before RTC Bulacan
reconveyance, the case should still be dismissed for being time-barred.[39] It is RTC Bulacan convicted petitioner Petitioner appealed and raised RTC’s
not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original Certificate of Title was jurisdiction for the first time CA considered the petitioner to have actively
issued to Palanca on February 21, 1977,[40] while the Complaint was filed only participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC;
on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years from the thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of
date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of jurisdiction Petitioner elevated case to SC o Does the fact that the petitioner
fraudulently registered real property.[41] It must likewise be stressed that failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was
Palanca’s title -- which attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute
issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no longer laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Ybanez v. Intermediate Appellate notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s
Court[42] ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an administrative appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active
proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, is as indefeasible as one issued participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed
under a judicial registration proceeding one year from its issuance; provided, not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
however, that the land covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case.
In Aldovino v. Alunan,[43] the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own ISSUE: Whether petitioner may assail RTC’s jurisdiction for the first time on
complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be appeal.
dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the
defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato,[44] we also explained thus: o "x x x [T]rial HELD: YES. As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision
courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred
indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does
O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94. While both the
Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless
SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded
16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC— the trial went on for
defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever
merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the
even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time
found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the
Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or principle of laches will not be applicable. To settle once and for all this problem
where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the
What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.
prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been
record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter
established by the evidence."[45] (Italics supplied) Clearly then, the CA did submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that: o It has
not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when they are able to do been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal,
so, courts must endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court
future litigations.[46] below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases
there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction,

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the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of
Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.) Jurisdiction over the subject-matter plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus: x x x that an appellant who files his brief
in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the
the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an latter’s jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as
objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of
x x x16 Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained: o 4. The operation said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the
of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20 Then came our ruling
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches from invoking
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We
if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a expounded, thus: o A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of
who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general
an inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
Secundum says: Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
void, or has been granted an instruction based on its defective character directing abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale
the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations,
whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. It has
quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.) Where such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or.
accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
378.)18 But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason
the following observations: o It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision that such a practice cannot be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy.
has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
Court’s jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243
the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127,
this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is
must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually jurisdiction to escape a penalty. Upon this same principle is what We said in
exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaña de 1963 (supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a

98
party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as in or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.24 In Calimlim, despite the fact
etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who
Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277. The facts of this case show that from the invoked the court’s jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment
time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, by waiver or by estoppel. Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As such, in
the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled:
said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final o While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent
the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and
Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22 Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held: Moreover, we note that petitioner
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to
tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in
jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had
Ramirez,23 we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc.
rather than the exception: o A rule that had been settled by unquestioned vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491),
acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking
a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it
from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously raised the question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus
not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics
which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of ours) Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development,
objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled: o In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in
been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private
the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply
time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over
estoppel. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned
rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It the trial court’s jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the
was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents
motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and
been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to
As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and obtain affirmative relief – the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents

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have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That
actions. The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v.
may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the case Ramirez, which we quote: o A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of
affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally
or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however,
300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously
[1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy
in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had
(Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics ours)26 the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
v. Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the estoppel. Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that
examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel, that the ruling in jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the
Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover,
thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses
the NLRC on appeal.28 Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the contained in the answer.30 Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if
Court clarified that: o Petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the trial the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by
court’s dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in
already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no Calimlim, said: o Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of
longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended. The jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial.
above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by
successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party
jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when
a party may be barred from questioning a court’s jurisdiction after being invoked the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as
of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
participated. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a assert it.32 And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." The ruling in be applicable, thus: o Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an
Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
the rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to
jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that
cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine

100
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then
the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and
issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional
to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting
present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or more after more or less 15 years.37 The same, however, does not obtain in the
declined to assert it. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was instant case. We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a
raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only from necessity,
after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great
proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety care and the equity must be strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine
invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of
submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject
adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to matter is void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in
raise the question of jurisdiction. Clearly, the factual settings attendant in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction
Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null
the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, and void for want of jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz
promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42 o It is axiomatic that the
based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasijudicial officer or government agency,
appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by
contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred
the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties
to comply.34 The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject
circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or
as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction
should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. x x x o Indeed, the
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set
or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss.
absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the
factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is
to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal
challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to
arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where direct and collateral attacks.
the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not
thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.35
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no THIRD DIVISION
considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone,
though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless FACTS: Petitioner, appointed as student regent of UP, discussed with then
it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce President Erap the proposed renovation of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman She, with
them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so her siblings and relatives, then registered with the SEC the Office of the Student

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Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI) OSFRI then received an amount of Php 15M and Position Classification Act of 1989. o accused-movant’s contention that the
from Pres. Erap as financial assistance for the proposed renovation, the source of same of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from the
which, according to the information, was the Office of the President The coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
project, however, did not materialize Petitioner’s successor, Kristine Clare ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case Petitioner filed an MR
Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa which was denied by SB
U.P. filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner. Ombudsman found probable ISSUE # 1: Whether SB has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa
Petitioner filed an MQ on the ground that Sandiganbayan does not have any HELD # 1: YES. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606,
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended. A brief legislative history of
student regent o Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public
(Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the
RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. o it was President Estrada, not people.29 P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received the promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of
P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the the Sandiganbayan.30 P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on
government. o the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606,
peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of
capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Upon the
as a student regent. She further contended that she had no power or authority to other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The
receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
(BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to
her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should
connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32 R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan. Ombudsman enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact,
Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the
phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals.
charges against petitioner Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s MQ o As Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not
correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting
the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. The
single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
by a public official in relation to his office. o It is unmistakably evident that the construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio
Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity
to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accusedmovant is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi
undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa. Every section, provision or clause of
vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at
occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must

102
be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the
opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over
principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held
statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27
ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose
na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
o B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
section in relation to their office. Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction provision of law.44 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or
in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a
subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public board of trustees of a nonstock corporation.45 By express mandate of law,
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office. Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47
ISSUE # 2: Whether SB has jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment
in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
HELD # 2: YES. Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer. In Khan, Jr. be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was
officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different not committed in relation to her office. According to petitioner, she had no
statutes and jurisprudence. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no
that: o A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then
law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of in relation to public office. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a averments in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by
public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53 In
thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner,
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of
office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881). In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office: o "A public office is the right, SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied) Clearly,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the did not quash the information based on this ground.
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual
so invested is a public officer."42 Petitioner claims that she is not a public

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ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR., Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the
Respondent. G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013 THIRD DIVISION investigating committee constituted therein.14 Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No.
7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of
FACTS: Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old second year high school Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to
student filed a complaint against petitioner, third year high school teacher, with suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for
the CSC CAR, alleging that the latter punched him in the stomach for failing to causes enumerated therein.15 Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is
follow instructions of falling in line, causing said complainant to suffer from possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or
stomach pain for several days Bang-on then filed a criminal case for less more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the
serious PI against petitioner before RTC CSC-CAR found the existence of a jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be
prima faciecase for misconduct and formally charged Pat-og While the admin presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body
case was ongoing, RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of slight PI is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
CSC CAR rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of simple misconduct o concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.16 Where concurrent jurisdiction exists
Petitioner filed an MR but was dismissed; he then elevated the case to CSC o in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
CSC affirmed with modification the decision of the CSC-CAR o Petitioner exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which
filed an MR assailing for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it.
contended that administrative charges against a public school teacher should Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the
have been initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.17 In CSC v. Alfonso,18 it was
Carta for Public School Teachers. o CSC denied MR CA affirmed CSC o It held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC of its
agreed that Pat-og was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC as inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service,
the records clearly showed that he actively participated in the proceedings. It was including public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and
of the view that Patog was not denied due process when he failed to cross- foremost, a civil servant accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC for
examine Bang-on and his witnesses because he was given the opportunity to be complaints lodged against him as a public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670
heard and present his evidence before the CSC-CAR and the CSC. divests the CSC of its power to discipline public school teachers would negate the
very purpose for which the CSC was established and would impliedly amend the
ISSUE # 1: Whether CSC may hear and decide the administrative complaint Constitution itself. To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v.
against petitioner. HELD # 1: YES. Macud19 that R.A. No. 4670, in imposing a separate set of procedural
requirements in connection with administrative proceedings against public school
ISSUE # 2: Whether petitioner may question the authority of CSC to hear and teachers, should be construed to refer only to the specific procedure to be
decide the administrative complaint. HELD # 2: NO. The petitioner’s argument followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DepEd. By no means,
that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A. No. 4670 is then, did R.A. No. 4670 confer an exclusive disciplinary authority over public
misplaced. In Puse v. Santos-Puse,10 it was held that the CSC, the school teachers on the DepEd. At any rate, granting that the CSC was without
Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional Teachers- jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the issue. Although the
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule
administrative cases against public school teachers. Under Article IX-B of the admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened.20 Here,
1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the
administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies same by
of the government.11 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative Code of actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing
1987)12 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his
Philippines)13 expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time
administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case
Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it
inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
including public school teachers. Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the

104
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND monetary claims. To satisfy the claim, a truck in the possession of Sereno’s
LOLITA G. TOLEDO, Respondents. G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013 SECOND employer was levied upon by a sheriff of the NLRC, accompanied by Sereno and
DIVISION his lawyer, Rogelio Sarsaba, the petitioner in that case. A complaint for recovery
of motor vehicle and damages, with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the lite was eventually filed against Sarsaba, Sereno, the NLRC sheriff and the NLRC
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and by the registered owner of the truck. After his motion to dismiss was denied by
Lolita Toledo PR Lolita in her Answer, alleged that her husband and co- the trial court, petitioner Sarsaba filed his answer. Later on, however, he filed an
defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead During the trial, instead of omnibus motion to dismiss citing, as one of the grounds, lack of jurisdiction over
presenting its evidence, respondent filed an MD: o (1) that the complaint failed to one of the principal defendants, in view of the fact that Sereno was already dead
implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence, the case must when the complaint for recovery of possession was filed. Although the factual
be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; (2) that the trial court did not milieu of the present case is not exactly similar to that of Sarsaba, one of the
acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of issues submitted for resolution in both cases is similar: whether or not a case,
the Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the trial court erred in ordering the where one of the named defendants was already dead at the time of its filing,
substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that the court must also should be dismissed so that the claim may be pursued instead in the proceedings
dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in the
the Rules of Court. RTC denied the MD for having been filed out of time, Sarsaba Case claimed, as did respondent herein, that since one of the defendants
citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states that: "[W]ithin died before summons was served on him, the trial court should have dismissed
the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a the complaint against all the defendants and the claim should be filed against the
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made x x x." Respondent filed an MR o estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in Sarsaba, therefore, prayed
RTC denied the MR on the ground that "defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction that the complaint be dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to all the
of this Court is now barred by estoppel by laches" since respondent failed to raise defendants, considering that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
the issue despite several chances to do so. Respondent elevated case to CA of Sereno.42 This is exactly the same prayer made by respondent herein in her
CA granted respondent’s petition o It is elementary that courts acquire motion to dismiss. The Court, in the Sarsaba Case, resolved the issue in this
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant x x x only when the latter wise: o x x x We cannot countenance petitioner’s argument that the complaint
voluntarily appeared or submitted to the court or by coercive process issued by against the other defendants should have been dismissed, considering that the
the court to him, x x x. In this case, it is undisputed that when [petitioner] RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. The court’s failure to
Boston filed the complaint on December 24, 1997, defendant Manuel S. Toledo acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal to the person
was already dead, x x x. Such being the case, the court a quo could not have claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view
acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel S. Toledo. of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so
as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants.
ISSUE # 1: Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Manuel. Failure to serve summons on Sereno’s person will not be a cause for the
dismissal of the complaint against the other defendants, considering that they
HELD # 1: NO. jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by have been served with copies of the summons and complaints and have long
the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case against him when he receives submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the other defendants in
summons. "Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action the complaint were given the chance to raise all possible defenses and objections
brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court personal to them in their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent
acquires jurisdiction over his person."40 In the case at bar, the trial court did answers.
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no valid
service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even ISSUE # 2: Whether respondent may still question the jurisdiction of RTC over
before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court. The the person of Manuel on her MD.
issues presented in this case are similar to those in the case of Sarsaba v. Vda.
de Te.41 In Sarsaba, the NLRC rendered a decision declaring that Patricio HELD # 2: NO. At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding
Sereno was illegally dismissed from employment and ordering the payment of his discussions will demonstrate, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel should not be

105
an issue in this case. A protracted discourse on jurisdiction is, nevertheless, posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their
demanded by the fact that jurisdiction has been raised as an issue from the lower cause voluntarily.35 Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to
court, to the Court of Appeals and, finally, before this Court. For the sake of dismiss before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of
clarity, and in order to finally settle the controversy and fully dispose of all the defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in
issues in this case, it was deemed imperative to resolve the issue of jurisdiction. this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the
Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss parties are pertinent herein. the "objection on jurisdictional grounds which is
questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was filed more than six years after her not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of
amended answer was filed. According to petitioner, respondent had several jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the subject
opportunities, at various stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial court’s matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since
jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x subject, however, to the principle of
in the case of Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.30 petitioner claimed that estoppel by laches."36 Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person
respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed waived
her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in the under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a
proceedings conducted by the trial court. Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense.37 If the
that, it failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the
namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is
(3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of
jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.31 Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.38 The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of made a sweeping pronouncement in its questioned decision, stating that "issue
estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first
case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of the then time on appeal" and that, therefore, respondent timely raised the issue in her
Court of First Instance to hear a case for the collection of a sum of money in the motion to dismiss and is, consequently, not estopped from raising the question of
amount of P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time, within the exclusive jurisdiction. As the question of
original jurisdiction of the municipal courts. In subsequent cases citing the jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant Manuel, the
ruling of the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at issue was the jurisdiction of the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any
trial court over the subject matter of the case. Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga case, respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the
v. Court of Appeals,32 the issue for consideration was the authority of the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted
regional trial court to hear and decide an action for reformation of contract and by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.
damages involving a subdivision lot, it being argued therein that jurisdiction is
vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant to PD 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HENRY T. GO, Respondent. G.R. No.
Judge, MTC, Legaspi City,33 petitioners argued that the respondent municipal 168539 March 25, 2014 EN BANC
trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment because the issue
of ownership was raised in the pleadings. Finally, in People v. Casuga,34 FACTS: After the promulgation of SC’s decision in the Agan case, one Ma.
accused-appellant claimed that the crime of grave slander, of which she was Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against several
charged, falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts or city courts individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019, which included respondent, who
and the then courts of first instance, and that the judgment of the court of first was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired
instance, to which she had appealed the municipal court's conviction, should be with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in entering into a contract which is
deemed null and void for want of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed grossly disadvantageous to the government Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. In all of these cases, the for Luzon found probable cause in indicting respondent hence the filing of the
Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts Information with the SB o Secretary was already deceased thus no charge was
concerned over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, filed against him Respondent filed an MQ on the ground that the operative
declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A.

106
3019; contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on
public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders. Lastly, the
agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 SB issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in
granted the MQ on said ground the main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9)
years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay
ISSUE: Whether SB has jurisdiction over respondent, considering that he is not a the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's
PO. right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.

HELD: YES. As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]: o "[L]ack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS.
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE
himself to that jurisdiction." Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS.,
for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and
must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the SIGNATURE LINES, Respondents. G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014 EN BANC
appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court FACTS: The City of Manila, through its treasurer, Liberty Toledo, assessed
jurisdiction over the person." Verily, petitioner’s participation in the taxes for the taxable period from Jan. to Dec. 2002, against private respondents,
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc.,
issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.,
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In
deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28 In the instant case, addition to the taxes due from private respondents pursuant to Secs. 14, 15, 16,
respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of 17 the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, said assessment covered the local
the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Sec. 21 of the same
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the
28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay
cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his the P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest. Private respondents then filed
person. As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant with the RTC a complaint for the refund or recovery of illegally and/or
case involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the erroneously collected local business tax with prayer to issue TRO and writ of
government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has preliminary injunction. In their amended complaint, private respondents alleged
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 that, in relation to Sec. 21 thereof, Secs. 14 to 20 of the RRCM were violative of
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of RA No. 7160 (Local
R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, Government Code) on double taxation. They further averred that the city’s
accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 8100 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already
respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in been declared illegal and unconstitutional by the DOJ. The trial court granted the
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the
Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer orders of the RTC. The CA dismissed the same holding that it has no jurisdiction
be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the over the said petition. The CA ruled that since the appellate jurisdiction over
SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is

107
vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an jurisdiction; 4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise be filed with the CTA. liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or
Hence, the present petition. The Supreme Court finds that the instant petition release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation
should be denied for being moot and academic. The decision of the trial court had thereto, or other matters arising under the
already become final and executory per Certificate of Finality issued by the same Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs; 5.
trial court on Oct. 20, 2008. In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
the issue on jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
future guidance of both bench and bar. property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him
ISSUE: Whether the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs
Code; 7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of
HELD: YES. On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in
1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over the the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and
following: o (1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties. o b.
Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided: 1.
Internal Revenue; o (2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of
involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws
detention or release of property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where
other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and o (3) the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties,
Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no
the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction
Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto. On March 30, of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the
2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action
RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be
elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by
Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides thus: o Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it
The CTA shall exercise: o a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
as herein provided: 1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in separately from the criminal action will be recognized. 2. Exclusive appellate
cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or jurisdiction in criminal offenses: o a. Over appeals from the judgments,
other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction. o b. Over petitions for review
Revenue; 2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the
charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of in their respective jurisdiction. o c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein
Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific provided: 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final
period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial; 3. and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides,
Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases however, that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos

108
(P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Trial Court and Regional Trial Court. 2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax jurisdiction o n the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
collection cases: a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted
the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has
their respective territorial jurisdiction. b. Over petitions for review of the been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the
their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in
in their respective jurisdiction. A perusal of the above provisions would show these cases. Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its
that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such
jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate
amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be
for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases considered as partial, not total. Consistent with the above pronouncement, this
filed before it. The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.
certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body,
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
existence of appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC, extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This principle
Garcia v. De Jesus, Veloria v. COMELEC, Department of Agrarian Reform was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that "a
Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has ruled court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court
against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions
ground that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power. It of the lower court." The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated in
must be observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo and Bulilis v. Nuez.
these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasijudicial Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that
powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 now provides when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, employed by such court or officer. If this Court were to sustain petitioners'
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this
jurisdiction. In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the
Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-
jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.
to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially
the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the
issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review
jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such
the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129. power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no expres s grant of such power, jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the
with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To
such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power i ncludes rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not case. Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the

109
pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention enforcement of its judgments and mandates." Hence, demands, matters or
of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and
giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal
appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide
consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the
it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning
jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its
complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders appellate jurisdiction. Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not
and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the
the latter. A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the
the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial
the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make bodies.
the decisions of the court thereunder
effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all JURISDICTION OVER SMALL CLAIMS; CASES COVERED BY THE RULES ON
auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of SUMMARY PROCEDURE AND BARANGAY CONCILIATION
that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain
the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its Katarungang Rule on Small Rules on
rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. Lastly, it would not be amiss to Pambarangay Claims Cases Summary
point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have Law Procedure
powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. Purpose/Object To effect an To provide a To achieve an
These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the amicable simpler and more expeditious
court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress settlement of inexpensive and and
any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process. disputes expeditious inexpensive
among family means of settling determination
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same
and barangay disputes of the cases
level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
members at involving purely defined to be
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied the barangay money claims governed by
from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on level without than the regular the Rules on
them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary judicial civil process Summary
and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and recourse and Procedure
functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are consequently
directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted help relieve
powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it the courts of
effective in behalf of the litigants. Thus, this Court has held that "while a court docket
may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its congestion
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, (Preamble of
implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, PD
1508).(1999
subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted
Bar)
court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the

110
Where to file 1. For disputes 1. MeTC 1. MeTC 2. lupon therein
between 2. MTCC MTCC 3. MTC shall be
residents of 3. MTC 4. MCTC brought in the
the same 4. MCTC barangay
barangay: the where the real
dispute must property or
be brought for larger portion
settlement in thereof is
the said situated;
barangay;
4. For disputes
2. For disputes arising at the
between workplace
residents of where the
different but contending
adjoining parties are
barangays and employed or at
the parties the institution
agree to where such
submit their parties are
differences to enrolled for
amicable study shall be
settlement: brought in the
within the barangay
same city or where such
municipality workplace or
where any of institution is
the located.
respondents
reside a the CASES COVERED
election of the Civil Cases All disputes Small claims 1. All cases of
complainant; involving cases – civil forcible entry
parties who claims which are and unlawful
actually reside exclusively for detainer
3. For disputes in the same the payment or irrespective of
involving real city or reimbursement the amount of
property or municipality of a sum of damages or
any interest may be the money not to unpaid rentals
when the subject of the exceed Two sought to be
parties thereto proceedings Hundred recovered.
agree to for amicable Thousand Pesos Where
submit their settlement in (P200,000.00) attorney’s
differences to the barangay. exclusive of fees are
amicable interest and awarded, the
settlement by If the only costs. (as same shall not
an appropriate contending amended A.M.

111
party is the No. 08-8-7-SC, exceed Php the Barangay c. Contract of
government or EFFECTIVE 20,000; and Court to Services;
its FEBRUARY 1, change or
instrumentality 2016) 2. All other modify. d. Contract of
or subdivision civil cases, (Claudia Rivera Sale;
the case is 1. Purely civil in except Sanchez V.
exempted from nature where the probate Honorable e. Contract of
the claim or relief proceedings, Mariano C. Mortgage;
requirement of prayed for by the where the Tupas, Claudia
barangay plaintiff is solely total amount Rivera Sanchez 2. For damages
conciliation for payment or of plaintiff’s V. Honorable arising from any
proceedings reimbursement claim does not Mariano C. of the following:
but when it of sum of money, exceed Two Tupas)
(government or Hundred The a. Fault or
or its Thousand requirement of negligence;
instrumentality 2. The civil Pesos undergoing b. b. Quasi-
or subdivision) aspect of criminal (P200,000.00) barangay contract;
is only one of actions, either exclusive of conciliation c. Contract;
the contending filed before the interest and proceedings
parties, a institution of the costs. (as applies only to d. The
confrontation criminal action, amended A.M. cases involving enforcement
should still be or reserved upon No. 08-8-7- natural of a
undertaken the filing of the SC, persons, and barangay
among the criminal action in EFFECTIVE not where any amicable
other parties. court, pursuant FEBRUARY 1, of the parties settlement
(Napoleon to Rule 111 of 2016 is a juridical or an
Gegare V. Hon. the Revised Rules person such as arbitration
Court Of of Criminal a corporation, award
Appeals Procedure. partnership, involving a
(Eleventh corporation money
Division) And These claims or sole, testate or claim
Armie Elma, demands may intestate covered by
G.R. No. be: estate, this Rule
83907, etc.(Petra Vda. pursuant to
September 13, 1. For money De Borromeo Sec. 417,
1989) owed under any V. Hon. Julian LGC
An action for of the following: B. Pogoy, .R.
annulment of a No. L-63277,
compromise a. Contract of November 29,
judgment as a Lease; 1983)
general rule is Conciliation
immediately b. Contract of process at the
executory and Loan; barangay level
accordingly, is a condition
beyond the precedent for
authority of the filing of a

112
complaint in February 18,
court and 2008)
noncompliance
therewith is a The
ground for enforcement
dismissal of by execution of
the complaint the amicable
for lack of settlement in
cause of action the barangay
or prematurity. conciliation
(Elmer proceedings is
Peregrina v. only applicable
Hon. Domingo if the
D. Panis) contracting
parties have
Barangay not repudiated
conciliation such
process is not settlement. If
a jurisdictional the amicable
requirement, settlement is
so that repudiated by
noncompliance one party,
therewith either
cannot affect expressly or
the jurisdiction impliedly, the
which the other party has
court has two options,
otherwise namely, to
acquired over enforce the
the subject compromise or
matter or over to consider it
the person of rescinded and
the defendant. insist upon his
Such defense original
shall be raised demand.
in the answer, (Crisanta
otherwise, Alcaraz Miguel
such objection V. Jerry D.
will be deemed Montanez G.R.
waived. No. 191336,
(Librada M. January 25,
Aquino V. 2012
Ernest S. Aure Criminal Cases When None 1. Violations
G.R. No. punishable by of traffic laws,
153567, imprisonment rules and
of not more regulations;

113
than 1 year or TOTALITY RULE
fine of not 2. Violations
more than Php of the rental Totality or Aggregate Rule
5,000 (Sec. law;
408, LGC). Where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different
3. Violations parties embodied in one complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of municipal
of the claims in all causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action
or city
arose out of the same or different transaction [Sec. 5(d), Rule 2].
ordinances;

4. Violations NOTE: Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two
of B.P. 22 or or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a
the Bouncing single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action
Checks Law against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes
(A.M. No. 00- of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants
11-01-SC, should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should
April 15, be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 3 (permissive
2003); 5. All joinder of parties).
other criminal
cases where The totality rule is not applicable if the claims are separate and distinct from each
the penalty is
other and did not arise from the same transaction. In the case of Flores v. Mallare
imprisonment
Philips, the SC did not apply the totality test where there are two claims filed by
not exceeding
6 months Flores first against Ignacio Binongcal and the second cause of action was against
and/or a fine Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay an amount representing cost of truck
of Php 1,000 tires.
irrespective of
other Totality rule is subject to the rules on joinder of parties. If there is a misjoinder of
penalties or parties for the reason that the claims against respondents are separate and
civil liabilities distinct, then neither of which falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction (Remedio V. Flores
arising V. Hon. Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps, G.R. No. L-66620, September, 24, 1986).
therefrom;
and 6. Claim for damages
Offenses
involving
If the main action is for the recovery of sum of money and the damages being
damage to
claimed are merely the consequences of the main cause of action, the same are
property
through not included in determining the jurisdictional amount. However, in cases where the
criminal claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
negligence amount of such claim
where the
imposable fine Q: Lender extended to Borrower a P100,000.00 loan covered by a
is not promissory note. Later, Borrower obtained another P100,000.00 loan
exceeding Php again covered by a promissory note. Still later, Borrower obtained a
10,000. P300,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage on his land valued at
P500,000.00. Borrower defaulted on his payments when the loans

114
matured. Despite demand to pay the P500,000.00 loan, Borrower refused MEANING OF ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONS
to pay. Lender, applying the totality rule, filed against Borrower with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a collection suit for P500,000.00. At It is one in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right
the trial, Borrower's lawyer, while cross-examining Lender, successfully or the prevention or redress of a wrong [Sec. 3(a), Rule 1]. It is governed by
elicited an admission from the latter that the two promissory notes have ordinary rules (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed.; Words and Phrases, Vol. 2).
been paid. Thereafter, Borrower's lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the case
on the ground that as proven only P300,000.00 was the amount due to Subject matter of an action
Lender and which claim is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. He further argued that lack of jurisdiction over It is the physical facts, the thing, real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and
the subject matter can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. a.) Did the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted (Iniego v. Purganan, G.R. No.
Lender correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes 166876, March 24, 2006).
of action? b.) Should the court dismiss the case? (2015 Bar)
Commencement of an action
A:
It is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court (Sec. 5, Rule 1). It
a. YES. Lender correctly applied the totality rule and the rule on joinder of can be instituted by filing the complaint by personal service or by registered mail
causes of action. Under the rule on joinder of causes of action, a party (Sec. 3, Rule 13) (2000 Bar).
may in one pleading assert as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party. Under the totality rule, where the claims in all NOTE: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. Here the causes of action jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action (Heirs of Hinog v.
by Lender are all against borrower and all the claims are principally for Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005).
recovery of money. Hence the aggregate amount claimed, which is When an additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is
P500,000 shall be the test of jurisdiction and thus it is the RTC of Manila commenced with regard to him on the date of the filing of such later pleading (Sec.
which has jurisdiction. Although the rules on joinder of causes of action 5, Rule 1).
state that the joinder shall not include special civil actions, the remedy
resorted to with respect to the third loan was not foreclosure but Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules
collection. Hence joinder of causes of action would still be proper.
The liberal construction of the rules may only be invoked in situations where there
b. NO, the court should not dismiss the case. The Supreme Court has held is an excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same
that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the amount of the claim does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a
alleged in the complaint and not the amount substantiated during the trial. reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules (Felix Martos, et al. v. New San
(Dionisio v Sioson Puerto, 31 October 1974) Here the amount claimed was Jose Builders, Inc. G.R. No. 192650, October 24, 2012).
P500,000. Even if the claim substantiated during the trial was only The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or to
P300,000 that is not determinative of subject-matter jurisdiction. Hence except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when
the argument that lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any the purpose of justice requires it (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant
time is misplaced since in the first place the RTC has jurisdiction. Pagbilao Corporation G.R. No. 159593, October 12, 2006).
Instances when the Rules of Court are NOT applicable

CIVIL PROCEDURE GR: It is not applicable in: (NICOLE)

ACTIONS 1. Naturalization proceedings;

2. Insolvency proceedings;

115
3. Cadastral proceedings; Rules of Court (e.g.
4. Other cases not provided in the Rules of Court; settlement of estate,
5. Land registration proceedings; and escheat, guardianship,
6. Election cases (Sec. 4, Rule 1). etc.) (Riano, 2014)
Governing Law Ordinary rules Requires the
XPNs: supplemented by application of specific
special rules rules as provided for in
the Rules of Court
1. By analogy or in a suppletory character; and
(Natcher v. CA, et al.,
2. Whenever practicable and convenient (Sec. 4, Rule 1).
G.R. No. 133000,
October 2, 2001).
MEANING OF SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS Court Heard by courts of Heard by courts of
general jurisdiction limited jurisdiction
It is one in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right (Ching v. Rodriguez,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong wherein it has special features not found G.R. No. 192828,
in ordinary civil actions. It is governed by ordinary rules but subject to specific November 28, 2011).
rules prescribed under Rules 62-71. (Riano, 2011). Procedure Initiated by a pleading Initiated by an
and parties respond application and parties
MEANING OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS through an answer respond through an
opposition
It is one by which the state prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable
by law (Sec. 3(b), Rule 1). PERSONAL ACTIONS AND REAL ACTIONS

CIVIL ACTION SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Real Action Personal Action

A civil action is one by which a party A special proceeding is a remedy Scope When it affects title to Recovery of personal
sues another for the enforcement by which a party seeks to establish or possession of real property, the
or protection of a right, or the a status, a right, or a particular property, or an enforcement of a
prevention or redress of a wrong fact [Rule 1, Sec. 3 (c)] (1999 interest therein (Sec. contract or the
(Rule 1, Sec. 3 (a)) Bar). 1, Rule 4) recovery of damages
(Chua v. TOPROS,
G.R. No. 152808,
September 30, 2005).
Action vs. Special proceeding (1999 Bar) Basis When it is founded Founded on privity of
upon the privity of a contract such as
real estate. The realty damages, claims of
Action Special Proceeding or interest therein is money, etc. (Paper
Purpose Civil action: 1. To establish a the subject matter of Industries Corporation
1. To protect a right; status; the action. of the Philippines v.
2. Prevent or redress 2. Right; or Samson, G.R. No.
a wrong. 3. Particular fact (Sec. NOTE: It is important L30175, November
3 Rule 1). that the matter in 28, 1975).
Criminal action: litigation must also
Prosecute a person for Rules of special involve any of the
an act or omission proceedings are following issues:
punishable by law provided for under 1. Title
(Sec. 3, Rule 1) Sec. 1 of Rule 72 of the

116
2. Ownership the contrary (Sec. 4, action arose. Subject
3. Possession Rule 4) to Sec. 4, Rule 4.
4. Partition Privity of contract No privity of contract Founded on privity of
5. Foreclosure of and the action is contract between the
mortgage founded on privity of parties whether debt
6. Any interest in real estate only (Riano, or covenant (Paper
property (Riano, 2014) Industries Corporation
2014) of the Philippines v.
Venue A real action is ‘local’ – A personal action is Samson, supra)
i.e., its venue depends ‘transitory’ – i.e., its
upon the localtion of venue depends upon RULES 1-5
the property involved the residence of the
in the litigation. plaintiff or the A. Actions: Commencement
Venue of action shall defendant.
be commenced and
Rule 1 Sections 3 and 5
tried in the proper Venue of action is the
court which has place where the
jurisdiction over the plaintiff or any of the Section 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the procedure to be
area wherein the real principal plaintiffs observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.
property involved, or a resides, or where the
portion thereof is defendant or any of (a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
situated (Sec. 1, Rule the principal protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, (1a, R2)
4). defendants resides, or
in the case of a non- A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules
resident defendant for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil
where he may be action. (n)
found, at the election
of the plaintiff (Sec. 2, (b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or
Rule 4).
omission punishable by law. (n)
NOTE: The distinction between a real action and a personal action is important for
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
the purpose of determining the venue of the action. Questions involving the
a right, or a particular fact. (2a, R2)
propriety or impropriety of a particular venue are resolved by initially determining
the nature of the action, i.e., if the action is personal or real (Riano, 2014).
Section 5. Commencement of action. — A civil action is commenced by the
filing of the original complaint in court. If an additional defendant is impleaded in
a later pleading, the action is commenced with regard to him on the dated of the
filing of such later pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its admission,
LOCAL AND TRANSITORY ACTIONS
if necessary, is denied by the court. (6a)

Local Action Transitory Action

 No difference between an “action” and a “suit”
Venue Must be brought in a Dependent on the
o BUT if there is such a difference:
particular place where place where the party
 Action - generally confined to proceedings in a court of
the subject property is resides regardless of
located, unless there where the cause of law
is an agreement to

117
 Suit - equally applied to prosecutions at law or in  GR: exhaustion of administrative remedies (before resorting to courts of
equity justice)
 o XPNs:
 Author’s note:  When the issue is purely a legal one and nothing of an
o In PH, there is no such distinction because there are no courts administrative nature can be done
of equity in this jurisdiction  Insistence of its observance will result to the
 SIGNIFICANCE of Section 5 - reckoning point of reglementary periods, nullification of the claim sought
hence, important when the defense of prescription is raised  Controverted act is patently illegal or was performed
 Commencement of an action may be done by filing of a complaint by without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
registered mail (Sec 3 Rule 13)  When respondent is a department secretary, an alter
o Even if the COC receives the complaint beyond the prescriptive ego of the President, except if disapproved by him
period, IF it was sent by registered mail within such period,  There are circumstances indicating an urgency of
requirement was complied with judicial intervention
o BUT if docket fees are paid subsequently, the date of such  Rule does not provide a P,A,S remedy
payment is deemed the date of filing of the pleading  Estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
 GR: pleading only considered filed upon payment of correct docket fees; concerned
underpayment of docket fees arising from insufficient allegations in the  To require exhaustion would be unreasonable
pleading cannot be cured by amendment (Manchester)  Subject matter is a private land in land case
o Modifications on Manchester set forth in Sun Insurance: proceedings
 When filing of initiatory pleading is unaccompanied by  Issue of exhaustion has been rendered moot
payment, court may allow extension of time for B. One suit for one Action
payment but NOT beyond reglementary period to file
said pleading Rule 2 Section 3
 Same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-
party claims, similar pleadings Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. — A party may not institute more
 When court acquires jurisdiction by filing and payment, than one suit for a single cause of action. (3a)
BUT judgment later on awards a claim which is not
specified in the pleading or if specified, the amount  Singleness of COA lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong done
has been left for the determination of court, the violating the rights of a person
additional filing fee shall constitute as a lien on the
judgment which shall be enforced and collected by the Splitting a singles cause of action
COC
 How to COMPUTE filing fees: Rule 2 Section 4
o Actions involving real property AND related claim for damages -
assessed on BOTH the value of the property AND amount of Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are
damages instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
o Based on the amount of damages stated in the complaint judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
 XPN: damages which are not stated may be awarded the others. (4a)
even if filing fees are not paid therefor so long as such
damages arose AFTER the filing of the complaint or  Splitting of COA - act of dividing a single cause of action, claim or
similar pleading and provided that the same shall demand into 2 or more parts only, intending to reserve the rest for
constitute a lien on the judgment anther separate action
 PURPOSES:

118
o To avoid harassment and vexation to defendant  Section 5 - purely permissive; promotes the policy on avoiding multiplicity
o o To obviate multiplicity of suits of suits
 REMEDIES of defendant when there is splitting of COA:  Par (a) - necessary that the right of relief from said COAs should arise
o File MD on the ground of litis pendentia - if one action is out of the same transaction or series of transactions and a question of law
already ending and another is instituted based on a single COA and fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants may arise in the action
o File MD based on res judicata - if there is already a final  Par (b) - only COAs in ordinary civil actions may be joined
judgment on one action and another is instituted based on the  Pars (c) and (d) - determine which court will have jurisdiction where COAs
same COA are joined
 BREACH of CONTRACT:
o If payment is to be done in installments; defendant failed to C. Parties to Civil Actions
pay one installment - one COA
o If still he failed to the subsequent installments after an action Rule 3 Section 1
has already been filed - separate COAs
 Hence, may be instituted as separate cases OR may be Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. — Only natural or juridical
alleged in the same case by supplemental pleadings persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term
o HOWEVER, if he has failed to pay multiple installments and an "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-
action is yet to be filed - plaintiff must allege ALL failures to claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) — party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may
pay, otherwise, such claims not alleged will be barred refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counter-claim, the cross-
defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) — party defendant. (1a)
Joinder of causes of action
 JURIDICAL persons:
Rule 2 Section 5 o Article 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality
may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
joinder of parties; personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder,
partner or member. (35a)
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed  Corporations by estoppel
by special rules;
Joinder of Parties
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain
to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the Rule 3 Sections 6 and 7
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or
of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
jurisdiction. (5a) alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or
be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but

119
the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
proceedings in which he may have no interest. (6n) counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in interest representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either disciplinary action.
as plaintiffs or defendants. (7)
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
 Indispensable parties - joinder is compulsory without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
 Permissive: may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
o Right of relief arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
 Series of transactions - separate dealings BUT involve appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
the same subject matter
o There is a question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs or If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
defendants one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
o Joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an
of jurisdiction and venue. executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
Indispensable and Necessary Parties procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
as costs. (16a, 17a)
Rule 3 Sections 7 and 8
Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. — When
Section 8. Necessary party. — A necessary party is one who is not indispensable a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency
but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and
those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor
subject of the action. (8a) takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown
to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or
Class Suit maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or
Rule 3 Section 12 continue to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution
is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto,
Section 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an
common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable opportunity to be heard. (18a)
to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently
numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may Section 18. Incompetency or incapacity. — If a party becomes incompetent or
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to incapacitated, the court, upon motion with notice, may allow the action to be
intervene to protect his individual interest. (12a) continued by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by his
legal guardian or guardian ad litem. (19a)
Death or Separation of a Party
Transfer of Interest
Rule 3 Sections 16, 17, and 18
Rule 3 Section 19

120
Section 19. Transfer of interest. — In case of any transfer of interest, the action lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaims based on the latter’s failure to
may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion pay docket fees.
directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action
or joined with the original party. (20) ISSUE # 1: Whether respondent may still question petitioner’s non-payment of
docket fees in its MD.
Contractual Money Claims
Rule 3 Section 20 HELD # 1: YES. Petitioner’s position is unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises
from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. — When the action is for recovery warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before or declined to assert it.[15] In the case at bar, respondent cannot be considered
entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of as estopped from assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s
such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until counterclaim since this issue was raised by respondent with the trial court itself –
entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall the body where the action is pending - even before the presentation of any
be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims evidence by the parties and definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered
against the estate of a deceased person. (21a) by the trial court.

D. Venue of Actions: real actions, personal actions

ISSUE # 2: Whether CA has acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed by petitioner.
E. Summary Procedure vs. Small Claims Suit
HELD # 2: YES. Meanwhile, respondent questions the jurisdiction of the Court
EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent. of Appeals over the appeal filed by petitioner from the 18 September 1990 and 28
G.R. No. 138822. January 23, 2001 THIRD DIVISION February 1991 orders of the trial court. It is significant to note that this objection
to the appellate court’s jurisdiction is raised for the first time before this Court;
FACTS: Respondent filed a suit against petitioner before RTC Makati, alleging respondent never having raised this issue before the appellate court. Although the
that the latter owed it P114,650.76 which she incurred in the course of her being lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may
an insurance agent for said respondent Petitioner filed an Answer with be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very
Counterclaim, asserting her right of payment of her right for the payment of proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in
P104,893.45 representing commissions etc Respondent filed a Motion to the event that that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to
Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In him.[16] In this case, respondent actively took part in the proceedings before the
Default” because petitioner’s answer was allegedly filed out of time o RTC denied Court of Appeals by filing its appellee’s brief with the same.[17] Its participation,
this and the subsequent MR Respondent filed an MD on petitioner’s when taken together with its failure to object to the appellate court’s jurisdiction
counterclaim, contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the during the entire duration of the proceedings before such court, demonstrates a
same because of the non-payment of docket fees by petitioner. Petitioner willingness to abide by the resolution of the case by such tribunal and accordingly,
asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket respondent is now most decidedly estopped from objecting to the Court of Appeals’
fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having assumption of jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal.
failed to answer such counterclaim RTC petitioner’s counterclaim is merely
permissive hence failure to pay the docket fees prevented said RTC from acquiring ISSUE # 3: Whether the counterclaim of petitioner is permissive in nature thereby
jurisdiction Petitioner respondent is estopped from questioning her non- warranting the payment of docket fees.
payment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular issue when it filed
its first motion - the “Motion to Strike out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim HELD # 3: YES. In Valencia v. Court of Appeals,[20] this Court capsulized the
And To Declare Defendant In Default” – with the trial court; rather, it was only nine criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is
months after receiving petitioner’s answer that respondent assailed the trial court’s compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows: o 1. Are the issues of fact and
law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same? o 2. Would res judicata

121
bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory counterclaim demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash
rule? advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondent’s claims is not
o 3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioner’s counterclaim, such that
as defendant’s counterclaim? o 4. Is there any logical relation between the claim conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time
and the counterclaim? Another test, applied in the more recent case of and effort of the court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a
Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals,[21] is the “compelling test of compulsoriness” logical connection between the parties’ claims. This conclusion is further reinforced
which requires “a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, by petitioner’s own admissions since she declared in her answer that respondent’s
where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the Special Agent’s
a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.” As Contract.[23] However, petitioner’s claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a
contained in her answer, petitioner’s counterclaims are as follows: o (20) That result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.[24] There is
defendant incorporates and repleads by reference all the foregoing allegations as no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim.[25] On
may be material to her Counterclaim against FGU. o (21) That FGU is liable to pay the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her
the following just, valid and legitimate claims of defendant: (a) the sum of at permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.[26]
least P104,893.45 plus maximum interest thereon representing, among others, The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid down by the Court in the case
direct commissions, profit commissions and contingent bonuses legally due to of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion[27]- o 1. It is not simply
defendant; and (b) the minimum amount of P500,000.00 plus the maximum the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
allowable interest representing defendant’s accumulated premium reserve for 1985 the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-
and previous years, which FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
despite repeated demands in gross violation of their Special Agent’s Contract and accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
in contravention of the principle of law that “every person must, in the exercise of fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his reglementary period. o 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-
due, and observe honesty and good faith.” o (22) That as a result of the filing of party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and
this patently baseless, malicious and unjustified Complaint, and FGU’s unlawful, unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of
illegal and vindictive termination of their Special Agent’s Contract, defendant was said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
unnecessarily dragged into this litigation and to defense [sic] her side and assert prescriptive or reglementary period.
her rights and claims against FGU, she was compelled to hire the services of
counsel with whom she agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as and for 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
attorney’s fees and stands to incur litigation expenses in the amount estimated to appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
at least P20,000.00 and for which FGU should be assessed and made liable to pay the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
defendant. o (23) That considering further the malicious and unwarranted action has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
of defendant in filing this grossly unfounded action, defendant has suffered and constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
continues to suffer from serious anxiety, mental anguish, fright and humiliation. Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
In addition to this, defendant’s name, good reputation and business standing in additional fee. The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has been reiterated
the insurance business as well as in the community have been besmirched and for in the recent case of Suson v. Court of Appeals.[28] In Suson, the Court explained
which FGU should be adjudged and made liable to pay moral damages to defendant that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional
in the amount of P300,000.00 as minimum. o (24) That in order to discourage the requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the
filing of groundless and malicious suits like FGU’s Complaint, and by way of serving case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or
[as] an example for the public good, FGU should be penalized and assessed reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 or such amount as the Honorable respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has
Court may deem warranted under the circumstances.[22] Tested against the attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive
abovementioned standards, petitioner’s counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to dismiss
and accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required petitioner’s counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner
to prove petitioner’s claims differs from that needed to establish respondent’s immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim

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as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, covered by the checks for failing to completely install and make the plant
to declare that respondent was in default for its failure to answer her operational; and that KOGIES was liable for damages amounting to PhP 4,500,000
counterclaim.[29] However, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s counterclaim. for altering the quantity and lowering the quality of the machineries and equipment
Pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead . Moreover, PGSMC averred that it has already paid PhP 2,257,920 in rent (covering
given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable January to July 1998) to Worth and it was not willing to further shoulder the cost
prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive of renting the premises of the plant considering that the LPG cylinder
counterclaim. Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared manufacturing plant never became operational. RTC denied the Motion for
respondent in default for having failed to answer her counterclaim.[30] Insofar as Issuance of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioner for the reason that PR has
the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned, there is obviously no need already paid petitioner USD 1,224,000, the value of the machineries and
to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees for only then equipment as shown in the contract such that petitioner no longer had proprietary
shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim.[31] Meanwhile, the compulsory rights over them o held that Art. 15 of the Contract as amended was invalid as it
counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of an tended to oust the trial court or any other court jurisdiction over any dispute that
allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable may arise between the parties Petitioner filed Reply to Answer and Answer
from the claims of respondent. If respondent were to answer the compulsory to Counterclaim
counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading the same Petitioner filed a Supplemental Memorandum with MD and an MR to the order
facts raised in its complaint denying the issuance of injunctive writ, praying, among others for the dismissal of
PR’s counterclaims o RTC denied CA affirmed RTC o On the issue of
KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO A. LERMA, in his nonpayment of docket fees and non - attachment of a certificate o f non - forum
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa shopping by PGSMC, the CA held that the counterclaims of PGSMC were
City, and PACIFIC GENERAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents. compulsory ones and payment of docket fees was not required since the Answer
G.R. No. 143581 January 7, 2008 SECOND DIVISION AUTHOR’S NOTE: with counterclaim was not an initiatory pleadin g. For the same reason, the CA said
NO LONGER GOOD JURISPRUDENCE: abandoned in MERCADO ruling; hence, a certificate of non-forum shopping was also not required. Petitioner strongly
standing doctrine is that in ALDAY argues that when PR filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and
filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so was a fatal
FACTS: Petitioner, a Korean corporation which is engaged in the supply and defect.
installation of LPG manufacturing plants, and PR, a domestic company, entered
into a contract where petitioner would do an installation in Cavite The initial ISSUE: Whether compulsory counterclaims require the payment of docket fees.
operation, however, cannot be conducted because PR experienced financial
difficulties Petitioner deposited the checks paid to it by PR but the same were HELD: NO. As aptly ruled by the CA, the counterclaims of PGSMC were
dishonored for the reason of “PAYMENT STOPPED” PR then wrote to petitioner incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 in
that it would be cancelling their contract since petitioner had altered the quantity accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the
and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered to PR and rule that was effective at the time the Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8
that PR would dismantle and transfer the machineries, equipment, and facilities on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, "A compulsory counterclaim or a
installed in the Carmona plant PR then filed an affidavit-complaint before the cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be
Prosecutor against petitioner for estafa Petitioner informed PR that it cannot contained therein." On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer
unilaterally rescind the contract and then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees
before RTC Muntinlupa RTC issued a TRO against PR, upon the request of for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that
petitioner, which was later on extended Petitioner contended, among others, effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-
that PR violated Art. 15 of their Contract, as amended, by unilaterally rescinding 04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or
the contract without resorting to arbitration PR filed an Answer with crossclaims. As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC’s
Compulsory Counterclaim o asserting that it had the full right to dismantle and Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a certification against forum
transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full as shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a
stipulated in the contract; that KOGIES was not entitled to the PhP 9,000,000

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responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, decisions, final
denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaims. orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a
petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over
EDUARDO S. MERCADO, herein represented by his counsel, ATTY. ENRICO M. the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an
UYEHARA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, the Honorable LETICIA P. independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a
MORALES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 140 of the Regional Trial general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
Court of Makati City, ESTATE OF CONCEPCION CLAUDIO GATMAITAN, CARMELIE appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party adopts
C. GATMAITAN and ARMANDO V. GATMAITAN, respondents. G.R. No. 150241. an improper remedy, as in this case, his petition may be dismissed outright.[10]
November 04, 2004 FIRST DIVISION Petitioner should have availed of the ordinary appeal process such as a petition
for review under Rule 45, within 15 days after notice of denial of his Motion for
FACTS: PR Armando V. Gatmaitan obtained a loan from petitioner for the Reconsideration. Undoubtedly, petitioner had already lost this remedy when he
renovation of PR and his wife’s (Concepcion) house, with a promise that PR will filed this special civil action on January 16, 2001. A Petition for Certiorari cannot
lease the same and pay the rentals to petitioner as payment of loan PR was be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is
unable to pay despite demands Petitioner then learned that Concepcion filed a occasioned by the petitioner’s own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.[11]
case against PR for the separation and liquidation of their conjugal properties By his own account, petitioner received the Order denying the Motion for
before RTC Makati Branch 149 Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Reconsideration from the RTC on November 17, 2000. Instead of filing a petition
Complaint in Intervention, claiming that he had an interest as a creditor in the for review with the appellate court within 15 days thereof or until December 2,
unpaid loans o RTC denied o But petitioner allegedly did not learn such denial 2000, he filed a petition for certiorari by registered mail on January 16, 2001, but
RTC decided the case between Corazon and PR o Petitioner again claimed that belatedly made the payment of docket fees only on January 17, 2001. Noteworthy,
he was unaware of such decision Petitioner elevated the case to CA CA petitioner did not even attempt to explain why he was unable to file a petition for
dismissed the petition due to late payment of docket fees o The appellate court review within the reglementary period. Indeed, not infrequently, litigants and
found that while Eduardo filed his petition for certiorari by registered mail on parties to a petition have invoked liberal construction of the Rules of Court to justify
January 16, 2001, the sixtieth (60th) day from the receipt of the Order of Denial lapses in its observance. Hopefully, it is not simply a cover-up of their own neglect
of Motion for Reconsideration, the docket and other lawful fees were paid only on or sheer ignorance of procedure. While indeed this Court has on occasion set aside
January 17, 2001, one day after the expiration of the reglementary period for filing procedural irregularities in the interest of justice, it must be stressed that liberality
his petition. The Court of Appeals applied Rule 46, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of of construction of the rules should not be a panacea for all procedural maladies.
Civil Procedure[7] which allows payment of docket fees within a reasonable time if For this Court will not tolerate wanton disregard of the procedural rules under the
it was not paid during the filing of the initiatory pleading, but in no case beyond guise of liberal construction. In any event, even if we were to disregard the
the applicable prescriptive period. It held that while the rule on the payment of procedural defects, we find that this petition must still be dismissed as the appellate
docket fees may be liberally construed if only to secure a just and speedy court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess
disposition of every action and proceeding, nonetheless, it should not be ignored of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition for late payment of filing fees. Petitioner
or belittled, lest it scathes and prejudices the other party’s substantive rights.[8] undeniably paid his docket fees beyond the reglementary period of 60 days for
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. filing a petition for certiorari. Well settled is the rule that the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, unless the docket fees are paid.[12]
ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly dismissed the petition. And where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fees, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
HELD: YES. Petitioner’s arguments lack persuasiveness. It bears stressing that but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period
this case must be dismissed outright as the petitioner adopted the wrong remedy
in bringing this case before this Court. Petitioner should have filed a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure instead of a special civil ANTONIO NAVARRO and GRAHMMS, INC., petitioners, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK &
action for certiorari under Rule 65. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a TRUST COMPANY, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE HON. ZEUS C.
decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is not

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ABROGAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150), without which the decision or final order appealed from would become final and
respondents. G.R. No. 138031. May 27, 2004 SECOND DIVISION executory as if no appeal was filed at all. We have consistently ruled that
litigation is not a game of technicalities and that every case must be prosecuted in
FACTS: Respondent filed with RTC Makati a foreclosure of mortgage against accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented
petitioner RTC Makati rendered a decision in favor of respondent Petitioner and justly resolved.[26] However, we have also ruled that rules of procedure must
filed a Notice of Appeal without payment of docket fees Hence, RTC denied the be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and weighting reasons, they
Notice of Appeal and granted respondent’s Motion for Execution Petitioner may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure
elevated to CA, proffering an excuse behind non-payment of docket fees o to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation
Petitioners’ failure to pay the appellate docket fee is not without a valid explanation. of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
At the time of the filing of Notice of Appeal, petitioners’ counsel’s lone secretary, liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[27] Our ruling
without informing in advance the undersigned, decided to migrate to another in this case is not antithetical to our ruling in La Salette College v. Victor Pilotin,[28]
country for “greener pasture,” leaving the undersigned the responsibility to tend viz: o Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of
to all the cases in his office. The undersigned’s operation was literally disabled and appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by
in shambles CA denied petition petitioners aver that the payment of the the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows
said fees is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal. They contend that only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used
having seasonably filed their notice of appeal from the RTC’s January 16, 1998 by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with
Decision and March 25, 1998 Order, the appeal therefrom was deemed perfected; the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
thus, divesting the RTC of jurisdiction over the case. Hence, when the RTC issued consideration of all attendant circumstances. In Mactan Cebu International
its March 25, 1998 Order, it had no jurisdiction to do so. The petitioners cited the Airport Authority v. Mangubat, the payment of the docket fees was delayed by six
rulings of this Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals[20] and in Manila Mandarin (6) days, but the late payment was accepted, because the party showed willingness
Employees Union v. NLRC[21] to bolster its stance. to abide by the Rules by immediately paying those fees. Yambao v. Court of
Appeals, saw us again relaxing the Rules when we declared therein that “the
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s Notice of Appeal should be granted, in light of the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant
excuse the latter proffered. is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for … the failure to pay the correct
amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake,
HELD: NO. Time and time again, this Court has consistently held that the excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part
“payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the of the appellant.” In the present case, the petitioners failed to establish any
perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The sufficient and satisfactory reason to warrant a relaxation of the mandatory rule on
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action the payment of appellate docket and other lawful fees. The explanation given by
and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.”[22] the petitioners’ counsel for the non-payment was that his secretary, who migrated
It bears stressing that appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege.[23] to another country, inadvertently failed to pay the docket and other fees when she
Corollary to this principle is that the appeal must be exercised strictly in accordance filed the petitioners’ notice of appeal with the court. The said counsel came to
with the provisions set by law. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an know of the inadvertence only when he received a copy of the RTC’s May 27, 1998
appeal to the CA from a case decided by the RTC in the exercise of the latter’s Order which denied due course to the appeal for failure to pay the required docket
original jurisdiction shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of fees. The explication deserves scant consideration. We have reviewed the records
judgment or final order appealed from. Such appeal is perfected by filing a notice and find that the petitioners failed to show how and when their counsel’s secretary
of appeal thereof with the court that rendered the judgment or final order and, by left the country. Neither did the petitioners submit any explanation why their
serving a copy of that notice upon the adverse party,[24] and counsel failed to ascertain immediately after April 14, 1998 if the requisite appellate
by paying within this same period the full amount of the appellate court docket and docket and other lawful fees had been paid by the said secretary before her
other lawful fees to the clerk of court.[25] The payment of the docket fees within departure. Thus, putting the blame on the counsel’s secretary for her failure to
this period is a condition sine qua non to the perfection of the appeal. Contrary to perfect the petitioners’ appeal to the CA is unjustified. As aptly declared by the
the petitioners’ predication, the payment of the appellate docket and other lawful appellate court: o The reason given for movants’ failure to pay the docket fees,
fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, i.e., that their counsel’s employee had left his office has been debunked by the

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Supreme Court as “a hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who the plaintiff is not among the legal grounds for the dismissal of the case. Anyway,
fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. in the appreciation of the court, this is simply evidentiary. Petitioners elevated
(Lanting vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 974) The Supreme Court has also often repeated to CA CA denied petition o Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the case handled by lawyers, excludes interest accruing from the principal amount being claimed in the pleading
is binding upon the latter.” (Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 162 in the computation of the prescribed filing fees. The complaint was submitted for
SCRA 371.) the computation of the filing fee to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City which made an assessment that respondent paid
accordingly. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did and the ruling of the
PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION, AUTOMOTIVE PHILIPPINES, ASEA ONE respondent Judge find support in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ng Soon
CORPORATION and AUTOCORP, Petitioners, vs. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS,1 vs. Alday and Tacay vs. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte. In the latter case, the
Respondent. G.R. No. 151242 June 15, 2005 THIRD DIVISION Supreme Court explicitly ruled that "where the action is purely for recovery of
money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate
FACTS: Petitioner Proton availed of the credit facilities of respondent with co- amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs." o Assuming arguendo that
petitioners as corporate guarantors. In their agreement, Proton will receive the correct filing fees was not made, the rule is that the court may allow a
imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them in trust for BNP, selling the same reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof,
and delivering the proceeds of the sale to the latter Proton was unable to deliver and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take
and pay Co-petitioners likewise refused to pay Respondent then filed a case cognizance of the action unless in the meantime prescription has set in and
before RTC Makati o praying that they be ordered to pay (1) US$1,544,984.40 consequently barred the right of action. Here respondent Judge did not make any
plus accrued interest and other related charges thereon subsequent to August 15, finding, and rightly so, that the filing fee paid by private respondent was
1998 until fully paid and (2) an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from insufficient. o On the issue of the correct dollar-peso rate of exchange, the Office
petitioners as attorney's fees Petitioners filed an MD on the ground of of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati pegged it at P 43.21 to US$1. In the
respondent’s failure to pay docket fees RTC denied MD and held that the absence of any office guide of the rate of exchange which said court functionary
docket fees were in fact paid o Resolving the first ground relied upon by the was duty bound to follow, the rate he applied is presumptively correct. o
defendant, this court believes and so hold that the docket fees were properly paid. Respondent Judge correctly ruled that the matter of demand letter is evidentiary
It is the Office of the Clerk of Court of this station that computes the correct docket and does not form part of the required allegations in a complaint Petitioners cite
fees, and it is their duty to assess the docket fees correctly, which they did. o Even Supreme Court Circular No. 7: o SUBJECT: ALL COMPLAINTS MUST SPECIFY
granting arguendo that the docket fees were not properly paid, the court cannot AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SOUGHT NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF THE PLEADING, BUT
just dismiss the case. The Court has not yet ordered (and it will not in this case) ALSO IN THE PRAYER IN ORDER TO BE ACCEPTED AND ADMITTED FOR FILING.
to pay the correct docket fees, thus the Motion to dismiss is premature, aside from THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SO SPECIFIED IN THE COMPLAINT SHALL BE THE
being without any legal basis. o Citing National Steel Corporation vs. CA, G.R. No. BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF THE FILING FEES. o In Manchester
123215, February 2, 1999: Although the payment of the proper docket fees is Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149
a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to SCRA 562, this Court condemned the practice of counsel who in filing the original
pay the same within a reasonable time within the expiration of applicable complaint omitted from the prayer any specification of the amount of damages
prescription or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint.
requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he This Court observed that "(T)his is clearly intended for no other purpose than to
would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in
appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when,
considered a lien or (sic) any award he may obtain in his favor. As to the second even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an
ground relied upon by the defendants, in that a review of all annexes to the investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint,
complaint of the plaintiff reveals that there is not a single formal demand letter for deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the
defendants to fulfill the terms and conditions of the three (3) trust agreements. complaint. xxx" o For the guidance of all concerned, the WARNING given by the
In this regard, the court cannot sustain the submission of defendant. As correctly court in the afore-cited case is reproduced hereunder: o "The Court serves warning
pointed out by the plaintiff, failure to make a formal demand for the debtor to pay that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.

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o To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers because Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, itemizing the filing fees,
and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed speaks of "the sum claimed, exclusive of interest." This clearly implies that the
for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable. Factually, therefore,
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading not everything was left to "guesswork" as respondent Judge has opined. The sums
that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or claimed were ascertainable, sufficient enough to allow a computation pursuant to
shall otherwise be expunged from the record. o The Court acquires jurisdiction over Rule 141, section 5(a). Furthermore, contrary to the position taken by
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of respondent Judge, the amounts claimed need not be initially stated with
the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, mathematical precision. The same Rule 141, section 5(a) (3rd paragraph), allows
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the an appraisal "more or less."31 Thus: o "In case the value of the property or estate
amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case (115 SCRA 193) in so far as it or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court,
is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed." the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be." o In other
words, a final determination is still to be made by the Court, and the fees ultimately
ISSUE # 1: Whether the docket fees paid by respondent was correct. found to be payable will either be additionally paid by the party concerned or
refunded to him, as the case may be. The above provision clearly allows an initial
HELD # 1: NO. Defendants AUTOMOTIVE CORPORATION PHILIPPINES, ASEA payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim
ONE CORPORATION and AUTOCORP GROUP to be ordered to pay Plaintiff BNP the subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved. o ". . . there is merit in
aggregate sum of (i) US DOLLARS ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR petitioner's claim that the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 5(a) clearly
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR AND FORTY CENTS (US$1,544,984.40) contemplates a situation where an amount is alleged or claimed in the complaint
(First through Third Causes of Action), plus accrued interest and other related but is less or more than what is later proved. If what is proved is less than what
charges thereon subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid; and (ii) an amount was claimed, then a refund will be made; if more, additional fees will be exacted.
equivalent to 5% of all sums due from said Defendants, as and for attorney's Otherwise stated, what is subject to adjustment is the difference in the fee and not
fees.26 Moreover, respondent posits that the amount of US$1,544,984.40 the whole amount" (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., et als., vs. Court of Appeals,
represents not only the principal but also interest and other related charges which et als., G.R. No. 76119, April 10, 1989).32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
had accrued as of August 15, 1998. Respondent goes even further by suggesting Respecting the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the clerk of court did not err
that in light of Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte27 where when he applied the exchange rate of US $1 = P43.00 "[i]n the absence of any
the Supreme Court held, o Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or office guide of the rate of exchange which said court functionary was duty bound
damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount to follow,[hence,] the rate he applied is presumptively correct," the same does not
claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs.28 (Emphasis and underscoring lie. The presumption of regularity of the clerk of court's application of the exchange
supplied) it made an overpayment. When Tacay was decided in 1989, the rate is not conclusive.33 It is disputable.34 As such, the presumption may be
pertinent rule applicable was Section 5 (a) of Rule 141 If the case concerns real overturned by the requisite rebutting evidence.35 In the case at bar, petitioners
estate, the assessed value thereof shall be considered in computing the fees. In have adequately proven with documentary evidence36 that the exchange rate
case the value of the property or estate or the sum claim is less or more in when the complaint was filed on September 7, 1998 was US $1 = P43.21. In
accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fees shall be refunded fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.
or paid as the case may be. When the complaint in this case was filed in 1998,
however, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, Rule 141 had been amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94 The clerk of court should thus have assessed ISSUE # 2: Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction, notwithstanding the incorrect
the filing fee by taking into consideration "the total sum claimed, inclusive of payment of docket fees.
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs,
or the stated value of the property in litigation." Respondent's and the Court of HELD # 2: YES. With respect to petitioner's argument that the trial court did not
Appeals' reliance then on Tacay was not in order. Neither was, for the same acquire jurisdiction over the case in light of the insufficient docket fees, the same
reason, the Court of Appeals' reliance on the 1989 case of Ng Soon v. Alday,30 does not lie. True, in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
where this Court held: o …The failure to state the rate of interest demanded was Appeals,37 this Court held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
not fatal not only because it is the Courts which ultimately fix the same, but also upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees,38 hence, it concluded that the

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trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It bears emphasis, however, Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically
Asuncion39 when this Court held that in the former there was clearly an effort to cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the additional demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus,
fees as required. The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no
present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) In the case at bar,
filing of the second amended complaint. However, in Manchester, petitioner did respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which
not pay any additional docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the
7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive
Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal. Parenthetically, in the
the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint, respondent prayed for "accrued interest… subsequent to August 15,
complaint was null and void. In the present case, a more liberal interpretation 1998 until fully paid." The complaint having been filed on September 7, 1998,
of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent respondent's claim includes the interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket filing.
fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee corresponding to its claim for
that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket interest from August 16, 1998 until the filing of the complaint on September 7,
fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by 1998. As priorly discussed, this is required under Rule 141, as amended by
manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered. Administrative Circular No. 11-94, which was the rule applicable at the time. Thus,
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still as the complaint currently stands, respondent cannot claim the interest from
insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the August 16, 1998 until September 7, 1998, unless respondent is allowed by motion
clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in to amend its complaint within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of
charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must interest petitioners owe from August 16, 1998 to September 7, 199842 and pay
require the private respondent to pay the same. Thus, the Court rules as follows: the corresponding docket fee therefor. With respect to the interest accruing after
o 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, the filing of the complaint, the same can only be determined after a final judgment
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with has been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to pay the corresponding
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the docket fee therefor. Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to pay additional
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the fees which shall constitute a lien in the event the trial court adjudges that it is
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. o 2. The same rule applies to entitled to interest accruing after the filing of the complaint. Sec. 2. Fees as lien.
permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not - Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The different or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of
case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. o 3. Where the trial said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees. In
court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and Ayala Corporation v. Madayag,43 in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a Insurance regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, this Court held
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for that the same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly on the judgment. … The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.40 or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The ruling in Sun Insurance Office was true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective
echoed in the 2005 case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor: o damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties

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claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the Nullity of Deed which is also classified as beyond pecuniary estimation, must be
court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the computed based on the provision of Section 7(A) herein-above, in part, quoted. o
appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or Since [herein respondent], Romeo Tan in his Answer has a counterclaim against
to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only the plaintiff, the former must likewise pay the necessary filling (sic) fees as
to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading provided for under Section 7 (A) of 54
for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the
amount thereof.44 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted) Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 issued by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration o arguing that Civil Case No. 2006-
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, 0030 was principally for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and, as such,
vs. HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner submitted that the RTC erred in
21, Naga City, as Pairing Judge for Regional Trial Court Branch 22, Formerly applying Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to petitioner’s
Presided By HON. NOVELITA VILLEGAS-LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May 2006), ROMEO first cause of action in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 RTC denied
Y. TAN, ROBERTO L. OBIEDO and ATTY. TOMAS A. REYES, Respondents. G.R. No. petitioner’s MPR o Analyzing, the action herein pertains to real property, for as
175914 February 10, 2009 THIRD DIVISION admitted by the [herein petitioner], "the deeds of sale in question pertain to real
property" x x x. The Deeds of Sale subject of the instant case have already been
FACTS: Petitioner obtained a loan from PRs secured by a mortgage on 5 parcels transferred in the name of the [herein respondents Tan and Obiedo]. o Compared
of land Petitioner, unable to pay, entered into an agreement and a Deed of with Quieting of Title, the latter action is brought when there is cloud on the title
Absolute Sale with PRs, stipulating, among others, that the 5 parcels of land are to real property or any interest therein or to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
deemed sold to the latter and, should petitioner want to redeem the same, he title to the real property (Art. 476, Civil Code of the Philippines) and the plaintiff
should pay the amount of loan and interests. Further, it stipulated that if petitioner must have legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the
shall contest the agreement, it shall pay PRs liquidated damages and that its subject matter of the action (Art. 447, ibid.), and yet plaintiff in QUIETING OF
president will solidarily be liable therefor Petitioner then filed with RTC praying TITLE is required to pay the fees in accordance with paragraph (a) of Section 7 of
for the declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages, with prayer for the the said Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, hence, with more reason
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order that the [petitioner] who no longer has title to the real properties subject of the
(TRO) o paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed instant case must be required to pay the required fees in accordance with Section
by the Office of the Clerk of Court o initially considered Civil Case No. 2006-0030 7(a) of the Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 afore-mentioned. o
as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and other Furthermore, while [petitioner] claims that the action for declaration of nullity of
legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court deed of sale and memorandum of agreement is one incapable of pecuniary
After filing his Answer, PR Tan filed an Omnibus Motion, contending that since estimation, however, as argued by the [respondent Tan], the issue as to how much
the case involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in filing and docket fees should be paid was never raised as an issue in the case of
accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Russell vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738 Petitioner elevated to CA CA denied
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004 petition o Clearly, the petitioner’s complaint involves not only the annulment of the
o Since petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006- deeds of sale, but also the recovery of the real properties identified in the said
0030, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case. o Hence, respondent documents. In other words, the objectives of the petitioner in filing the complaint
Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct and were to cancel the deeds of sale and ultimately, to recover possession of the same.
accurate docket fees pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as It is therefore a real action. o Consequently, the additional docket fees that must
amended; and should petitioner fail to do so, to deny and dismiss the prayer of be paid cannot be assessed in accordance with Section 7(b). As a real action,
petitioner for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale for having been Section 7(a) must be applied in the assessment and payment of the proper docket
executed in contravention of the law or of the Memorandum of Agreement as fee. o Resultantly, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
pactum commisorium RTC granted PR’s Omnibus Motion o It must be noted of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
that under paragraph (b) 2. of the said Section 7, it is provided that QUIETING OF capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
TITLE which is an action classified as beyond pecuniary estimation "shall be jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough – it must be grave. The
governed by paragraph (a)". Hence, the filing fee in an action for Declaration of

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abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party,
exercised arbitrarily and despotically. etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE
OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND
ISSUE # 1: Whether the complaint is in the nature of recovery of real property ATTORNEY’S FEES, LITIGATIO NEXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving
thus calling for the application of Section 7(a), Rule 141, where docket fees are property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE
computed based on the value of such real property. CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE
HELD # 1: YES. In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,28 STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE
the Court explicitly pronounced that "[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over any case PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee." Hence, the payment of docket IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is: If the action involves both a
fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. money claim and relief pertaining to property, then THE fees will be charged on
(SIOL) v. Asuncion,29 the Court laid down guidelines for the implementation of its both the amounts claimed and value of property based on the formula prescribed
previous pronouncement in Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit: o in this paragraph a. o (b) For filing: 1. Actions where the value of the subject
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but matter cannot be estimated 2. Special civil actions, except judicial foreclosure
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction of mortgage, EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, PARTITION AND QUIETING OF
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory TITLE which will 3. All other actions not involving property The docket fees
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable market value of the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the
prescriptive or reglementary period. o 2. The same rule applies to permissive docket fees due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. In order to resolve
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court the issue of whether petitioner paid the correct amount of docket fees, it is
may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case necessary to determine the true nature of its Complaint. The dictum adhered to in
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. o 3. Where the trial court this jurisdiction is that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in
acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and the body of the pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.32
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a However, the Court finds it necessary, in ascertaining the true nature of Civil Case
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for No. 2006-0030, to take into account significant facts and circumstances beyond
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien the Complaint of petitioner, facts and circumstances which petitioner failed to state
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly in its Complaint but were disclosed in the preliminary proceedings before the court
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. a quo. Petitioner persistently avers that its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-
In the Petition at bar, the RTC found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that 0030 is primarily for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Based on the
petitioner did not pay the correct amount of docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006 allegations and reliefs in the Complaint alone, one would get the impression that
0030. According to both the trial and appellate courts, petitioner should pay docket the titles to the subject real properties still rest with petitioner; and that the
fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. interest of respondents Tan and Obiedo in the same lies only in the Deeds of
Consistent with the liberal tenor of Sun Insurance, the RTC, instead of dismissing Absolute Sale sought to be annulled. What petitioner failed to mention in its
outright petitioner’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030, granted petitioner time Complaint was that respondents Tan and Obiedo already had the Memorandum of
to pay the additional docket fees. Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC, Agreement, which clearly provided for the execution of the Deeds of Absolute Sale,
petitioner refused to pay the additional docket fees assessed against it, believing registered on the TCTs over the five parcels of land, then still in the name of
that it had already paid the correct amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), petitioner. After respondents Tan and Obiedo had the Deeds of Absolute Sale
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Relevant to the present controversy notarized on 3 January 2006 and presented the same to Register of Deeds for Naga
are the following provisions under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by City on 8 March 2006, they were already issued TCTs over the real properties in
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC30 and Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. question, in their own names. Respondents Tan and Obiedo have also acquired
35-200431 : o SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. – o (a) For filing an action possession of the said properties, enabling them, by petitioner’s own admission, to
or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim demolish the improvements thereon. It is, thus, suspect that petitioner kept

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mum about the afore-mentioned facts and circumstances when they had already same to be a real action, the filing fees for which should have been computed based
taken place before it filed its Complaint before the RTC on 16 March 2006. on the assessed value of the subject property or, if there was none, the estimated
Petitioner never expressed surprise when such facts and circumstances were value thereof. The Court expounded in Siapno that: o In his amended petition,
established before the RTC, nor moved to amend its Complaint respondent Manalo prayed that NTA’s sale of the property in dispute to Standford
accordingly.1avvphi1.zw+ Even though the Memorandum of Agreement was East Realty Corporation and the title issued to the latter on the basis thereof, be
supposed to have long been registered on its TCTs over the five parcels of land, declared null and void. In a very real sense, albeit the amended petition is styled
petitioner did not pray for the removal of the same as a cloud on its title. In the as one for "Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages," it is, at bottom, a
same vein, although petitioner alleged that respondents Tan and Obiedo forcibly suit to recover from Standford the realty in question and to vest in respondent the
took physical possession of the subject real properties, petitioner did not seek the ownership and possession thereof. In short, the amended petition is in reality an
restoration of such possession to itself. And despite learning that respondents Tan action in res or a real action. Our pronouncement in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc.
and Obiedo already secured TCTs over the subject properties in their names, vs. Court of Appeals is instructive. There, we said: A prayer for annulment or
petitioner did not ask for the cancellation of said titles. The only logical and rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of
reasonable explanation is that petitioner is reluctant to bring to the attention of the the action which is to recover real property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97,
Court certain facts and circumstances, keeping its Complaint safely worded, so as 1948) An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a
to institute only an action for annulment of Deeds of Absolute Sale. Petitioner real action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v.
deliberately avoided raising issues on the title and possession of the real properties Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760, 1954) An action to annul a real estate mortgage
that may lead the Court to classify its case as a real action. No matter how foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real
fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is true that petitioner
sought in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in
action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
of the five parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo. A real action is one intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is
in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary
is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission
title to or recovery of possession of real property.33 Section 7, Rule 141 of the of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime
Rules of Court, prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, had a specific objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real
paragraph governing the assessment of the docket fees for real action, to wit: o In action. Unfortunately, and evidently to evade payment of the correct amount of
a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated filing fee, respondent Manalo never alleged in the body of his amended petition,
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing much less in the prayer portion thereof, the assessed value of the subject res, or,
the fees. It was in accordance with the afore-quoted provision that the Court, in if there is none, the estimated value thereof, to serve as basis for the receiving
Gochan v. Gochan,34 held that although the caption of the complaint filed by clerk in computing and arriving at the proper amount of filing fee due thereon, as
therein respondents Mercedes Gochan, et al. with the RTC was denominated as required under Section 7 of this Court’s en banc resolution of 04 September 1990
one for "specific performance and damages," the relief sought was the conveyance (Re: Proposed Amendments to Rule 141 on Legal Fees). Even the amended
or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in petition, therefore, should have been expunged from the records. In fine, we
their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of rule and so hold that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over its Civil Case
agreement. Under these circumstances, the case before the RTC was actually a No. Q-95-24791. It was in Serrano v. Delica,37 however, that the Court dealt
real action, affecting as it did title to or possession of real property. Consequently, with a complaint that bore the most similarity to the one at bar. Therein respondent
the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the Delica averred that undue influence, coercion, and intimidation were exerted upon
property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged in the complaint. But since him by therein petitioners Serrano, et al. to effect transfer of his properties. Thus,
Mercedes Gochan failed to allege in their complaint the value of the real properties, Delica filed a complaint before the RTC against Serrano, et al., praying that the
the Court found that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the same for non- special power of attorney, the affidavit, the new titles issued in the names of
payment of the correct docket fees. Likewise, in Siapno v. Manalo,35 the Court Serrano, et al., and the contracts of sale of the disputed properties be cancelled;
disregarded the title/denomination of therein plaintiff Manalo’s amended petition that Serrano, et al. be ordered to pay Delica, jointly and severally, actual, moral
as one for Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages; and adjudged the and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00, as well as attorney’s fee

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of P200,000.00 and costs of litigation; that a TRO and a writ of preliminary for: o 1. Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale
injunction be issued ordering Serrano, et al. to immediately restore him to his (Supplementary Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private
possession of the parcels of land in question; and that after trial, the writ of respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or
injunction be made permanent. The Court dismissed Delica’s complaint for the violation of the terms and conditions of the said contract. o 2. Declaring void ab
following reasons: o A careful examination of respondent’s complaint is that it is a initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for being absolutely simulated; and o 3. Ordering
real action. In Paderanga vs. Buissan, we held that "in a real action, the plaintiff defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs (private respondents) attorney's fees in
seeks the recovery of real property, or, as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the the amount of P100,000.00.41 As this Court has previously discussed herein,
Revised Rules of Court, a real action is one ‘affecting title to real property or for the nature of Civil Case No. 20060030 instituted by petitioner before the RTC is
the recovery of possession of, closer to that of Serrano, rather than of Spouses De Leon, hence, calling for the
or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on a real application of the ruling of the Court in the former, rather than in the latter. It
property.’" o Obviously, respondent’s complaint is a real action involving not only is also important to note that, with the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-
the recovery of real properties, but likewise the cancellation of the titles thereto. o 04-SC, which became effective on 16 August 2004, the paragraph in Section 7,
Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, pertaining specifically to the basis for computation
assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof of docket fees for real actions was deleted. Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as
shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees." o amended, provides that "in cases involving real property, the FAIR MARKET value
We note, however, that neither the "assessed value" nor the "estimated value" of of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR
the questioned parcels of land were alleged by respondent in both his original and CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICH IS
amended complaint. What he stated in his amended complaint is that the disputed HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN
realties have a "BIR zonal valuation" of P1,200.00 per square meter. However, the LITIGATION x x x" shall be the basis for the computation of the docket fees. Would
alleged "BIR zonal valuation" is not the kind of valuation required by the Rule. It is such an amendment have an impact on Gochan, Siapno, and Serrano? The Court
the assessed value of the realty. Having utterly failed to comply with the rules in the negative. A real action indisputably involves real property. The
requirement of the Rule that he shall allege in his complaint the assessed value of docket fees for a real action would still be determined in accordance with the value
his real properties in controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As of the real property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the
such, his complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties,
that it has not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be
respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone, respondent’s using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration
complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.38 Brushing aside the significance of or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or,
Serrano, petitioner argues that said decision, rendered by the Third Division of the in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same. In sum, the Court finds
Court, and not by the Court en banc, cannot modify or reverse the doctrine laid that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is
down in Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals.39 Petitioner relies heavily on the the recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily
declaration of this Court in Spouses De Leon that an action for annulment or involving real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation. with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of
The Court, however, does not perceive a contradiction between Serrano and the Appeals, therefore, did not commit any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring
Spouses De Leon. The Court calls attention to the following statement in Spouses petitioner to pay additional docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-
De Leon: "A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining 0030. The Court does not give much credence to the allegation of petitioner that
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary if the judgment of the Court of Appeals is allowed to stand and not rectified, it
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of would result in grave injustice and irreparable injury to petitioner in view of the
the principal action or remedy sought." Necessarily, the determination must be prohibitive amount assessed against it. It is a sweeping assertion which lacks
done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances of each. evidentiary support. Undeniably, before the Court can conclude that the amount of
What petitioner conveniently ignores is that in Spouses De Leon, the action therein docket fees is indeed prohibitive for a party, it would have to look into the financial
that private respondents instituted before the RTC was "solely for annulment or capacity of said party. It baffles this Court that herein petitioner, having the
rescission" of the contract of sale over a real property.40 There appeared to be no capacity to enter into multi-million transactions, now stalls at paying P720,392.60
transfer of title or possession to the adverse party. Their complaint simply prayed additional docket fees so it could champion before the courts its rights over the

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disputed real properties. Moreover, even though the Court exempts individuals, as the appeal is not perfected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited within the
indigent or pauper litigants, from paying docket fees, it has never extended such reglementary period and the remainder is tendered after the expiration of the
an exemption to a corporate entity. period. The rulings in these cases have been consistently reiterated in
subsequent cases: Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,34 Pedrosa v. Spouses Hill,35
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., Petitioner, vs. EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS, Gegare v. Court of Appeals,36 Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,37 Sps. Manalili v. Sps.
Respondent. G.R. No. 187104 August 3, 2010 THIRD DIVISION de Leon,38 La Salette College v. Pilotin,39 Saint Louis University v. Spouses
Cordero,40 M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva,41 Far Corporation v.
FACTS: Respondent, an associate professor in petitioner SLU, failed the Magdaluyo,42 Meatmasters Int’l. Corp. v. Lelis Integrated Dev’t. Corp.,43 Tamayo
evaluation for 3 cumulative years and, as such, was placed on forced leave by SLU, v. Tamayo, Jr.,44 Enriquez v. Enriquez,45 KLT Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits, Inc.,46
pursuant to the existing CBA During the grievance procedure, respondent cited Tan v. Link,47 Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Yap,48 and most recently in Tabigue v.
a CA case where it was held that those who fail the evaluation could not be placed International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO),49 and continues to be the
on forced leave, as they are co-terminous with the existing CBA Petitioner controlling doctrine. In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review
argued that respondent cannot cite said case as it is on appeal before SC VA on December 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA decision on
decided in favor of petitioner and denied respondent’s MR Respondent elevated November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full only after seventy-two (72)
to CA CA dismissed the petition for failure to pay the required fees and to days, when she filed her motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and
attach the copies of material records Respondent filed an MR o She, attached the postal money orders for P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were
nonetheless, attached to her motion copies of the material portions of the record paid late, and without payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not
and the postal money orders for P4,230.00. She maintained that the ends of justice perfected within the reglementary period. Exceptions to the Rule on Payment of
and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits CA reinstated Appellate Court Docket Fees not applicable Procedural rules do not exist for the
petition and annulled the decision of VA o found that Cobarrubias substantially convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order
complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system.50 While procedural rules are
documents in her motion for reconsideratio liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary
ISSUE: Whether the subsequent payment of respondent cured her non-payment to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.51 Viewed in this light,
of docket fees during the filing of the petition before the CA. procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they
HELD: NO. Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees Appeal is not a natural are required to be followed. However, there are recognized exceptions to their
right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve
accordance with the provision set by law.25 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting
petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
judgment.26 Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case;
to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees;27 non-compliance (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petition’s by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
dismissal.28 Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.29 It is an essential requirement, thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the
without which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to
no appeal has been filed.30 As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia and each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance
Andres,31 we stressed that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In Lee v. Republic,32 we decided by all the attendant circumstances.52 Thus, there should be an effort, on the part
that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was deposited, no appeal of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation
was deemed perfected where the other half was tendered after the period within for his/her failure to comply with the rules.1avvphi1 In Cobarrubias' case, no
which payment should have been made. In Aranas v. Endona,33 we reiterated that such explanation has been advanced. Other than insisting that the ends of justice

133
and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits, Cobarrubias administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising
offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in full when she filed her from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this
petition for review. To us, Cobarrubias’ omission is fatal to her cause. We, thus, cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit: o “If
find that the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition for review despite the a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
nonpayment of the requisite docket fees within the reglementary period. The VA obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
decision had lapsed to finality when the docket fees were paid; hence, the CA had receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal except to order its dismissal. administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx” The administration of
the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other
IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner, vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, respondent. G.R. No. persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her
138497. January 16, 2002 FIRST DIVISION first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation
between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. In
FACTS: Respondent filed a case before the RTC praying that she be declared as fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists. The second cause
administratix of conjugal partnership against Alberto Lopez, her husband, and of action is for an accounting “by respondent husband.”[14] The accounting of
herein petitioner, alleging that Alberto and petitioner cohabited and have been conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has
using the conjugal partnership and have amassed fortunes which petitioner had no nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no
contribution Petitioner filed an MD on the ground that respondent has no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground. Respondent’s
COA against her RTC denied MD on the ground that she is impleaded as a alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’ share in the co-
necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are owned property “acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation with
registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name Petitioner [petitioner]”[15] and for the “dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
elevated to CA CA denied petition between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent].” The third cause of action
is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property co-owned by him
ISSUE: Whether respondent has a COA against petitioner. and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between
Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit
HELD: NO. First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the Alberto J. Lopez’ share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with
proceedings below. “A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the petitioner. Respondent’s asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez’
defendant in violation of the legal right of the other.”[10] The elements of a cause share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial
of action are: o (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and court finds in respondent’s favor, results in a breach of an obligation to respondent
under whatever law it arises or is created; o (2) an obligation on the part and gives rise to a cause of action.[16] Such cause of action, however, pertains to
of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and o (3) an Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. The respondent also sought support. Support
act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff cannot be compelled from a stranger. The action in Special Proceedings M-3630
or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez’ own words, one by “an aggrieved wife
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[11] A cause of action against her husband.”[17] References to petitioner in the common and specific
is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were allegations of fact in the complaint are merely incidental, to set forth facts and
admitted or proved.[12] In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause circumstances that prove the causes of action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.
of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent’s claim for moral damages is against
than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. To sustain a cause of action for moral damages,
uncertain.[13] Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged the complaint must have the character of an action for interference with marital or
in Special Proceedings M-3630, we assay its allegations. In Part Two on the family relations under the Civil Code. A real party in interest is one who stands
“Nature of [the] Complaint,” respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez summarized the “to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.”[18] In this case, petitioner
causes of action alleged in the complaint below. The complaint is by an aggrieved would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630. If
wife against her husband. Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An
is sought against petitioner. Respondent’s causes of action were all against her indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an
husband. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as action.[19] Petitioner’s participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not

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indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties. The
Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give De Castros admit that the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the contract
support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez’ conjugal of agency,[10] citing Article 1915 of the Civil Code, which reads: o Art. 1915. If
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property co- two or more persons have appointed an agent for a common transaction or
owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and undertaking, they shall be solidarily liable to the agent for all the consequences of
enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in the agency. The solidary liability of the four co-owners, however, militates
Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is not indispensable against the De Castros’ theory that the other co-owners should be impleaded as
but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those indispensable parties. A noted commentator explained Article 1915 thus –
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject o “The rule in this article applies even when the appointments were made by the
of the action.[20] In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent principals in separate acts, provided that they are for the same transaction. The
would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for solidarity arises from the common interest of the principals, and not from the act
his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to of constituting the agency. By virtue of this solidarity, the agent can recover from
respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner any principal the whole compensation and indemnity owing to him by the others.
and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with The parties, however, may, by express agreement, negate this solidary
respondent. responsibility. The solidarity does not disappear by the mere partition effected by
the principals after the accomplishment of the agency. If the undertaking is one
CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO and CORAZON AMOR DE CASTRO, petitioners, vs. in which several are interested, but only some create the agency, only the latter
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO ARTIGO, respondents. G.R. No. 115838. July are solidarily liable, without prejudice to the effects of negotiorum gestio with
18, 2002 THIRD DIVISION respect to the others. And if the power granted includes various transactions some
of which are common and others are not, only those interested in each transaction
FACTS: PR Artigo acted as broker for petitioners, who were co-owners of the shall be liable for it.”[11] When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the
subject lots PR instituted a complaint against petitioners demanding payment of obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor
his commissions as broker Petitioners filed an MD on the ground that the may be compelled to pay the entire obligation.[12] The agent may recover the
other co-owners were not impleaded as parties RTC denied MD and ruled in whole compensation from any one of the co-principals, as in this case. Indeed,
favor of PR CA affirmed Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that a creditor may sue any of the solidary
debtors. This article reads: o Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any
ISSUE: Whether the complaint of PR was dismissable on the ground that the other one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand
co-owners were not impleaded as parties. made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully
HELD: NO. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the collected. Thus, the Court has ruled in Operators Incorporated vs. American
court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case Biscuit Co., Inc.[13] that – o “x x x solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an
can be had.[7] The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code
proceed without their presence.[8] Whenever it appears to the court in the course says that the creditor `may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some
of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of or all of them simultaneously’.” (Emphasis supplied)
the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party.[9] However, the
rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
case. There is no dispute that Constante appointed Artigo in a handwritten note APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
dated January 24, 1984 to sell the properties of the De Castros for P23 million at 77, Quezon City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA
a 5 percent commission. The authority was on a first come, first serve basis. KALAW LEDESMA, substituted by TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the other coowners. respondents. G.R. No. 141463 August 6, 2002 SECOND DIVISION
Under this note, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante
and Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante’s individual FACTS: PR Pura Kalaw Ledesma, registered owner of Lot 689, which was
or representative capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of adjacent to portions of Lot 707, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro,

135
which the latter sold to Mariano Lising in the name of M.B. Lising Realty, who, in thereto. We found that the houses on the subject lot were formerly owned by
turn, subdivided them into smaller lots. Such smaller lots were sold to spouses Mangahas and Ramos who sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in turn sold them
Victor and Honorata Orquiola. PR instituted an action against Herminigilda Pedro to Medina. Under the circumstances, petitioner was privy to the two judgment
and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689 Tandang Sora then debtors Mangahas and Ramos, and thus Medina could be reached by the order of
substituted Pura Kalaw RTC held Pedro and Lising liable; pay PR, remove execution and writ of demolition issued against the two. As to the lot under dispute,
constructions, etc Deputy Sheriff directed petitioners, through an alias writ of we sustained Magbanua’s ownership over it, she being the holder of a Torrens title.
execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land they were occupying We declared that a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of
Petitioners (before CA) contended that the writ cannot be issued against them the land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title
since they were not impleaded as parties in the case and that they were buyers in was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any
good faith informacion possessoria, or other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not
annotated on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing with property covered
ISSUE: Whether petitioners may be directed to vacate their house, considering by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its
that they were not impleaded in the case. face. Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the
petitioner in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the
HELD: NO. On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution dispute after the original action was commenced and became final and executory.
cannot be enforced against them. They argue that the appellate court erred when In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil
it relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz8 in holding that petitioners Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right over the disputed land of the predecessors-
are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be reached by in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity,
the order of execution in Civil Case No. Q-12918 even though they were not allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish Government
impleaded as parties thereto. Petitioners submit that Medina is not applicable in in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the land of
this case because the circumstances therein are different from the circumstances the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized
in the present case. In Medina, the property in dispute was registered under Torrens title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own
Land Registration Act No. 496 in 1916 and Original Certificate of Title No. 868 was names, while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-
issued in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). In 1949, Benedicta in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land. We
Mangahas and Francisco Ramos occupied and built houses on the lot without the must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of
PRC’s consent. In 1959, PRC sold the lot to Remedios Magbanua. Mangahas and land under the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with
Ramos opposed and instituted Civil Case No. C-120 to annul the sale and to compel the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely
PRC to execute a contract of sale in their favor. The trial court dismissed the solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as
complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot and surrender are annotated on the title.9 It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor
possession thereof to Magbanua. The judgment became final and executory. When and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the
Magbanua had paid for the land in full, PRC executed a deed of absolute sale in her Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a
favor and a new title was consequently issued in her name. Magbanua then sought mere Titulo de Composicion.
the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-120. This was opposed by
petitioner Medina who alleged that she owned the houses and lot subject of the CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MERCEDES M. OLIVER,
dispute. She said that she bought the houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia respondent. G.R. No. 135796. October 3, 2002 SECOND DIVISION
de Guzman, while she purchased the lot from the heirs of the late Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban. The latter held the land by virtue of a Titulo de Composicion FACTS: Pangan Lim, Jr. and a certain Mercedes M. Oliver (Oliver 1) opened an
Con El Estado Num. 4136, dated April 29, 1894. In opposing the execution, Medina account with petitioner bank, obtained a loan with a collateral of a lot in Muntinlupa
argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, claiming that she Another Mercedes Oliver, herein respondent Oliver 2, claimed that she was the
was not a party in Civil Case No. C-120, thus, she could not be considered as "a owner of said lot and filed a case against petitioner before RTC praying for the
person claiming under" Ramos and Mangahas. When Medina reached this Court, annulment of mortgage and cancellation of title with damages Petitioner filed
we held that the decision in Civil Case No. C120, which had long become final and an MD for lack of cause of action and non-joinder of an indispensable party, the
executory, could be enforced against petitioner even though she was not a party mortgagor RTC denied MD CA affirmed RTC o Rule 6, Section 11 of the

136
Rules of Court allows petitioner to file a third-party complaint against the of Appeals, et al., 313 SCRA 504 (1999), we held that a party is not indispensable
mortgagor. As to the judgment by default, the Court of Appeals said that an order to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible
denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and may not be questioned through from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a
a special civil action for certiorari. The defendant must proceed with the case and judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. In this case,
raise the issues in his motion to dismiss when he appeals to a higher court Chinabank has interest in the loan which, however, is distinct and divisible from
the mortgagor’s interest, which involves the land used as collateral for the loan.
ISSUE: Whether respondent should have impleaded the mortgagors for her Further, a declaration of the mortgage’s nullity in this case will not necessarily
complaint against petitioner to prosper. prejudice mortgagor Oliver One. The bank still needs to initiate proceedings to go
after the mortgagor, who in turn can raise other defenses pertinent to the two of
HELD: NO. Petitioner Chinabank alleges that there are two owner’s duplicate them. A party is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit
copies of TCT No. S-50195 involved in this case and two persons claiming to be complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or will simply
the real “MERCEDES MARAVILLA OLIVER.” One is the mortgagor, Oliver One. The avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of Chinabank and mortgagor Oliver One.[10]
other is the respondent, Oliver Two. Respondent’s complaint before the trial court The latter’s participation in this case will simply enable petitioner Chinabank to
was one for cancellation of the transfer certificate of title in petitioner’s possession make its claim against her in this case, and hence, avoid the institution of another
(Annex B). According to petitioner, the issue below is the genuineness of the titles, action. Thus, it was the bank who should have filed a third-party complaint or
which is intertwined with the issue of ownership. This being the case, said the other action versus the mortgagor Oliver One. As to the second issue, since
petitioner, the mortgagor Oliver One must necessarily be impleaded for she is the mortgagor Oliver One is not an indispensable party, Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997
registered owner under Annex “B.” Petitioner argues that mortgagor Oliver One is Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires compulsory joinder of indispensable parties
in a better position to defend her title. She stands to suffer if it is declared fake. in a case, does not apply. Instead, it is Section 11, Rule 3, that applies.[11] Non-
Further, petitioner claims that the validity and enforceability of the mortgage joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be added
entirely depends on the validity and authenticity of Annex “B.” The mortgage by order of the court, either on its own initiative or on motion of the parties.[12]
cannot be declared a nullity without the trial court declaring Annex “B” a nullity. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it found no abuse of
Hence, mortgagor Oliver One’s participation in the suit is indispensable, according discretion on the part of the trial court for denying Chinabank’s motion to dismiss
to petitioner. In brief, what petitioner Chinabank is saying is that it was and, instead, suggested that petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor
indispensable for respondent Oliver Two to implead mortgagor Oliver One in the Oliver One. A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the
case before the trial court. Failing to do that, the complaint of herein respondent defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability
Oliver Two should have been dismissed. Petitioner’s contention is far from to the plaintiff.[13] Now, the third issue, did the Court of Appeals err when it
tenable. An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final sustained the trial court’s ruling that petitioner Chinabank was in default? As found
determination can be had of an action.[8] It is true that mortgagor Oliver One is by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not file its answer, although it received the
a party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of the case. She stands March 13, 1997 order denying the motion to dismiss. Instead, petitioner filed a
to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Said petition, however,
is declared fake.[9] However, does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
mortgagor Oliver One’s absence from the case does not hamper the trial court in order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued.[14] No such order or writ was
resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. A perusal of issued in this case. Hence, Chinabank as defendant below was properly declared
Oliver Two’s allegations in the complaint below shows that it was for annulment of in default by the trial court, after the 15-day period to file its answer or other
mortgage due to petitioner’s negligence in not determining the actual ownership of responsive pleading lapsed. Lastly, were the withdrawal and consequent
the property, resulting in the mortgage’s annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in the dismissal of the complaint against officials of the Registry of Deeds conclusive of
Registry of Deeds’ custody. To support said allegations, respondent Oliver Two the authenticity of mortgagor Oliver One’s copy of TCT No. S-50195? This is a
had to prove (1) that she is the real Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and question of fact, which is not a proper subject for review in this petition. Here, we
(2) that she is not the same person using that name who entered into a deed of are limited only to questions of law,[15] as a general rule. Petitioner failed to show
mortgage with the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can do in her complaint that this case falls under any of the exceptions to this rule. We need not tarry on
without necessarily impleading the mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is this issue now.
not an indispensable party in the case filed by Oliver Two. In Noceda vs. Court

137
LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC., petitioner, vs. ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, LEONOR MAMAUAG, indispensable.[23] Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the
LOURDES CAUBA, JOSEPHINE DOMANAIS, ARLENE CAGAYAT, AMELITA YAM, party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are
VIVIAN DOMARAIS, MARILYN ANTALAN, CHRISTOPHER RAMIREZ, ARNOLD SAN just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
PEDRO, MARISSA SAN PEDRO, LORELI JIMENEZ, JEFFREY BUENO, CHRISTOPHER of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
CAGAYAT, GERARD CABILES, JOAN ENRIQUEZ, JOSEPH DE LA CRUZ, NELLY petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor.[24] Although 7J was a co-party
CLERIGO, DULCE NAVARETTE, ROWENA BELLO, DANIEL RAMIREZ, AILEEN in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, respondents failed to include it
BAUTISTA and BALTAZAR FERRERA, respondents. G.R. No. 166302. July 28, 2005 in their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals
FIRST DIVISION did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No final ruling on this matter can be had
without impleading 7J, whose inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete
FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic corporation, hired herein respondents, by entering resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties with due process and fair
into a contract with 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services, but said respondents play.
latter were later on advised not to report for work anymore Respondents filed a
case against petitioner for illegal dismissal before LA LA declared that DOMINGO CARABEO, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO and SUSAN DINGCO,
petitioner is the employer and held that it is liable to respondents Petitioner Respondents. G.R. No. 190823 April 4, 2011 THIRD DIVISION
it is only a labor only contractor NLRC affirmed LA and denied petitioner’s MR
Petitioner argues that 7J is respondents’ employer CA affirmed NLRC FACTS: Petitioner entered into a Kasunduan with respondents whereby they
stipulated that the former will sell his rights over the subject property to the latter
ISSUE: Whether the failure to implead 7J should have resulted in the outright for a consideration of P38,000 Respondents paid the DP of P10,000 and claimed
dismissal of the case. that they later on attempted to pay petitioner but the latter refused, saying that
there were disputes over the land When they learned that the disputes have
HELD: NO. Lotte asserts that 7J is an indispensable party and should have been been terminated, respondents alleged that they attempted once again to pay
impleaded in respondents’ petition in the Court of Appeals. It claims that the petitioner the balance, but the latter still refused. Respondents then instituted a
petition before the Court of Appeals was dismissible for failure to comply with complaint for specific performance with RTC against petitioner Petitioner the
Section 3,[13] Rule 46 in relation to Section 5[14] of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules Kasunduan was void for lack of object certain, the metes and bounds not having
of Civil Procedure. o Petitioner’s contention is tenable. 59 been specified therein; respondents failed to pay the amount of P28,000 when it
was due, hence, he was constrained to accept installment payments RTC ruled
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination in favor of respondents Petitioner died but there was no notice to RTC o The
can be had of an action,[15] and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or records do not show that petitioner’s counsel informed Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC,
defendants.[16] The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory.[17] The where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court Petitioner’s
which is “the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a counsel then appealed to the CA o It was shown that it was already petitioner’s
case”.[18] Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or son, Antonio, who filed said appeal
proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.[19] The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for ISSUE #1: Whether RTC decision was valid and binding upon the representatives
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those and heirs of petitioner, notwithstanding the lack of proper substitution.
present.[20] In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in
interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter HELD # 1:YES.
and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of respondents. The
Court of Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who ISSUE # 2: Whether CA validly took cognizance of the appeal, considering that
was not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of respondents. there was no proper substitution.
Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J. In Domingo v. Scheer,[21] we held that
the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an HELD # 2: NO. That the kasunduan did not specify the technical boundaries of
action[22] and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be the property did not render the sale a nullity. The requirement that a sale must

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have for its object a determinate thing is satisfied as long as, at the time the respondent died during the pendency of the case. There being no substitution by
contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate the heirs, the trial court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the litigation
without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties.9 As the
abovequoted portion of the kasunduan shows, there is no doubt that the object of ISSUE: Whether RTC lost jurisdiction, considering the death of respondent during
the sale is determinate. Clutching at straws, petitioner proffers lack of spousal the pendency of the case.
consent. This was raised only on appeal, hence, will not be considered, in the
present case, in the interest of fair play, justice and due process.10 Respecting HELD: NO. The Rules require the legal representatives of a dead litigant to be
the argument that petitioner’s death rendered respondents’ complaint against him substituted as parties to a litigation. This requirement is necessitated by due
dismissible, Bonilla v. Barcena11 enlightens: o The question as to whether an process. Thus, when the rights of the legal representatives of a decedent are
action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued actually recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance
for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects with the Rules cannot affect the validity of the promulgated decision. After all, due
primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person process had thereby been satisfied. When a party to a pending action dies and
being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the the claim is not extinguished,21 the Rules of Court require a substitution of the
injury complained of is to the person, the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3, which
property and rights of property affected being incidental. (emphasis and reads thus: o "Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. –Whenever a party
underscoring supplied) In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of
kasunduan to protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for
the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights,12 it disciplinary action. o "The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted
survives. It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
petitioner died. Since the trial court was not informed of petitioner’s death, it may administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. o "The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner’s legal representatives or appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. o "If no
successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one
is concerned.13 In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the
counsel of authority.14 Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor
record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it or administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the latter shall immediately
bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
court’s decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs."
perfected. The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party’s right to
due process.22 The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly
Spouses JULITA DE LA CRUZ and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. PEDRO represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative.23
JOAQUIN, Respondents. G.R. No. 162788. July 28, 2005 THIRD DIVISION Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if
the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.24 The Court has nullified not
FACTS: Respondent obtained a loan from petitioners, secured by him upon his only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal
execution of a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners over his parcel of land representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments.25 In those
Claiming that said Deed of Sale is an equitable mortgage, respondent filed an action instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
for recovery of possession and ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages representatives or the heirs upon whom no judgment was binding.26 This
before the RTC Petitioners the kasunduan was merely an accommodation to general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when
allow the repurchase of the property until June 29, 1979, a right that he failed to they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence
exercise RTC in favor of respondent CA sustained Petitioners assert in defense of the deceased.27 These actions negate any claim that the right to due
that the RTC’s Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction.19 They claim that process was violated. The Court is not unaware of Chittick v. Court of Appeals,28

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in which the failure of the heirs to substitute for the original plaintiff upon her death complaint did not state cause of action PR filed MR RTC reversed o Acting
led to the nullification of the trial court’s Decision. The latter had sought to recover on the presumption that Glenn Go’s leasing business is a conjugal property, the
support in arrears and her share in the conjugal partnership. The children who RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the
allegedly substituted for her refused to continue the case against their father and action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should have included
vehemently objected to their inclusion as parties.29 Moreover, because he died her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules
during the pendency of the case, they were bound to substitute for the defendant of Court (Rules).12 Thus, the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the
also. The substitution effectively merged the persons of the plaintiff and the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. Petitioner’s MR was denied Petitioner
defendant and thus extinguished the obligation being sued upon.30 Clearly, the elevated to CA o According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause of
present case is not similar, much less identical, to the factual milieu of Chittick. action could not be converted into one with a cause of action by mere amendment
Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, or supplemental pleading. CA affirmed RTC
but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when
the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance ISSUE: Whether PR is real party in interest therefore impleading of Glenn Go is no
or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a longer warranted.
promulgated decision.31 Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a
sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party must prove HELD: YES. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must
that there was an undeniable violation of due process. Evidently, the heirs of be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party
Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the case. We stress that the who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
appellate court had ordered33 his legal representatives to appear and substitute entitled to the avails of the suit.15 Interestingly, although Navarro admits that
for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly. In all Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, he still
proceedings, the legal representatives must appear to protect the interests of the insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in the case. According to
deceased.34 After the rendition of judgment, further proceedings may be held, Navarro, while the lease contracts were in Kargo Enterprises’ name, this was
such as a motion for reconsideration or a new trial, an appeal, or an execution.35 merely a trade name without a juridical personality, so the actual parties to the
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution may be lease agreements were Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go. As
deemed to have been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, a corollary, Navarro contends that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
Pedro Joaquin. There being no violation of due process, the issue of substitution when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff, since this in effect created
cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify the trial court’s Decision. a cause of action for the complaints when in truth, there was none. o We do not
find Navarro’s arguments persuasive.
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business
ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the title of the Complaint where the
RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO
name KARGO ENTERPRISES, Respondents. G.R. No. 153788 November ENTERPRISES," and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the
27, 2009 SECOND DIVISION Complaint. Paragraph 2 defined the business KARGO ENTERPRISES undertakes.
Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that the defendant "leased from plaintiff
FACTS: Petitioner allegedly entered into a lease agreement with option to a certain motor vehicle" that was thereafter described. Significantly, the Complaint
purchase with PR Karen Go, who was married to one Glenn Go and doing business specifies and attaches as its integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the
under the name of Kargo Enterprises which buys and sells motor vehicles, and paid transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. Again, the name KARGO
post dated checks which were later on dishonored. As a result, PR filed 2 ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this Lease Agreement provides: As Navarro
complaints before RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages The 2 correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a
complaints stated the same facts and circumstances except a few RTC issued natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code: o
writs of replevin on the 2 cases As a result, sheriff seized to vehicles and Art. 44. The following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political
delivered them to PR Petitioner sought consolidation of the case which was subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest
granted Petitioner filed an MD on the ground that complaint did not state or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been
cause of action and of lack of legal personality RTC granted MD on the ground constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for

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private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate – a woman – does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a
and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. Thus, pursuant property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married. By law, all property
to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules,16 Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
action. This legal reality leads to the question: who then is the proper party to file contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
an action based on a contract in the name of Kargo Enterprises? We faced a conjugal unless the contrary is proved.21 Our examination of the records of the
similar question in Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza,17 where we said: o Finally, there case does not show any proof that Kargo Enterprises and the properties or
is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The contracts in its name are conjugal. If at all, only the bare allegation of Navarro to
law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business this effect exists in the records of the case. As we emphasized in Castro v. Miat:22
organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor o Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all
or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be
pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This article
upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court. o does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired
owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint would show does not appear.23 [Emphasis supplied.] Thus, for purposes solely of this case
that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is
conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words conjugal or paraphernal property, we hold that it is conjugal property. Article
"doing business as Juasing Hardware" may be added to the title of the case, as is 124 of the Family Code, on the administration of the conjugal property, provides:
customarily done.18 [Emphasis supplied.] o This conclusion should be read in o Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, which states: SEC. 2. Parties in shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or implementing such decision. This provision, by its terms, allows either Karen or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. As the registered owner of Glenn Go to speak and act with authority in managing their conjugal property, i.e.,
Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured Kargo Enterprises. No need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the consent of the
by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is the other before performing an act of administration or any act that does not dispose
real party-ininterest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not of or encumber their conjugal property. Under Article 108 of the Family Code,
state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in
that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by
legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, the spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations
a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the of the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
trial court to consider in a trial on the merits. We find it significant that the Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses’ marriage
business name Kargo Enterprises is in the name of Karen T. Go,19 who described settlement and by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of
herself in the Complaints to be "a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, any evidence of a marriage settlement between the spouses Go, we look at the
a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, and doing business under the trade name Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance. A rule on partnership applicable
KARGO ENTERPRISES."20 That Glenn Go and Karen Go are married to each other to the spouses’ circumstances is Article 1811 of the Civil Code, which states: o Art.
is a fact never brought in issue in the case. Thus, the business name KARGO 1811. A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership
ENTERPRISES is registered in the name of a married woman, a fact material to the property. The incidents of this co-ownership are such that: (1) A partner,
side issue of whether Kargo Enterprises and its properties are paraphernal or subject to the provisions of this Title and to any agreement between the partners,
conjugal properties. To restate the parties’ positions, Navarro alleges that Kargo has an equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for
Enterprises is Karen Go’s paraphernal property, emphasizing the fact that the partnership purposes; xxx Under this provision, Glenn and Karen Go are
business is registered solely in Karen Go’s name. On the other hand, Karen Go effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under this
contends that while the business is registered in her name, it is in fact part of their name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties.
conjugal property. The registration of the trade name in the name of one person Applying Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that "in default of contracts, or

141
special provisions, coownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title," filed for the benefit of all co-owners.25 [Emphasis supplied.] Under this ruling,
we find further support in Article 487 of the Civil Code that allows any of the co- either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover possession
owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned property. of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is
While ejectment is normally associated with actions involving real property, we find consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position
that this rule can be applied to the circumstances of the present case, following that either spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they
our ruling in Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman.24 In this case, one spouse filed an do not dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other spouse’s
action for the recovery of credit, a personal property considered conjugal property, consent. On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an
without including the other spouse in the action. In resolving the issue of whether indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he
the other spouse was required to be included as a coplaintiff in the action for the only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4,
recovery of the credit, we said: o Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co- Rule 4 of the Rules, which states: o Section 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and
owner of the credits allegedly extended to the spouses Carandang, seems to be wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. Non - joinder of
either an indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an indispensable party, indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action Even assuming that Glenn Go
dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a number of cases26 that
warranted, whether or not there was an order for her inclusion in the complaint the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3. o Article 108 of the Family Code provides: Art. for dismissal of action. As we stated in Macababbad v. Masirag:27 o Rule 3, Section
108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus: Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-
Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. o This provision is joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
practically the same as the Civil Code provision it superseded: Art. 147. The dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter. o In terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is a co- proceeded with separately. In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper
owner with the other partners of specific partnership property." Taken with the remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage
presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may
used to pay for petitioners’ stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to
credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to
Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit. o Being co-owners of the whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply
alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent cases of Baloloy v. Hular and Adlawan v. defendant or upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal
Adlawan, we held that, in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.
recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of his co-owners. In the latter case and in that of De Guia v. Court of
Appeals, we also held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any of
the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, covers all kinds of action for the
recovery of possession. o In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are
real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action,
for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER
is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable HENRICHSEN, Petitioners, vs. KLAUS K. SCHONFELD, Respondent. G.R. No.
parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded 166920 February 19, 2007 THIRD DIVISION
in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been

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FACTS: Respondent, a Canadian citizen, was hired by Pacific Consultants the reliable yardstick: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
International of Japan (PCIJ), a company which has a subsidiary in PH, Pacicon payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to
Philippines, Inc. (PPI) Respondent received a letter from Henrichsen, PCIJ control the employee’s conduct. It is the so-called "control test" which constitutes
president, saying that respondent’s services are being terminated as the venture the most important index of the existence of the employer-employee relationship–
in PH was unsuccessful Respondent then filed a suit before the LA against PPI that is, whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the
Petitioners filed an MD o Petitioners claimed that respondent did not offer any employee not only as to the result of the work to be done but also as to the means
justification for filing his complaint against PPI before the NLRC in the Philippines. and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. Stated otherwise, an
Moreover, under Section 12 of the General Conditions of Employment appended to employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are
the letter of employment dated January 7, 1998, complainant and PCIJ had agreed performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved but also
that any employment-related dispute should be brought before the London Court the means to be used in reaching such end.29 We quote with approval the following
of Arbitration. Respondent PPI, and not PCIJ, was his employer. LA PCIJ ruling of the CA: o [T]here is, indeed, substantial evidence on record which would
remained respondent’s employer despite him being sent to PH NPRC affirmed erase any doubt that the respondent company is the true employer of petitioner.
Respondent elevated to CA o averred that the absence or existence of a written In the case at bar, the power to control and supervise petitioner’s work
contract of employment is not decisive of whether he is an employee of PPI. He performance devolved upon the respondent company. Likewise, the power to
maintained that PPI, through its president Henrichsen, directed his work/duties as terminate the employment relationship was exercised by the President of the
Sector Manager of PPI; proof of this was his letter-proposal to the Development respondent company. It is not the letterhead used by the company in the
Bank of the Philippines for PPI to provide consultancy services for the Construction termination letter which controls, but the person who exercised the power to
Supervision of the Water Supply and Sanitation component of the World terminate the employee. It is also inconsequential if the second letter of
BankAssisted LGU Urban Water and Sanitation Project.20 He emphasized that as employment executed in the Philippines was not signed by the petitioner. An
gleaned from Alien Employment Permit (AEP) No. M-029908-5017 issued to him employer-employee relationship may indeed exist even in the absence of a written
by DOLE on February 26, 1999, he is an employee of PPI. It was PPI president contract, so long as the four elements mentioned in the Mafinco case are all
Henrichsen who terminated his employment; PPI also paid his salary and present.
reimbursed his expenses related to transactions abroad. That PPI is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of PCIJ is of no moment because the two corporations have separate ISSUE # 2: Whether the labor case was correctly filed in PH
and distinct personalities. CA in favor of respondent
HELD # 2: YES. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by
ISSUE # 1: Whether PCIJ should have been impleaded as a party this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan,31 is
that while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a
HELD # 1: NO. Inexplicably, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ignored the contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
documentary evidence which respondent appended to his pleadings showing that Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should
he was an employee of petitioner PPI; they merely focused on the January 7, 1998 be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue
letter of employment and Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment. to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention
Petitioner PPI applied for the issuance of an AEP to respondent before the DOLE. of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly
In said application, PPI averred that respondent is its employee. To show that this and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them
was the case, PPI appended a copy of respondent’s employment contract. The be litigated only at the place named by them.32 In the instant case, no
DOLE then granted the application of PPI and issued the permit. Thus, as claimed restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court
by respondent, he had an employment contract with petitioner PPI; otherwise, save —," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or words of equal import
petitioner PPI would not have filed an application for a Permit with the DOLE. were stated in the contract.33 It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in
Petitioners are thus estopped from alleging that the PCIJ, not petitioner PPI, had London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the
been the employer of respondent all along. We agree with the conclusion of the employment contract. Petitioners contend that respondent should have filed his
CA that there was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner PPI and Complaint in his place of permanent residence, or where the PCIJ holds its principal
respondent using the four-fold test. Jurisprudence is firmly settled that whenever office, at the place where the contract of employment was signed, in London as
the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute, four elements constitute stated in their contract. By enumerating possible venues where respondent could

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have filed his complaint, however, petitioners themselves admitted that the
provision on venue in the employment contract is indeed merely permissive. HELD: NO. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed
Petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.
must be rejected. The bare fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a Jurisprudence and Sec. 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of
repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle for the following Court) provide that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud
reasons: o First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.9 Petitioner asserts that extrinsic
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.34 fraud consisted in her husband’s concealment of the loans which he obtained from
o Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a respondent PCRB; the filing of the complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage;
factual determination; hence, it is properly considered as defense.35 o Third. In service of summons; rendition of judgment by default; and all other proceedings
Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of which took place until the writ of garnishment was served.10 Extrinsic fraud
Appeals,36 this Court held that: x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting
requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an party.11 Extrinsic fraud is present where the unsuccessful party had been
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by
has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. x x x his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise;
or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance
by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney
BANK, Respondent. G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007 SECOND DIVISION regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side. The
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
FACTS: Petitioner’s husband, Ernesto Biaco, had obtained loans from prevented a party from having his day in court.12 With these considerations,
respondent. These loans were secured by mortgage covering the subject parcel of the appellate court acted well in ruling that there was no fraud perpetrated by
land. They failed to pay causing respondent to file a case for foreclosure of respondent bank upon petitioner, noting that the spouses Biaco were co-
mortgage. Summons was allegedly served by Ernesto failed to file Answer. defendants in the case and shared the same interest. Whatever fact or
Ernesto was declared in default by RTC, hence, the judgment against him. circumstance concealed by the husband from the wife cannot be attributed to
Sheriff personally served the decision upon Ernesto. Upon issuance of writ of respondent bank. Moreover, petitioner’s allegation that her signature on the
execution, the same was served at the residence of the spouses. They did not promissory notes was forged does not evince extrinsic fraud. It is well-settled that
appeal, hence, the subject lot was sold on public auction Petitioner then sought the use of forged instruments during trial is not extrinsic fraud because such
the annulment of said decision, contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her from evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the proceedings.13
filing Answer CA against petitioner o (1) the failure of the sheriff to personally The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of
serve summons on petitioner; and (2) petitioner’s husband’s concealment of his the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. The
knowledge of the foreclosure proceedings. o On the validity of the service of rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court likewise apply
summons, the appellate court ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are according to the nature of the action. An action in personam is an action against
actions quasi in rem. o As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against
not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Noting that the the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein
spouses Biaco were not opposing parties in the case, the Court of Appeals further an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
ruled that the fraud committed by one against the other cannot be considered his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.14 In an
extrinsic fraud. Petitioner the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for
which should be deemed void for lack of jurisdiction over her person. the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
ISSUE: Whether the RTC decision was valid, considering that summons was not jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
validly served upon petitioner. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under

144
legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to serve summons by publication
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is upon Abelardo. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff later filed an amended
recognized and made effective.15 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon complaint against Abelardo, this time impleading Carmelita and Rallye as additional
the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely defendants. Summons was served on Abelardo through publication in the Manila
for satisfying the due process requirements.16 A resident defendant who does Evening Post. Abelardo failed to file an answer and was declared in default.
not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this case, must be personally Carmelita went on certiorari to the Court of Appeals assailing as grave abuse of
served with summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If discretion the declaration of default of Abelardo. The Court of Appeals dismissed
she cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, the petition and denied reconsideration. In her petition with this Court, Carmelita
substituted service may be effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the raised the issue of whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over her husband,
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing a non-resident defendant, by the publication of summons in a newspaper of general
therein, or (2) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of circulation in the Philippines. The Court sustained the correctness of extrajudicial
business with some competent person in charge thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, service of summons by publication in such newspaper. The Court explained,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding citing El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca,19 that foreclosure and attachment
instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction proceedings are both actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of
over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, the (non-resident) defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the resident defendant who is not found in the country is required, not for purposes of
trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter. There is a physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the
dimension to this case though that needs to be delved into. Petitioner avers that requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action
she was not personally served summons. Instead, summons was served to her against him and the possibility that property belonging to him or in which he has
through her husband at his office without any explanation as to why the particular an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may
surrogate service was resorted to. The Sheriff’s Return of Service dated March 21, thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, should he be so
2000 states: That on March 16, 2000, the undersigned served the copies of minded. Significantly, the Court went on to rule, citing De Midgely v. Ferandos,
Summons, complaint and its annexes to the defendants Sps. Ernesto R. & Ma. et. al.20 and Perkins v. Dizon, et al.21 that in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
Teresa Ch. Biaco thru Ernesto R. Biaco[,] defendant of the above-entitled case at the only relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose
his office EXPORT & INDUSTRY BANK, Jofelmore Bldg.[,] Mortola St., Cagayan de person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of summons or by
Oro City and he acknowledged receipt thereof as evidenced with his signature voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res. Similarly, in this
appearing on the original copy of the Summons.17 [Emphasis supplied] Without case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited
ruling on petitioner’s allegation that her husband and the sheriff connived to to a rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the
prevent summons from being served upon her personally, we can see that res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioner’s personal liability. In doing so
petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in the judicial without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did,
foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation of petitioner’s the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process, warranting the
constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons annulment of the judgment rendered in the case.
on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court. There is more,
the trial court granted respondent PCRB’s ex-parte motion for deficiency judgment
and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the spouses Biaco to satisfy BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. SHIRLEY G. UNANGST and OTHER UNKNOWN
the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial court went beyond its PERSONS, respondents. G.R. No. 173002 July 4, 2008 THIRD DIVISION
jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses
Biaco. This cannot be countenanced.1awphil.net In Sahagun v. Court of FACTS: Hamilton Salak, common law husband of herein respondent, rented a
Appeals,18 suit was brought against a non-resident defendant, Abelardo Sahagun, car from GAB Rent-A-Car, owned by petitioner. He, however, failed to return the
and a writ of attachment was issued and subsequently levied on a house and lot same, causing petitioner to file a case of estafa, violation of BP 22 and carnapping
registered in his name. Claiming ownership of the house, his wife, Carmelita against Salak and respondent. They were then arrested and they offered to pay
Sahagun, filed a motion to intervene. For failure of plaintiff to serve summons but, since they were short of cash, offered their residential property to petitioner,
extraterritorially upon Abelardo, the complaint was dismissed without prejudice. which the latter agreed Petitioner and respondent then issued an agreement,

145
stipulating, among others that respondent would sell to petitioner the said property respondent argues that petitioner failed to contest the RTC Order dated February
with right to repurchase. Respondent failed to repurchase thus causing 21, 2004 that allowed the payment of supplementary docket fees. Petitioner failed
petitioner to file a case praying for the ff: o (1) surrender the possession of the to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari to the higher court to
property; (2) pay P150,000.00 for the reasonable compensation for its use from question said order. We agree with respondents. Their failure to pay the correct
March 7, 1997 to June 7, 1998, plus P10,000.00 per month afterward; (3) pay the amount of docket fees was due to a justifiable reason. The right to appeal is a
amount advanced by petitioner, to wit: P71,129.05 and P11,993.72 for the purely statutory right. Not being a natural right or a part of due process, the right
payment of capital gains tax and real estate taxes, respectively; and P70,000.00 to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the rules
for attorney's fees. o consolidation of ownership pursuant to Article 1607 of the provided therefor.41 For this reason, payment of the full amount of the appellate
Civil Code Respondent petitioner had no cause of action inasmuch as court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period is mandatory
respondent Unangst signed the subject deed of sale under duress and intimidation and jurisdictional.42 Nevertheless, as this Court ruled in Aranas v. Endona,43 the
employed by petitioner and his cohorts; that, assuming that her consent was freely strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on payment of
given RTC in favor of petitioner; consolidated the ownership Respondent appellate docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better
filed a suit for annulment of judgment, contending that she only learned about serve the interest of justice. It is always within the power of this Court to suspend
the same when she had received the motion for execution filed by petitioner its own rules, or to except a particular case from their operation, whenever the
Petitioner filed an MD on the ground that respondent paid an insufficient sum of purposes of justice require it.44 In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the
P200.00 as docket fees o It appears that respondent Unangst initially paid P200.00 rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to
as docket fees as this was the amount assessed by the Clerk of Court of the RTC.23 fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored
Said amount was insufficient as the proper filing fees amount to P1,715.00. principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to
Nevertheless, the correct amount was subsequently paid by said respondent on argue their causes and defenses.45 For, it is far better to dispose of a case on the
February 22, 2005 RTC granted petition for relief Petitioner elevated to CA merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality, if it be the case, that
CA The CA declared that the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase executed may result in injustice.46 The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford
by the parties was an equitable mortgage. On the procedural aspect pertaining to every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination
the petition for relief filed by respondent Unangst, the CA ruled that "the trial court, of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.47 As early as 1946, in
in opting to apply the rules liberally, cannot be faulted for giving due course to the Segovia v. Barrios,48 the Court ruled that where an appellant in good faith paid
questioned petition for relief which enabled appellants to interpose the instant less than the correct amount for the docket fee because that was the amount he
appeal. o While the records is bereft of any proof or evidence that appellee was required to pay by the clerk of court, and he promptly paid the balance, it is
employed unlawful or improper pressure against appellant Unangst to give her error to dismiss his appeal because "(e)very citizen has the right to assume and
consent to the contract of sale, there is, nevertheless, sufficient basis to hold the trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and
subject contract as one of equitable mortgage performs them in accordance with law. To penalize such citizen for relying upon
said officer in all good faith is repugnant to justice."49 Technicality and
ISSUE # 1: Whether the petition for relief should have been dismissed for failure procedural imperfections should thus not serve as bases of decisions.50 In that
to pay docket fees way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective
of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
HELD # 1: NO. On the first issue, petitioner contends that respondents' "Petition contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to
for Relief to Be Able to Appeal Judgment," which paved the way for the allowance promote the administration of justice
of respondents' appeal of the RTC decision, was filed within the prescriptive period
but the proper docket fees for it were belatedly paid.40 He thus posits that the RTC ISSUE # 2: Whether the subject agreement was merely an equitable mortgage in
did not acquire jurisdiction over said petition. Having no jurisdiction, the RTC could that respondent should be allowed to question RTC’s judgment for the reason that
not have allowed respondents to appeal. On this issue, respondent counters that it was not a sale with right to repurchase.
the belated payment of proper docket fees was not due to their fault but to the
improper assessment by the Clerk of Court. Respondent asserts the ruling of the HELD # 2: YES. Respondent is correct in alleging that the deed of sale with
CA that the court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if there right to repurchase qualifies as an equitable mortgage under Article 1602. She
is a justifiable reason for the failure to pay the correct amount. Moreover, merely secured the payment of the unpaid car rentals and the amount advanced

146
by petitioner to Jojo Lee. The transaction between the parties is one of equitable that is, reimbursement of what petitioner paid to the mortgagee, Jojo Lee. Fact is,
mortgage and not a sale with right to purchase as maintained by petitioners. Article the purchase price stated in the deed
1602 of the New Civil Code provides that the contract is presumed to be an was the amount of the indebtedness of both respondent and Salak to petitioner.60
equitable mortgage in any of the following cases: o (1) When the price of a sale o Apparently, the deed purports to be a sale with right to purchase. However, since
with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; o (2) When the vendor remains it was executed in consideration of the aforesaid loans and/or indebtedness, said
in possession as lessee or otherwise; o (3) When upon or after the expiration of contract is indubitably an equitable mortgage. The rule is firmly settled that
the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or whenever it is clearly shown that a deed of sale with pacto de retro, regular on its
granting a new period is executed; o (4) When the purchaser retains for himself a face, is given as security for a loan, it must be regarded as an equitable
part of the purchase price; o (5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes mortgage.61 The above-mentioned circumstances preclude the Court from
on the thing sold o (6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the declaring that the parties intended the transfer of the property from one to the
real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a other by way of sale. They are more than sufficient to show that the true intention
debt or the performance of any other obligation. In any of the foregoing cases, of the parties is to secure the payment of said debts. Verily, an equitable mortgage
any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or under paragraphs 2 and 6 of Article 1602 exists here. Settled is the rule that to
otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury create the presumption enunciated by Article 1602, the existence of one
laws.53 (Emphasis ours) The conclusion that the deed of sale with right to circumstance is enough.62 Moreover, under Article 1603 of the Civil Code it is
repurchase is an equitable mortgage is buttressed by the following: o First, before provided that: "(i)n case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to
executing the deed, respondent and Salak were under police custody due to the repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage." In this case, We have
complaint lodged against them by petitioner. They were sorely pressed for money, no doubt that the transaction between the parties is that of a loan secured by said
as they would not be released from custody unless they paid petitioner. It was at property by way of mortgage. In Lorbes v. Court of Appeals,63 the Court held
this point that respondent was constrained to execute a deed of sale with right to that: o The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the
repurchase. Respondent was in no position whatsoever to bargain with their parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by
creditor, petitioner. Nel consensui tam contrarium est quam vis atqui metus. There all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at
can be no consent when under force or duress. Bale wala ang pagsang-ayon kung that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations
ito'y nakuha sa pamimilit o paraang di malaya. o It is established that respondent between them leading to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a
signed the deed only because of the urgent necessity of obtaining funds.1avvphi1 tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding.
When the vendor is in urgent need of money when he executes the sale, the alleged As such, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove
sale with pacto de retro will be construed as an equitable mortgage.54 "Necessitous the intention of the parties. Sales with rights to repurchase, as defined by the
men are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency will Civil Code, are not favored. We will not construe instruments to be sales with a
submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them."55 o Second, right to repurchase, with the stringent and onerous effects which follow, unless the
petitioner allowed respondent and Salak to retain the possession of the property terms of the document and the surrounding circumstances require it. Whenever,
despite the execution of the deed. In fact, respondent and Salak were not bound under the terms of the writing, any other construction can fairly and reasonably be
to deliver the possession of the property to petitioner if they would pay him the made, such construction will be adopted and the contract will be construed as a
amount he demanded.56 o Where in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the mere loan unless the court can see that, if enforced according to its terms, it is not
vendor remains in possession, as a lessee or otherwise, the contract shall be an unconscionable one.64 Article 1602 of the Civil Code is designed primarily to
presumed to be an equitable mortgage.57 The reason for the presumption lies in curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase, such
the fact that in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the legal title to the property as the circumvention of the laws against usury and pactum commissorium.
is immediately transferred to the vendee, subject to the vendor's right to redeem.
Retention, therefore, by the vendor of the possession of the property is inconsistent RULES 6 – 9
with the vendee's acquisition of the right of ownership under a true sale.58 It
discloses, in the alleged vendee, a lack of interest in the property that belies the A. Kinds of Pleadings [RULE 6]
truthfulness of the sale a retro.5 o Third, it is likewise undisputed that the deed
was executed by reason of: (1) the alleged indebtedness of Salak to petitioner, Complaint and Answer
that is, car rental payments; and (2) respondent's own obligation to petitioner,

147
Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims. — A counter-claim may
or causes of action. The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be asserted against an original counter-claimant.
be stated in the complaint. (3a)
A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant. (n)
Section 4. Answer. — An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth
his defenses. (4a) Reply

Defenses: Negative and Affirmative Section 10. Reply. — A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to
deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of
Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or affirmative. defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a
party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in controverted.
the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action.
If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or supplemental complaint.
hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, (11)
would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses
include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds,
estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way B. Parts of a Pleading [RULE 7]
of confession and avoidance. (5a)
Verification and Certification
Counterclaims: Compulsory and Permissive
Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
Section 6. Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)
may have against an opposing party. (6a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is one which, the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with
the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties "information and belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (6a)
the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except
that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party
considered compulsory regardless of the amount. (n) shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
Section 8. Cross-claim. — A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co- therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency and, to the
of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may include a best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there
claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross- is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
(7) claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.

148
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance with pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred
any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of (2a)
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute Default
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)
Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within
the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with
C. Allegations in Pleadings [RULE 8] notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party
in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
Actionable Documents claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be
Section 6. Judgment. — In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign delegated to the clerk of court. (1a, R18)
court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to
aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to (a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to notice of
render it. (6) subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (2a, R18)

Section 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or defense (b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default may at any time after
is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order
or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense.
of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading. (7) In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions
as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. (3a, R18)
Specific Denial
(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a claim states a common
Section 10. Specific denial. — A defendant must specify each material allegation of cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the
fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus
the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. (4a, R18).
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of
it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is (d) Extent of relief to be awarded. — A judgment rendered against a party in default
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award
material averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have unliquidated damages. (5a, R18).
the effect of a denial. (10a)
(e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending party in an action for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
D. Effect of Failure to Plead [RULE 9] shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State
Waiver of Defenses and Objections in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (6a, R18)

149
explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action; that Priscilla, as
PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, Petitioner, vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., Respondents. sole heir, succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita with respect to the
G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012 FIRST DIVISION parcels of land; that Margarita’s undertaking under the contract was not a purely
personal obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was consequently bound
FACTS: Margarita Marquez Alma Jose sold to Javellana for the consideration of to comply with the obligation; that the action had not yet prescribed due to its
P160,000 three parcels of land by deed of conditional sale. (September 8, 1979) being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible brought by Javellana
They agreed to the ff: o Javellana will pay P80,000 upon execution of the deed who had actual possession of the properties; and that based on the complaint,
and P80,000 upon registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System o Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and the cloud on his title had
Margarita will cause the registration of said and within a reasonable period of time come about only when Priscilla had started dumping filling materials on the
o Should Margarita become incapacitated, the obligation would fall into her son, premises Prisilla filed MR CA denied MR o it decided to give due course
Juvenal, and her daughter, Priscilla Juvenal predeceased Margarita Margarita to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay
failed to cause the registration before her death Priscilla allegedly called the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension of time to file his
Javellana asking how the mortgaged land is, to which the latter answered that it appellant’s brief; that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest
was sold, and not mortgaged to him. Javellana then reminded Priscilla of the opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such
obligation to cause the registration. Instead of causing the registration, Priscilla that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was given the
dumped filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons ISSUES:
into a residential or industrial subdivision Javellana field a complaint with RTC Whether there was forum shopping, considering that Javellana filed a Rule 65 with
Bulacan (February 10, 1997) for specific performance, injunction, and damages o CA pending appeal with said court. NO. Whether the RTC Order directing the
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction dismissal of Javellana’s complaint against Priscilla for lack of cause of action,
to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and o that among others, was appealable. YES. Whether there was a COA in the complaint.
Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final YES. Whether Javellana’s action has already prescribed. NO. Whether the
deed of sale in his favor Priscilla filed MD o Prescription o Failure to state appeal was timely filed. YES.
cause of action RTC denied MD Priscilla MR RTC reversed itself;
granted MR o Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not being HELD:
bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a party Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final
thereto; that there was no evidence showing the payment of the balance; that he order and appealable The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order
had never demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final
brought a suit for specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal; and that his order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely
claim of paying the balance was not credible Javellana filed MR o the the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other
presentation of evidence of full payment was not necessary at that stage of the than to execute the order.1 Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of
proceedings; and that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial First of all,
state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint were hypothetically the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done
admitted and only the allegations in the complaint should be considered in by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79M-97. It was
resolving the motion o attached to the motion for reconsideration the receipts clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between
showing the payments made to Margarita o maintained that Priscilla could no final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,22 thuswise: o The
longer succeed to any rights respecting the parcels of land because he had distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
meanwhile acquired absolute ownership of them; and that the only thing that she, disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding
as sole heir, had inherited from Margarita was the obligation to register them under or action, leaving nothing
the Torrens System RTC denied MR o lack of any reason to disturb the order more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined,
of June 24, 1999 Javellana appealed before CA Priscilla the appeal was but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else
not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping PENDING to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the
APPEAL Javellana filed a Rule 65 before CA o CA dismissed petition for trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to
certiorari CA granted Javellana’s appeal; remanded records to RTC o The CA ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does

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the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) Under the rule, Javellana had only the
to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to
otherwise, it is final. And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration
determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of
to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
of Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however,
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v.
declared by these Rules to be appealable;"23 but the remedy from an interlocutory Court of Appeals,25 by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse
one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt: o xxx The notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion
reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit: o The Supreme Court may
of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend,
on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process,
appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of
for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals.
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. o To standardize the appeal
by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
being included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The remedy against an to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. o
under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to. Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make
clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
interlocutory order. Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out order or resolution.26 The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the
of time. She points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July Court has already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to "actions pending
9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of
lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no
order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had vested rights in rules of procedure."27 According to De los Santos v. Vda. de
only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect Mangubat:28 o Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules
an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice.
should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or
of the reglementary period. Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given
o Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. o The "fresh
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. o The period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within
period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws,

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the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present which eventually came up to this Court by way of the instant Petition (re: Non-
case. Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will Suit). The elements of litis pendentia are present between the two suits. As the
amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final CA, through its Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on
order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject matter—the RTC Orders which
of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases,
incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders.1âwphi1 The parties, the
issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same.
later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.29 It is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the
Consequently, we rule that Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant other.
to the fresh period rule. The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and
forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot
303168 and 303169 and Issuance of Owner’s Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu hedge her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event that the
of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:30 o Forum shopping is the act ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others, she cannot post facto validate
of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one this circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been speedy
forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other or adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits in multiple fora, where each
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a "precautionary measure" for the rest,
or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens thereby increasing the chances of a favorable decision. This is the very evil that
when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of the proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right. In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc.
rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis v. Baltao, the Court stated that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule
pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate
judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a
for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different
such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these
the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rules results in the dismissal of the case.32 The same result was reached in Zosa
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res v. Estrella,33 which likewise involved the successive filing of a notice of appeal and
judicata in the other. o For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the a petition for certiorari to challenge the same orders, with the Court upholding the
same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical CA’s dismissals of the appeal and the petition for certiorari through separate
causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where decisions. Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here
different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were even if the orders of the RTC being challenged through appeal and the petition for
raised, and two objectives were sought. Should Javellana’s present appeal now certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists because the appeal and the petition
be held barred by his filing of the petition for certiorari in the CA when his appeal for certiorari actually sought different objectives. In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
in that court was yet pending? We are aware that in Young v. Sy,31 in which 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No.
the petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate the orders concerning the dismissal 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be
of her case due to nonsuit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing tried and determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had
the same orders four months later, the Court ruled that the successive filings of the ostensible objective "to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property
the notice of appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain the same objective of and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved,"
nullifying the trial court’s dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.34 Nor
warranted the dismissal of both cases. The Court said: o Ineluctably, the petitioner, were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping
by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity
forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize considering
elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP

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No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction against Estate Estate (thru
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second Heirs) filed a Rule 65 before CA against Hon. Renato D. Muñez, Presiding
danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 60 of Cadiz City, Spouses Medado, Sheriff IV Balbino
ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not B. Germinal of RTC, Branch 60 of Cadiz City and LBP o They sought, among other
arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for injunction for violation of the rules on litis
of the petition for certiorari. Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two pendentia and forum shopping. On the matter of the absence of a motion for
inconsistent remedial approaches to be the result of the tactical misjudgment by reconsideration of the trial court's order before resorting to a petition for certiorari,
Javellana’s counsel on the efficacy of the appeal to stave off his caretaker’s eviction the heirs explained that the implementation of the questioned writs through LBP's
from the parcels of land and to prevent the development of them into a residential release of the VOS proceeds' balance to the sheriff on March 29, 2007,
or commercial subdivision pending the appeal. In the petition for certiorari, notwithstanding: (a) the pendency of motions for reconsideration and dissolution
Javellana explicitly averred that his appeal was "inadequate and not speedy to of the writs filed by the heirs, and (b) the fact that the writs were immediately
prevent private respondent Alma Jose and her transferee/assignee xxx from implemented even if a hearing on the motions was already scheduled for March
developing and disposing of the subject property to other parties to the total 30, 2007, prompted the heirs' withdrawal of their motions for being already moot
deprivation of petitioner’s rights of possession and ownership over the subject and academic. o The heirs argued that their case was within the exceptions to the
property," and that the dismissal by the RTC had "emboldened private respondents general rule that a petition under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for
to fully develop the property and for respondent Alma Jose to file an ejectment reconsideration is first filed before the lower court. Spouses questioned,
case against petitioner’s overseer xxx."35 Thereby, it became far-fetched that among other matters, the authority of Soledad to sign the petition's certification of
Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the policy against forum non-forum shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners CA granted Estate’s
shopping. petition

ELSA D. MEDADO, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO CONSING, as ISSUES: Whether there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
represented by DR. SOLEDAD CONSING, Respondents. G.R. No. 186720 verification and certificate of non-forum shopping in the petition for certiorari
February 8, 2012 SECOND DIVISION before the CA. YES. Whether an MR to the assailed Order is a condition precedent
before filing said Rule 65 with CA. NO. Whether Spouses committed forum
FACTS: Elsa (and spouse Rey) Medado entered into a contract with Estate of shopping in filing the complaint for injunction during the pendency of the action
Consing where the latter agreed to sell to the former Hacienda Sol, an estate in for rescission against them. YES.
Cadiz City Spouses Medado then undertook to assume Estate’s loan with PNB
Estate, however, subsequently offered to the Gov’t the subject land via the HELD: The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping
Department of Agrarian Reform's Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program Estate in the CA petition were substantially complied with, following settled jurisprudence.
filed with RTC Bacolod Br 44 an action an action for rescission and damages Before us, the petitioner contended that the consolidated verification and
against Spouses , PNB and the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City, due to the alleged certification against forum shopping of the petition filed with the CA was defective:
failure of the spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement. DURING first, for being signed only by Soledad, instead of by all the petitioners, and second,
PENDENCY of the RESCISSION CASE Landbank issued in favor of Estate a its jurat cites a mere community tax certificate of Soledad, instead of a
certificate of deposit of cash and agrarian reform bonds, as compensation for the government-issued identification card required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial
lots covered by the VOS Spouses, fearing that the full proceeds will go to Estate Practice. The second ground was never raised by herein petitioner in her comment
when they had bought the properties through the Deeds of Sale with Assumption on the CA petition, thus, it cannot be validly raised by the petitioner at this stage.
of Mortgage which they and the Estate of Consing had earlier executed, filed with As regards the first ground, records show that Soledad signed the verification
RTC Cadiz Br 60 an action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of TRO praying and certification against forum shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners by virtue
for: o (a) writ of prohibitory injunction to restrain LBP from releasing the remaining of a Special Power of Attorney10 (SPA) attached to the petition filed with the CA.
amount of the VOS proceeds of the lots offered by the Estate of Consing, and The SPA, signed by her co-heirs Ma. Josefa Consing Saguitguit, Ma. Carmela
restraining the Estate of Consing from receiving these proceeds; and o (b) writ of Consing Lopez, Ma. Lourdes Consing Gonzales and Mary Rose Consing Tuason,
mandatory injunction to compel LBP to release the remaining amount of the VOS provides that their attorney-in-fact Soledad is authorized: o To protect, sue,
to the spouses. RTC Cadiz Br 60 granted; issued writ of preliminary prohibitory prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action necessary and proper relative and

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with respect to our right, interest and participation over said properties, particularly provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores
those described in previous titles under TCT No. T-498, TCT No. T-31275, TCT No. its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
T-31276 and TCT No. T-31277 of the [R]egister of Deeds, Cadiz City, covering a or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances,
total area of 73.6814 square meters, and declared in the name of said Antonio the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification
Consing and located in Brgy. Magsaysay, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, the same considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. o In HLC
parcels of land are the subject of judicial litigation before the [R]egional Trial Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision
[Court], Branch 44, Bacolod City, docketed as Civil [C]ase No. 11320, entitled Homeowners Association, it was held that the signature of only one of the
"Soledad T. Consing, for herself and as Administratix of the estate of Antonio petitioners in the certification against forum shopping substantially complied with
Consing, plaintiffs, versus, Spouses Meritus Rey and Elsa Medado, et.al., [the] rules because all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
defendants," and Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Cadiz City and docketed as Civil common cause of action or defense. o The same leniency was applied by the Court
Case No. 797-C, entitled, ["]Spouse[s] Meritus Rey Medado and Elsa Medado, in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the lone petitioner who executed the
plaintiffs, versus, Land Bank of the Philippines and heirs of the Late Antonio certification of non-forum shopping was a relative and co-owner of the other
Consing as represented by Dra. Soledad Consing, defendants"; pending in said petitioners with whom he shares a common interest. x x o Here, all the petitioners
court and which cases may at anytime be elevated to the Court of Appeals and/or are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land sought to be
Supreme Court as the circumstances so warrant;11 As may be gleaned from the reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same arguments in support
foregoing, the authority of Soledad includes the filing of an appeal before the CA, thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak
including the execution of a verification and certification against forum shopping for and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any
therefor, being acts necessary "to protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the
whatever action necessary and proper" in relation to their rights over the subject Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial
properties. In addition, the allegations and contentions embodied in the CA compliance under the Rules.14 (citations omitted) Furthermore, we have
petition do not deviate from the claims already made by the heirs in Civil Case Nos. consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional,
00-11320 and 797-C, both specifically mentioned in the SPA. We emphasize that requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a
the verification requirement is simply intended to secure an assurance that the pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of
allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and not the product of the unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
faith.12 We rule that there was no deficiency in the petition's verification and swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
certification against forum shopping filed with the CA. In any case, we reiterate verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith
that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest or are true and correct.15 It was based on this principle that this Court had also
in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners allowed herein petitioner, via our Resolution16 dated April 22, 2009, a chance to
executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court submit a verification that complied with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as
from proceeding with the action. In Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Mingoa, amended, instead of us dismissing the petition outright. There are recognized
Sr.,13 we held: exceptions permitting resort to a special civil action of certiorari even without first
o Even if only petitioner Domingo Hernandez, Jr. executed the filing a motion for reconsideration. On the second issue, the CA did not err in
Verification/Certification against forum-shopping, this will not deter us from accepting the petition for certiorari even if the motion for reconsideration of the
proceeding with the judicial determination of the issues in this petition. As we RTC Order of March 9, 2007 was withdrawn by herein respondents before the RTC
ratiocinated in Heirs of Olarte v. Office of the President: The general rule is that could act thereon. It is settled that the requirement on the filing of a motion for
the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case reconsideration prior to the institution of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also the Rules of Court admits of several exceptions, such as when the filing of a motion
stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate appears to be useless given the circumstances attending the action. Thus, we have
the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such repeatedly held: o The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to
rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by re-
the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. There are, however,

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recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari Consing, as represented by Dra. Soledad Consing." The primary litigants in the two
without first filing a motion for reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v. action, and their interests, are the same. The two other elements are likewise
Sandiganbayan, it was written: "The rule is, however, circumscribed by well- satisfied. There is an identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in the two
defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court cases, with the reliefs being founded on the same set of facts. In both cases, the
a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding parties claim their supposed right as owners of the subject properties. They all
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as anchor their claim of ownership on the deeds of absolute sale which they had
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity executed, and the law applicable thereto. They assert their respective rights, with
for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the Spouses Medado as buyers and the heirs as sellers, based on the same set of facts
interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action that involve the deeds of sale's contents and their validity. Both actions necessarily
is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would involve a ruling on the validity of the same contract as against the same parties.
be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme Thus, the identity of the two cases is such as would render the decision in the
urgency of relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent rescission case res judicata in the injunction case, and vice versa. It does not
and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings even matter that one action is for the enforcement of the parties' agreements,
in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were while the other action is for the rescission thereof. In the similar case of Victronics
ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the Computers, Inc. v. RTC, Branch 63, Makati,19 we discussed: o Civil Case No. 91-
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved."17 (emphasis 2069 actually involves an action for specific performance; it thus upholds the
supplied, and citations and underscoring omitted) As correctly held by the CA, a contract and assumes its validity. Civil Case No. 91-2192, on the other hand, is for
motion for reconsideration, or the resolution of the trial court thereon, had become the nullification of the contract on the grounds of fraud and vitiated consent. While
useless given that the particular acts which the movants sought to prevent by the ostensibly the cause of action in one is opposite to that in the other, in the final
filing of the motion were already carried out. Significantly, the heirs of the late analysis, what is being determined is the validity of the contract. x x x Thus, the
Consing had filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's order, but withdrew it identity of rights asserted cannot be disputed. Howsoever viewed, it is beyond cavil
only after the trial court had decided to implement the writs notwithstanding the that regardless of the decision that would be promulgated in Civil Case No. 91-
pendency of the motion and just a day before the scheduled hearing on said 2069, the same would constitute res judicata on Civil Case No. 91-2192 and vice
motion. Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia concur. versa.20 (emphasis supplied) This was further explained in Casil v. CA,21 where
On the third issue, there is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendentia we ruled: o The Court of Appeals held that there can be no res adjudicata because
are present, i.e., between actions pending before courts, there exist: (1) identity there is no identity of causes of action between the two cases. We do not agree.
of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, In the two cases, both petitioner and private respondent brought to fore the validity
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the of the agreement dated May 4, 1994. Private respondent raised this point as an
same facts, and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any affirmative defense in her answer in the First Case. She brought it up again in her
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, complaint in the Second Case. A single issue cannot be litigated in more than one
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also forum. As held in Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals: The similarity between the two
constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.18 Applying causes of action is only too glaring. The test of identity of causes of action lies not
the foregoing, there was clearly a violation of the rule against forum shopping when in the form of an action but on whether the same evidence would support and
Spouses Medado instituted Civil Case No. 797-C for injunction notwithstanding the establish the former and the present causes of action. The difference of actions in
pendency of Civil Case No. 00-11320 for rescission of contract and damages. All the aforesaid cases is of no moment. In Civil Case No. 58713, the action is to enjoin
elements of litis pendentia are present with the filing of the two cases.1âwphi1 PNB from foreclosing petitioner's properties, while in Civil Case No. 60012, the
There is no dispute that there is identity of parties representing the same interests action is one to annul the auction sale over the foreclosed properties of petitioner
in the two actions, both involving the estate and heirs of the late Consing on one based on the same grounds. Notwithstanding a difference in the forms of the two
hand, and Spouses Medado on the other. The rescission case names "Soledad T. actions, the doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were
Consing, for herself and as administratrix of the estate of Antonio Consing" as litigating for the same thing, i.e. lands covered by TCT No. 27307, and more
plaintiff, with "Spouses Meritus Rey and Elsa Medado, [PNB] and the Register of importantly, the same contentions and evidence
Deeds of Cadiz City" as respondents. The injunction case, on the other hand, was as advanced by herein petitioner in this case were in fact used to support the
instituted by Spouses Medado, against "(LBP) and the Heirs of the Late Antonio former cause of action."22 The CA was then correct in ordering the dismissal of

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the complaint in Civil Case No. 797-C for violation of the rule against forum already reached the compulsory age of retirement on July 28, 2005 and was no
shopping. The issue on the validity of the subject deeds of absolute sale can best longer entitled to reinstatement, the CA affirmed with modification CSC resolution
be addressed in the action for rescission, as against the case for injunction filed by 041214 dated November 9, 2004 and resolution No. 050833 dated June 23, 2005
Spouses Medado. In a line of cases, we have set the relevant factors that courts
must consider when they have to determine which case should be dismissed, given ISSUES: Whether the Commission Secretary sufficiently established his
the pendency of two actions, to wit: o (1) the date of filing, with preference authority to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum
generally given to the first action filed to be retained; o (2) whether the action shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman. NO. Whether the one-day delay
sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the latter action or to anticipate of Paler in filing his appeal warranted the denial thereof. NO.
its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and o (3) whether the action is the
appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties.23 We HELD: The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a
emphasize that the rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman.18cЃa
eventualities as conflicting final decisions.24 This Court has consistently held that There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its
the costly consequence of forum shopping should remind the parties to ever be representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts
mindful against abusing court processes.25 In addition, the principle of res judicata alleged in the petition could sign the verification.19cЃa With regard, however, to
requires that stability be accorded to judgments. Controversies once decided on the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be
the merits shall remain in repose for there should be an end to litigation which, executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.20cЃa
without the doctrine, would be endless.26 Given the foregoing grounds already In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the
warranting the denial of this petition, we deem it no longer necessary to take any Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition
action or to now rule on the issue of the non-joinder of the petitioner's husband in in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not
the petition. even bother to controvert Palers allegation of his lack of authority. This renders
the petition dismissible.21cЃa Furthermore, the petition is bereft of merit as it
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, represented herein by its Secretary HON. merely restates the arguments presented before the CSC and CA. It does not
ARTURO L. TIU, Petitioner, vs. CELSO M. PALER, Respondent. G.R. No. 172623 advance any cogent reason that will convince this Court to deviate from the rulings
March 3, 2010 EN BANC of both tribunals. Section 72 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999,22cЃa
provides for the period of appeal for non-disciplinary actions, to wit: o Section 72.
FACTS: Paler, a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II (SG-24) with the When and Where to File. - A decision or ruling of a department or agency may be
Technical Support Service of the Commission on Appointments, applied for a VL for appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the party adversely
74 working days from August 1, 2003 to November 14, 2003 Ramon C. affected to the Civil Service Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper
Nghuatco, Director III of Technical Support Service, submitted a letter to within the same period. Paler's son received the letter from the Commission
Commission Secretary, stating, among others, that: o Paler’s VL for 09 June 2003 Chairman denying Palers motion for reconsideration on March 18, 2004. Thus,
- 30 July 2003 has been pre-approved and o The Application for Leave may be Palers had until April 2, 2004 within which to file his appeal with the CSC. It was
acted upon depending on the completion of his work load and submission of the filed, however, only on April 5, 2004.23cЃa Nevertheless, the CSC entertained the
medical certificate Since his leave for June 9-July 30 has been pre-approved, he appeal in the interest of substantial justice.24cЃa We agree with the CSC. We
went to US without verifying whether the application for leave was approved uphold its decision to relax the procedural rules because Paler's appeal was
September 16, 2003: date of letter from Commission Secretary informing Paler meritorious. This is not the first time that the Court has upheld such exercise of
that he has been dropped from the roll of employees due to his continuous 30day discretion. In Rosales, Jr. v. Mijares25cЃainvolving Section 49(a) of the CSC
absence without leave September 23, 2003: date of receipt of his son of said Revised Rules of Procedure, the Court ruled: o On the contention of the petitioner
letter Paler filed an MR with Commission Secretary February 20, 2004: that the appeal of the respondent to the CSC was made beyond the period therefor
denial of MR, on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15day reglementary period under Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the CSC correctly ruled
March 18, 2004: date of receipt of his son of said denial Paler appealed that: Movant claims that Mijares appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary
before CSC CSC granted Paler’s petition; reversed Commission Secretary period for filing appeals. He, thus, contends that the Commission should not have
Commission filed MR o CSC denied MR Commission filed a petition for given due course to said appeal.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary o The Commission need
review via Rule 43 with CA CA affirmed CSC o Since Paler had in the meantime not delve much on the dates when Mijares was separated from the service and

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when he assailed his separation. Suffice it to state that the Commission found his approved applications for leave as basis for his separation from work, even in the
appeal meritorious. This being the case, procedural rules need not be strictly absence of opportunity for him to controvert the matter, would constitute a
observed. This principle was explained by in the case of Mauna vs. CSC, 232 SCRA violation of the fundamental requirements of fairness and equity and the
388, where the Supreme Court ruled, to wit: "Assuming for the sake of argument constitutional guarantee of due process."31cЃa The Court finds no reason to
that the petitioners appeal was filed out of time, it is within the power of this Court deviate from the findings of both the CSC and CA, given that they concur with each
to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the other and should be accorded great weight and respect.
Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be The CSC and CA were also correct in ruling that Paler could not be considered
so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration absent without leave (AWOL) for the period of August 1, 2003 to November 14,
of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is 2003. Paler was dropped from the roll of employees pursuant to Section 63, Rule
because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave: o An official or an employee who is
rights of the parties. As held by the Court in a number of cases: o It bears stressing continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) calendar days
that the case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of a public officer shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated
sacrosanctly protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He shall, however,
the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a strained and be informed, at his address appearing on his 201 files of his separation from the
inordinate application of Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of service, not later than five (5) days from its effectivity. (Emphasis and underscoring
Procedure.26cЃa (Emphasis supplied) Constantino-David v. Pangandaman- supplied) o AWOL means that the employee has left or abandoned his post for a
Gania27cЃa likewise sustained the CSC when it modified an otherwise final and continuous period of thirty (30) calendar days or more without any justifiable
executory resolution and awarded backwages to the respondent, in the interest of reason and notice to his employer.33cЃa The bone of contention in this case is
justice and fair play. The Court stated o No doubt, the Civil Service Commission whether or not Paler had an approved leave. Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus
was in the legitimate exercise of its mandate under Sec. 3, Rule I, of the Revised Rules on Leave requires that an application for leave should be acted upon within
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service that "[a]dministrative 5 working days from receipt, otherwise, such application is deemed
investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the approved.34cЃa The CSC interpreted said provision in this wise It is explicit from
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings." This the aforequoted rule that an application for leave of absence which had not been
authority is consistent with its powers and functions to "[p]rescribe, amend and acted upon either by approving or disapproving by the head of agency or his/her
enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil authorized representative within five (5) working days from the date of its filing
Service Law and other pertinent laws" being the central personnel agency of the shall be deemed approved.35cЃa (Italics supplied) The CSC also ruled that
Government.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary o Furthermore, there are special "Section 49 calls for a specific action to be done by the head of the agency or his
circumstances in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play that warrant duly authorized representative on the application for leave filed which is either to
such liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a compassionate like-minded approve or to deny the same."36cЃa Being the central agency mandated to
discernment by this Court. x x x28cЃa o When substantial justice dictates it, "prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just disposition of a case. provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws," the CSC has the
The purpose behind limiting the period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable delay in power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them, with its
the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one-day delay, interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves.37cЃa The Court
as in this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by
indication of intent to delay justice on the part of Paler29cЃa and the pleading is administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of
meritorious on its face. Petitioner harps on Paler's alleged bad faith and power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the
misrepresentation in filing his previous applications for leave. However, as correctly letter and spirit of the law.38cЃa The CA added its own reading of Section 49
found by the CSC and CA, the basis for Paler's dismissal was his continuous absence which the Court now sustains: o x x x The action contemplated therein connotes a
without leave, not bad faith and misrepresentation. The CSC even noted that Paler clear and explicit exercise of discretion. It pertains to an absolute and unequivocal
never misrepresented or misled petitioner as to where he was spending his "approval" or "disapproval" of the request for leave and not one which is merely
vacation leave. He clearly stated in his application for leave dated April 17, 2003 "recommendatory" in nature. If the rule were otherwise, the authority to act on
that he was spending it not only in the Philippines but also in the U.S.30cЃa the application for leave would not have been vested on the head of the agency or
According to the CA, "to utilize Paler's alleged misrepresentation in his previously the CA [Commission on Appointments] Chairman's authorized representative.

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Needless to state, the purpose of the provision is for the applicant to be made on the basis of the draft survey conducted by the Overseas Merchandise
immediately informed of the status of his application, whether it has been approved Inspection Co., Ltd. or OMIC o Ernesto Caybyab, secretary of Nil Alejandre,
or denied, so that he can act accordingly. x x x Clearly, Atty. Nghuatco's manager of Benguet he was present when the cargo was loaded on the ship, as
memorandum did not cover the action contemplated by Section 49. For one, it did evidenced by the Certificate of Loading (Exh. E), Certificate of Weight (Exh. F), and
not bear the imprimatur of the Commission Chairman (or his duly authorized the Mate’s Receipt (Exh. G); did not know, however, how many trucks were used
representative) who was the proper party to grant or deny the application, as to load the entire cargo of the copper concentrates nor did he know exactly how
dictated by Section 52 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave.40cЃa For another, it only many hours were spent loading the copper concentrates to the ship. He could only
submitted to the Commission Secretary Atty. Nghuatco's comments and/or remember that he reported for work in the morning and that he worked overtime
recommendations on Paler's application. It was merely preliminary and did not because he had to wait until the loading of the cargo was finished before he could
propose any definitive action (i.e.,approval or disapproval) on Paler's application, leave. During the loading, he moved from place to place, and his attention was
and simply recommended what action to take. It was obviously not controlling and sometimes distracted. Thus, he could not tell with certainty that no spillage took
the Chairman could have agreed or disagreed with the recommended action. In place during the loading Switzerland presented 3 witnesses: o Eduardo Pantoja,
fact, the memorandum clearly provided that Paler's request was still to be referred assistant branch manager of respondent Switzerland Insurance in the Philippines
to the Legal Service for comment,41cЃa and that the application "(could) be acted he prepared the data and conditions of the marine insurance policy of petitioner
upon depending on the completion of his work load and submission of the medical Benguet using information furnished by the latter; figure of 2,243.496 wet metric
certificate."42cЃa These circumstances plainly meant that further action was yet to tons contained in the policy of Benguet was taken from the latter’s declaration;
be made on the application. And since there was no final approval or disapproval Switzerland Insurance relied on the value of the cargo declared by the insured on
of Paler's application within 5 working days from receipt as required by Section 49, the basis of the principle of uberrimae fidei, i.e., the insured must act in the utmost
the application was deemed approved. Paler, therefore, could not be considered on good faith.[13] One of the conditions set forth in the marine policy (Exh. 8) was
AWOL. All told, the CA committed no error in affirming, with modification, CSC that the “[w]arranted vessel is equipped with steel centerline bulk head; the
Resolution Nos. 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004 and 050833 dated June 23, company had its own system of determining various rates of insurance; he did not
2005. make any investigation in this case but used only his previous experience and
project knowledge in dealing with similar cases. He admitted that Switzerland
BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SWITZERLAND Insurance checked whether the ship had a steel centerline bulkhead only after a
GENERAL INSURANCE, CO., LTD., and SEAWOOD SHIPPING, INC., respondents. claim had been made by petitioner Benguet. He explained, however, that it was
G.R. No. 117434. February 9, 2001 SECOND DIVISION impossible for them to make the investigation before the execution of the marine
policy because they had only one day to check whether the ship had a steel
FACTS: Benguet filed a complaint for damages against Seawood with RTC Makati centerline bulkhead and the ship at that time was not in Manila but in Poro Point.
Br 149 Benguet then filed a complaint for damages against Switzerland with RTC o Anastacio Fabian, the marine manager of Certified Adjusters, Inc he went to
Makati Br 148 Upon consolidation of the 2 cases, Switzerland filed a 3rd party Poro Point where the shipment was loaded for transport to Japan. It took him
complaint against Seawood Benguet presented 2 employees as witnesses: o almost two months to finish his investigation and to come up with a written report
Rogelio Lumibao, marketing assistant of Benguet Benguet chartered Seawood (Exh. 12); identified petitioner Benguet’s export declaration (Exh. 11) which
Shipping; bill of lading (Exh. A) stated that the cargo, consisting of 2,243.496 wet provides therein that the cargo loaded on the ship weighed 2,050 wet metric tons
metric tons of copper concentrates, was loaded on board Sangkulirang No. 3 at or 1,845 dry metric tons; during his investigation he asked how and when the
Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union and the same was insured by Switzerland shipment was loaded in the vessel and where it was loaded. He also checked
Insurance (marine insurance policy was marked Exh. C); he received information records of the loading of the cargo. Although he admitted that the records show
that the cargo was 355 metric tons short of the amount stated in the bill of lading that a shortage of the copper concentrates had occurred when these reached
when it got to Japan; admitted that he did not actually see the actual loading of Japan, he attributed it to the rains which occurred during the loading of the copper
the cargo at Poro Point and that his knowledge was limited to what was contained concentrates which increased their weight, although he conceded that it was not
in the bill of lading which he received about two days after the loading nor was he possible that the rains would cause a shortage of around 300 metric tons. He did
in Japan for the unloading; Thus, he could not determine the truth or falsity of the not know what could have caused the shortage o Edgardo Diño, president and
contents of the draft survey. He only knew that there was in fact a shortage based general manager of Certified Adjusters, Inc his company conducted an
on his reading of the draft report; he did not prepare the bill of lading, which was investigation and found that the vessel Sangkulirang No. 3 was not equipped with

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a steel centerline bulkhead. The main function of the steel centerline bulkhead total of 2,451.630 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro
was to prevent shifting of the copper concentrates during transport; expressed Point.[35] As the report stated: It is to be pointed out that there were no actual
doubt that the loss of moisture of the copper concentrates caused the shortage weighing made at Benguet Exploration, Inc.’s site. The procedure done was that
because these were actually mixed with some water to keep them from heating up after weighing the trucks before and after unloading at Philex Poro Point
or to prevent spontaneous combustion. According to Diño, it was possible that Installation, the weight of the load was determined and entered on “Philex” Trip
some shifting of the cargo occurred as indicated by the photographs of the ship Ticket which was later on copied and entered by the truck driver on Benguet
RTC dismissed Benguet’s complaint and Switzerland’s counterclaim against Exploration, Inc.’s Transfer Slip.[36] Considering the discrepancies in the
Seawood CA affirmed RTC Benguet filed an MR CA denied Benguet’s various documents showing the actual amount of copper concentrates transported
MR Benguet Rule 45 with SC to Poro Point and loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount of
copper concentrates shipped. Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the
ISSUES: Whether the matters raised on the present Rule 45 are only questions transactions might have risen from the genuineness and due execution of the Bill
of law. NO. Whether trial court and CA misappreciated the evidence presented. of Lading, Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and Mate’s Receipt was
NO. Whether the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by respondent Switzerland
Benguet were sufficiently established. NO. Insurance which showed disparities in the actual weight of the cargo transported
to Poro Point and loaded on the vessel. This fact is compounded by the admissions
HELD: made by Lumibao and Cayabyab that they had no personal knowledge of the actual
Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents amount of copper concentrates loaded on the vessel. Correctly did the Court of
presented, i.e., Bill of Lading, Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, Mate’s Appeals rule: o In the face of these admissions, appellant’s claim of loss or shortage
Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of its witness, Ernesto is placed in serious doubt, there being no other way of verifying the accuracy of
Cayabyab, and that as a result, there is a prima facie presumption that their the figures indicated in appellant’s documentary evidence that could confirm the
contents are true. This contention has no merit. The admission of the due alleged loss of 355.736 MT. Notwithstanding the figure stated in Bill of Lading No.
execution and genuineness of a document simply means that “the party whose PP/0-1 (Exhibit A) that 2,243.496 WMT of copper concentrates was loaded by
signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him appellant at the port of origin, it should be stressed that this is merely prima facie
with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly evidence of the receipt by the carrier of said cargo as described in the bill of lading.
as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was Thus, it has been held that recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods shipped
delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.”[29] In and as between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the
another case, we held that “When the law makes use of the phrase ‘genuineness recital (Saludo vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 498, 509 [1992]). Resultingly, the
and due execution of the instrument’ it means nothing more than that the admissions elicited from appellant’s witnesses that they could not confirm the
instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the accuracy of the figures indicated in their documentary evidence with regard to the
one executed.”[30] It is equally true, however, that execution can only refer to the actual weight of the cargo loaded at the port of origin and that unloaded at the
actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other matters without enlarging port of destination, in effect rebuts the presumption in favor of the figure indicated
its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to in the bill of lading.
make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant
from introducing any defense on the merits which does not contradict the execution
of the instrument introduced in evidence.[31] In this case, respondents ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT
presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of these documents. OF APPEALS and MONARK EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No.
Respondent Switzerland Insurance presented Export Declaration No. 1131/85 160242 May 17, 2005 SECOND DIVISION
(Exh. 11)[32] which petitioner’s own witness, Rogelio Lumibao, prepared,[33] in
which it was stated that the copper concentrates to be transported to Japan had a FACTS: Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) leased
gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric tons, 10 percent Caterpillar generator sets and Amida mobile floodlighting systems from Monark
more or less.[34] On the other hand, Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which Switzerland Equipment Corporation (MEC) but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals
Insurance had referred petitioner’s claim, prepared a report which showed that a therefor in the total amount of P4,313,935.00 ACDC likewise leased equipment

159
from MEC for the former’s power plant in Mauban, Quezon, and that there was still allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
a balance of P456,666.67 ACDC also purchased and took custody of various direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or
equipment parts from MEC for the agreed price of P237,336.20 which, despite annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
demands, ACDC failed to pay MEC filed a complaint for sum of money against complaint shall always be proved. The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules
ACDC before RTC QC ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third- of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third-
party complaint against Becthel Overseas Corporation (Becthel) o Admitted its party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing
indebtedness BUT it was Becthel which used the equipment and which has not paid multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned would then be
ACDC MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a third-party complaint against adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and does not create a
Becthel on the ground that the defendant had already admitted its principal substantial right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights
obligation to MEC in the amount of P5,071,335.86; the transaction between it and of any litigant.15 This right to file a thirdparty complaint against a third-party rests
ACDC, on the one hand, and between ACDC and Becthel, on the other, were in the discretion of the trial court. The third-party complaint is actually independent
independent transactions. Furthermore, the allowance of the third-party complaint of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint, such that were it not for the
would result in undue delays in the disposition of the case MEC filed a motion rule, it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint.16 A
for summary judgment, alleging therein that there was no genuine issue as to the prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-
obligation of ACDC to MEC in the total amount of P5,071,335.86, the only issue for party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation,
the trial court’s resolution being the amount of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation contribution or other substantive right.17 The bringing of a third-party defendant
ACDC opposed; alleged that there was a genuine issue with respect to the is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or
amount of P5,071,335.86 being claimed by MEC, and that it had a third-party part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the third-party
complaint against Becthel in connection with the reliefs sought against it which had defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction.18 The defendant may
to be litigated RTC denied ACDC’s motion for leave to file a third-party implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the
complaint; granted MEC’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings; ruled in favor latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief;
of MEC; held ACDC liable CA dismissed ACDC’s appeal o The appellate court (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or
ruled that since MEC had prayed for judgment on the pleadings, it thereby waived (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the
its claim for damages other than the amount of P5,071,335.86; hence, there was defendant.19 There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff
no longer a genuine issue to be resolved by the court which necessitated trial. The in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the
appellate court sustained the disallowance of the third-party complaint of ACDC defendant against the third-party defendant. In Capayas v. Court of First
against Becthel on the ground that the transaction between the said parties did not Instance,20 the Court made out the following tests: (1) whether it arises out of
arise out of the same transaction on which MEC’s claim was based ACDC filed the same transaction on which the plaintiff’s claim is based; or whether the
an MR but the same was denied by CA thirdparty claim, although arising out of another or different contract or
transaction, is connected with the plaintiff’s claim; (2) whether the third-party
ISSUES: Whether a judgment on the pleadings is warranted. YES. Whether defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the
the 3rd party complaint filed by ACDC against Betchel should have been granted. plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant’s
NO. Whether MEC’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings barred its claim for liability arises out of another transaction; and (3) whether the third-party
damages against ACDC. YES defendant may assert any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has or may have
to the plaintiff’s claim. The third-party complaint does not have to show with
HELD: Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides: o Sec. 11. Third (fourth, certainty that there will be recovery against the third-party defendant, and it is
etc.)-party complaint. – A third (fourth, etc.) – party complaint is a claim that a sufficient that pleadings show possibility of recovery.21 In determining the
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint
action, called the third (fourth, etc.) – party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, and the third-party complaint
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. Furthermore, must be examined.22 A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court may render show that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other
judgment on the pleadings, as follows: o Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – relief from the third-party defendant.23 It bears stressing that common liability
Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or, otherwise, admits the material is the very essence for contribution. Contribution is a payment made by each, or

160
by any of several having a common liability of his share in the damage suffered or therein, thus: o … In the words of private respondent, he "[s]eeks to transfer
in the money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf of the other or liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-
others.24 The rule on common liability is fundamental in the action for party defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from
contribution.25 The test to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third- performing his obligations." Thus, if at the outset the issue appeared to be a simple
party complaint is, whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the maker’s liability on a promissory note, it became complex by the rendition of the
plaintiff’s claim is based, or the third-party plaintiff’s claim, although arising out of aforestated decision.28 In British Airways, the Court allowed the third-party
another or different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiff’s complaint of British Airways against its agent, the Philippine Airlines, on the
claim.26 In this case, the claims of the respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC, plaintiff’s complaint regarding his luggage, considering that a contract of carriage
against the petitioner as defendant therein, arose out of the contracts of lease and was involved. The Court ruled, thus: o Undeniably, for the loss of his luggage,
sale; such transactions are different and separate from those between Becthel and Mahtani is entitled to damages from BA, in view of their contract of carriage. Yet,
th e petitioner as third - party plaintiff for the construction of the latter’s project in BA adamantly disclaimed its liability and instead imputed it to PAL which the latter
Mauban, Quezon, where the equipment leased from the respondent was used by naturally denies. In other words, BA and PAL are blaming each other for the
the petitioner. The controversy between the respondent and the petitioner, on one incident. o In resolving this issue, it is worth observing that the contract of air
hand, and tha t between the petitioner and Becthel, on the other, are thus entirely transportation was exclusively between Mahtani and BA, the latter merely
distinct from each other. There is no showing in the proposed third - party endorsing the Manila to Hongkong leg of the former’s journey to PAL, as its
complaint that the respondent knew or approved the use of the leased equipment subcontractor or agent. In fact, the fourth paragraph of the "Conditions of
by the petitioner for the said pr oject in Quezon. Becthel cannot invoke any defense Contracts" of the ticket issued by BA to Mahtani confirms that the contract was one
the petitioner had or may have against the claims of the respondent in its of continuous air transportation from Manila to Bombay. o "4. xxx carriage to be
complaint, because the petitioner admitted its liabilities to the respondent for the performed hereunder by several successive carriers is regarded as a single
amount of P5,075,335.86. The barefaced fact that the petitioner used the operation." o Prescinding from the above discussion, it is undisputed that PAL, in
equipment it leased from the respondent in connection with its project with Becthel transporting Mahtani from Manila to Hongkong acted as the agent of BA. o
does not provide a substantive basis for the filing of a third-party complaint against Parenthetically, the Court of Appeals should have been cognizant of the well-settled
the latter. There is no causal connection between the claim of the respondent for rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its
the rental and the balance of the purchase price of the equipment and parts sold function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its
and leased to the petitioner, and the failure of Becthel to pay the balance of its negligent act. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred when it opined that BA, being the
account to the petitioner after the completion of the project in Quezon.27 We principal, had no cause of action against PAL, its agent or sub-contractor. o Also,
note that in its third-party complaint, the petitioner alleged that Becthel should be it is worth mentioning that both BA and PAL are members of the International Air
ordered to pay the balance of its account of P456,666.67, so that the petitioner Transport Association (IATA), wherein member airlines are regarded as agents of
could pay the same to the respondent. However, contrary to its earlier plea for the each other in the issuance of the tickets and other matters pertaining to their
admission of its third-party complaint against Becthel, the petitioner also sought relationship. Therefore, in the instant case, the contractual relationship between
the dismissal of the respondent’s complaint. The amount of P456,666.67 it sought BA and PAL is one of agency, the former being the principal, since it was the one
to collect from Becthel would not be remitted to the respondent after all. The which issued the confirmed ticket, and the latter the agent.29 It goes without
rulings of this Court in Allied Banking Corporation and British Airways are not saying that the denial of the petitioner’s motion with leave to file a third-party
applicable in this case since the factual backdrops in the said cases are different. complaint against Becthel is without prejudice to its right to file a separate
In Allied Banking Corporation, Joselito Yujuico obtained a loan from General complaint against the latter. Considering that the petitioner admitted its liability
Bank and Trust Company. The Central Bank of the Philippines ordered the for the principal claim of the respondent in its Answer with Third-Party Complaint,
liquidation of the Bank. In a Memorandum Agreement between the liquidation of the trial court did not err in rendering judgment on the pleadings against it.
the Bank and Allied Banking Corporation, the latter acquired the receivables from
Yujuico. Allied Banking Corporation then sued Yujuico for the collection of his loan,
and the latter filed a third-party complaint against the Central Bank, alleging that BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. (formerly Equitable PCI Bank), Petitioner, vs. JOHN
by reason of its tortious interference with the affairs of the General Bank and Trust TANSIPEK, Respondent. G.R. No. 181235 July 22, 2009 THIRD DIVISION
Company, he was prevented from performing his obligation under the loan. This
Court allowed the third-party complaint based on the claim of the defendant

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FACTS: J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI) entered into a contract with Duty Free
Philippines, Inc. for the construction of a Duty Free Shop in Mandaue City. During HELD: To recapitulate, upon being declared in default, respondent Tansipek filed
the construction, payments therefor were received by JOCI directly or through a Motion for Reconsideration of the Default Order. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek
herein respondent John Tansipek, its authorized collector. However, payment filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for
through PNB Check No. 0000302572 in the amount of P4,050,136.51 was not failure to attach the assailed Orders. Respondent Tansipek’s Motion for
turned over to JOCI, the same having been deposited by Tansipek in his personal Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals was denied for having been filed out of
bank account in Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB). PCIB time. Respondent Tansipek did not appeal said denial to this Court. Respondent
allegedly allowed such deposit, despite the fact that the check was crossed for the Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very
deposit to payee’s account only, and despite the alleged lack of authority of beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have
respondent Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay the amount filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration,
despite demands from JOCI JOCI filed a complaint against PCIB before RTC pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court: o (b) Relief from order of
Makati PCIB filed MD o (1) an indispensable party was not impleaded, and (2) default.—A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and
therein plaintiff JOCI had no cause of action against PCIB RTC denied MD before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon
PCIB filed its Answer: o (1) JOCI had clothed Tansipek with authority to act as proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
its agent, and was therefore estopped from denying the same; (2) JOCI had no excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the
cause of action against PCIB ; (3) failure to implead Tansipek rendered the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may
proceedings taken after the filing of the complaint void; (4) PCIB’s act of accepting impose in the interest of justice. A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different
the deposit was fully justified by established bank practices; (5) JOCI’s claim was from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must show
barred by laches; and (6) the damages alleged by JOCI were hypothetical and fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses.7 The
speculative. PCIB incorporated in said Answer its counterclaims for exemplary allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of
damages in the amount of P400,000.00, and litigation expenses and attorney’s meritorious defenses must concur.8 Assuming for the sake of argument,
fees in the amount of P400,000.00. PCIB filed Motion for Leave of Court to however, that respondent Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration may be treated
admit the former’s third-party complaint against respondent Tansipek PCIB filed as a Motion to Lift Order of Default, his Petition for Certiorari on the denial thereof
a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. The amendment consisted in has already been dismissed with finality by the Court of Appeals. Respondent
the correction of the caption, so that PCIB appeared as Third-Party Plaintiff and Tansipek did not appeal said ruling of the Court of Appeals to this Court. The
Tansipek as Third-Party Defendant. Tansipek was then given by RTC time to dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial of respondent Tansipek’s
Answer the Motion but he defaulted. His Motion to Reconsider the Default Order Motion constitutes a bar to the retrial of the same issue of default under the
was denied. Tansipek filed a Rule 65 before CA Meanwhile, RTC doctrine of the law of the case. In People v. Pinuila,9 we held that: o "Law of
promulgated its decision o In favor of JOCI, directed PCIB to pay o On the third the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
party complaint, third-party defendant John Tansipek is ordered to pay the third- specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
party plaintiff Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank all amounts said controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
defendant/third-party plaintiff shall have to pay to the plaintiff on account of this continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not,
case. Tansipek appealed said decision to CA CA remanded the case to so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts
RTC o it was an error for the trial court to have acted on PCIB’s motion to declare of the case before the court. It may be stated as a rule of general application
respondent Tansipek in default Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc., as successor-in-interest that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is substantially the
to PCIB, filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the above same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent
appeals and will not be considered or readjudicated therein. As a general rule a
ISSUES: Whether Tansipek correctly resorted to an MR when the RTC declared decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether
him in default. NO. Whether the issue on Tansipek’s default may still be tried by that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved
CA after the latter has dismissed the petition for certiorari filed him assailing RTC’s being to seek a rehearing. Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a
decision denying his MR. NO. Whether Tansipek may still appeal the RTC former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal,
decision, notwithstanding his being declared in default. YES although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the

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presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have the Case applies only when the appellate court renders a decision on the merits
received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the would be putting a premium on the fault or negligence of the party losing the
opinion. (Emphasis supplied.) The issue of the propriety of the Order of Default previous appeal. In the case at bar, respondent Tansipek would be awarded (1) for
had already been adjudicated in Tansipek’s Petition for Certiorari with the Court of his failure to attach the necessary requirements to his Petition for Certiorari with
Appeals. As such, this issue cannot be readjudicated in Tansipek’s appeal of the the Court of Appeals; (2) for his failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in time;
Decision of the RTC on the main case. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes and (3) for his failure to appeal the Decision of the Court of Appeals with this Court.
the law of the case, whether or not said decision is erroneous.10 Having been The absurdity of such a situation is clearly apparent. It is important to note that
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the a party declared in default – respondent Tansipek in this case – is not barred from
judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had previously
it may contain.11 Respondent Tansipek counters that the doctrine of the law of filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of the
the case is not applicable, inasmuch as a Petition for Certiorari is not an appeal. latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the
Respondent Tansipek further argues that the Doctrine of the Law of the Case Decision’s being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the
applies only when the appellate court renders a decision on the merits, and not alleged invalidity of the default order
when such appeal was denied due to technicalities. o We are not persuaded. In
Buenviaje v. Court of Appeals,12 therein respondent Cottonway Marketing
Corporation filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court assailing the Decision of REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering, inter alia, the (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS
reinstatement of therein petitioners and the payment of backwages from the time ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC,
their salaries were withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. The Petition for FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA
Certiorari was dismissed by this Court. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents. G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003 EN
was likewise denied. However, the Labor Arbiter then issued an Order limiting the BANC
amount of backwages that was due to petitioners. The NLRC reversed this Order,
but the Court of Appeals reinstated the same. This Court, applying the Doctrine of FACTS: Republic filed a case against the Marcoses for the declaration of the
the Law of the Case, held: o The decision of the NLRC dated March 26, 1996 has aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten
become final and executory upon the dismissal by this Court of Cottonway’s wealth. They likewise sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in
petition for certiorari assailing said decision and the denial of its motion for treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income
reconsideration. Said judgment may no longer be disturbed or modified by any as well as income from legitimately acquired property. Imelda R. Marcos, Maria
court or tribunal. It is a fundamental rule that when a judgment becomes final and Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable, and any amendment or answer. Before pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is void, Agreements were executed by by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman
including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. Once a judgment becomes Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family.
final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, Marcoses then filed a motion for the execution thereof. Hearings were then
and the issuance of a writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. A conducted for this purpose. Republic then filed a motion for summary judgment
decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless of any and/or judgment on the pleadings. SB denied Republic’s motion on the ground
claim that it is erroneous. The writ of execution must therefore conform to the that the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over
judgment to be executed and adhere strictly to the very essential particulars.13 the motion for summary judgment." Imelda Marcos then manifested that she
(Emphases supplied.)1avvphil Furthermore, there is no substantial distinction was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that
between an appeal and a Petition for Certiorari when it comes to the application of she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos
the Doctrine of the Law of the Case. The doctrine is founded on the policy of ending estate. Meanwhile, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in its Decision, upheld the
litigation. The doctrine is necessary to enable the appellate court to perform its ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request of Republic for the
duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question once transfer of more funds of the Marcoses to an escrow account in the PNB Republic
considered and decided by it were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any filed another motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings,
and every subsequent appeal.14 Likewise, to say that the Doctrine of the Law contending that after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established,

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warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited. SB coffers were empty, or nearly so. In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed
granted motion after hearing and decided IN FAVOR of Republic Marcoses by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that
filed MR SB reversed its decision and denied motion for summary judgment merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have
and/or judgment on the pleadings Republic filed a Rule 65 before SC such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to
the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection
ISSUES: Whether summary judgment before the SB was proper. YES. of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have
Whether respondent Marcoses admitted the genuineness and due execution of the passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten
Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue.
and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit
of the contents thereof. YES. Whether there was specific denial to the conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other
allegations. NO. Whether petitioner was estopped from moving for summary assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying
judgment. NO. Whether the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks We hold that respondent
parties. NO. Whether the doctrine of transcendental importance justifies the Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on
resort to Rule 65. YES. motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a matter of
right. In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo24, summary judgment was
described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both
HELD: But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party,
regarding the propriety of petitioner Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 6519 supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits,
January 21, 2002 should be threshed out. At the outset, we would like to stress depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both
that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between
petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought them. Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35
before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65.20 But where the case is undeniably of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: o SECTION 1. Summary judgment for
ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer
of the remedy of appeal.21 One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.25
wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any
relatives, friends and business material fact in the action.26 The theory of summary judgment is that, although
associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is
Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not
EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and
Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic. The Solicitor General
in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture: o 4. Respondent
E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or public officer for several decades continuously and without interruption as
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action of the people
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986. o 5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos
connections or relationship." The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM during the 14-year
by this Court in Republic vs. Lobregat22: o surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from
and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations"; it was initiated not only June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise
out of considerations of simple justice but also out of sheer necessity - the national served once as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years

164
of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other respondents that
capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. x x x o 11. At the outset, however, it the funds were "lawfully acquired" without detailing how exactly these funds were
must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion
total salaries of former President Marcos as President form 1966 to 1976 was that the funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any
P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former factual support which can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that
First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to indeed the funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family. Respondents'
February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year Court finds that respondent Mrs. denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack of
Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls of the petition. It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules
for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious is a denial through a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or
and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in
constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge the complaint. The question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents'
for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so.
on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,30 this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and
insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular
and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues. In their answer, act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express
respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the denial must be made. Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against
petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or
answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could not recall because information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a
it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for
acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions. Section 10, Rule 8 of the forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: o A defendant must specify each material positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, alleged.31 To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of
shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his the petition for forfeiture stated: o 23. The following presentation very clearly and
denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away
specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of
a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their
the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate
shall have the effect of a denial.28 The purpose of requiring respondents to entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the
make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret
allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following
support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent presentation is confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances
unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling both parties to lay their amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or
cards on the table, thus reducing the controversy to its true terms. As explained in separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.32 Respondents' lame denial
Alonso vs. Villamor,29 o A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, of the aforesaid allegation was: o 22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23
more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth
entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and
party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents' aforesaid
aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of properties were lawfully acquired.33 Evidently, this particular denial had the
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is,
not to be won by a rapier's thrust. On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to particularly state the responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the
ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject averments it was directed at.34 Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of

165
negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude
of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R.
admission of the substantial facts alleged in Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents' answer
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been pertained to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as their respective
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the
admitted.35 In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the Republic's petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically
said petition were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that "the funds involved were
answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the lawfully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said
averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that "Respondents deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph
clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss
layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the bank deposits. The allegations in paragraphs 4737 and 4838 of the petition for
respondents' answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-
substantial facts: o (1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and o (2) that the Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-a39 of the said
estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990. Therefore, petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356
the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank million were again not specifically denied by respondents in their answer. The
deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied respondents did not at all respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the
by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to existence, nature and amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted
Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure: o Material by them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,40 if a defendant's denial is a negative
averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission. Moreover, respondents' denial of the
denied. xxx.36 By the same token, the following unsupported denials of allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information
respondents in their answer were pregnant with admissions of the substantial facts sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were
alleged in the Republic's petition for forfeiture: o 23. Respondents specifically DENY not privy to the transactions" was just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos' privity to the
paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or transactions was in fact evident from her signatures on some of the vital
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since documents41 attached to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos failed to
respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso- specifically deny as required by the rules.42 It is worthy to note that the
Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she pertinent documents attached to the petition for forfeiture were even signed
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. o 24. personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, indicating that said documents were within their knowledge. As correctly pointed
41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion: o The
to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3)
and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember with approving regulations of the Foundations for the distribution of capital and income
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent of the Foundations to the First
Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired. o 25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of 76
the petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief as to
the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM and his family), 4) opening of
and as to such transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the names of the Foundations, 6)
exactitude, the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to other Foundations or Fides
Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated by the Annexes U to U-
acquired. o 26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the 168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real
petition for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the owners of the assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as
truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and dummies.43 How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge

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or information regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact
of five groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the
masterminded and participated in the formation and control of said foundations? pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show
This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain. Not only that. that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the
Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution rules must ensue as a matter of law.56 In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied
of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.57
veracity of the contents thereof. The answer again premised its denials of said A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious
ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or information settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact posed and,
points out that respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion for
or information sufficient to form a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need
reviewing their own records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is
the genuineness and due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules
had the means and opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the BIR of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists no serious
and the Office of the President. They did not. When matters regarding which controversy.58 Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt
respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine
are plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack issue as to any material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although
of information will not be considered a specific denial.44 An unexplained denial of an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is established
information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but
evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial.45 The form of denial fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and judgment for petitioner.59 In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture,
certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what allegations petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of witnesses who had personal
of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made for the purpose knowledge of the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited
of delay.46 In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated in the Swiss accounts under the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn
assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by presenting statements substantiated the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their
an obviously contrived defense. Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a answer and other subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made
fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge or means of general
knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all.47 Respondents' ineffective denial thus denials of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible in evidence
failed to properly tender an issue and the averments contained in the petition for at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact. Under these
forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them. As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been
Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.: o Its "specific denial" of the material allegation of totally unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for
the petition without setting fo rth the substance of the matters relied upon to forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations
support its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its knowledge of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that
and it could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to the matters raised in the Marcoses' answer were false. Time and again, this
properly tender on issue .48 Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of Court has encountered cases like this which are either only half-heartedly defended
the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information or, if the semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is only to delay disposition
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest of justice to allow respondent
to the transactions" cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are Marcoses to avail of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to
the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of the Filipino
bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds. We therefore rule people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents' good faith
that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper. In fact, it is the should have been made to the court below. Without the deceptive reasoning and
law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for. Under the rules, argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended a long time ago. Since

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1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all the plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial
respondents have offered are foxy responses like "lack of sufficient knowledge or justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days after the final adjournment
lack of privity" or "they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago" or, as of the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial justice, the
to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired." But, whenever it suits them, plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The
they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs plaintiff also moved for summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil
to the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from beginning to end. Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by proceeding to
In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment and that the answer
Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts and and the opposing affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under
express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on March 10, the contract is not in dispute. The Special Term granted both motions and the
2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing defendants have appealed. o The Special Term properly held that the answer and
issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary the opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice
judgment."60 We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express and the Civil Practice Act prescribe no limitation as to the time when a motion for
admissions of the petitioner did not preclude it from filing a motion for summary summary judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court
judgment Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment "at any to summarily determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the
time after the pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim parties, and there is no limitation on the power of the court to make such a
or cross-claim) has been served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by the determination at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis ours) o On the basis of the
Rules. How else does one construe the phrase "any time after the answer has been aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means that "even if the
served?" This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from thereafter moving
authoritative work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of for summary judgment."66 In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary
foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence.
of our laws and rules were copied, is in order. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-
Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim trial conference, petitioner "waived" its right to summary judgment. This
or cross-claim may move for summary judgment at any time after the expiration argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we
of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker,67 the defendant opposed the motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a party against whom a claim, summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is,
counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may move for summary judgment at any "that plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding
time. However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of to trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to move
New York, specifically provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be for summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for resolution,
made until issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been more so should we permit it in the present case where petitioner moved for
served.62 Under said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary summary judgment before trial. Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the
judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.63 No fixed prescriptive period pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of
is provided. Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules Civil Procedure means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident
also provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues at any stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or that the defenses raised
have been joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary
move for summary judgment.64 And like the New York rules, ours do not provide judgment. A contrary interpretation would go against the very objective of the Rule
for a fixed reglementary period within which to move for summary judgment. on Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham claims or defenses thereby
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial."68 In cases with
Rules of Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1, political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do almost
Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the New York rule, after anything to delay the proceedings in the hope that a future administration
the issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in their
any stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the phrase "at any stage of the favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate. The law looks with disfavor on
litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,65 the New York Supreme Court ruled: o long, protracted and expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and prompt
Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by disposition of cases. That is why the law and the rules provide for a number of

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devices to ensure the speedy disposition of cases. Summary judgment is one of As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of
them. Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right
seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that or claim to be enforced or asserted.75 Equity demands that petitioner Republic
petitioner Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the should not be barred from pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses. In
respondents' answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's
litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33.
prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to
was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses. This interpretation conforms U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing
with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount
Procedure that the "[r]ules should be liberally construed in order to promote their had an equivalent value of $304,372.43. The dollar equivalent was arrived at by
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US dollar
proceeding."69 Respondents further allege that the motion for summary from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and
judgment was based on respondents' answer and other documents that had long February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical Information of the Bangko
been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March Sentral ng Pilipinas. Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule
10, 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner. We disagree. 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained o Section 4. – Judicial admissions – An admission, verbal or written, made by a
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof.
been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
right or declined to assert it.70 In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.81 It is settled that
of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights from judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in
prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or
the original parties and their successors-in-interest".71 A careful examination of (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.82 Thus,
the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed
its case against respondent Marcoses through every remedy available to it, admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to
including the motion for summary judgment. Petitioner Republic initially filed its contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with
motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied such admissions.83 The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known
because of the pending compromise agreement between the Marcoses and lawful income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and
petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be
the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another motion for summary judgment determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as
now under consideration by this Court. It was the subsequent events that President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of
transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which prevented petitioner from its subdivisions and instrumentalities".84 Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution,
filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not because of neglect or inaction Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other
that petitioner filed the (second) motion for summary judgment years after emolument from the Government or any other source."85 In fact, his management
respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture. In invoking the doctrine of of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was
estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution: o Article VII, Sec. 4(2) – The
that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred.72 This, President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office
respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any
Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or
they claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could be be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any
adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction. But even assuming for the franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision,
sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled
does not apply when the government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental corporation. o Article VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly shall
rights. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.74 appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x

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x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits. The stipulations set forth in
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the manifest
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with petitioner. Corollarily,
or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any respondents' willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only
matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit. o Article IX, affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person
Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in
provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before fact own them. Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this
any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements were null and void.89 They
profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against
provided by law. Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore them because they stood on the same ground as an accepted offer which, under
legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case Section 27, Rule 13090 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "in civil
of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. Respondents argue that petitioner was not able cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not
to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed admissible in evidence against the offeror." We find no merit in this contention.
to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA The declaration of nullity of said agreements was premised on the following
1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of criminal immunity to the
be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGG's commitment to exempt from all
Marcoses. We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses' other forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the
lawful income or income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption Constitution; and (3) the government's undertaking to cause the dismissal of all
to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other
better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The reasons relied upon by the
indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of
stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it respondents' admission with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides,
was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents. Section 9 of the having made certain admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot now
PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject Swiss funds,
ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later declared null
material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be and void. The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino
out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Castañeda, Jr. in the decision dated September 19, 2000 could not have been
Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which better said: o x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the
their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a same without legal effects but it did not detract from the admissions of the
violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not respondents contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said
presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law. Further, agreements, as quoted above, remain binding on the respondents.91 A written
contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their various statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a
pleadings and documents were valid. It is of record that respondents judicially document which is not itself effective for the purpose for which it is made, either
admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to them. We by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by reason of not
agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of their being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as
ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the competent evidence of admissions, although they may be unenforceable.92 The
General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion
dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note for the approval of the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent credence
of the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in to the allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted ownership of
holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the the Swiss bank accounts o ll told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of
Swiss funds. While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that: o respondents that "petitioner failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY funds" and that "it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements
shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually made by private respondents out of context that petitioner was able to treat these

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as judicial admissions." The Court is fully aware of the relevance, materiality and amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
implications of every pleading and document submitted in this case. This Court officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
carefully scrutinized the proofs presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
and weighed them to ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an unlawfully acquired. x x x" The elements which must concur for this prima facie
admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and political implications of this presumption to apply are: o (1) the offender is a public officer or employee; o (2)
case, we considered and examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his
parties, even if it might have bordered on factual adjudication which, by authority incumbency; and o (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
of the rules and jurisprudence, is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank legitimately acquired property. It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and
deposits. We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly
made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission extant. The second element deals with the amount of money or property
and becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary acquired by the public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably
thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is acquired and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups
interposed by the adverse party or not.104 This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court: o SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. ─ An admission, and ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the
verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same second element. The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets,
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer's salary and
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was his other lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in
made.105 In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents' determining whether a prima facie presumption has been established in this case.
judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them. Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had
pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: o SEC. 29. huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five
Admission by co-partner or agent. ─ The act or declaration of a partner or agent different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie
of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us
same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing
person jointly interested with the party.106 o SEC. 31. Admission by privies. ─ the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way
Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their
of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against incumbency as government officials. Considering, therefore, that the total
the former.107 The declarations of a person are admissible against a party amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known
whenever a "privity of estate" exists between the declarant and the party, the term lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were
"privity of estate" generally denoting a succession in rights.108 Consequently, an unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was sufficient for the petition for
admission of one in privity with a party to the record is competent.109 Without forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and property acquired by the
doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where several co- respondents, and their total government salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and
parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, Regulations states: o Prima Facie Evidence. – Any accumulation of assets,
the admission of one is competent against all.110 properties, and other material possessions of those persons covered by Executive
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful
Republic has failed to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss income is prima facie deemed ill-gotten wealth. Indeed, the burden of proof was
deposits. We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show by clear and convincing
strange, to say the least, as its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other
voluminous records of this case. Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact
"whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption

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is disproved, it must stand as proved.111 Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that opportunity to participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption that they
the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as they were indispensable owned a nominal share of the assets.118 But this was already refuted by no less
parties without whom no complete determination of the issues could be made. She than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the
asserts that the failure of petitioner Republic to implead the foundations rendered Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given
the judgment void as the joinder of indispensable parties was a sine qua non by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the
exercise of judicial power. Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the foreign purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in the assets
foundations violated the conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated
the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and
them their rights under the Swiss constitution and international law.112 The their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary. In Republic vs.
Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign Sandiganbayan,119 this Court ruled that impleading the firms which are the res of
foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,113 taken from the action was unnecessary: o "And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten
Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the wealth, but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party conduct – in other words, the companies themselves are not the object or thing
must be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. However, failure to involved in the action, the res thereof – there is no need to implead them either.
join an indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule Indeed, their impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having been
regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part.
jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds,
in the absence of indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the
the non-joined party.114 An indispensable party115 has been defined as one: o corporations in question with the person who formed or made use of them to give
[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth
it cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render – at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former
justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an injurious effect with the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical
upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his absence will personality and legal culpability from their erring members or stockholders, said
be inconsistent with equity and good conscience. There are two essential tests corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the
of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Government's cause of
presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits without action for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result of their
prejudicing the rights of the other party?116 There is, however, no fixed formula members' (or stockholders') manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal
for determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the
context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation. In the present case, res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in
there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998 principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as
Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole beneficiary of 90% defendants in said actions." Just like the corporations in the aforementioned
of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10% belonging to the case, the foreign foundations here were set up to conceal the illegally acquired
estate of Ferdinand Marcos.117 Viewed against this admission, the foreign funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action for
foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack of cause of
proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and action or ground to implead them. Assuming arguendo, however, that the
according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead them
$356 million was neither inimical to the foundations' interests nor inconsistent with was a curable error, as held in the previously cited case of Republic vs.
equity and good conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only Sandiganbayan:120 o "Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued
confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations were that the failure of the Government to implead the sequestered corporations as
established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from defendants is indeed a procedural abberation, as where said firms were allegedly
petitioner Republic. It negated whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for
foundations owned even a nominal part of the assets in question. The rulings of conversion of public funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored
the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be given an government contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the

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conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective
rules – e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of
amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. REYNALDO M. ALON,
Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ERIC B. DE VERA, respondents. G.R. No.
omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 142896 September 12, 2007 THIRD DIVISION
3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old familiar
doctrines that the omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect FACTS:
which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and
that, particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and ISSUES: Whether an injunction may still issue. NO. Whether Caneland made
participation is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment a specific denial as to PNs covered by the security documents. NO. Whether PD
may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should 385 may apply against Caneland such that
be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this
Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and HELD: Without first resolving the foregoing issue, the Court finds that the
character as such indispensable parties."121 Although there are decided cases petition should be denied for the sole reason that the act sought to be enjoined by
wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the petitioner is already fait accompli. In Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro
suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. Corporation,9 the Court held that – o [I]njunction would not lie where the acts
The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the sought to be enjoined have already become fait accompli or an accomplished or
judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And consummated act. In Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc. this Court ruled that where
the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3122 of the 1997 Rules of Civil the period within which the former employees were prohibited from engaging in or
Procedure. It prohibits the working for an enterprise that competed with their former employer— the very
dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows purpose of the preliminary injunction —has expired, any declaration upholding the
the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion propriety of the writ would be entirely useless as there would be no actual case or
or on order of the court on its own initiative.123 Likewise, jurisprudence on the controversy between the parties insofar as the preliminary injunction is
Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3124 on indispensable concerned.10 Records show that the foreclosure sale which petitioner sought to
parties was copied, allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment be enjoined by the RTC has already been carried out by the Sheriff, and in fact, a
has been entered if such is needed to afford the moving party full relief.125 Mere Certificate of Sale dated June 26, 2000 was issued to respondent.11 There is,
delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in the waiver of the therefore, no more actual case or controversy between the parties insofar as the
right as long as the delay is excusable.126 Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot RTC’s refusal to enjoin the sale is concerned, and any resolution by the Court of
correctly argue that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the impropriety or propriety of the RTC’s refusal to issue any restraining or
the non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render injunctive relief against the foreclosure sale will serve no purpose but merely lend
judgment which, even in the absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all further addle to Civil Case No. 2067-40 pending before the RTC. Nevertheless,
the parties before it though not on the absent party.127 If she really felt that she even if petitioner’s quest for the issuance of an injunctive relief has been rendered
could not be granted full relief due to the absence of the foreign foundations, she moot and academic by the holding of the foreclosure sale and issuance of
should have moved for their inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of the Certificate of Sale, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the merits of the principal
proceedings. She never did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered. In the issue raised for the future guidance of both bench and bar. As the Court stated in
face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence Acop v. Guingona, Jr.,12 "courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
against them, respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of their academic if it is ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’" Petitioner does not
acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered ill- dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioner’s bone of contention before
gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA the RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were covered
1379: o SEC. 6. Judgment.─ If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its property
of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court covered by TCT No. T-11292.13 It does not categorically deny that these
shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such promissory notes are covered by the security documents. These vague assertions
judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x. are, in fact, negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the

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substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. As of FMC for the loan, which was the basis of the mortgage being foreclosed, was not
defined in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,14 a negative pregnant is yet settled. These circumstances prompted the Court to grant an injunction against
a "form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an the foreclosure sale. The Court ruled – o x x x P.D. 385 was never meant to protect
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with officials of government lending institutions who take over the management of a
an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged borrower corporation, lead that corporation to bankruptcy through
with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so mismanagement or misappropriation of its funds, and who, after ruining it, use the
qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid the consequences of their misdeeds.
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted." o The designated officers of the government financing institution cannot simply
walk away and then state that since the loans were obtained in the corporation’s
Petitioner’s allegations do not make out any justifiable basis for the granting of any name, then P.D. 385 must be peremptorily applied and that there is no way the
injunctive relief. Even when the mortgagors were disputing the amount being borrower corporation can prevent the automatic foreclosure of the mortgage on its
sought from them, upon the non-payment of the loan, which was secured by the properties once the arrearages reach twenty percent (20%) of the total obligation
mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is no matter who was responsible.18 In the case at bench, petitioner does not
in consonance with the doctrine that to authorize a temporary injunction, the deny its liability. While petitioner alleged that the management and control of its
plaintiff must show, at least prima facie, a right to the final relief.15 The operations has already been virtually taken over by respondent, thus, implying that
foregoing conclusion finds greater force in light of the provisions of P.D. No. 385,16 it was respondent that caused petitioner's present miserable financial state, this
Section 1 of which, provides for a mandatory foreclosure, viz.: o Section 1. It shall allegation is obviously merely an attempt to place itself under the Filipinas Marble
be mandatory for government financial institutions, after the lapse of sixty (60) situation in order to preempt the operation of P.D. No. 385. Petitioner’s claim is
days from the issuance of this Decree, to foreclose the collaterals and/or securities more appropriately threshed out and determined after trial on the merits. The
for any loan, credit, accommodation, and/or guarantees granted by them whenever Court likewise cannot sustain petitioner's argument that the RTC’s refusal to grant
the arrearages on such account, including accrued interest and other charges, any injunctive relief amounts to a prejudgment of the issues before it. The RTC’s
amount to at least twenty (20%) of the total outstanding obligations, including sole basis for allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed is P.D. No. 385. It did not
interest and other charges, as appearing in the books of account and/or related make any finding or disposition on the issue of the validity of the mortgage. In
records of the financial institution concerned. This shall be without prejudice to the any event, such issue of the validity of the mortgage, not to mention the issue of
exercise by the government financial institution of such rights and/or remedies the nullity of the foreclosure sale as well as petitioner’s prayer for damages, still
available to them under their respective contracts with their debtors, including the has to be resolved in the trial court. As ruled in Philippine National Bank v. Court
right to foreclose on loans, credits, accommodations, and or guarantees on which of Appeals,19 to wit: o In the instant case, aside from the principal action for
the arrearages are less than twenty percent (20%). while Section 2 prohibits damages, private respondent sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order
the issuance of restraining orders or injunctions against government financial and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale in order to prevent
institutions in any foreclosure action taken by such institutions, to wit: o Section an alleged irreparable injury to private respondent. It is settled that these
2. No restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights
court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such and interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided in Section 1 remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined ha[d]
hereof whether such restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction is become fait accompli, only the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied.
sought by the borrower(s) or any third party or parties, except after due hearing However, the trial court should still proceed with the determination of the principal
in which it is established by the borrower and admitted by the government financial action so that an adjudication of the rights of the parties can be had.
institution concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding arrearages had
been paid after the filing of foreclosure proceedings. Petitioner cannot find any RULES 10-14
solace in its contention that the case of Filipinas Marble Corporation v. Intermediate
Appellate Court17 is applicable to the present case. In Filipinas Marble, it was the A. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings [RULE 10]
DBP-imposed management of FMC that brought the corporation to ruin, not to
mention that there were prima facie findings of mismanagement and Kinds of Amendments
misappropriation of the loan proceeds by DBP and Bancom. Moreover, the liability

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Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right . — A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in Q: Effect of amendment?
the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. (2a) A: Amended pleading supersedes the original.

Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. — Except as provided in the next Q: Totally?

preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. A: No, admissions in the original pleading may be used as evidence.
But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made
with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section Q: A files a case against B for collection of sum of money. Summons was
shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, served Jan. 10 and B filed an answer Jan. 20. May A still amend his
and an opportunity to be heard. (3a) complaint?

Section 4. Formal amendments. — A defect in the designation of the parties and A: Yes, because the period to amend a complaint as a matter of right is any time
other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the before a responsive pleading has been served. Filing and service are two different
court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice things. Filing is with the court while service is to the parties.
is caused thereby to the adverse party. (4a)
NOTE: Amendment as a matter of right is absolute when the plaintiff has not yet
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — received a copy of responsive pleading. If a motion to dismiss is filed, such is not
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied a bar for a plaintiff to amend his complaint.
consent of the parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause Q: If A filed a case against B for a sum of money and then there was no
them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon allegation as to a demand, hence the issue of demand is not within the
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does jurisdiction of the court. During the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence,
not effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the the witness of the plaintiff would like to present as evidence the demand
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court letter, B objected the same on the ground that it was not raised in the
may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the pleading and therefore the court has no jurisdiction over the issue. If you
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be were the judge, how will you rule on the objection?
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment
to be made. (5a) A: You will grant the objection because the court has no actually jurisdiction over
the issue. In granting the objection for denying the presentation of such kind of
Supplemental Pleadings evidence because it is without jurisdiction of the court.

Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. — Upon motion of a party the court may, upon Q: As plaintiff, what will you do?
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have A: Under Rule 10 section 5, Amendments to conform or authorize presentation of
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse evidence, the plaintiff may move for amendment and such must be granted to by
party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the court with liberality. So even in this instance, at this point in time of the
the supplemental pleading. (6a) proceeding (during trial), amendment is still available. It is an amendment with
leave of court. If the court does not grant it, it can be construed as grave abuse of
RULE 10 ATTY. BRONDIAL LECTURE discretion on the part of the court which is adept to certiorari or mandamus as the
case may be.
Q: Two (2) Classifications of Amendment:
A: 1. Amendment a matter of right or by leave or court As a general rule, the evidence must conform to the pleading. This time,
2. Substantial or formal amendment considering that the evidence is not within the jurisdiction of the court, it should

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be the pleading that must conform to the evidence to authorize the presentation admissions, you need not to offer them. It can be used by the court as basis of its
of evidence. That is the meaning of section 5 Rule 10. COURTS MUST GRANT WITH decisions, judgment or resolution.
LIBERALITY.
B. Time/ period for Filing Responsive Pleadings [RULE 11]
Q: Suppose the amendment sought by the plaintiff here is a change of
cause of action, will you grant it? Answer

A: Even if it is a change of cause of action, it must be granted with liberality. But Section 1. Answer to the complaint. — The defendant shall file his answer to the
as a general rule, never with jurisdiction. Cause of action yes but jurisdiction no. complaint within fifteen (15) days after service of summons, unless a different
period is fixed by the court. (la)
Q: Why?
Section 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity. — Where the
A: Because if for example you filed a case with the RTC for sum of money in the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity and service of summons is made on
amount of P350,000.00. That is definitely outside the jurisdiction of the RTC and the government official designated by law to receive the same, the answer shall be
you ask for amendment with leave of court so that the RTC will have jurisdiction, filed within thirty (30) days after receipt of summons by such entity. (2a)
and changed the amount claimed to P500,000.00, you cannot do that because this
is an issue of jurisdiction. You cannot do that. Why? because remember, under the Section 3. Answer to amended complaint. — When the plaintiff files an amended
latest jurisprudence on that matter, jurisdiction over the subject matter is not only complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the same within fifteen
conferred upon filing of the necessary pleading but payment of the correct docket (15) days after being served with a copy thereof.
fees. So the docket fees you paid for is only for the amount of P350,000.00, and
you want to change it to P1 million, you wont be allowed. It is an indirect way of Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the amended
escaping the payment of the correct docket fees. This is taken from the old Mar complaint within ten (l0) days from notice of the order admitting the same. An
Copper doctrine. answer earlier filed may serve as the answer to the amended complaint if no new
answer is filed.
Q: How would you distinguish an amended pleading from a supplemental
pleading? This Rule shall apply to the answer to an amended counterclaim, amended cross-
claim, amended third (fourth, etc.)—party complaint, and amended complaint-in-
A: As to the purpose, an amended pleading aims to change certain facts while in intervention. (3a)
a supplemental pleading you don’t change anything, you just ask for supplement.
As held in the Remington case, there is no need for the issuance of a new summons Section 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross - claim. — A counterclaim or cross-
because it did not change the cause of action. If the pleading changes the cause of claim must be answered within ten (10) days from service. (4)
action, then another summons is necessary because as a general rule, an amended
pleading supersedes the original pleading. Section 5. Answer to third (fourth, etc.) - party complaint. — The time

Q: Even if it superseded the original pleading, is there anything admissible to answer a third (fourth, etc.)—party complaint shall be governed by the same
from the original pleading? rule as the answer to the complaint. (5a)

A: Admissions remain even when the original pleading has been superseded Reply
pleading. What kind of admissions are they? They used to be extrajudicial
admissions but jurisprudence now, under the new rule, these are already Section 10. Reply. — A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to
considered as judicial admissions. You have to distinguish that because the effect deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of
of a judicial admission is different from an extra judicial admissions whereby the defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a
latter requires or calls for proof, requires for offer. But because these are judicial

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party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed
controverted. Q: How about the 30 day period?

If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so A: There is only one instance- when the defendant is a foreign corporation
alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or supplemental complaint. or foreign private entity and summons was served to the corporation through the
(11) government official in the Philippines. The 30 day period must be counted not from
the receipt of the government official but from the receipt of the defendant itself,
RULE 11 ATTY. BRONDIAL LECTURE the corporation.
Under section 13 of Rule 14, you will find out that a foreign private entity
Next rule is only about periods. The only thing to remember here in Rule 11 are can be served with summons in three (3) ways. Kaya tatandaan nyo. If it is served
the following days- 10 days, then 15 days, then 30 days and finally 60 days. to the government official in the country, 30 days, otherwise 15 days. This is the
Tandaan nyo lang yon and we are through with Rule 11. So this is about when to only 30 day period, wala ng iba sa rules.
file responsive pleading, take note they are responsive pleading so if there is
nothing to respond to, a responsive pleading is not necessary but if it is required, Now finally, we go the 60 day period- When summons is served under section 15
when are you suppose to file them? of Rule 14 or what we call extra territorial service. But take note, there is a cross
reference in section 15, that is 14 and 16. Before and after. That summarizes Rule
Q: So 10 days, what pleading must be filed within the period of 10 days? 11.

A: 1. Answer to the complaint when it is covered by the Rules on C. Bill of Particulars [RULE 12]
Summary Procedure;
2. Answer to an amended pleading if the amendment is not a Section 1. When applied for; purpose . — Before responding to a pleading, a party
matter of right; may move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which
3. Reply; is not averted with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to
4. Answer to the counterclaim, cross claim and answer to a prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed
complain in intervention; within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects
5. Answer to a pleading after a bill of particulars has been complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.
granted. (1a)

Q: Let’s go to 15 days: Section 2. Action by the court . — Upon the filing of the motion, the clerk of court
must immediately bring it to the attention of the court which may either deny or
A: 1. Answer to a complaint under regular procedure; grant it outright, or allow the parties the opportunity to be heard. (n)
2. Answer to an amended complaint when the amendment is a matter
of right; Section 3. Compliance with order. — If the motion is granted, either in whole or in
3. Answer filed by a third, fourth or fifth party defendant as the case part, the compliance therewith must be effected within ten (10) days from notice
may be. of the order, unless a different period is fixed by the court. The bill of particulars
or a more definite statement ordered by the court may be filed either in a separate
Q: Why is the answer in a complaint in intervention is only 10 days? or in an amended pleading, serving a copy thereof on the adverse party. (n)

A: Remember that the one who answers it is already within the jurisdiction Section 4. Effect of non - compliance. — If the order is not obeyed, or in case of
of the court. Kaya 10 days nalang but the one who is suppose to answer within 15 insufficient compliance therewith, the court may order the striking out of the
days is not yet within the jurisdiction of the court like a fourth party defendant is pleading or the portions thereof to which the order was directed or make such other
not within the jurisdiction of the court. So he must be first before he is brought order as it deems just. (1[c]a)
within the jurisdiction of the court that is why you have the 15 days period.

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Section 5. Stay of period to file responsive pleading. — After service of the bill of are delaying your own case. Why? because there are many remedies to default and
particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of denial of his motion, the court will grant this remedies. Motion to set aside the order of default, motion
the moving party may file his responsive pleading within the period to which he for reconsideration then judgment and you go all over again and when you move
was entitled at the time of filing his motion, which shall not be less than five (5) up to the Supreme Court the latter will say, no default, the party must be given
days in any event. (1[b]a) due process. Don’t fight it out of technicalities, so remand the case for further
proceedings after fifteen (15) years. Although these are very good problems in the
Section 6. Bill a part of pleading. — A bill of particulars becomes part of the pleading bar but later on, if you were in practice, how can you avail of what you don’t even
for which it is intended. (1[a]a) know. Like in the bill of particulars, it may not be that important but it might be
given in the bar.
RULE 12 ATTY. BRONDIAL LECTURE
Q: So when do you count the period?
Rule 12 is only the Bill of Particulars. Bill of Particulars maybe filed by any party
that is supposed to file a responsive pleading. Before one files a responsive A: When you file a bill of particulars, the period to file a responsive pleading is stop
pleading and he wants to be clarified on certain matters, then instead of filing of and you’ll only have the balance of the period within which to file an answer if it is
the answer, he must file a motion for a Bill of Particulars. denied but if its granted, you have to file a bill of particulars within the period of
10 days but the 10 day period must be counted from the receipt of the resolution
Q: Who may file a motion for a bill of particulars? granting your motion for a bill of particulars.

A: 1. So this can be filed by the plaintiff with regard to a permissive Q: Suppose A filed an action against B and the latter received the summons
counterclaim. in January 1. So he has ordinarily up to January 16 in which
2. This can be filed by the defendant with respect to the complaint. to file an answer but on January 5, instead of filing the answer he filed a
3. This may again be filed by the plaintiff if he intends to file a reply. motion for a bill of particulars. The court granted the bill of particulars on
January 20, then the question is when should B file the answer?
Q: Anyone who is bound or required to file a responsive pleading may ask
for a bill of particulars. What does this mean? A: No answer yet because it is A who should clarify because the bill of particulars
is granted, the order is directed to A to amend, to change what is suppose to be
A: It simply means that you are not clear on a matter in his allegation, so change, and if he does not, this may be ground for dismissal.
clarify it.
Now, after he has change, the 15 day period will no longer apply. The 15 day period
Q: Suppose in the complaint of the plaintiff, the plaintiff joined three (3) ordinarily within which to file an answer no longer apply because of that bill of
causes of action. Assuming the defendant owns him P50,000.00, on particulars. So what applies? You have only the balance of the period but not less
another occasion he owes him P130,000.00 and another occasion he owes than 5 days. Pareho lang yan ng motion to dismiss under Rule 16. Under Rule 16,
him P300,000.00. There was no allegation of when and how it was loaned. when the defendant files a motion to dismiss and it is denied by the court, you do
not appeal. Why? It is an Interlocutory order. So the defendant has only the
A: That is a very clear case that calls for a bill of particulars. remaining balance of the period but not less than 5 days. Do not apply the
Domingo Mated doctrine, the fresh day rule. This is a September 2005 case,
Although a bill of particulars is there in the rules, but you will note that this is very Domingo mated et al vs Court of Appeals penned by Justice Corona. Bago yan ha,
academic. I’m telling you now because in actual practice you don’t ask for a bill of September 14, 2005, this is the fresh day rule or the fresh day doctrine. Baka
particulars. Good lawyers won’t ask for that. What will I do? I’ll file a motion to lumabas sa bar, atleast you know. It simply says that when a motion to dismiss is
dismiss for lack of cause of action. If I’m not clear on the matter, motion to dismiss filed and then the court denies it or grants it as the case may be, of course denied.
so he’ll amend the pleading. Thus, you bought time. Like default, if I were the You have the entire period all over again, 15 days, not just the balance. But do not
plaintiff and he did not file an answer, I will not move for declaration of default. apply it here in a bill of particulars and motion to dismiss because the time to file
Why? I will ask for presentation of evidence, after all if the party is in default, you the answer is the remaining balance which must not be less than 5 days.

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Section 5. Modes of service. — Service of pleadings motions, notices, orders,
So the old rule applies only to Rule 42, 43 and 45. Yun lang ang may fresh day judgments and other papers shall be made either personally or by mail. (3a)
doctrine. It applies to Rule 41 as well. You have the entire period all over again. In
fact my opinion on the matter is that it applies as well to Rule 64 and 65 because Section 6. Personal service . — Service of the papers may be made by delivering
in Rule 65, a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his
clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or
D. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and other papers his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the
[RULE 13] hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's
residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing
Distinction between FILING and SERVICE therein. (4a)

Section 2. Filing and service, defined. — Filing is the act of presenting the pleading Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered mail shall be made by
or other paper to the clerk of court. depositing the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the
party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known,
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the
concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is
upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered available in the locality of either the senders or the addressee, service may be done
by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be by ordinary mail. (5a; Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side. (2a)
Section 8. Substituted service. — If service of pleadings, motions, notices,
Filing: Manner, Completeness, Proof resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under the two preceding
sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his counsel being
Section 2. Filing and service, defined. — Filing is the act of presenting the pleading unknown, service may be made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with
or other paper to the clerk of court. proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete
at the time of such delivery. (6a)
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper
concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions. — Judgments, final
upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When
by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments,
entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side. (2a) final orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication
at the expense of the prevailing party. (7a)
Section 12. Proof of filing. — The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by
its existence in the record of the case. If it is not in the record, but is claimed to Section 10. Completeness of service. — Personal service is complete upon actual
have been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by the written or stamped delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days
acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court on a copy of the same; if filed by after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is
registered mail, by the registry receipt and by the affidavit of the person who did complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date
the mailing, containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (8a)
in the post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully
prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender Section 13. Proof of Service. — Proof of personal service shall consist of a written
after ten (10) days if not delivered. (n) admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit
of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of
Service: Manner, Completeness, Proof service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit
of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If

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service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the Q: Why registered mail?
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter You have to distinguish now because in service it is different. How do you
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to personally file?
the addressee. (10a)
Q: How about service, what are the modes?
Priorities in Modes of Service
A: There are three (3):
Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the 1. Personal Service;
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except 2. Substituted Service; and
with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be 3. By mail. Under mail, it is divided in two kinds, either registered or
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done ordinary mail. Importante eto because you might ask regarding completeness and
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed. proof. So mag-didiffer yon, as to completeness and proof.
(n)
What is Personal Service? And by mail? Have you ever mail by registered
RULE 13 ATTY. BRONDIAL LECTURE mail?

Rule 13 is about Filing and Service. In Service, what do you use? Powder or lotion? Q: Why is ordinary mail allowed in service but in filing, always registered
mail?
Q: What is Filing and what is Service? Which comes first, Filing or Service?
Distinguish. A: It has something to do with the prescriptive period. The court is not as concerned
in the adverse party because he would contest it if he becomes prejudiced.
A: As to initiatory pleading, filing comes first, service later. Thereafter, service
comes first and filing later. So when you file a complaint, initiatory pleading yan, By Substituted Service. Do not confuse this with substituted service of summons.
you don’t serve first because it is the court that serves the same together with the
copy of the summons to the defendant so filing comes first. But answer, before the Q: To whom do you leave a copy? Which Clerk of Court?
court receives the same for filing, you must first establish that you have served a
copy thereof. Aside from initiatory pleading, ordinarily processes that emanated A: In every court, when you say RTC, isa lang yon. Kasi ang concept nyo pag
from the court, filing comes first then service later. For example, judgment. A sinabing RTC, ang dami nyon. Isa lang yon, but several branches. Every Regional
judgment that emanates from the court, this is first filed and then served a copy Trial Court in a judicial region has only one clerk of court. But each branch has
to the party. Resolutions and orders, they are first filed and then served. what you called a branch clerk of court. This city here in Metro Manila, for example
here in Makati, there are more than 50 branches, but in Manila or Quezon City
We are going to discuss three (3) topics under Rule 13, so first is Manner or Mode there are maybe a hundred I supposed or even more. Each branch has a branch
of Filing and Manner or Mode of Service. The second topic is completeness of Filing clerk of court. This Substituted Service is not with the branch clerk of court but the
and completeness of service. And the third topic is proof of Filing and Proof of Chief Clerk of Court. If your book says in the branch clerk of court, that’s wrong.
Service. If you can answer that, tapos nanaman ang Rule 13. It should be the Chief Clerk of Court and the latter is the one in charge with all the
branches. In fact the sheriff is under the clerk of court. That is substituted service.
Q: What is the mode or manner of Filing?
Q: What do you have to establish to avail of substituted service?
A: There are two (2):
1. Personal Filing; and A: That is section 8, do not confuse that with section 9. You cannot avail of section
2. Filing by Registered mail. 8 if the subject matter to be serve are final resolution or judgment, that is under
section 9. Service of judgment, service of final order under section 9 is different

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from service of pleadings under section 8. In section 8, there is substituted service 2. If it is by registered mail, proof is the registry receipt.
of pleadings but when you go to section 9, you do not avail of substituted.
Q: Proof of Service
Q: What is the provision of section 9?
A: Take note of the requirement, now of an affidavit of the sender, especially if you
A: It is through publication. So that the period for finality of the resolution or are filing with the court of appeals or the supreme court under Rule 66 of the Rules
judgment starts to run only after availment of section 9. In the case of substituted of Court, that is a ground for the dismissal of your petition if you do not include an
service, that begins to run upon receipt of the clerk of court of whatever pleading affidavit of service. If you do not include as proof that you have serve to the
is served. adverse party the affidavit of the sender together with the registry receipt stamp,
that is a ground of the dismissal by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
Do not confuse that with Rule 14, personal service is no longer used in summons.
Personal service is used now in Rule 13. If you go to Rule 14, they do not use Q: There are many instances when you try to establish that you have filed
anymore personal service and you must follow that. It is already called Service on a pleading with a court, the court cannot find anymore the pleading you
the person of the defendant under Rule 14. That is as to summons because have filed. Should the record of the court prevail over your personal
substituted service of summons is very different. While here in service of pleadings, record?
that is still personal service. If you cannot find the person to whom it must serve,
you have to leave at the residence where a person of sufficient age and discretion A: You present your own copy kasi karamihan ngayon nakakaligtaan.
is found, or in the office to a person in charge thereof. These three (3) ways are is
still personal service of pleadings. Distinguish from the service on the person of Let me give a special mention to section 11. It says there priority of personal
the defendant under Rule 14. service. Of the many modes we have discuss, the Rules seems to prioritize personal
service, why? This is new in the 1997 Rules. If you cannot avail of personal service,
Q: When is filing complete? you have to make an explanation stating therein the reasons why you cannot avail
of personal service. Service and filing cannot be made without that written
A: explanation.
1. In Personal filing, after actual delivery.
2. If it is by registered mail, the posting is the date of filing. When you What is the historical background regarding this amendment of Rule 13,
mail by registered mail, the post office stamp is the date of filing so that within the these addition to the rules? Because several practicing lawyers would try to
15 day period for example, the stamping is in the 15th day, that is within the 15 delay for one reason or the other, some reasons are valid but most reasons are
day period. not. They would not expedite the administration of justice. So the Supreme Court
amended the Rules modestly and moderately by simply prioritizing personal
Q: When is service complete? service. For example here in Makati, in the same building, the plaintiff’s counsel is
in the 4th floor while the defendant is in the 1st floor. What do they do? They mail
A: You have to distinguish whether it is by ordinary mail or registered mail. If it is pleadings to buy time. No amount of reason will invalidate your delay, if that is the
by registered mail, from the actual receipt of the mail or 5 days thereafter from case. Although the court would not mind it, but now with this rule, that must be
the first notice of the postmaster. The post office sends three notices, it is the first practiced. The rule calls for a valid reason as long as he has a reason and the usual
and not the last. Hindi eto unlawful detainer. In Unlawful detainer, you count the reasons are for convenience and practicality or lack of personnel to serve the same
one day period from the last demand, dito first notice. In substituted service, upon or there are other reasons I find like because of the horrendous traffic in Metro
actual receipt of the clerk of court. Manila.

Q: Proof of filing E. Summons [RULE 14]

A: 1. What is Summons?
1. If it is personal filing, the stamp made by the clerk of court.

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Section 2. Contents. — The summons shall be directed to the defendant, signed by Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
the clerk of court under seal and contain (a) the name of the court and the names be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
of the parties to the action; (b) a direction that the defendant answer within the may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
time fixed by these Rules; (c) a notice that unless the defendant so answers with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for. leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. (8a)
A copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem if any, shall
be attached to the original and each copy of the summons. (3a) c. Extraterritorial

Section 5 . Issuance of alias summons. — If a summons is returned without being i. Personal

served on any or all of the defendants, the server shall also serve a copy of the ii. Publication
return on the plaintiff's counsel, stating the reasons for the failure of service, within iii. Any mode
five (5) days therefrom. In such a case, or if the summons has been lost, the clerk,
on demand of the plaintiff, may issue an alias summons. (4a) Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
2. Who issues? plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
Section 1. Clerk to issue summons. — Upon the filing of the complaint and the which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached
corresponding summons to the defendants. (1a) within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper
3. Who serves? of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered
Section 3. By whom served. — The summons may be served by the sheriff, his mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court
deputy, or other proper court officer, or for justifiable reasons by any suitable may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time,
person authorized by the court issuing the summons. (5a) which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant
must answer. (17a)
Section 4. Return. — When the service has been completed, the server shall, within
five (5) days therefrom, serve a copy of the return, personally or by registered 5. On whom served
mail, to the plaintiff's counsel, and shall return the summons to the clerk, who
issued it, accompanied by proof of service. (6a) a. On corporations
a. Public
4. Kinds of Summons
Section 13. Service upon public corporations. — When the defendant is the
a. Service in Person Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in
case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the
shall be served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he court may direct. (15)
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. (7a)
b. Private
b. Substituted i. Domestic

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Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity . — When the defendant which they are generally or commonly known, service may be effected upon all the
is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the defendants by serving upon any one of them, or upon the person in charge of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, office or place of business maintained in such name. But such service shall not bind
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house individually any person whose connection with the entity has, upon due notice,
counsel. (13a) been severed before the action was brought. (9a)

ii. Foreign F. Proofs of Service [RULE 14]

Sec tion 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entities . — When the defendant Section 18. Proof of service. — The proof of service of a summons shall be made
is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, in writing by the server and shall set forth the manner, place, and date of service;
service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for shall specify any papers which have been served with the process and the name of
that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated the person who received the same; and shall be sworn to when made by a person
by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. (14a) other than a sheriff or his deputy. (20)

b. On natural persons G. Voluntary Appearance [RULE 14]

a. Prisoners
Section 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the
Section 9. Service upon prisoners. — When the defendant is a prisoner confined in action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
a jail or institution, service shall be effected upon him by the officer having the dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
management of such jail or institution who is deemed deputized as a special sheriff defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (23a)
for said purpose. (12a)

b. Minors and incompetent RULE 14 ATTY. BRONDIAL LECTURE

Section 10. Service upon minors and incompetents. — When the defendant is a Rule 14 is very, very important. As a warning, summons is singular, the plural is
minor, insane or otherwise an incompetent, service shall be made upon him summonses. I am warning you that because one of my friend examiners did not
personally and on his legal guardian if he has one, or if none his guardian ad litem correct the examination booklet anymore because it states “summons are”, he said
whose appointment shall be applied for by the plaintiff. In the case of a minor, this examinee is not yet ready to become a lawyer. He underscores that, grade 49.
service may also be made on his father or mother. (l0a, 11a) Even if you get 90 in the Bar, if you have 49, you are already disqualified and only
because of that grammar. Again, Summons is singular, the plural is Summonses.
c. Unknown identity and whereabouts Also an examiner in Criminal Law, who in the same manner, did not bother to check
the examination booklet because of the word “stafa” was misspelled. So be very
Section 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. careful with your grammar.
— In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the
like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by Q: What is a Summons?
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the A: Is a process issued by the court and served upon the defendant for the purpose
court may order. (16a) of acquiring jurisdiction over him and to direct him to file responsive or an answer.

c. Entities without juridical personality Q: What is the purpose of a Summons?

Section 8. Service upon entity without juridical personality. — When persons A: There are only two ways by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
associated in an entity without juridical personality are sued under the name by of the defendant:

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1. Valid Service of Summons. Remember that it must be VALID. When A: This is one of the most important words in special proceedings like habeas
you say service of summons that is wrong because even if you serve the summons corpus. Ano nakalagay sa return? Alam nyo crucial yan, because when the sheriff
and the same but the service is invalid, the court did not acquire jurisdiction. files a return that he served summons by substituted service, it requires that he
2. Voluntary Appearance must have exerted effort and his effort is futile that is why substituted service is
availed of. Like and Habeas Corpus, you recall your lessons in habeas corpus, very
Q: What is an alias summons? prominent yung return, there is a return as a plea and a return as an evidence.

A: It is a Summons other than the original summons. Q: Aside from the sheriff, who may serve summons?
A: Any officer authorized by the court.
To whom is the Summons addressed? Together with the summons is a copy of
the complaint. Q: Can the plaintiff serve the summons?
A: The rule says the sheriff, the deputy sheriff and any person authorized by law,
Q: Who serve the summons? kung susundin nyo lang yon, you rationalize.

A: The sheriff. In the analysis of service of summons, you have to know to whom it must be
served. So you have to consider the defendant. Remember under section 1 of Rule
Q: How does the sheriff serve summons? What are the modes of service 3, that the defendant of parties to an action may either be a natural person, a
of summons? juridical person or any entity authorized by law. You apply that in cases of
defendant. In fact we discuss about necessary and indispensable party, so the first
A: thing you have to ask “Who is the defendant?” because the mode of service
1. Service on the person of the defendant somehow depend who the defendant is.
2. Substituted service
3. Extraterritorial Service (under section 14, 15 and 16) Q: If the defendant is a minor to whom should the summons be served?
a. Service on the person of the defendant A: To the minor and the parents or guardian as the case maybe.
b. Substituted Service
c. Publication
d. By any other modes authorized by the court Q: So how many summons?
A: Two (2) summonses. If you only serve it to the parents, that is wrong, it will
Note: There is no service of summons by registered mail be an invalid service of summons. The rule says service on the minor AND service
on the parents or guardian or guardian ad litem.
Q: Why is there no service of summons by registered mail?
Q: If the defendant is an insane or an incompetent, to whom summons
A: Because the purpose of service of summons is to acquire jurisdiction over the must be served?
person of the defendant and if it is by mail, it is dependent already on the mail A: Personally to the insane or incompetent and personally to the guardian.
proper. The court will not allow that. So the sheriff who is task to serve the
summons will serve the same either service on the person of the defendant or Q: Why will you serve the summons to an insane defendant? Loko loko na
substituted service. isserve mo pa ng summons?
A: Because an insane person is not insane all the time. They have lucid interval.
Q: After he has done that, what should he do? But an imbecile is different from an insane because the former is not qualified but
the latter is qualified, therefore there is no provision regarding an imbecile. If you
A: The sheriff will file a return. are given a choice between an imbecile and an insane, you choose the latter, must
be insane.
Q: What is this return?

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Q: If the defendant is a prisoner, to whom summons be served?
A: To the prisoner himself or to the deputized sheriff. So he is not within the And another basic requirement is “after complying or after exerting earnest effort
concept “authorized by law” because the rule says authorizes the sheriff or the to serve summons on the person of the defendant”. So that is substituted service.
warden. The rule itself authorizes the warden or one charged with the jail to serve You will note, going to Rule 13 that substituted service of pleading is handing over
it but it is served to the prisoner or upon the prisoner not to the sheriff. It is only the pleading to the clerk of court, personal service therein includes service in the
the sheriff or the warden who is authorized by the rules to serve it. He is deputized. office and in the residence.
These are natural persons. The rule says it must be served upon the person of the
defendant themselves but does it follow that it cannot be serve through substituted Q: You will note that in summons, it is the residence and then office, in
service? It can. So if ever it is served upon the warden, it is already substituted Rule 13 it is office then residence, why is that so? Have you ever thought
service. Take note of that. It is no longer service upon the person of the defendant of that why ganun ang priority?
but rather substituted service. Why? because that is where the defendant resides, A: Because when summons is supposed to be served, there is no counsel yet so
so you serve it on the person in charge thereof. So nagiging substituted service. the priority is the residence while in pleading, there is already a presumption that
Magandang catch yon if it is given in the problem. he is already protected or he has already a counsel of choice. Counsel de parte
kaya ganun.
Q: What kind of service is service upon the prisoner?
A: The answer is the rule requires personal service or service upon the person of Q: There is another defendant which is a corporation and under this
the prisoner because the rule says service on the prisoner through the warden. heading, the corporation can either be of two kinds:
Service on the warden because he is in charge thereof. Even in cases of this special A:
kind of defendant, service of summons may still be made through substituted 1. Public corporation; and
service. 2. Private corporation
a. Domestic private entity; and
Q: What are the requirements for substituted service? Where do you serve b. Foreign private entity
substituted service?
A: At the residence of the defendant to a person of suitable age and discretion Q: In public corporation, to whom must summons be served?
residing therein. The place must be the residence of the defendant and you just
cannot leave it to anyone there in the residence, it must be a person residing A: Correlate this with section 17 Rule 3. In local government unit, the head of the
therein and must be of suitable age and discretion. There are many cases to that state. If it is a province the governor, vice governor. If it is a city, the city mayor
effect. or vice mayor. If it is the municipality, the municipal mayor and in cases of the
barangay, the barangay captain. You can also serve it on the vice mayor in the
Q: If you cannot find his residence, or there is no residence or the absence of the mayor. So any officer of that public corporation, summons may be
residence is unknown? served. But you have to establish that it was received. Yan ang importante don.
That can be done through the return of course. In private corporation, if it is a
A: At the office of the defendant to a person in charged thereof. foreign corporation, summons may be served to the agent of the corporation or
the government entity charged with the said corporation or any agent authorized
Q: If you leave it to a security guard in the office of the defendant, suppose by the corporation.
in a condominium unit, the office is at the 4th floor, pag pasok ng sheriff
sabi ng guard “do ho pwede”, tapos iniwan sa kanya ng sheriff, valid? Q: Is there any difference among these three? Who is that Philippine
government officer authorized to receive summons?
A: That is not valid because the security guard is not in charge thereof. For example
are the cases of Millenium and EB Villarosa doctrine. Substituted service means the A: In cases of insurance corporation, summons may be served to the insurance
service is not anymore to the person of the defendant but rather to someone else commissioner or if it is a bank, to the governor of the Central Bank. If the foreign
whether residing in his residence and must be of suitable age and discretion or to corporation is authorized to do business here in the Philippines, then it is necessary
someone in charge of his office at his office to be valid. that he has an agent here, so you serve it to him. But going back under Rule 11,

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the period to file a responsive pleading, if it is served upon the government officer,
30 days from the receipt not by the government officer but by the corporate December 06, 2006
defendant. If it is served upon the agent, 15 days lang. If it is served upon the
representative, it is also 15 days. Summons is how the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

If it is a domestic private corporation, summons may be served to the president, Q: How is summons served?
the managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer and the
in-house counsel. Note that this is exclusive under the Villarosa doctrine. You better 1. Service on person of the defendant
memorize that because the doctrine now is it is exclusive, the enumeration there
is exclusive. As held in the case of Mason vs CA which reiterated the Villarosa Note: It is not called personal service anymore to distinguish it from sec. 6
doctrine. pleadings and judgment but rather it should be called “Service in person of the
defendant”. In 1964 rule we call that “personal service” but under the present rule
Let’s go back to the modes because another situation here is when the defendant it is now known as “service in person of the defendant”. So if you say personal
is outside the country. When the defendant is outside the country, normally what service it will be marked wrong because there is no more personal service of
comes into your mind is that service of summons must also be made outside the summons, technically speaking, because the rule already calls it “service in person
country as well. That is why you call it extraterritorial service of of the defendant”.
summons under section 15. You connect that with section 14 and 16 because they
have the same mode when the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown or when Note: There is no service by mail of summons, the rationale thereof is that the
the defendant is temporarily outside the country. completeness of the service would be doubtful and since summons is the way by
which the court acquires jurisdiction of the person of the defendant hence
What is the case of Valmonte vs CA? jurisdiction may not be acquired, and there is always a question.

When you speak of extraterritorial service under section 15, it does not follow that 2. Substituted service
you must always have to do it with publication, No! The first mode of
extraterritorial service is service on the person of the defendant. So even if she is Q: Is there a substituted service of pleadings? How do you distinguish
a residence of Washington, they could have ask the sheriff by giving him a round substituted service of summons with substituted service of pleadings?
ticket to Washington, and serve the summons there. That is within the range but
of course it is very impractical, you’ll never do that because the sheriff will not A: Yes. Substituted service of pleadings and other processes is to the clerk of court.
accept it and ask for another ticket for his wife. The second mode is through That substituted service is at the place of residence or at the place of business or
substituted service but who will substitute for that? Now your course is through office.
publication.
Q: In the office, who should receive it?
Q: But look at the “any other mode that may be authorize by the court” A: The person who is in charge thereof.
what is this? Can you give me an example of this?
A: This is upon the discretion of the court but what are the instances of doing that? Q: In the residence?
Through the Philippine Embassy, through the courier (LBC, Fedex), but it must A: Any person who is a resident thereof and of sufficient age and discretion.
always be by leave of court, Yan ang importante. Sometimes when you ask the
court for any other mode, it will tell you “send it by registered mail”. Q: May a minor receive summons?
A: It depends, because what is required is a person who is of sufficient age and
Q: So when you are asked can there be summons by registered mail? discretion. The age refers to one who has discretion. So even if he is a minor but
A: Ordinarily not but it can fall under any other mode directed by the court as long he has discretion he can still receive summons. Age here does not mean age of
as you present to the court the registry receipt. That would fall under any other majority. Definitely a child of 2 cannot receive it due to lack of discretion but a
mode directed by the court. student of 15 years old may receive it because he has discretion.

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Note: There is no service of summons by registered mail. If the court order that it
Q: Can a janitor in the office receive it? Why? must be mailed to the Philippine embassy where the defendant may be
A: No, because he is not in charge of the office, such summons must be served to residing…that falls under sec 16.
a person in charge of the office.
Q: What if the court ordered that summons be served by registered mail,
Q: Can a secretary receive it? shall it be valid?

A: Yes, because ordinarily secretaries are the ones in charge in the office and A: Yes it is valid but not because registered mail is allowed but because it is a mode
there are a lot of jurisprudence that tells us that receipt of secretary of summons of service ordered by the court. Or if the court deems it proper to order the sheriff
is a valid service. to send the sheriff there, but that would be already service of person of the
defendant.
3. Publication
When one whose whereabouts are unknown (sec 14) or where Note: Under extraterritorial service there is no substituted service under sec 15
one is temporarily outside the country (sec 16) summons by
publican may be done. But in the case of Mason vs. CA, you Q: Where is service of summons deemed completed?
have to consider the kind of action in order to avail that mode A: Service on person of the defendant and substituted service is completed upon
of service available, so that service of summons by publication actual receipt. Note that in substituted service it is not the defendant who received
is not allowed in action strictly in personam. Eg. Action for it, it may only by representation but actual receipt of the representatives completes
specific performance, damages, claims etc. Q: If Mr. A married the service. If the service is by publication, it is deemed completed upon the
to Ms. B who is a nurse in Saudi Arabia and Mr. A has filed an completion of the publication.
action for annulment of their marriage, how can summons be
served? A: Summons by publication may be done on the ground Q: How is the completion of the service of summons by publication proved?
that annulment of marriage is a personal action but not an action A: Completion thereof may be proven by affidavits of any person involved in the
in personam. The subject matter of an annulment case is the publication of said summons, eg the editor, circulation manager, publisher etc. any
status of a party from that being married wanting to revert back affidavit of said person will establish proof of service of summons.
to singlehood. Status as subject matter is not strictly in
personam, service of summons may be done by publication and Q: Who are the persons or different kind of defendants to whom summons
together with furnishing a copy of the summons and complaint must be served?
in the last known address which is the address in fact of the A: It must be served to the prisoner through the warden. It must be served to a
plaintiff. minor, incompetent and its parent or guardian. It must be served to an insane and
parent or guardian.
4. Extraterritorial Service
When we go to another defendant, an artificial being, a corporation, we divide it
Note: The mode of extraterritorial service is also by way of publication. into 2, which can be a foreign corporation or domestic corporation. The rule now is
quite strict to a defendant of a private domestic corporation. Cases of Baliwag
Q: There are 3 ways of extraterritorial service of summons. transit which you have studied, of Palsak enterprises, those of Phil oil, of Medialay
a. Service in person of the defendant vs Fernando no longer apply. They were all overturned by the strict provision of
b. Publication together with the sending of the copy of the summons and the rule.
the complaint at the last known address of the defendant
c. any other mode as directed by the court Q: These defendant corporations, private domestic corporation are
required to be served only through specific individuals who are these
persons?

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A: Service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, The other mode in which the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. In the old rules summons defendant is through VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE.
may be made on the cashier and agent, but in the present rules they are not
included anymore. Q: When is a defendant deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court?
Q: What is the Villarosa doctrine? A: When the defendant files a pleading other than a motion to dismiss.

NOTE: Remember that there is no prohibition regarding substituted service when Q: Is filing a motion cannot be construed that the defendant voluntary
defendants are public corporation in other words substituted service is not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court? Irrespective of the ground for
disallowed, meaning it can be availed of. However there is an exact jurisprudence the motion to dismiss?
in the matter so indirectly we can apply the doctrine laid down in Mason vs CA as A: When the defendant asks for affirmative relief from the court he is considered
well as Jose vs Boyo. to voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court hence there is voluntary
appearance.
Q: Where it was established that in order that the service of summons be
considered valid the following must concur: It started in the case of Medialey vs Fernando when a defendant file a motion to
A: dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction he is not considered to have submitted
1. that it must be actually received; himself to the jurisdiction of the court but if over and above the ground of lack of
2. that the person who received it must be duly authorized; jurisdiction he avails of other grounds for a motion to dismiss then he is considered
3. and that there must be evidence to the effect of 1 and 2; to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
4. but most importantly you must establish the relationship of the person
who received it with the corporation. This jurisprudence is no longer correct because in the doctrine of the La Naval case
states that if a defendant files a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
Somehow, this relaxes the doctrine under Villarosa, because the doctrine in jurisdiction and other grounds he is not considered that he has submitted himself
Villarosa if we strictly implement it, all the corporations could never be sued. to the jurisdiction of the court.

Q: If you sue SMC and summons would be served to the 6 as enumerated And the latest case on the matter is that of Millenium Industrial vs Tan which says
under Sec 11, will you ever find them? that in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
A: Before you reach anyone of them you have to pass through several rooms, by voluntary appearance, there must be an “unequivocal submission” (and
through several personalities just to serve the summons. Note: substituted service intentional submission) of himself to the jurisdiction of the court. So if it is equivocal
is not prohibited although there is no clear cut jurisprudence on the subject matter, then the court does not acquire jurisdiction.
as of now there is none.
These somehow modified the old doctrine which says that when a defendant
Q: To whom was the summons served in the Villarosa? In Millenium vs Tan secures or ask for affirmative relief he submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
to whom was it served? court. That doctrine was modified by Millenium vs Tan. Because even if you seek
affirmative relief but you do not categorically submit yourself to the jurisdiction of
NOTE: Remember that if a corporation is the plaintiff, the address of the the court. This seems contradictory, Why? Because if you are seeking affirmative
corporation should not be the branch office, it must always be the principal office. relief from the court you want to the court to give you relief but at the same time
That is why MERALCO for example, there are several offices throughout the you are questioning the jurisdiction of the court to give you relief.
country, that if you want to send summons upon MERALCO you have to serve it in
the principal office and not in any of its branches. Be sure that the defendant is
properly identified branch manager so that you can served it properly. LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A.
SORIANO, Petitioners, vs. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK),* LILIAN S. SORIANO, ESTATE OF LEANDRO

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A. SORIANO, JR., REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEGASPI CITY, and JESUS L. SARTE, Amended Complaint. YES. Whether RTC should have suspended the action
Respondents. G.R. No. 143264 April 23, 2012 THIRD DIVISION instead of dismissing it. YES

FACTS: Lisam Enterprises (LEI) filed an action before RTC Legaspi City against HELD: The Court shall first delve into the matter of the propriety of the denial
herein respondents for Annulment of Mortgage with Prayer for Temporary of the motion to admit amended complaint. Pertinent provisions of Rule 10 of the
Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction with Damages Respondents Lilian S. Rules of Court provide as follows: o Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. −
Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. filed their Answer o They were A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of right at any time before a
duly authorized by LEI to mortgage the subject property; that the proceeds of the responsive pleading is served x x x. o Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court.
loan were all for the benefit of LEI; that all documents bore the signature of Lolita − Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may
Soriano Respondent PCIB filed an MD on the ff grounds: o lack of legal be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to
capacity to sue, failure to state cause of action, and litis pendencia Respondent the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. x x x It should be
PCIB’s co-defendants filed a Motion to Suspend Action RTC issued a Reso noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr.
dismissing the Complaint o Petitioners filed MR o During the pendency of the already filed their Answer, to petitioners' complaint, and the claims being asserted
Reso on said MR, petitioners filed an Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, were made against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed,
amending paragraph 13 of the original complaint to read as follows: 13. That amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and
said irregular transactions of defendant Lilian S. Soriano and her husband Leandro no longer
A. Soriano, Jr., on one hand, and defendant PCIB, on the other, were discovered as a matter of right. However, in Tiu v. Philippine Bank of Communications,[4] the
by plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano sometime in April 1999. That immediately upon Court discussed this rule at length , to wit: o x x x [A]fter petitioners have filed
discovery, said plaintiff, for herself and on behalf and for the benefit of plaintiff LEI, their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows
made demands upon defendant Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. amendment by leave of court. The said Section states: SECTION 3.
Soriano, Jr., to free subject property of plaintiff LEI from such mortgage lien, by Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the next preceding section,
paying in full their personal indebtedness to defendant PCIB in the principal sum substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave
of P20 Million. However, said defendants, for reason only known to them, continued may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to
and still continue to ignore said demands, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiffs; delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made
that plaintiff Lol ita A. Soriano likewise made demands upon the Board of Directors upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity
of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal steps to protect the interest of the to be heard. o Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997
corporation from said fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately, until now, no such Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus: Interestingly,
legal step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this action for the benefit and in Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule
behalf of the corporation; in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is
RTC denied BOTH MR and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint o The trial substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear
court held that no new argument had been raised by petitioners in their motion for import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the
reconsideration to address the fact of plaintiffs' failure to allege in the complaint amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This
that petitioner Lolita A. Soriano made demands upon the Board of Directors of should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in
Lisam Enterprises, Inc. to take steps to protect the interest of the corporation the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the
against the fraudulent acts of the Spouses Soriano and PCIB. The trial court further higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the
ruled that the Amended Complaint can no longer be admitted, because the same laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive
absolutely changed petitioners' cause of action. disposition of every action and proceeding.” The granting of leave to file
amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the
ISSUES: Whether Lolita Soriano is a real party in interest. YES. Whether the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
present case was correctly dismissed by RTC on the ground of litis pendentia. NO. amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory
Whether the present case was correctly dismissed by RTC on the ground of of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as
failure to state COA. NO. Whether RTC should have granted the Motion to Admit enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of
action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve

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the higher interest of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just, speedy the changes made by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may now
and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings. o The courts should be substantially alter the cause of action or defense. It should not have been a
liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in surprise to them that petitioners would redress the defect in the original complaint
order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights by substantially amending the same, which course of action is now allowed under
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This the new rules. The next question then is, upon admission of the amended
liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where complaint, would it still be proper for the trial court to dismiss the complaint? The
the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the Court answers in the negative. Saura v. Saura, Jr.[8] is closely analogous to
petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial. o the present case. In Saura,[9] the petitioners therein, stockholders of a
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be corporation, sold a disputed real property owned by the corporation, despite the
liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as existence of a case in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between
possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the stockholders for annulment of subscription, recovery of corporate assets and funds,
case or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless etc. The sale was done without the knowledge of the other stockholders, thus,
there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse said stockholders filed a separate case for annulment of sale, declaration of nullity
party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to of deed of exchange, recovery of possession, etc., against the stockholders who
amend.[5] Since, as explained above, amendments are generally favored, it took part in the sale, and the buyer of the property, filing said case with the regular
would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards court (RTC). Petitioners therein also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order annulment of sale filed with the RTC, on the ground of forum shopping, lack of
dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is quite apparent jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and litis pendentia among others. The Court
that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not held that the complaint for annulment of sale was properly filed with the regular
have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have served the higher interest court, because the buyer of the property had no intra-corporate relationship with
of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties the stockholders, hence, the buyer could not be joined as party-defendant in the
to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. SEC case. To include said buyer as a party-defendant in the case pending with the
Hence, the Court overrules the trial court's denial of the motion to admit the SEC would violate the then existing rule on jurisdiction over intra-corporate
amended complaint, and orders the admission of the same. With the amendment disputes. The Court also struck down the argument that there was forum shopping,
stating “that plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano likewise made demands upon the Board of ruling that the issue of recovery of corporate assets and funds pending with the
Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal steps to protect the interest of SEC is a totally different issue from the issue of the validity of the sale, so a decision
the corporation from said fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately, until now, no in the SEC case would not amount to res judicata in the case before the regular
such legal step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this action for the benefit and court. Thus, the Court merely ordered the suspension of the proceedings before
in behalf of the corporation,” does the amended complaint now sufficiently state a the RTC until the final outcome of the SEC case. The foregoing pronouncements
cause of action? In Hi-Yield Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court of the Court are exactly in point with the issues in the present case. Here, the
enumerated the requisites for filing a derivative suit, as follows: o a) the party complaint is for annulment of mortgage with the mortgagee bank as one of the
bringing the suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction defendants, thus, as held in Saura,[10] jurisdiction over said complaint is lodged
complained of, the number of his shares not being material; o b) he has tried to with the regular courts because the mortgagee bank has no intra-corporate
exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of relationship with the stockholders. There can also be no forum shopping, because
directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his there is no identity of issues. The issue being threshed out in the SEC case is the
plea; and o c) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the due execution, authenticity or validity of board resolutions and other documents
wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to the corporation and not to used to facilitate the execution of the mortgage, while the issue in the case filed
the particular stockholder bringing the suit.[7] A reading of the amended by petitioners with the RTC is the validity of the mortgage itself executed between
complaint will reveal that all the foregoing requisites had been alleged therein. the bank and the corporation, purportedly represented by the spouses Leandro and
Hence, the amended complaint remedied the defect in the original complaint and Lilian Soriano, the President and Treasurer of petitioner LEI, respectively. Thus,
now sufficiently states a cause of action. Respondent PCIB should not complain there is no reason to dismiss the complaint in this case.
that admitting the amended complaint after they pointed out a defect in the original
complaint would be unfair to them. They should have been well aware that due to

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HENRY CHING TIU, CHRISTOPHER HALIN GO, and GEORGE CO, Petitioners, vs. PBCOM maintained that the insertion was not a falsification, but was made only to
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 151932 speak the truth of the parties’ intentions. PBCOM also contended that petitioners
August 19, 2009 THIRD DIVISION were already primarily liable on the Surety Agreement whether or not the insertion
was made, having admitted in their pleadings that they voluntarily executed and
FACTS: Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by petitioners, applied signed the Surety Agreement in the original form. PBCOM, invoking a liberal
for a loan with respondent PBCOM to fund its water operations. Petitioners, for that application of the Rules, emphasized that the motion incorporated in the pleading
purpose, submitted a Board Resolution and executed a mortgage over the subject can be treated as a motion for leave of court to amend and admit the amended
property AWRI then decided to apply for a bigger loan. Since, this time, the loan complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. RTC allowed
is unsecured, it required its Board members to be sureties, thus executing a Surety substitution of the altered document with the original Surety Agreement
Agreement which was notarized o Of the two copies kept by the notary public, one Petitioners filed a Rule 65 before CA CA denied
copy was retained for his notarial file and the other was sent to the Records
Management and Archives Office, through the Office of the RTC Clerk of Court. ISSUE: Whether RTC correctly allowed the substitution pursuant to Rule 3 Section
AWRI then informed PBCOM that AWRI is willing to surrender and assign to PBCOM 10.
all its present properties as dacion en pago for its present obligation with PBCOM
PBCOM denied this and demanded for the payment of the balance AWRI failed HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that the CA committed a reversible error in
to pay PBCOM filed a complaint for collection against herein petitioners affirming the Order of the RTC allowing the substitution of the document by relying
Petitioners filed an Answer o It alleged, among other things, that they were not on Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the Rules do
personally liable on the promissory notes, because they signed the Surety not allow the withdrawal and substitution of a “falsified document” once discovered
Agreement in their capacities as officers of AWRI. They claimed that the Surety by the opposing party. Petitioners maintain that PBCOM’s cause of action was
Agreement attached to the complaint as Annexes “A” to “A-2”[9] were falsified, solely and principally founded on the alleged “falsified document” originally marked
considering that when they signed the same, the words “In his personal capacity” as Annexes “A” to “A-2.” Thus, the “withdrawal” of the document results in the
did not yet appear in the document and were merely intercalated thereon without automatic withdrawal of the whole complaint on the ground that there is no more
their knowledge and consent. o In support of their allegations, petitioners attached cause of action to be maintained or enforced by plaintiff against petitioners. Also,
to their Answer a certified photocopy of the Surety Agreement issued on March 25, petitioners argue that if the substitution will be allowed, their defenses that were
1999 by the Records Management and Archives Office in Davao anchored on Annexes “A” to “A-2” would be gravely affected. Moreover,
City,[11] showing that the words “In his personal capacity” were not found at the considering that the said document was already removed, withdrawn, and
foot of page two of the document where their signatures appeared. PBCOM’s disregarded by the RTC, the withdrawal and substitution of the document would
counsel retrieved the Surety Agreement and found that the notarial copy showed prevent petitioners from introducing the falsified documents during the trial as part
that the words “In his personal capacity” did not appear on page two of the Surety of their evidence.[23] Petitioners submit that the RTC misapplied the principle
Agreement Petitioners demanded PBCOM to explain such alteration PBCOM of equity when it allowed PBCOM to substitute the document with the original
later on found that said alteration was done by PBCOM’s audito o It alleged that agreement. Petitioners also claim that the remedy of appeal after the termination
when the Surety Agreement was inspected by the bank auditor, he called the of the case in the RTC would become ineffective and inadequate if the Order of the
attention of the loans clerk, Kenneth Cabahug, as to why the words “In his personal RTC allowing the “withdrawal” and “substitution” of the document would not be
capacity” were not indicated under the signature of each surety, in accordance with nullified, because the falsified document would no longer be found in the records
bank standard operating procedures. The auditor then ordered Mr. Cabahug to of the case during the appeal.[24] Petitioners contend that the CA went beyond
type the words “In his personal capacity” below the second signatures of the issue raised before it when it interpreted the provisions of the Surety
petitioners. However, the notary public was never informed of the insertion.[14] Agreement, particularly paragraph 4 thereof, and then ruled on the obligations of
Mr. Cabahug subsequently executed an affidavit[15] attesting to the circumstances the parties based on the document. Petitioners posit that the CA prematurely
why the insertion was made. PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to ruled on petitioners’ obligations, considering that their obligations should be
Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to Substitute Annex “A” of the determined during trial on the merits, after the parties have been given the
Complaint, o it attached the duplicate original copy retrieved from the file of the opportunity to present their evidence in support of their respective claims.
notary public. PBCOM also admitted its mistake in making the insertion and Petitioners stress that the CA went into the merit of the case when it gave credence
explained that it was made without the knowledge and consent of the notary public. to the statement of fact of PBCOM that “From August 15 to December 9, 1997,

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Asian Water Resources, Inc. obtained several availments on its additional loans substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective
totalling P2,030,000.00 as evidenced by 4 promissory notes marked as Annexes of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
B, B-1, B-2, and B-3. Thus, the conclusion of the CA in declaring the petitioners action and proceeding.”[27] o The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a
liable as sureties violated their right to due process.[25] For its part, PBCOM matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that
argues that since the complaint is based on an actionable document, i.e., the surety discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not
agreement, the original or a copy thereof should be attached to the pleading as an substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it
exhibit, which shall be deemed part of the pleading. Considering that the surety was not made to delay the action.[28] Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela,
agreement is annexed to the complaint, it is an integral part thereof and its even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such
substitution with another copy is in the nature of a substantial amendment, which amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of
is allowed by the Rules, but with prior leave of court. Moreover, PBCOM alleges substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
that since the Rules provides that substantial amendments may be made upon disposition of actions and proceedings. The courts should be liberal in allowing
leave of court, the authority of the RTC to allow the amendment is discretionary. amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real
Thus, the CA correctly held that the act of granting the said substitution was within controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the
the clear and proper discretion of the RTC. o The petition is without merit. As to case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in
the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was annexed to the complaint the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was
with the original thereof, this Court finds that the RTC did not err in allowing the made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed
substitution. The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Section 7, by law to answer and to prepare for trial.[29] Furthermore, amendments to
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the cause of action is pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of
anchored on a document, its substance must be set forth, and the original or a justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real
copy thereof “shall” be attached to the pleading as an exhibit and deemed a part facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action
thereof, to wit: o Section 7. Action or defense based on document. – Whenever an and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as
action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which
of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original might justify a refusal of permission to amend.[30] In the present case, there
or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the altered surety
deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have
in the pleading. With respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint, including submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted
the documents annexed thereto, after petitioners have filed their answer, Section that, through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the
3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court. copy wherein the words “IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY” were inserted to conform
The said Section states: o SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as to the bank’s standard practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge
provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only of the notary public. PBCOM’s counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the
upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the surety agreement
the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters with the original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously resolved.
provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice Verily, it is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance,
to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard. This Court has that the written document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a
emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure matter of both principle and policy that when the written contract is established as
in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,[26] thus: o Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the repository of the parties’ stipulations, any other evidence is excluded, and the
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that same cannot be used to substitute for such contract, or even to alter or contradict
the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered” was the latter.[31] The original surety agreement is the best evidence that could
stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment establish the parties’ respective rights and obligations. In effect, the RTC merely
in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) allowed the amendment of the complaint, which consequently included the
substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true, substitution of the altered surety agreement with a copy of the original.
however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere tools
defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application

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that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote which cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This
substantial justice must always be avoided.[32] Applied to the instant case, this rule is only intended to correct defects of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
not only assures that it would be resolved based on real facts, but would also aid procedure or matters in the trial court’s findings or conclusions. However, this
in the speedy disposition of the case by utilizing the best evidence possible to Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the CA should not have made
determine the rights and obligations of the party- litigants. Moreover, contrary determinations as regards the parties’ respective rights based on the surety
to petitioners’ contention, they could not be prejudiced by the substitution since agreement. The CA went beyond the issues brought before it and effectively
they can still present the substituted documents, Annexes “A” to A-2,” as part of preempted the RTC in making its own determinations. It is to be noted that the
the evidence of their affirmative defenses. The substitution did not prejudice present case is still pending determination by the RTC. The CA should have been
petitioners or delay the action. On the contrary, it tended to expedite the more cautious and not have gone beyond the issues submitted before it in the
determination of the controversy. Besides, the petitioners are not precluded from petition for certiorari; instead, it should have squarely addressed whether or not
filing the appropriate criminal action against PBCOM for attaching the altered copy there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the Orders
of the surety agreement to the complaint. The substitution of the documents would dated December 14, 1999 and January 11, 2000.
not, in any way, erase the existence of falsification, if any. The case before the
RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged falsification is criminal, which is separate REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
and distinct from another. Thus, the RTC committed no reversible error when it APPEALS and BRITISH STEEL (ASIA), LTD., respondents. G.R. No. 133657 May 29,
allowed the substitution of the altered surety agreement with that of the original. 2002 FIRST DIVISION
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to FACTS: Petitioner Remington filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court arisin from breach of contract before RTC Manila Br 22 against principal defendant
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a therein was Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading GMBH (Ferro) and
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[33] For a respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL and respondent British
petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are: Steel filed MDs for failure to state COA o RTC denied MD; denied ensuing MRs
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial Respondent British Steel filed a Rule 65 before CA o Respondent claimed
or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or therein that the complaint did not contain a single averment that respondent
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or committed any act or is guilty of any omission in violation of petitioner’s legal right
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[34] The phrase without jurisdiction means additional factual allegations constitutive of its cause of action against respondent.
that the court acted with absolute lack of authority or want of legal power, right or Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10[9] of the Rules of Court, petitioner maintained that
authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or it can amend the complaint as a matter of right because respondent has not yet
with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority. filed a responsive pleading thereto o RTC NOTED said amendment CA
Excess of jurisdiction occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without granted British Steel’s Rule 65; likewise ordered for the suspension of proceedings
any statutory authority; or results when an act, though within the general power before the RTC
of a tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not authorized, and is invalid with respect
to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the ISSUE: Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has
exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. Grave abuse of been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be higher court?
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; HELD: YES. Section 2, Rule 10[16] of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states
and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive that a pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading
duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in is served. This only means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has
contemplation of law.[35] The present case failed to comply with the above- the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change
stated requisites. In the instant case, the soundness of the RTC’s Order allowing in theory is introduced.[17] The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent
the substitution of the document involves a matter of judgment and discretion, Section 3 of Rule 10[18]. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the

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complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, should be allowed in the case at bar as a matter of right in accordance with the
because any material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could rules.
prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense in the
answer. Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant’s rights have been LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE, petitioners, vs. THE
violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION and ROSITA DIMALANTA,
In such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be respondents. G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996 SECOND DIVISION
altered[19] or affected by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity to FACTS: PR Dimalanta, sister of petitioner Lourdes, filed a complaint for partition
address the allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in the of real property and accounting of rentals against the latter and the latter’s spouse,
answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint Alfredo Valmnonte The Valmonte spouses were residents of Washington, USA
once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant. The but, since Alfredo was a member of PH Bar and a practicing lawyer in PH, he
right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before regularly commutes from Washington to his office in Mabini, Manila Service of
an answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss[20] summons was then effected upon Alfredo in his Manila office, which summons was
or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, personally received by Alfredo. However, he refused receiving the same on behalf
the right to amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory of his wife, Lourdes, as he was not authorized to receive the same Alfredo then
and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial right filed his Answer. Lourdes, however, did not. Dimalanta moved that Lourdes be
is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer. declared in default Alfredo then made a special appearance for his wife Lourdes
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in and questioned the court’s jurisdiction over the latter RTC denied Dimalanta’s
the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its motion and the ensuing MR Dimalanta filed a Rule 65 before CA CA
merits without regard to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized to granted petition; declared Lourdes to be in default
speed up trial and save party litigants from incurring unnecessary expense, so that
a full hearing on the merits of every case may be had and multiplicity of suits ISSUE: Whether summons was validly served upon Lourdes thereby warranting
avoided.[21] In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate court in its the order declaring her to be in default.
assailed judgment will precisely result in multiple suits, involving the same set of
facts and to which the defendants would likely raise the same or, at least, related HELD: NO. Petitioners assail the aforequoted decision, alleging that the Court of
defenses. Plainly stated, we find no practical advantage in ordering the dismissal Appeals erred (1) in refusing to apply the provisions of Rule 14, § 17 of the Revised
of the complaint against respondent and for petitioner to re-file the same, when Rules of Court and applying instead Rule 14, § 8 when the fact is that petitioner
the latter can still clearly amend the complaint as a matter of right. The Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident defendant; and (2) because even if Rule 14,
amendment of the complaint would not prejudice respondents or delay the action, § 8 is the applicable provision, there was no valid substituted service as there
as this would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition. The fact that was no strict compliance with the requirement by leaving a copy of the summons
the other defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint does not bar and complaint with petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte. Private respondent, upon the
petitioner’s right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where other hand, asserts that petitioners are invoking a technicality and that strict
some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its adherence to the rules would only result in a useless ceremony. We hold that
complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against there was no valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte. To provide
the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other perspective, it will be helpful to determine first the nature of the action filed against
defendants.[22] Furthermore, we do not agree with respondent’s claim that it petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte by private respondent,
will be prejudiced by the admission of the Amended Complaint because it had spent whether it is an action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. This is because the
time, money and effort to file its petition before the appellate court.[23] We cannot rules on service of summons embodied in Rule 14 apply according to whether an
see how the result could be any different for respondent, if petitioner merely re- action is one or the other of these actions. In an action in personam, personal
filed the complaint instead of being allowed to amend it. As adverted to earlier, service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served,
amendment would even work to respondent’s advantage since it will undoubtedly substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, § 7-8[2] is essential for the acquisition
speed up the proceedings before the trial court. Consequently, the amendment by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court.[3] If defendant cannot be served with

194
summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication.[4] burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or
Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
personally served with summons, may be summoned either by means of foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The
substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, § 8 or by publication as provided judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
in § 17 and 18 of the same Rule.[5] In all of these cases, it should be noted, As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the
defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in personam Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, § 17.
cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by
binding decision. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known
is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem
extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, § 17, which provides: o § 17. sufficient. Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner
Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not reside and is not found in Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes, the
the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates question is whether the service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte,
to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the can be justified under the third mode, namely, “in any . . . manner the court may
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the deem sufficient.” We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must
relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the
interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the foreign country where the defendant resides.[8] Moreover, there are several
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by reasons why the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be
personal service as under Section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of general considered a valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case first place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made
a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly was not a
the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service
deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for
which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant her failure to file an answer. In the second place, service in the attempted
must answer. In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required
or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of also in Rule 14, § 17. As provided in § 19, such leave must be applied for by motion
the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached. in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and
Service of summons in the manner provided in § 17 is not for the purpose of vesting setting forth the grounds for the application. Finally, and most importantly,
it with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte
process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be
the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to file
an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can an Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs from the period given
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.[6] Applying the in an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not found in the
foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondent’s action, which is for partition Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons,
and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice. Strict compliance
action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific with these requirements alone can assure observance of due process. That is why
property and not to render a judgment against him. As explained in the leading in one case,[9] although the Court considered publication in the Philippines of the
case of Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca :[7] o [An action quasi in rem is] an action summons (against the contention that it should be made in the foreign state where
which while not strictly speaking an action in rem partakes of that nature and is defendant was residing) sufficient, nonetheless the service was considered
substantially such. . . . The action quasi in rem differs from the true action in rem insufficient because no copy of the summons was sent to the last known correct
in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant and the address in the Philippines. Private respondent cites the ruling in De Leon v.

195
Hontanosas, 67 SCRA 458,462463 (1975), in which it was held that service of
summons upon the defendant’s husband was binding on her. But the ruling in that FACTS: Petitioner Millenium executed a Deed of REM in favor of respondent Tan
case is justified because summons were served upon defendant’s husband in their for the loan it obtained from the latter in the amount of P2M without interest but
conjugal home in Cebu City and the wife was only temporarily absent, having gone payable on its due date in the amount of P4M Petitioner was unable to pay
to Dumaguete City for a vacation. The action was for collection of a sum of money. Respondent filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage before RTC Cebu Br 6
In accordance with Rule 14, § 8, substituted service could be made on any person Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner through a
of sufficient discretion in the dwelling place of the defendant, and certainly certain Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriff's return, dated November 23,
defendant’s husband, who was there, was competent to receive the summons on 1995, as "a Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and (discretion) working therein,
her behalf. In any event, it appears that defendant in that case submitted to the he is the highest ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge of defendant's Corporation,
jurisdiction of the court by instructing her husband to move for the dissolution of to receive processes of the Court." Petitioner filed an MD o on the ground that
the writ of attachment issued in that case. On the other hand, in the case of there was no valid service of summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court
Gemperle v. Schenker,[10] it was held that service on the wife of a nonresident did not acquire jurisdiction over
defendant was found sufficient because the defendant had appointed his wife as it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, §13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and contended that
his attorney-in-fact. It was held that although defendant Paul Schenker was a Swiss service on Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff's return, was invalid as he is
citizen and resident of Switzerland, service of summons upon his wife Helen not one of the authorized persons on whom summons may be served and that, in
Schenker who was in the Philippines was sufficient because she was her husband’s fact, he was not even its employee o Petitioner also sought the dismissal of the
representative and attorney-in-fact in a civil case, which he had earlier filed against complaint against it on the ground that it had satisfied its obligation to respondent
William Gemperle. In fact Gemperle’s action was for damages arising from when the latter opted to be paid in shares of stock under the following stipulation
allegedly derogatory statements contained in the complaint filed in the first case. in the mortgage contract: That in the remote possibility of failure on the part of
As this Court said, “i]n other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had the mortgagor to pay the mortgage obligation and interest in cash, the
actually sued, on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to MORTGAGEE at his option may demand that payment be made in the form of
represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the one at bar, shares of stock of Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation totaling at least
which is a consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.”[11] Indeed, if 4,000,000 shares.[4] o Petitioner further prayed for "other reliefs just and
instead of filing an independent action Gemperle filed a counterclaim in the action equitable under the premises." RTC denied MD o By interposing the second
brought by Mr. Schenker against him, there would have been no doubt that the ground, the defendant has availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which
trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over Mr. Schenker through his agent the Court has to hear and receive evidence. For the Court to validly decide the said
and attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Schenker. In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner plea of the defendant it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although the defendant. Thus, defendant is considered to have then abandoned its first
she wrote private respondent’ s attorney that “all communications” intended for ground and is deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the latter’s Court. It is a legal truism that voluntary appearance cures the defect of the
address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred summons, if any. The defendant's filing of the motion to dismiss by pleading therein
therefrom. In fact the letter was written seven months before the filing of this case the second ground amounts to voluntary appearance and it indeed cured the
below, and it appears that it was written in connection with the negotiations defect. Petitioner filed MR but the same was denied Petitioner filed a
between her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition Rule 65 before CA CA dismissed petition o The appellate court ruled that
of the property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the exchange although petitioner denied Lynverd Cinches' authority to receive summons for it,
of correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the authority its actual receipt of the summons could be inferred from its filing of a motion to
given to petitioner’s husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed dismiss, hence, the purpose for issuing summons had been substantially achieved.
as also including an authority to represent her in any litigation. For the foregoing Moreover, it was held, by including the affirmative defense that it had already paid
reasons, we hold that there was no valid service on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte its obligation and praying for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
in this case. voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court

MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JACKSON

TAN, respondent. G.R. No. 131724 February 28, 2000 SECOND DIVISION

196
ISSUE: Whether the fact that petitioner south another affirmative defense, aside officers of the corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying the substantial
from the lack of jurisdiction of RTC over his person, cured the invalid service of compliance rule,[17] there was direct evidence, such as the admission of the
summons upon it. corporation's officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation through the person
upon whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely
HELD: NO. First. Petitioner objects to the application of the doctrine of infer actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on whom
substantial compliance in the service of summons for two reasons: (1) the summons was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial
enumeration of persons on whom service of summons on a corporation may be compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person
effected in Rule 14 §13, is exclusive and mandatory; and (2) even assuming that served must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of summons
substantial compliance is allowed, its alleged actual receipt of the summons is and the filing of the complaint against it through some person or means other than
based on an unfounded speculation because there is nothing in the records to show the person actually served, the service of summons becomes meaningless. This is
that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of particularly true in the present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd
the corporation.[9] Petitioner contends that it was able to file a motion to dismiss Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was effected, is in fact an
only because of its timely discovery of the foreclosure suit against it when it employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to
checked the records of the case in the trial court. o The contention is meritorious. show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.
Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the Respondent casts doubt on petitioner's claim that it came to know about the
existence of an action against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction summons and the complaint against it only after it learned that there was a pending
over the person of the defendant.[10] If the defendant is corporation, Rule 14, §13 foreclosure of its mortgage. There is nothing improbable about this claim. Petitioner
requires that service of summons be made upon the corporation’s president, was in default in the payment of its loan. It had received demand letters from
manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.[11] The rationale of the respondent. Thus, it had reason to believe that a foreclosure suit would be filed
rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the against it. The appellate court was, therefore, in error in giving weight to
corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his respondent's claims. Receipt by petitioner of the summons and complaint cannot
responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers received by be inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Second. We
him.[12] Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, §13 is exclusive now turn to the issue of jurisdiction by estoppel. Both the trial court and the Court
and that service of summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. of Appeals held that by raising the affirmative defense of payment and by praying
This is the general rule.[13] However, it is settled that substantial compliance by for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner in effect waived its objection to
serving summons on persons other than those mentioned in the above rule may the trial court's jurisdiction over it. We think this is error. Our decision in La
be justified. In G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[14] we ruled that Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals[18] settled this question. The rule prior
although the service of summons was made on a person not enumerated in Rule to La Naval was that if a defendant, in a motion to dismiss, alleges grounds for
14, §13, if it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the dismissing the action other than lack of jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have
corporation, there is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose has been submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.[19] This rule no longer holds
attained. In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[15] this Court enumerated true. Noting that the doctrine of estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and
the requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: intentional, we ruled in La Naval: o Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably
(a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative
transferring possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person defense. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The
served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be construed as an estoppel
there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person or as a waiver of such defense.[20] Third. Finally, we turn to the effect of
on whom the summons was actually served.[16] The third requisite is the most petitioner's prayer for "other reliefs" in its Motion to Dismiss. In De Midgely v.
important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of Fernandos,[21] it was held that, in a motion to dismiss, the allegation of grounds
summons is attained. In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second other than lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, including a prayer
requisites were fulfilled. With respect to the third, the appellate court held that "for such other reliefs as" may be deemed "appropriate and proper" amounted to
petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof that it received voluntary appearance. This, however, must be deemed superseded by the ruling
the copy of the summons and the complaint. There is, however, no direct proof of in La Naval that estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional. It
this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the would be absurd to hold that petitioner unequivocally and intentionally submitted

197
itself to the jurisdiction of the court by seeking other reliefs to which it might be receipt of the summons and the complaint that defendant chose to file a motion to
entitled when the only relief that it can properly ask from the trial court is the dismiss. Petitioner filed by Special Appearance a Reply RTC denied
dismissal of the complaint against it petitioner’s MR

E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO, ISSUE: Whether there was substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 132, Makati City and IMPERIAL service of summons upon petitioner.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. 136426. August 6, 1999
THIRD DIVISION HELD: NO. Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that: o “When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
FACTS: Petitioner and PR entered into a contract whereby petitioner agreed to under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made
develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
to PR into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They treasurer, or inhouse counsel.” (underscoring supplied). This provision revised
further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that: o “SEC.
the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati. PR then instituted a 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. – If the defendant
complaint against petitioner for Breach of Contract and Damages before RTC Makati is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier,
other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial agent, or any of its directors.” (underscoring supplied). Petitioner contends that
developments therein Summons was served upon petitioner through its Branch the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is “restricted,
Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at CDO o Sheriff’s Return limited and exclusive” following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios
of Service[3] stated that the summons was duly served “upon defendant E. B. est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so
on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, by clear and concise language. o We agree with petitioner. Earlier cases have
and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons.” uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager[15]; a
Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with MD o “summons intended for corporation’s assistant manager[16]; ordinary clerk of a corporation[17]; private
defendant” was served upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an employee of defendant secretary of corporate executives[18]; retained counsel[19]; officials who had
at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of charge or control of the operations of the corporation, like the assistant general
the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of manager[20]; or the corporation’s Chief Finance and Administrative Officer[21].
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Defendant contends that the trial In these cases, these persons were considered as “agent” within the contemplation
court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly of the old rule.[22] Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an
served upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The cases cited by private
one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 respondent are therefore not in point. In the Kanlaon case, this Court ruled that
Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be made. PR under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be served
filed a motion to declare defendant in default, alleging that the latter failed to file personally or by registered mail on the party himself; if the party is represented
its answer Petitioner filed an Opposition to said motion RTC denied both by counsel or any other authorized representative or agent, summons shall be
MD and motion to declare herein petitioner in default; ordered the latter to file its served on such person. In said case, summons was served on one Engr. Estacio
Answer within 10 days Petitioner filed by Special Appearance an MR o Section who managed and supervised the construction project in Iligan City (although the
11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the principal address of the corporation is in Quezon City) and supervised the work of
service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is the employees. It was held that as manager, he had sufficient responsibility and
very specific and clear in that the word “manager” was changed to “general discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay
manager”, “secretary” to “corporate secretary”, and excluding therefrom agent and the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner such that
director. PR filed its Opposition o defendant’s branch manager “did bring summons for petitioner was validly served on him as agent and authorized
home” to the defendantcorporation the notice of the filing of the action and by representative of petitioner. Also in the Gesulgon case cited by private respondent,
virtue of which a motion to dismiss was filed; and that it was one (1) month after the summons was received by the clerk in the office of the Assistant Manager (at

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principal office address) and under Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule), summons may obviated had the summons been served at the firm’s principal office. And in the
be made upon the clerk who is regarded as agent within the contemplation of the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et al.[28]
rule. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept the Court succinctly clarified that, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, “strictest”
summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (on
specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now Priorities in modes of service and filing) is mandated and the Court cannot rule
states “general manager” instead of only “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation by the 1997 Rules in order
of “secretary”; and “treasurer” instead of “cashier.” The phrase “agent, or any of to obviate delay in the administration of justice. Accordingly, we rule that the
its directors” is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. The particular revision service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at
under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at
Regalado, thus:[23] o “x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
defendant corporation to ‘be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, over the person of the petitioner. The fact that defendant filed a belated motion
agent or any of its directors.’ The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person. There is no
susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word question that the defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to
‘agent’ of the corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the service of summons.[29] Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the
corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special appearance through a
but whose very appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised other grounds or
defective service, is an illustration of the need for this revised section with limited invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction
scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case of the court, the party is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the court.[30] This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug
the corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[31] which became the basis of the
from an independent practitioner.” (underscoring supplied) Retired Justice Oscar adoption of a new provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of
Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee, stated Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules. Section 20 now provides that “the inclusion in a motion
that “(T)he rule must be strictly observed. Service must be made to one named to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
in (the) statute x x x”.[24] It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.” The emplacement of this
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on
enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing,[25] the summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly
Court held: o “A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be
must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. x deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service
xx The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction
prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be over the person of the defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court
served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will will consequently be null and void.[32]
know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, ‘to bring
home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.’ x x x. The liberal SOLEDAD CHANLIONGCO RAMOS, FRANCISCO D. CHANLIONGCO, ADELBERTO D.
construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal CHANLIONGCO, ARMANDO D. CHANLIONGCO and FLORENCIO D. CHANLIONGCO,
requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic petitioners, vs. TERESITA D. RAMOS, Spouses TERESITA and EDMUNDO S. MUYOT,
corporation. x x x.” (underscoring supplied). Service of summons upon persons Spouses VEDASTA and FLORENCIO M. DATO, LORETO MUYOT, Spouses TERESITA
other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as and ELMER SOLIS, LICERIA TORRES, Spouses CORAZON and VICENTE
improper.[26] Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firm’s MACATUNGAL, Spouses PRECILLA and CRISOSTOMO MUYOT, and Spouses
branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at CARIDAD and SALVADOR PINGOL, respondents. G.R. No. 144294. March 11, 2003
the firm’s principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Ins. Co., Inc. vs. THIRD DIVISION
Dizon,[27] it was held that the service of summons on the general manager of the
insurance firm’s Cebu branch was improper; default order could have been

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FACTS: Paulino V. Chanliongco Jr., his sister Narcisa, and his brothers Mario and particular person. It was therefore a real action, because it affected title to or
Antonio were the co-owners of the subject property Narcisa’s daughter, possession of real property.[18] As such, the Complaint was brought against the
Adoracion C. Mendoza, then sold the lot to herein respondents on different days in deceased registered co-owners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino and Antonio Chanliongco,
September 1986, by virtue of an SPA executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa as represented by their respective estates. Clearly, petitioners were not the
Petitioners (childred of Paulino) filed before RTC a complaint for interpleader, registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto
in view of the conflict between the heirs as to the validity of said sale RTC as heirs of Paulino. They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a
sale was invalid o It ruled that Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the property of the estate, because the latter was represented by an executor or
other co-owners, because the Special Power of Attorney had been executed in favor administrator.[19] Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the
only of her mother, Narcisa. CA modified RTC’s ruling case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been made
o It held that while there was no Special Power of Attorney in favor of Adoracion, parties. Furthermore, at the time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of
the sale was nonetheless valid, because she had been authorized by her mother to Court were still in effect. Under the old Rules, specifically Section 3 of Rule 3,[20]
be the latter’s sub-agent. There was thus no need to execute another special an executor or administrator may sue or be sued without joining the party for
power of attorney in her favor as sub-agent. This CA Decision was not appealed, whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended.[21] The present rule,[22]
became final and was entered in favor of respondents on August 8, 1996 however, requires the joinder of the beneficiary or the party for whose benefit the
Petitioners filed with CA a motion to set aside the decision o They contended action is brought. Under the former Rules, an executor or administrator is allowed
that they had not been served a copy of either the Complaint or the summons. to either sue or be sued alone in that capacity. In the present case, it was the
Neither had they been impleaded as parties to the case in the RTC. As it was, they estate of petitioners’ father Paulino Chanliongco, as represented by Sebrio Tan
argued, the CA Decision should be set aside because it adversely affected their Quiming and Associates, that was included as defendant[23] and served
respective shares in the property without due process. CA denied said motion summons.[24] As it was, there was no need to include petitioners as defendants.
Not being parties, they were not entitled to be served summons. Petitioner
ISSUE: Whether petitioners were still entitled to the service of summons, Florencio D. Chanliongco, on the other hand, was impleaded in the Complaint, but
considering that the case was already then on appeal before the CA. not served summons. However, the service of summons upon the estate of his
deceased father was sufficient, as the estate appeared for and on behalf of all the
HELD: NO. It is well settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes beneficiaries and the heirs of Paulino Chanliongco, including Florencio.
immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
or law;[11] and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, vs. SPS. IRENEO M. SANTIAGO and
highest court in the land.[12] The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of LIWANAG P. SANTIAGO, CENTROGEN, INC., REPRSENTED BY EDWIN SANTIAGO,
(1) clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice Respondent. G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007 THIRD DIVISION
to any party, and (3) void judgments.[13] To determine whether the CA Decision
of September 28, 1995 is void, the failure to implead and to serve summons upon FACTS: PR Centrogen is domestic company represented by its President, Edwin
petitioners will now be addressed.[14] To be able to rule on this point, the Court Santiago, son of private respondents Spouses Ireneo M. Santiago and Liwanag P.
needs to determine whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The Santiago. It then obtained loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC)
rules on the service of summons differ depending on the nature of the action. in different amounts, the total of which reached the sum P4,650,000.00, as
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an evidenced by promissory notes executed by Edwin Santiago. As security for part
action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person;[15] while of its obligation, Ireneo Santiago executed a REM over the subject land in Laguna.
an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject The mortgage secured the principal loan in the amount of P490,000.00. Later on,
that person’s interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation.[16] the same property secured another loan obligation in the amount of P1,504,280.00
The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to Centrogen defaulted FEBTC merged with BPI, the latter assuming all rights,
determine the ownership of the real property in question.[17] Specifically, it forced privileges and obligations of the former BPI filed a complaint for foreclosure
persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among themselves as Notice of Sale was sent to PRs PRs filed a Complaint seeking the issuance
to which of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve the of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the
ownership of the land and was not directed against the personal liability of any alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI. o Full

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payment; after the amount of Two Million Pesos was released and was accordingly the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality service may be made on the
used in funding the erection of the structural details of the project, FEBTC, in gross president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or
violation of the agreement, did not release the balance of Three Million Pesos that in-house counsel. Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of
will supposedly finance the purchase of machineries and equipment necessary for service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The
the operation. As a result, the squalene project failed and the company groped for officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute;
funds to pay its loan obligations. BPI was summoned Sheriff’s return: o otherwise, the service is insufficient.19 The purpose is to render it reasonably
Respectfully returned the original summons and order dated February 2003 with certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action
the information that on February 27, 2003 the undersigned served the copy of against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so
summons together with the corresponding copy of complaint and its Annexes and integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal
order dated February 27, 2003, to defendants (sic) Bank of the Philippine Islands papers served on him. Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we
(BPI) thru the manager Ms. Glona Ramos at Sta. Cruz Laguna Branch, at Sta. Cruz, rule that the service of summons on BPI’s Branch Manager did not bind the
Laguna, to defendant Sheriff Marcial Opinion at the Office of the Provincial Sheriff corporation for the branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the
of Laguna, R.T.C. (sic) Sta. Cruz, Laguna as shown by their signatures on the statute of the persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made in
original summons and order. BPI instead of filing an Answer, filed an MD o behalf of the corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual.
In its Motion to Dismiss, BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new summons on 11 March
Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the 2003, before the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued on 20 March 2003,
Revised Rules of Court9 to receive summons on behalf of the corporation. The whatever defect attended the service of the original summons, was promptly and
summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not bind the corporation. accordingly cured. It bears stressing, that on 7 March 2003, the Branch Clerk of
RTC denied MD o emphasized that the nature of the case merited its removal Court issued a new summons which was properly served upon BPI’s Corporate
from the purview of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Based on Secretary on 11 March 2003, as evidenced by the Sheriff’s Return. The
the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court,13 the RTC subsequent service of summons was neither disputed nor was it mentioned by BPI
declared that the instant Order is still valid and binding despite non-compliance except in a fleeting narration of facts and therefore enjoys the presumption that
with the provisions of Section 11, Rule 14 of the same Rules. RTC issued TRO official duty has been regularly performed.20 The Process
enjoining Sheriff from proceeding with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale; ordered Server’s Certificate of Service of Summons is a prima facie evidence of facts set
issuance of new summons o To avoid further argument as regards the proper out in that certificate.21 Inarguably, before the Order granting the application
service of summons to Defendant Bank, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby for Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued, the RTC already acquired jurisdiction
directed to issue another summons and serve copy of the same together with the over the person of BPI by virtue of the new summons validly served on the
complaint and its annexes to any of the officers of the Defendant Bank as provided Corporate Secretary. The fact that the original summons was invalidly served is of
by the rules of civil procedure. Sheriff’s Return: o This is to Certify that on March no moment since jurisdiction over BPI was subsequently acquired by the service of
11, 2003 the undersigned caused the service of summons together with the copy a new summons. In the case of The Philippine American Life and General
of complaint and its annexes to defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and Insurance Company v. Brevea,[22] we ruled: o A case should not be dismissed
receive (sic) by the Office of the Corporate Secretary dated March 11, 2003 at the simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult
BPI Building Ayala Avenue, Makati City. RTC granted PRs’ application for to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court
issuance of writ of PI BPI filed MR o RTC denied BPI filed a Rule 65 complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case against him
before RTC CA denied petition o The Court of Appeals declared that jurisdiction should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant.
was acquired upon the service of new summons. Before the assailed Orders were o x x x It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an "original" or
therefore issued, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI. an "alias" summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is
essential is that the summons complies with the requirements under the Rules of
ISSUE: Whether the subsequent service of summons upon BPI was valid thereby Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the prevailing
rendering the assailed Orders of RTC likewise valid. complaint. x x x Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias
summons but more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a
HELD: YES. Sec. 11, Rule 14. Service upon domestic private juridical entity – continuation of the first summons considering that it particularly referred to the
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under amended complaint and not to the original complaint. (Emphases supplied.)

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BPI’s lamentation, at every turn, on the invalidity of the service of summons made general circulation in the Philippines o submitted the affidavit of publication of the
on the Branch Manager and its deliberate neglect to acknowledge the fact that a advertising manager of Remate[5] and an affidavit of service of respondent’s
new summons was accordingly served on its Corporate Secretary, is an attempt in employee[6] to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail
futility to mislead this Court into believing that the court a quo never acquired to petitioner’s last known address. Petitioner failed to answer Respondent
jurisdiction over the case and thus the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction moved that he be allowed to present evidence ex parte RTC granted motion
was invalid. o We are not drawn into petitioner’s sophistry. In the case of G&G 96
Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,23 this Court made the following
pronouncements: o Although it may be true that the service of summons was made October 15, 2003: case was submitted for decision October 28, 2003:
on a person not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner, Petitioner filed an “Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
nevertheless since it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact Answer.” o He sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging
received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section
substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons. x x x The need for 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He
speedy justice must prevail over a technicality. In explaining the test on the also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the
validity of service of summons, Justice Florenz Regalado24 stressed that September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondent’s evidence ex parte be
substantial justice must take precedence over technicality and thus stated: o The stricken off the records and that his answer be admitted. Respondent insisted
ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the that it complied with the rules on service by publication. Moreover, pursuant to the
same and the attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in default for failure to
under such circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the file an answer within the prescribed period. RTC denied petitioner’s MR;
procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present its responsive denied petitioner’s motion to admit answer o held that the rules did not require the
pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk
justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each of court. o It also ruled that due process was observed as a copy of the September
case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it. Prescinding from 11, 2003 order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address.
the above, we deem it best to underscore that there is no hard and fast rule Petitioner filed a Rule 65 before CA o He imputed the following errors to the trial
pertaining to the manner of service of summons. Rather, substantial justice court: taking cognizance of the case despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper
demands that every case should be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances service of summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes,
attendant to each. In any event, as it is glaringly evident from the records of particularly the September 11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity
the case that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was validly acquired by and justice. RTC during the pendency of petition before CA, ruled against
the court by the valid service of a new summons before the writ of preliminary petitioner o ordered petitioner to pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of
injunction was issued and guided by jurisprudential pronouncements heretofore suit. CA sustained RTC; denied petitioner’s ensuing MR Petitioner
adverted to, we hold that the proceedings attendant to the issuance of the writ of elevated to SC o In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication
preliminary injunction were regular. under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not
actions in personam like a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., petitioner vs. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION, the affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by
respondent G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008 FIRST DIVISION the clerk of court, not respondent’s messenger.

FACTS: Respondent PNOC filed a complaint before RTC Pasig Br 167 for sum of
money against petitioner Santos seeking to collect the amount of P698,502.10 ISSUES: Whether the service of summons by publication may apply in actions
representing petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan[4] advanced to him by in personam, such as the instant case for sum of money. YES Whether an
respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors. Personal service affidavit of service of copy of the summons should be prepared by the clerk of
of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known court. NO Whether RTC was correct in allowing respondent to present evidence
address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, ex parte. YES
the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. o May 20, 2003:
Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of

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HELD: Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides: o SEC. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed
14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. – In any the “Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer.”[14] This
action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent over the person of petitioner. The trial court allowed respondent to present its
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a evidence ex parte on account of petitioner’s failure to file his answer within the
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court prescribed period. Petitioner assails this action on the part of the trial court as well
may order. (emphasis supplied) Since petitioner could not be personally served as the said court’s failure to furnish him with copies of orders and processes issued
with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent in the course of the proceedings. The effects of a defendant’s failure to file an
sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by answer within the time allowed therefor are governed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly (on Effect of Failure to Plead) of the Rules of Court: o SEC. 3. Default; declaration
served with summons by publication. Petitioner invokes the distinction between of. – If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the
an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that substituted service court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party,
may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the
personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his
the kind of action to which the rule was applicable.[10] Because of this silence, the pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to
Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.[11] This has submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of
been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies “[i]n any action court. o SEC. 4. Effect of order of default. – A party in default shall be entitled to
where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (emphasis
his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.” Thus, supplied) If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared
it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.[12] in default upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
19,[13] Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the following: o … an plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take
in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings. In
his last known address. Service of summons by publication is proved by the this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that he failed to file his answer
affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or on time. That was in fact why he had to file an “Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service and to Admit Attached Answer.” But respondent moved only for the ex parte
of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered presentation of evidence, not for the declaration of petitioner in default. In its
mail to the defendant’s last known address. This complementary service is February 6, 2004 order, the trial court stated: o The disputed Order of September
evidenced by an affidavit “showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order 11, 2003 allowing the presentation of evidence ex-parte precisely ordered that
for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by “despite and notwithstanding service of summons by publication, no answer has
registered mail to his last known address.” The rules, however, do not require been filed with the Court within the required period and/or forthcoming.[“]
that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While Effectively[,] that was a finding that the defendant [that is, herein petitioner] was
the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the in default for failure to file an answer or any responsive pleading within the period
duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party fixed in the publication as precisely the defendant [could not] be found and for
who resorts to service by publication. which reason, service of summons by publication was ordered. It is simply illogical
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial to notify the defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on account of
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address
appearance in the action against him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of and his whereabouts unknown – thus the publication of the summons. In other
the Rules of Court states: o SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s words, it was reasonable to expect that the defendant will not receive any notice
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The or order in his last known address. Hence, [it was] impractical to send any notice
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction or order to him. Nonetheless, the record[s] will bear out that a copy of the order
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. of September 11, 2003 was mailed to the defendant at his last known address but

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it was not claimed. (emphasis supplied) As is readily apparent, the September their Answers Respondent EIM filed a motion to set the case for pre-trial o
11, 2003 order did not limit itself to permitting respondent to present its evidence RTC granted A notice of pre-trial was sent by the RTC to the defendants,
ex parte but in effect issued an order of default. But the trial court could not validly including the petitioner. The notice to the latter was again sent to the address
do that as an order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming indicated in the complaint. Petitioner filed an MD o on the ground that the
party.[15] Since no motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person because he had not been
order should have been issued. To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if served with summons. RTC ordered the cancellation of the pre-trial and the
a party declared in default is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, all the resetting thereof; ordered respondent EIM to file a reply or opposition to
more should a party who has not been declared in default be entitled to such notice. petitioner’s MD Respondent EIM filed a Comment o explaining that summons
But what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not had not been served on the petitioner because, according to the sheriff, the
known or he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way notice petitioner’s address indicated in the complaint, “138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa,
can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does Manila,” could not be located. RTC denied petitioner’s MD; ordered issuance
not require that the impossible be done.[16 ] Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The of alias summons against the petitioner to be served upon him at 138 Maria Clara
law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.[17] Laws and rules must be Street, Sta. Mesa, Manil Respondent EIM filed a manifestation and motion o
interpreted in a way that they are in accordance wi th logic, common sense, reason Informed the court that the address of the petitioner as indicated in the complaint
and practicality.[ 18] Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in was erroneous, and that summons should instead be served upon him at “138
default, he could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City,” which was his correct address.
furnished him. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was Petitioner filed MR o He contended therein that the case should be dismissed
nonetheless still mailed to petitioner at his last known address but it was in view of the trial court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over his person and the
unclaimed. Petitioner failed to file his answer within the required period. Indeed, respondent’s failure to prosecute the case, considering that more than a year had
he would not have moved for the admission of his answer had he filed it on time. passed since the complaint was instituted and yet summons had not yet been
Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the trial court did not abuse its served on him. RTC denied petitioner’s MR Petitioner filed with CA a
discretion in denying its admission. Petitioner’s plea for equity must fail in the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition questioning the trial court’s November 17,
face of the clear and express language of the rules of procedure and of the 1999 Omnibus Order and the January 25, 2000 Order denying his motion for
September 11, 2003 order regarding the period for filing the answer. Equity is reconsideration. CA dismissed petition o for failure to attach certified true
available only in the absence of law, not as its replacement.[19] Equity may be copies of relevant documents referred to in the petition Petitioner filed MR o
applied only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention thereof. CA denied The appellate court upheld the petitioner’s argument that Rule 65
of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the originals or certified true copies only of
the orders challenged in the petition and not of the other relevant documents
RICHARD TEH, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. attached thereto. However, it dismissed the petition on the ground that the order
ALFREDO C. FLORES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch assailed therein was one denying a motion to dismiss, an interlocutory order which
167, EIM INTERNATIONAL SALES, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 147038. April 24, is beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals further held
2003 SECOND DIVISION that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and ordered
FACTS: Respondent EIM International filed a complaint for collection of sum of the issuance of an alias summons to the latter
money with prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment against Wood Based
Panels, Inc., Sinrimco. Inc., Manfred Luig and petitioner (President of said ISSUES: Whether RTC was correct in issuing alias summons against petitioner
corporations Wood Based Panels, Inc. AND Sinrimco. Inc) Summonses were instead of dismissing the case against him for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
served upon the 2 corporations and Luig. However, the sheriff failed to serve YES Whether an Order of RTC denying an MD is an interlocutory order that is
the summons intended for the petitioner because the former could not locate the beyond the scope of Rule 65. YES
petitioner’s address as indicated in the complaint. Said address was obtained by
the respondent from the General Information Sheets filed with the Securities and HELD: The Court of Appeals was not required to look into the merits of the
Exchange Commission by the two corporations. Wood Based Panels, Inc., petition for certiorari before issuing its March 14, 2000 Resolution because it ruled
Sinrimco. Inc., Manfred Luig filed an MD o RTC denied o They then submitted

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in good faith that the petition was defective in form. Under Rule 65, Section 6 of Summons was served upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde.
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for certiorari may be dismissed outright o While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde as a secretary of
if it is insufficient in form, that is, it fails to comply with the requirements in Section Columbus, the sheriff’s return described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate
1 of the same Rule. When the appellate court studied the petitioner’s motion for president, duly authorized to receive legal processes. PR failed to file Answer
reconsideration and found that the contention therein was correct, it proceeded to Petitioners moved that PR be declared in default
look into the merits of the petition. However, it found that the same should be RTC granted petitioners’ motion; allowed petitioners to present evidence ex
dismissed for lack of merit because it found that the trial court’s order assailed by parte
the petitioner therein was an order denying a motion to dismiss. Based on the RTC then rendered decision in favor of petitioners, ordering PR to pay and
factual circumstances of the case, the appellate court ruled that the order sought declaring the lease contract rescinded
to be reversed was an interlocutory order which is beyond the scope of a petition o The decision becam e final on May 12, 1999 The ff day (May 13, 1999): PR
for certiorari, and that the trial court did not commit abuse of discretion when it filed a motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by petitioners
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person RTC ordered parties to submit their Memoranda
of the petitioner and ordered the issuance of an alias summons to the latter. o However, without waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26, 1999, denied
The Court agrees with the appellate court’s ruling that there was no abuse of the motion to lift order of default PR filed an MR
discretion on the part of the trial court when the latter denied the petitioner’s o RTC denied
motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the issuance of an alias summons to PR filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution
be served upon him. Although the respondent should have resorted to other means o RTC denied
to determine the correct address of the petitioner when it was informed by the PR appealed to CA
sheriff that he failed to serve the summons on the petitioner, the respondent is not CA reversed RTC; granted appeal
entirely to blame for such failure because the petitioner’s address as indicated by o The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred when it denied private
Wood Based Panels, Inc., and Sinrimco, Inc. on their respective General respondent’s motion to lift order of default. The appellate court pointed out that
Information Sheets, was incorrect. Moreover, the trial court was merely private respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be
exercising its discretion under Rule 16, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Section 11, [7] Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure when it denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Under said rule, after Civil Procedure requires that service of summons upon domestic private juridical
hearing the motion, a judge may dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or entity shall be made through its president, managing partner, general manager,
order the amendment of the pleading. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss corporate secretary, treasurer or inhouse counsel. Since service upon private
based on its finding that the issues alleged by the respondent in its complaint could respondent was made through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in
not be resolved fully in the absence of the petitioner. In its desire to resolve private respondent’s office, as evidenced by the latter’s employment record, such
completely the issues brought before it, the trial court deemed it fitting to properly service cannot be considered valid. Consequently, the subsequent proceedings,
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by ordering the issuance of including the order of default, judgment by default and its execution, were also
alias summons on the petitioner. Evidently, the trial court acted well within its invalid because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent.
discretion. The Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in dismissing the petition Besides, judgments by default are not favored, especially so when there is a prima
for certiorari filed before it. facie showing that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, which in this
case was grounded on the contract of lease sued upon, said the Court of Appeals.
SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION, Petitioners filed MR o CA denied
respondents. G.R. No. 144662. October 13, 2003 SECOND DIVISION
ISSUES: Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of PR, considering
FACTS: Petitioners, owners of 2 parcels of land along EDSA in Pasay City, the mode of service of summons upon the latter. NO Whether PR correctly
entered into a lease contract with PR Columbus, under which Columbus undertook resorted to the remedy of Motion to Lift Order of Default, considering that the
to construct a building worth ten million pesos (P10,000,000) at the end of the judgment against it has become final. Moot and academic
third year of the lease PR Columbus was allegedly unable to comply with the
above stipulation Petitioners filed a complaint before RTC Pasay Br 112

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HELD: On the first issue, petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 of Court is invalid, according to private respondent. An exception is when the
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly specifies the persons authorized to receive summons is actually received by the corporation, which means that there was
summons on behalf of a private juridical entity, said provision did not abandon or substantial compliance with the rule. Private respondent stresses that since the
render inapplicable the substantial compliance rule. Petitioners cite Millenium exception referred to the old rule, it cannot be made to apply to the new rule,
Industrial Commercial Corporation v. Tan,[9] and maintain that this Court, by which clearly specifies and limits the persons authorized to receive the summons
referring to E.B Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito,[10] effectively ruled in behalf of the corporation. Neither can petitioners rely on Millenium to justify
that said provision is the statement of the general rule on service of summons upon their theory, adds private respondent, because at the time the complaint in this
corporation and the substantial compliance rule is the exception. Petitioners claim case was filed with the trial court, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure were already
that this Court, in an array of cases, upheld the substantial compliance rule when in effect. The case law applicable in the instant case, contends private respondent,
it allowed the validity of the service of summons on the corporation’s employee is Villarosa which squarely provides for the proper interpretation of the new rule
other than those mentioned in the Rule where said summons and complaint were on the service of summons upon domestic corporation, thus: o The designation of
in fact seasonably received by the corporation from said employee. Petitioners persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
insist that technicality must not defeat speedy justice. Petitioners stress that corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11,
even though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk in private Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states “general
respondent’s corporation, there was substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule manager” instead of only “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead of “secretary”;
14 because the summons actually reached private respondent. This can be gleaned and “treasurer” instead of “cashier.” The phrase “agent, or any of its directors” is
from private respondent’s motion to lift order of default where private respondent conspicuously deleted in the new rule.[14] According to private respondent,
did not question the validity of the service of summons but explained in paragraph service through Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk of private respondent and not
three thereof that its failure to answer the complaint was due to its impression that one of those enumerated above, is invalid. We find private respondent’s
the case would not be pursued by petitioners because the corporation already made submission on this issue meritorious. The question of whether the substantial
payments to them.[11] From said averment, according to petitioners, private compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
respondent in effect admitted that it received the summons. Notwithstanding this, Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant
private respondent did not file its answer to the complaint, said the petitioners. case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter
This is tantamount to negligence which the court cannot tolerate, petitioners Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with
conclude. There being valid service of summons, the Regional Trial Court acquired branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog,
jurisdiction over private respondent, according to petitioners Petitioners further Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement
contend that the Court of Appeals’ reliance on E.B Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. with private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to
Judge Benito,[12] in denying their motion for reconsideration was misplaced, comply with its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach
because the factual milieu in said case was different from that in the instant case. of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together
In Villarosa, according to them, there was no showing of actual receipt by the with the complaint, was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at
defendant corporation of the summons while in this case, private respondent Kolambog,
actually received the summons. Private respondent counters that nowhere in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
the Millenium case did this Court expressly state or remotely imply that we have Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of jurisdiction.
not abandoned the doctrine of substantial compliance. Private respondent claims The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was substantial compliance
that petitioners misquoted the portion of the Millenium decision where this Court with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned
cited the Villarosa case, to make it appear that the Villarosa ruling, which provides the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in Villarosa’s favor
an interpretation of Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, states and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. We
the general rule on the service of summons upon corporations where the held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made
substantial compliance rule is the exception. Private respondent avers that what through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
this Court discussed in the Millenium case was the rule on service of summons 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964
under the old Rules of Court prior to the promulgation and effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court’s basis for denying the motion to
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Millenium case held that as a general rule, service dismiss, namely, private respondent’s substantial compliance with the rule on
upon one who is not enumerated in Section 13,[13] Rule 14 of the then Rules of service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner’s assertions that the

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enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the to the [respondents] failed Petitioners filed an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of
rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Court to Effect Summons by Publication o RTC granted RTC WITHOUT a
Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of written motion from petitioners, declared respondents in default; allowed
summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. petitioners to submit evidence ex parte RTC issued a resolution ordering
Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with respondents to execute the necessary document with the effect of withdrawing the
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither can herein Affidavit of Loss they filed and annotated with the Register of Deeds of Makati City
petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to support their position for said case is so that title ‘to the parcel of land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
not on all fours with the instant case. We must stress that Millenium was decided the [petitioners] be transferred in their names Respondent Helen (who was then
when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case residing in USA) learned from her sister the issuance of the assailed resolution
which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases[15] cited by petitioners where Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the
we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo o RTC denied
Villarosa, which is the later case. At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that Respondents filed an MR, once again raising issue of lack of jurisdiction o RTC
notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere denied Petitioners filed motion for execution o RTC granted
technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The Respondents filed a Rule 65 before CA CA in favor of respondents o The
service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process.[16] We CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and
will deprive private respondent of its right to present its defense in this multi- Orders. According to the appellate 99
million peso suit, if we disregard compliance with the rules on service of summons.
On the second issue, petitioners claim that private respondent’s motion to lift court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid
order of default was not in order for it was filed late, contrary to the provision in service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to comply with the
sub-paragraph (b), Section 3,[17] Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not specify in the
which requires filing of the motion after notice but before judgment. Also, the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the
motion was (a) not under oath; (b) did not show the fraud, accident, mistake or impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by personal service.
excusable neglect that caused private respondents’ failure to answer; and (c) did Second, the subsequent summons by publication was equally infirm, because the
not show private respondent’s meritorious defense. Private respondent, in turn, Complaint was a suit for specific performance and therefore an action in personam.
argues that since service upon it was invalid, the trial court did not acquire Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders were null and void, since the RTC had
jurisdiction over it. Hence, all the subsequent proceedings in the trial court are never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
null and void, including the order of default. This renders the second issue now
moot and academic. We find merit in private respondent’s submissions. Since ISSUES: Whether the requirements for a valid substituted service were complied
we have ruled that service of summons upon private respondent through its filing with by the sheriff. NO Whether summons by publication was correctly resorted
clerk cannot be considered valid, it necessarily follows therefore that the Regional to. NO
Trial Court of Pasay City did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent.[18]
Consequently, all the subsequent proceedings held before it, including the order of HELD: Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons
default, are null and void.[19] As private respondent points out, the second issue on respondents was invalid. They submit that although the case filed before the
has become moot and academic. trial court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually
an action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the
Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, petitioners, vs. Spouses HELEN BOYON Philippines. They further argue that in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of
and ROMEO BOYON, respondents. G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003 THIRD a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res.
DIVISION Thus, the summons by publication, which they effected subsequent to the
substituted service of summons, was allegedly sufficient. On the other hand,
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint before RTC Muntinlupa against respondents respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial court were null and void
to compel the latter to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject because of the invalid and defective service of summons. According to them, the
of a controverted sale Per return of summons, substituted service was resorted Return of Summons issued by the process server of the RTC failed to state that he
to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally had exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of summons. He allegedly tried to

207
serve it personally on them on July 22, 1998 at No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously
Alabang. He, however, resorted to substituted service on that same day, resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine
supposedly because he could not find respondents in the above address. They effort to locate respondents. A review of the records[9] reveals that the only effort
further allege that the person to whom he gave the summons was not even a he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22,
resident of that address. Respondents contend that when summons is served 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While the Return
by substituted service, the return must show that it was impossible to serve the of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because
summons personally, and that efforts had been exerted toward that end. They Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not
add that noncompliance with the rule on substituted service renders invalid all mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to
proceedings relative thereto. As to the summons by publication subsequently find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process
effected by petitioners, respondents argue that the case filed before the trial court server obtained the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the
was an action for specific performance and, therefore, an action in personam. As Return of Summons is reproduced as follows: o “That efforts to serve the said
such, the summons by publication was insufficient to enable the trial court to Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon were made
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents. Respondents conclude that but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that defendant Helen
even granting that the service of summons by publication was permissible under Boyon is somewhere in the United States of America and defendant Romeo Boyon
the circumstances, it would still be defective and invalid because of the failure of is in Bicol thus substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule
petitioners to observe the requirements of law, like an Affidavit attesting that the 14, of the Revised Rules of Court.”[10] The Return of Summons shows that no
latter deposited in the post office a copy of the summons and of the order of effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server
publication, paid the postage, and sent the documents by registered mail to the or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At
former’s last known address. We agree with respondents. In general, trial courts best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances
service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such
laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read: efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
o “Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the substituted service of summons. The necessity of stating in the process server’s
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, Return or Proof of Service the material facts and circumstances sustaining the
or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. o “Section 7. validity of substituted service was explained by this Court in Hamilton v. Levy,[11]
Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served from which we quote: o “x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be
person in charge thereof.” As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no
personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.”[12]
the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of Moreover, the requirements of substituted service of summons and the effect of
summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the noncompliance with the subsequent proceedings therefor were discussed in
defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient Madrigal v. Court of Appeals[13] as follows: o “In a long line of cases, this Court
age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted
or regular place of business, of the defendant.[7] It is likewise required that the service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the
the officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since
ineffective service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the

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acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile. During the
substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all hearing, petitioner presented the ff pieces of evidence: o Witness Carlos Gonzales
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. It must be noted that testified that he only saw petitioner twice in the Alexandra Homes as visitor;
extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when identified the Certification of Renato A. de Leon, which stated that Unit E-2104 was
the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc and that it was not leased to anyone; o
instead of against the defendant’s person; in the latter, an individual is named as Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card showing that
defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individual’s interest in a piece of petitioner was a resident of SG PR Trajano presented the ff: o Witness Robert
property to the obligation or loan burdening it.[15] In the instant case, what Swift, lead counsel for plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights
was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed Litigation confirmed that Mr. Marcos, Jr. testified that petitioner’s residence was
against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the at the Alexandra Apartment, Greenhills. 8 In addition, the entries 9 in the logbook
ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any of Alexandra Homes from August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993, listing the name of
interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an petitioner Manotoc and the Sheriff’s Return, 10 were adduced in evidence. RTC
action for specific performance is an action in personam.[16] Having failed to denied petitioner’s MD; denied ensuring MR o Address was correct based on PR’s
serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not validly acquire evidence; presumption of regularity enjoyed by sheriff Petitioner filed a
jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before CA dismissed said petition;
proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void. adopted RTC’s findings; denied ensuing MR

ISSUE: Whether the requirements of a valid substituted service of summons were

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner,vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and complied with so as to render petitioner within the jurisdiction of RTC.
AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO,
Respondents. G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006 THIRD DIVISION HELD: NO. The court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service
of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
FACTS: In a case entitled “Agapita Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of the Estate defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be
of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda ‘Imee’ R. Marcos-Manotoc”, Trajano sought to properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity
enforce a foreign judgment by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, to present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect
United States of America for for the wrongful death of deceased Archimedes one’s right to due process. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either
Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court.
under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when
influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of the court which has no
Revised Rules of Court RTC issued a summons to petitioner at Alexandra jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void." 18 In an action
Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of
Avenue, Pasig City. o the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If
served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a
condominium unit mentioned earlier Petitioner failed to file her Answer RTC reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted
declared petitioner in default Petitioner filed by special appearance an MD service of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and in derogation
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an of the usual method of service." 19 Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply
invalid substituted service of summons o The grounds to support the motion were: with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules.
(1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was Indeed, "compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction." 20 Section 8 of Rule 14
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to this case provides: o SEC. 8. 21
unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may
was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with

209
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the
person in charge thereof. We can break down this section into the following defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of
requirements to effect a valid substituted service: o (1) Impossibility of Prompt defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
Personal Service The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form
show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook
service. 22 Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the
"reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure. 26 Supreme
time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that
necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to
do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made
regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." 23 Under in the proof of service. o (3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion If the
the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the court, substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be
clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." 27 A person
and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity
lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the
has failed. 24 What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions
service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is
"reasonable time" lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". 28 Thus, to be of sufficient discretion,
means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the
is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and
because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take
require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the
service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the
uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found
Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s
month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
regard to personal service on the defendant. Sheriffs are asked to discharge significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it
their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These
reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons. o (4)
dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to A Competent Person in Charge If the substituted service will be done at
accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a
is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted
resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant,
defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, Again, these details must be contained in the Return. Let us examine the full
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why text of the Sheriff’s Return, which reads: o THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many
such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons with complaint and
confirmed or accepted. o (2) Specific Details in the Return The sheriff must annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above entitled case, personally upon
describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the the defendant IMELDA ‘IMEE’ MARCOS-MANOTOC located at Alexandra
attempted personal service. 25 The efforts made to find the defendant and the Condominium Corpration [sic] or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29 Merlaco

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[sic] Ave., Pasig, MetroManila at reasonable hours of the day but to no avail for imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with
the reason that said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or more particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service,
premises. That on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons was dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants
resorted to in accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the
said summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz, Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were made
caretaker of the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and to personally serve summons on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would
Telephone Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and discretion, prove impossibility of prompt personal service. Moreover, to allow sheriffs to
living with the said defendant at the given address who acknowledged the receipt describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine
thereof of said processes but he refused to sign (emphases supplied). A performance of their precise duties relating to substituted service—for it would be
meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly,
material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc considering that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by a defendant
in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts because of an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only fair that the
proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become Sheriff’s Return should clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or
impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many hopelessness of personal service. Granting that such a general description be
occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x personally," considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from the requirement
"at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for the reason that the said that the summons must be left with a "person of suitable age and discretion"
defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises." Wanting in residing in defendant’s house or residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements
detailed information, the Return deviates from the ruling—in Domagas v. Jensen under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and
30 and other related cases 31—that the pertinent facts and circumstances on the (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both requirements
efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the Return. were not met. In this case, the Sheriff’s Return lacks information as to residence,
It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriff’s general
hours of the day the attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted assertion that de la Cruz
service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to is the "resident caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto,
Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if
the service of summons be described with more particularity in the Return or Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit
Certificate of Service. Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioner’s address considering that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a
in the Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Cañelas, male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioner’s allegation that Macky
who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have
Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents additional information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s
were "informed, and so [they] allege" about the address and whereabouts of refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that he did not
petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an have the necessary "relation of confidence" with petitioner. To protect petitioner’s
effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means. 32 More right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the
so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioner’s residence or house is doubtful substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.
or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must
to have been pursued persistently. In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 33 it may faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the
be true that the Court held that a Sheriff’s Return, which states that "despite efforts circumstances authorized by the rules. 34 Even American case law likewise
exerted to serve said process personally upon the defendant on several occasions stresses the principle of strict compliance with statute or rule on substituted
the same proved futile," conforms to the requirements of valid substituted service. service, thus: o The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted or
However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service constructive service must be strictly pursued. 35 There must be strict compliance
which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions with the requirements of statutes authorizing substituted or constructive service.
of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and 36 Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in certain
wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the situations authorized in the place of personal service when the latter is
efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and inconvenient or impossible, a strict and literal compliance with the provisions of

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the law must be shown in order to support the judgment based on such substituted FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent before
or constructive service. 37 Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and exercised on the MTC Calasiao, Pangasinan, alleging, among others, that petitioner is the owner of
general ground that the subject matter of the suit is within the power of the court. the subject property and respondent gained entry into the petitioner’s property by
The inquiry must be as to whether the requisites of the statute have been complied excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon The
with, and such compliance must appear on the record. 38 The fact that the summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter
defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not render the service was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the
effectual if in fact the process was not served in accordance with the requirements respondent’s) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondent’s house at
of the statute. 39 Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. o The Sheriff left the summons
demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements of the then and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same MTC rendered a
Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). decision ordering respondent and all persons claiming right to pay and vacate
Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the Respondent failed to appeal September 27, 1999 : Decision was executed
proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be annulled. The court a August 16, 2000: Respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before RTC
quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official Dagupan City for the annulment of said MTC Decision, on the ground that due to
duty. It reasons out that "[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was
facie evidence of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person o The
from said certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing." 40 The Court respondent alleged therein that the service of the complaint and summons through
acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because of the
to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were following: ( a) when the complaint in Civil Case N o. 879 was filed, she was not a
exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of Oslo, Norway, and
must be specifically narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and the
the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and discretion complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales; (b) she was in Oslo,
living in the dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed Norway, at the time the summons and the complaint were served; (c) her brother,
and the presumption cannot be availed of. As previously explained, the Return of Oscar Layno, was merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a
Sheriff Cañelas did not comply with the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section resident nor an occupant thereof when he received the complaint and summons;
8 on substituted service. In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 41 it and (d) Oscar La yno was never authorized to receive the summons and the
was held that "x x x the presumption of regularity in the performance of official complaint for and in her behalf o The respondent filed a Manifestation dated August
functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the 31, 2000, and appended thereto the following: (a) a copy[8] of her passport
sheriff’s return is defective (emphasis supplied)." While the Sheriff’s Return in the showing that she left the country on February 17, 1999; (b) a copy[9] of the
Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve the Contract of Lease dated November 24, 1997, executed by her and Eduardo D.
summons, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas in the case at bar merely described the Gonzales over her house for a period of three (3) years or until November 24,
efforts or attempts in general terms lacking in details as required by the ruling in 2000; (c) her affidavit[10] stating, inter alia, that she owned the house at
the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Cañelas’ Return did not Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which she leased to Eduardo Gonzales;
mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted service is that she was married to Jarl Jensen, a citizen of Norway, on August 23, 1987 and
void. On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra Homes, had resided in Norway with her husband since 1993; that she arrived in the
Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our findings that the substituted Philippines on December 31, 1998, but left on February 17, 1999; she returned to
service is void has rendered the matter moot and academic. Even assuming that the Philippines on July 30, 2000 and learned, only then, of the complaint against
Alexandra Homes Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact would not make an her and the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879; her brother Oscar Layno
irregular and void substituted service valid and effective. was not a resident of the house at Barangay Buenlag; and that she never received
the complaint and summons in said case; (d) the affidavit[11] of Oscar Layno
FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner, vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent. G.R. No. declaring that sometime in April 1999, he was in the respondent’s house to collect
158407. January 17, 2005 SECOND DIVISION rentals from Eduardo Gonzales; that the Sheriff arrived and served him with a copy
of the summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879; and that he never
informed the respondent of his receipt of the said summons and complaint; (e) an

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affidavit[12] of Eduardo Gonzales stating that he leased the house of the proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enfo rce personal rights and obligations
respondent and resided thereat; the respondent was not a resident of the said brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although
house although he (Gonzales) allowed the respondent to occupy a room therein it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or
whenever she returned to the Philippines as a balikbayan; and that Oscar Layno seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in ac cordance with the mandate of
was not residing therein but only collected the rentals. Petitioner filed an the court .[20] The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the
Answer o respondent was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the
and was the owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the defendant.[21] Of this character are suits to compel a defen dant to specifically
Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of the complaint and perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.[22] An action in
summons by substituted service on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person,
879, was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It
Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights
for and in her behalf. RTC in favor of respondent; MTC decision declared null or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for
and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and the subject injunctive relief are concerned, it is well - settled that it is an injunctive act in
matter. o declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons personam .[23] In Combs v. Combs,[24] the appellate court held that proceedings
on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, considering that she left to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are
the Philippines on February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in
Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.[25] On the
her behalf. Petitioner appealed to CA o CA denied appeal; ruled in favor of other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to
respondent The CA ruled that the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one for subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed.[26]
ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of
the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening
complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in the property.[27] Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability
relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only
leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off
modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding
the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint only upon the parties who joined in the action.[28] Section 1, Rule 70 of the
upon the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879. Petitioner elevated Rules of Court provides: o Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. -
to SC Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building in force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth,
ISSUES: Whether action for forcible entry is an action quasi in rem , thereby or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
rendering applicable and mandatory the provision Section 15 of Rule 14 requiring land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
extraterritorial service of summons upon respondent who was allegedly out of PH right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
at the time that the purported substituted service of summons was made. NO representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
Whether the service of summons upon the brother of respondent constituted a may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
valid substituted service. NO. of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person
or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
HELD: The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
the petitioner against the respondent in Civil Case No. 879 is an action quasi in damages and costs Under Section 15, Rule 70 of the said Rule, the plaintiff may
rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action be granted a writ of preliminary prohibition or mandatory injunction: o Sec. 15.
and one in personam. Preliminary Injunction. – The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing
character.[18] Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff A possessor deprived of his
that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only.[19] A possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days

213
from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave
unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.[32] Thus, any
restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
days from the filing thereof. If, after due proceedings, the trial court finds for is null and void.[33] In the present case, the records show that the respondent,
the plaintiff, it shall then render judgment in his or her favor, thus: o Sec. 17. before and after his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a
Judgment. – If, after trial, the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be gleaned from the
true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that she was
premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for a resident of said barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated
the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that February 9, 1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed,
said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover the petitioner categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of Barangay
his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo,
sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. From Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and
the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very nature and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through
purpose, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads: o
personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code,[29] for the latter to vacate served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may
the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
or occupation of the property.[30] As gleaned from the averments of the the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent
petitioner’s complaint in the MTC, she sought a writ of a preliminary injunction person in charge thereof. Strict compliance with the mode of service is required
from the MTC and prayed that the said writ be made permanent. Under its in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
decision, the MTC ordered the defendant therein (the respondent in this case), to defendant.[34] The statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed
vacate the property and pay a “monthly rental” of P1,000.00 to the plaintiff therein faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by the
(the petitioner in this case). On the issue of whether the respondent was validly statute is rendered ineffective.[35] As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy:[36] o …
served with the summons and complaint by the Sheriff on April 5, 1999, the The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must
petitioner asserts that since her action of forcible entry against the respondent in be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted
Civil Case No. 879 was in personam, summons may be served on the respondent, service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary
by substituted service, through her brother, Oscar Layno, in accordance with because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner avers that Oscar Layno, a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and
person of suitable age and discretion, was residing in the house of the respondent in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made.
on April 5, 1999. She avers that the fact that the house was leased to and occupied Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted
by Eduardo Gonzales was of no moment. Moreover, the Sheriff is presumed to service renders said service ineffective.[37] In Keister v. Narcereo,[38] the
have performed his duty of properly serving the summons on the respondent by Court held that the term “dwelling house” or “residence” are generally held to refer
substituted service. o The contention of the petitioner has no merit. In Asiavest to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons at the
Limited v. Court of Appeals,[31] the Court had the occasion to state: o In an action former’s dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling
in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is
court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily
defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended
service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion
he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the
substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of
is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be jurisdiction The Return of Service filed by Sheriff Eduardo J. Abulencia on the
resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service service of summons reads: o Respectfully returned to the court of origin the herein

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summons and enclosures in the above-entitled case, the undersigned caused the alias summons was not properly served. The appellate court, however, ruled
service on April 5, 1999. o Defendant Vivian Layno Jensen is out of the country as otherwise. It reasoned that Dole’s president had known of the service of the alias
per information from her brother Oscar Layno, however, copy of summons and summons although he did not personally receive and sign it. It also held that in
enclosures was received by her brother Oscar Layno on April 5, 1999 as evidenced today’s corporate setup, documents addressed to corporate officers are received
by his signature appearing in the original summons. As gleaned from the said in their behalf by their staff. CA denied petition; denied ensuing MR
return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff
found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein. ISSUES: Whether Dole was validly served summons. NO Assuming that the
Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence service of summons was invalid, whether RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Dole
of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the nonetheless. YES
house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises
only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a HELD: Petitioner contends that for the court to validly acquire jurisdiction over
place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence a domestic corporation, summons must be served only on the corporate officers
or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to enumerated in Section 11,8 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner
which he intends to return.[41] The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno maintains that the alias summons was not validly served on it since the alias
dated June 15, 1997 wherein he declared that he was a resident of No. 572 summons was served on Marifa Dela Cruz, an employee of Dole Pacific General
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate and distinct from petitioner. It further
Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and Orlando Macasalda avers that even if she were an employee of the petitioner, she is not one of the
cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of officers enumerated under Section 11, Rule 14. Thus, the RTC, without proper
Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the house of service of summons, lacks jurisdiction over petitioner as defendant below.
the respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo Private respondent All Season, for its part, contends that the trial court had
Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house on April 5, 1999. acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner received the alias summons
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the through its president on April 23, 2003. According to private respondent, there was
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, full compliance with Section 11, Rule 14, when Marifa Dela Cruz received the
the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, summons upon instruction of petitioner’s president as indicated in the Officer’s
the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void. Return.9 More so, petitioner had admitted that it received the alias summons in its
Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time10 filed on May 5, 2003. Well-settled
is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (TROPIFRESH DIVISION), Petitioner, vs. HON. REINATO and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
G. QUILALA in his capacity as pairing judge of Branch 150, RTC-Makati City, and of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios
ALL SEASON FARM, CORP., Respondents. G.R. No. 168723 July 9, 2008 est exclusio alterius.11 Service must therefore be made on the president,
SECOND DIVISION managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel. In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal
FACTS: PR All Season filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money, assistant, received the alias summons .12 Contrary to private respondent’s claim
accounting and damages against petitioner Dole before RTC Makati Br 150 where that it was received upon instruction of the president of the corporation as indicated
public respondent Judge Quilala was the pairing judge According to Dole, an in the Officer’s Return, such fact does not appear in the receiving copy of the alias
alias summons was served upon it through a certain Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal summons which Marifa Dela Cruz signed. There was no evidence that she was
assistant employed by Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd., which is an entity authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the president. Considering that
separate from Dole. Dole filed an MD o (a) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the service of summons was made on a legal assistant, not employed by herein
the person of Dole due to improper service of summons; (b) the complaint failed petitioner and who is not one of the designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14,
to state a cause of action; (c) All Season was not the real party in interest; and (d) the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner. However, under
the officers of Dole cannot be sued in their personal capacities for alleged acts Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action is
performed in their official capacities as corporate officers of Dole RTC denied equivalent to service of summons.13 As held previously by this Court, the filing of
MD; denied ensuing MR Dole filed a Rule 65 before CA o contending that the motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to

215
file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default that the requirement of due process was complied with, considering that petitioner
with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the actually received the summons through his security guard. It held that where the
jurisdiction of the court.14 Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry summons was in fact received by the defendant, his argument that the Sheriff
of Appearance with Motion for Time. It was not a conditional appearance entered should have first tried to serve summons on him personally before resorting to
to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting substituted service of summons deserves scant consideration. Thus, in the interest
to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons of fairness, the CA said that the process server's neglect or inadvertence in the
and praying for additional time to file responsive pleading.15 Consequently, service of summons should not unduly prejudice the respondent's right to speedy
petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also having justice.
invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for
additional time, petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the ISSUE: Whether there was valid service of summons upon petitioner.
RTC. It is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.16 The
RTC therefore properly took cognizance of the case against Dole Philippines, Inc., HELD: NO. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
and we agree that the trial and the appellate courts committed no error of law complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
when Dole’s contentions were overruled. acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority.14 As a rule,
summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons
SIXTO N. CHU, Petitioner, v. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent. cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted
G.R. NO. 184333 April 1, 2013 THIRD DIVISION service may be resorted to.15 Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: o
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
FACTS: Petitioner purchased from respondent on installment one (1) Hitachi served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may
Excavator worth P900,000.00 Petitioner initially paid P180,000.00 with the be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with
balance of P720,000.00 to be paid in 12 monthly installments through Prime Bank some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
postdated checks Petitioner then purchased again 2 equipment from respondent the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
on installment basis in the sum of P1,000,000.00 Respondent deposited the 12 person in charge thereof. It is to be noted that in case of substituted service,
checks issued by petitioner. However, the same were DISHONORED by the bank there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in
either by reason of "closed account," "drawn against insufficient funds," or the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of
"payment stopped." Petitioner failed to pay despite demand, saying that his confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.16 Also,
business was hit by the crisis and he would be returning the equipment if he cannot impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have
pay Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before RTC Cebu for sum been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This
of money, replevin, attorney's fees and damages RTC issued writ of replevin is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
Sheriff Doroteo P. Cortes proceeded at petitioner's given address for the purpose service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only as
of serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond. o prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory
However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner, requirements of substituted
since the latter was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service
having the summons and the complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective Respectfully
security guard of the petitioner. Petitioner failed to file responsive pleading returned to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, the
Respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default RTC declared Summons and writ issued in the above-entitled case with the following information,
petitioner in default; ordered presentation of evidence ex parte RTC decided to wit: y o 1. That the Summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and
in favor of respondent; ordered petitioner to pay Petitioner appealed to CA o bond was received on December 7, 1999, by Rolando Bonayon, a security guard
argued that the RTC erred in concluding that the substituted service of summons on defendant Sixto Chu at his given address who received and signed receipt
was valid, and that, consequently, there was error on the part of the RTC when it thereof. After the issuance of the Sheriff's inventory receipt, the units were
declared him in default, in proceeding with the trial of the case, and rendering an turned over to Al Caballero and companion, representatives of plaintiff, who
unfavorable judgment against him. CA affirmed RTC o opined, among others, shipped the same to Cebu to be deposited with MACH ASIA TRADING

216
CORPORATION, Block 26 MacArthur Highway, Reclamation Area, Cebu City, for office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second
safekeeping, subject to the provision of Sec. 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.18 attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still
Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and
behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that explained why in his sheriff’s return o This is to certify that on September 18, 2000,
petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service I caused the service of summons together with copies of complaint and its annexes
contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered attached thereto, upon the following: 1. Defendant Allen A. Macasaet,
as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service. President/Publisher of defendant Abante Tonite, at Monica Publishing Corporation,
Moreover, the reasoning advanced by the CA in ruling against the petitioner was Rooms 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana corner A. Soriano
based merely on conjectures and surmises . The CA even went as far as to conclude Streets, Intramuros, Manila, thru his secretary Lu-Ann Quijano, a person of
that the process server's neglect should not have unduly prejudiced the respondent sufficient age and discretion working therein, who signed to acknowledge receipt
, thus: o Hence, if Chu had actually received the summons through his security thereof. That effort (sic) to serve the said summons personally upon said defendant
guard, the requirement of due process would have nevertheless been complied were made, but the same were ineffectual and unavailing on the ground that per
with. x x x. Based on the presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his information of Ms. Quijano said defendant is always out and not available, thus,
concerns, the security guard would not have allowed the sheriff to take possession substituted service was applied;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 2. Defendant Nicolas
of the equipments without the prior permission of Chu; otherwise he would be V. Quijano, at the same address, thru his wife Lu-Ann Quijano, who signed to
accountable to Chu for the said units. Chu, for his part, would not have given his acknowledge receipt thereof. That effort (sic) to serve 105
permission without being informed of the fact of the summons and the writ of
replevin issued by the lower court, which permission includes the authority to the said summons personally upon said defendant were made, but the same were
receive the summons and the writ of replevin. o Thus, where summons was in fact ineffectual and unavailing on the ground that per information of (sic) his wife said
received by defendant, his argument that the sheriff should have tried first to serve defendant is always out and not available, thus, substituted service was
summons on him personally before resorting to substituted service of summons is applied;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 3. Defendants Isaias Albano, Janet Bay,
not meritorious. o Evidently, plaintiff-appellee cannot be penalized, through no Jesus R. Galang, Randy Hagos and Lily Reyes, at the same address, thru Rene
fault of its own, for an irregular or defective return on service of summons. x x x. Esleta, Editorial Assistant of defendant Abante Tonite, a person of sufficient age
o In the interest of fairness, the process server's neglect or inadvertence in the and discretion working therein who signed to acknowledge receipt thereof. That
service of summons should not, thus, unduly prejudice plaintiff-appellee's right to effort (sic) to serve the said summons personally upon said defendants were made,
speedy justice. x x x 19chanroblesvirtualawlibrary The service of summons is a but the same were ineffectual and unavailing on the ground that per information
vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not of (sic) Mr. Esleta said defendants is (sic) always roving outside and gathering
been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and news, thus, substituted service was applied. Petitioners moved for the
a judgment rendered against them is null and void.20 Since the RTC never acquired dismissal of the complaint through counsel’s special appearance in their
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court behalf,alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and
could not be considered binding upon him for being null and void. ineffectual substituted service of summons. o They contended that the sheriff had
made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of them in
accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. They further
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, moved to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural
JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS, Petitioners, v. FRANCISCO R. nor a juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in a civil action. RTC
CO, JR., Respondent. G.R. No. 156759, June 05, 2013 FIRST DIVISION denied MD; directed petitioners to file their Answers Petitioners filed MR o
asserting that the sheriff had immediately resorted to substituted service of the
FACTS: Respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police summons upon being informed that they were not around to personally receive the
District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite and some of its employees, claiming summons, and that Abante Tonite, being neither a natural nor a juridical person,
damages because of an allegedly libelous article before RTC Manila Br 51 RTC could not be made a party in the action. RTC denied MR o The allegations of
Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service the defendants that the Sheriff immediately resorted to substituted service of
of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each summons upon them when he was informed that they were not around to
defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were then out of the personally receive the same is untenable. During the hearing of the herein motion,

217
Sheriff Raul Medina of this Branch of the Court testified that on September 18, defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform
2000 in the morning, he went to the office address of the defendants to personally some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is
serve summons upon them but they were out. So he went back to serve said said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
summons upon the defendants in the afternoon of the same day, but then again distinguished from a judgment against the prop[er]ty to determine its state. It has
he was informed that the defendants were out and unavailable, and that they were been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
always out because they were roving around to gather news. Because of that obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive
information and because of the nature of the work of the defendants that they are relief are concerned, it is wellsettled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In
always on field, so the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons. There Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal
was substantial compliance with the rules, considering the difficulty to serve the rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the
summons personally to them because of the nature of their job which compels rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for
them to be always out and unavailable. Additional matters regarding the service of recovery of real property are in personam. On the other hand, a proceeding
summons upon defendants were sufficiently discussed in the Order of this Court quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such
dated March 12, 2001. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an
mandamus before CA CA dismissed petition individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi
ISSUE: in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which
are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties
HELD: To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all
complaint, the serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who
defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal service has become futile joined in the action. As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a
or impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service. defendant who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the
The petition for review lacks merit. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears
in personam – the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject in court;but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in
the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear
action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction
criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In the latter
in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant,
jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the and such extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the
subject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the requirements of
acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of
requirement of due process.12 The distinctions that need to be perceived the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging
between an action in personam, on the one hand, and an action in rem or quasi in to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of
rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen,13 the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
thusly:cralavvonlinelawlibrary o The settled rule is that the aim and object of an On the other hand, when the defendant in an action in personam does not reside
action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or and is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him
quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and voluntarily appears in court.14 As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance
mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, in the action.15 Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite
through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the legal fees, the clerk of court forthwith issues the corresponding summons to the
person of the defendant.16 The summons is directed to the defendant and signed by the clerk of

218
court under seal. It contains the name of the court and the names of the parties and the fact that such efforts failed, which statement should be found in the proof
to the action; a direction that the defendant answers within the time fixed by the of service or sheriff’s return.28 Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the
Rules of Court; and a notice that unless the defendant so answers, the plaintiff will impossibility of prompt personal service as basis for resorting to substituted service
take judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for.17 To be may be waived by the defendant either expressly or impliedly.29 There is no
attached to the original copy of the summons and all copies thereof is a copy of question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of
the complaint (and its attachments, if any) and the order, if any, for the petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September
appointment of a guardian ad litem.18 The significance of the proper service of 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed
the summons on the defendant in an action in personam cannot be because Macasaet and Quijano were “always out and not available” and the other
overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, petitioners were “always roving outside and gathering news.” After Medina learned
namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant;and from those present in the office address on his second attempt that there was no
(b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that
against him.19 As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within
a civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his
such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void.20 If the defendant conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal
knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized
jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.21 As to the latter, the essence within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was
of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on
evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense.With the proper service personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the
of the summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the
claim against him, he may also waive the process.22 In other words, compliance procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.30 In reality, petitioners’
with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous.
process as it is of jurisdiction.23 Under the Rules of Court, the service of the They had actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as
summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with
Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pretrial brief ad cautelam. They had
defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of
tendering it to him.24 The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action. Nor can we
to ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, sustain petitioners’ contention that Abante Tonite could not be sued as a defendant
for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a due to its not being either a natural or a juridical person. In rejecting their
reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by contention, the CA categorized Abante Tonite as a corporation by estoppel as the
leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age result of its having represented itself to the reading public as a corporation despite
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or its not being incorporated. Thereby, the CA concluded that the RTC did not gravely
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.25 The abuse its discretion in holding that the non-incorporation of Abante Tonite with the
latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the Securities and Exchange Commission was of no consequence, for, otherwise,
summons on the defendant is made through his substitute. It is no longer whoever of the public who would suffer any damage from the publication of articles
debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed in the pages of its tabloids would be left without recourse. We cannot disagree with
strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized the CA, considering that the editorial box of the daily tabloid disclosed that although
by statute is considered ineffective.26 This is because substituted service, being in Monica Publishing Corporation had published the tabloid on a daily basis, nothing
derogation of the usual method of service, is extraordinary in character and may in the box indicated that Monica Publishing Corporation had owned Abante Tonite.
be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.27 Only
when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time may
substituted service be resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal AM No. 11-3-6-SC
service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself NEW RULE ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON FOREIGN JURIDICAL ENTITIES.

219
Section 1. Motion defined. — A motion is an application for relief other than by a
AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON pleading. (1a)
SERVICE UPON FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY
Section 2. Motions must be in writings. — All motions shall be in writing except
Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby amended to read as follows: those made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial. (2a)

"SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity . — When the defendant is a Section 3. Contents. — A motion shall state the relief sought to be obtained and
foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, the grounds upon which it is based, and if required by these Rules or necessary to
service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for prove facts alleged therein, shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other
that purpose, or, i f there be no such agent, on the government official designated papers. (3a)
by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Requirements
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no
resident agent, service may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon
through any of the following means: without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be
set for hearing by the applicant.
a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country
with the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs; Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least
b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
the defendant may be found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court hearing on shorter notice. (4a)
order by-registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;
Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must
service; or not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (5a)

d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct." Section 6. Proof of service necessary. — No written motion set for hearing shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. (6a)
This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Omnibus Motion

March 15, 2011 Section 8. Omnibus motion. — Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a
motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
_____________________________________________ waived. (8a)

RULES 15 - 19
RULE 15 ATTY. BRONDIAL’S LECTURE
A. Motions [Rule 15]
Q: Is a motion the same as a pleading?
Definition A: Sec 1 Rule 15 a motion is an application for relief other than a pleading. Meaning
a motion is different from a pleading. It is not a pleading technically speaking.

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Q: A and B parties to a case, upon receipt of summons by B, instead of But not the 3 day notice rule, that is not subject to exception that is differentiated
filing an answer he files a motion to dismiss, is he deemed to have from the 10 day setting rule.
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court?
Q: What is the 3 day notice rule?
Q: We said that motion is not a pleading because in a motion we always A: The 3 day notice rule requires that 3 days prior to the set hearing the notice
ask for relief. Motions are of 2 kinds they are? should have been received by parties. The 3 days notice rule is not about the notice
but it is about the receipt of notice by the adverse party.
A: Litigated and non-litigated motions.
1. A litigated motion is one which requires a hearing while a nonlitigated Therefore, the 3 days notice rule requires that the notice must be received by the
motion is one which does not require a hearing. adverse party at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing. That would show you
2. Non-litigated motions does not require a hearing because they are not that the 10 day setting rule is not mandatory. Because cannot be complied with if
prejudicial to other parties. Eg motion for continuance, motion for postponement service was done through registered mail. Note the 3 day notice rule is notice made
although under a circular of the SC a motion for postponement may not be litigated by the movant, the court does not notify anymore. It is the movant that sets the
but you have to pay P100 for the postponement. Litigated motions require hearing date for hearing and the party must have received it 3 days before the scheduled
because they prejudice other parties. Eg motion for reconsideration hearing.

NOTE: When we talk about litigated motions it does not automatically follow that Q: Oral motions are they litigated or non-litigated?
the court will set it for actual hearing like presentation of evidence, it merely means A: Non-litigated
that the other party is given the opportunity to answer, respond, comment.
NOTE: 3-day notice rule is always greater than the 10-day rule.
NOTE: Sec 4, 5 and 6 are mandatory under Rule 15. every motion must be set for
hearing, notice of hearing shall be served upon all parties concerned, and proof of Q: What is the omnibus motion rule?
service must be presented otherwise lack of any shall make the motion a mere A: Sec 8 Rule 15 a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment or proceeding
scrap of paper. Note that it must also comply with sec 2 that is must be in writing shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall
because it is a litigated motion. be deemed waived subject to the provisions of rule 9 sec 1.

Q: What is the proof of service in motions? Q: Exceptions to the Omnibus Motion rule?
A: Rule 13, it depends upon how you served it. A:
1. If you served it personally, in actual receipt the signature of the 1. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
recipient. 2. That there is an action pending between the same parties for the same
2. If served by registered mail, the registry receipt. cause; or
3. If served by ordinary mail in the absence of registered mail then 10 3. That the action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
days from the deposit to the post office. limitations.

The following need motion for leave: - Pleadings in intervention - 3rd, 4th, pary
Q: What is the time frame for hearing and notice? claim - Cross claim
A: Notice must be given 3 days before actual hearing and hearing must be set
within 10 days from filing of the motion.
Q: To whom do you address the notice of the hearing?
Suppose you file it in dec 5, hearing shall be set not later than dec 15 except if the A: To the clerk of court, however the rules says that the notice is not to the clerk
service is by registered mail because in registered mail chances are that it would of court, it must be to the adverse party who ever the counsel of the plaintiff. But
not be received by the party in that period. So it would be a case to case basis, jurisprudence however because it is the plaintiff who sets it in the calendar for
that is a very general rule that is subject to a lot of exceptions the 10 day period. hearing whether to approve it or not, the SC in many line of cases has decided that

221
that kind of notification (addressed to clerk of court) is substantial compliance  Notice of Lis Pendens (Section 13 Rule 14) vs. Litis Pendentia
provided that you state copy furnished to counsel of the plaintiff by registered mail
pursuant to sec 11 of rule 13 because of distance. Note: The priority of service is
personal service and if by registered mail explain why you are sending it by
registered mail and not personal service.

B. Motion to Dismiss [Rule 16]

 Lack of cause of action vs. Failure to state a cause of action
Grounds

Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any
of the following grounds:

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;

(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;  Bar by prior judgment vs. conclusiveness of judgment

(c) That venue is improperly laid;

(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause;

(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations;
 Prescription vs. Laches
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;

(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions
of the statute of frauds; and
Effect of Dismissal
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. (1a)
Section 5. Effect of dismissal. — Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting
DISTINCTIONS a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of section 1 hereof shall
bar the refiling of the same action or claim. (n)
 Jurisdiction over person vs. Jurisdiction over subject matter
RULE 16 ATTY. BRONDIAL’S LECTURE

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b. when a public officer is involved and the action involved his public office
Q: What are the grounds for a motion to dismiss? c. where one of the parties is a corporation
d. If the parties resides in different cities or municipalities except when
A: Rule 16 Sec 1. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint they voluntarily submit themselves in the proper forum and the barangay in which
or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the they reside is adjacent to each other. So even if the parties reside in different cities
following grounds: or municipalities but they reside in a barangay who is adjacent to each other there
(1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending is still a need for barangay conciliation.
party e. When the action avails any of the provisional remedies
(2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim
(3) that venue was improperly laid NOTE: So the general rule before an action be admissible in court is that there
(4) that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue must be a certificate to file an action from the barangay attesting to the fact that
(5) that there is another action pending between that same parties for the it has passed through the barangay conciliation proceedings and that there was no
same cause settlement in such proceeding.
(6) that the cause of the action is barred by a prior judgment or by the
statute of limitations The 2nd condition precedent is where an action involves member of the same
(7) that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action family and not earnest effort for amicable settlement were availed of.
(8) that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been
paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished Q: Who are members of the same family? How about the in-laws?
(9) that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under A: Only family members of ascendants, descendants and collateral relatives up to
the provisions of the statute of frauds the 2nd degree (brothers and sisters). In-laws are not included in family relations.
(10) that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied Relationship by affinity are not included. Note that this is irrespective of where they
with reside, there must still be earnest effort for amicable settlement.

NOTE: Be sure to memorize this by heart. Know the number because during recit, NOTE: Dismissal of action on the ground of condition precedent for filing has not
Atty Brondial will jumble the numbers and you have to answer the corresponding been complied with is without prejudice which means an action regarding the same
ground. action may be filed again.

Q: What is the statute of frauds? NOTE: Remember that prior to the case of Ebel vs Amin (?) barangay conciliation
proceedings was jurisdictional but because of the case ……. The barangay
Q: What are these condition precedent? requirement for conciliation, the absence of which is no longer jurisdictional. Which
A: means that because it is not anymore a matter of jurisdiction, if you don’t contest
1. Non compliance of barangay conciliation proceedings; and it you are considered to have waived it.
2. When the action is between relatives and no earnest effort for amicable
settlement has been availed of. Q: Then on what is it grounded?

Under the barangay conciliation proceeding which used to under PD1508 which A: It is grounded on what is called prematurity. Because of the fact that it is
was later repealed but it still applies this barangay conciliation proceeding because premature the courts now does not dismiss the case but only suspends the
the provisions has been granted to the local government code. It is required that proceeding subject to compliance with the barangay conciliation.
before any action is filed with the court it must first pass through the barangay
conciliation proceedings. NOTE: There is a provision in Rule 17 regarding unlawful detainer and forcible
entry, sec 12 thereof, where it specifically state that it would be premature to file
Q: What are the 6 exceptions? an unlawful detainer or forcible entry case without complying with the condition
a. an action wherein 1 of the parties is a government instrumentality

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precedent. Although it says subject to any the same, the exceptions that we’ve under each other term which is conclusiveness of judgment because res judicata
enumerated if that is present then there is no need for barangay conciliation. is of 2 forms, the first one is estoppel or bar by prior judgment, this is the strict
kind of res judicata. The other one is conclusiveness of judgment, where do you
Now venue improperly laid as the 4th ground. Venue is also not jurisdictional, it is find that? Sec 47 Rule 39 distinction by res judicata bar by prior judgment as
only jurisdictional in criminal cases but in civil cases it is not jurisdictional. That is distinguished from conclusiveness of judgment.
why when you look at a motion to quash under criminal procedure venue is a
ground because venue is jurisdictional. If a party moved for the dismissal of the case through litis pendencia it is presumed
that there is more than 1 action pending between the parties.
Venue is also waivable, a night before the 1997 rules, if you want to invoke venue
as a ground for motion to dismiss, you have to file a motion to dismiss in invoking Q: Which action should be dismissed? The 1st or the 2nd?
it, now no longer even if you do not file a motion to dismiss on the ground of A: It depends upon the movant. He can asked for the dismissal of either case. Any
improper venue you are not barred from invoking improper venue as an affirmative case may be prayed for the dismissal by the party.
defense in your answer.
Lack of cause of action is a misnomer because as discussed before cause of action
Jose vs Boyon there was no valid service of summons is the lack or omission. This should be lack of right of action. This should not be
confused with insufficiency of cause of action. Because there are some books which
Jurisdiction by subject matter conferred by law specifically by the constitution, says that insufficiency of cause of action is a ground for motion to dismiss, that is
BP129, and RA7691. wrong. It is lack of cause of action which is ground for motion to dismiss.

Q: What are the requirements of litis pendencia? What are the Q: Why is it so?
requirements of litis pendencia as ground for motion to dismiss? A: Because in insufficiency of cause of action there is a cause of action but there
a. identity of parties was error only in the presentation. And because there was only error in the
b. identity of subject matter presentation it is subject to amendment. Remember that a motion to dismiss is not
c. identity of cause of action a responsive pleading and therefore amendment is still a matter of right. But if it
is a lack of cause of action then definitely there is no cause of action.
The term same parties here identical parties. Same parties in litis pendencia and
res judicata does not refer to identical parties, it only refers to identity of interest. Q: Lack of cause of action should be distinguished from lack of legal
personality to sue.
Q: If the case is between A and B judgment rendered in favor of A over a A: One resides in the cause of action while the other resides with the person. A
property supposing it is an action publiciana regarding property A was the corporation example who sues without the proper board resolution that is lack of
plaintiff B the defendant. 3 or 4 years after the son of A who is X filed a legal personality to sue. A minor who sues without the assistance of parent or
case against the son of B who is Y. the case now is not between A and B guardian or guardian ad litem it is suing without legal personality to sue. In lack of
but between X and Y. can you ask for motion to dismiss on res judicata? legal personality it lies in the person, it is inherent with the person while the lack
of cause of action is inherent in the right of the person.
A: Yes. Remember it is not identity, similarity of parties does not mean identical
parties but identical subject matter, identical cause of action, and identical interest. Q: What are the requirements of res judicata?
But take note of the requirement of identity of subject matter, it is strict identity A:
of subject matter. 1. there must be a valid judgment must be rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction
So that if A and B quarreled over a parcel of land located in Makati under an action 2. valid judgment must be based on the merit of the case
publiciana case and then A and B over the same quarreled over the property located 3. that there is identity of parties, cause of action, and subject matter
in cebu under the same cause of action which is action publiciana there is no res
judicata or litis pendencia. If that is barred by prior judgment or estoppel but not Q: What is judgment of the merits?

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A: Judgement based on the evidence presented to the court Q: If the motion to dismiss is denied, can B the movant appeal its denial?
Why?
Q: Is it necessary that there should be a hearing? A: Because it is not appealable being an interlocutory order. He must file his
A: Judgment of the merits does not require a hearing, it merely means that all the answer, although if there is a grave abuse of discretion he may file certiorari under
parties were given the opportunity to defend and to assert their claim. That is why rule 65. but suppose it is granted, thus favorable to B.
a judgment of a pleading is a judgment on the merit, a judgment by default is also
a judgment on the merit. Q: What is the remedy of A?
A: You can appeal.
Judgment by compromise is a judgment on the merit, a summary judgment under
the rules 32 33 34 are judgment on the merit even if there is no actual hearing. As Q: Why can you appeal an order granting but you cannot appeal an order
long as the parties were given the opportunity to defend and to assert their claim. denying? A: Because an order of granting the motion to dismiss is deemed to be
a final order hence it is appealable.
Q: Which of these grounds are when such are used the dismissal is always
with prejudice? Q: What is appealable?
A: A: Only final orders are appealable.
a. Res judicata;
b. That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been December 7. 2006
paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
c. That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under Q: What are the remedies in case a motion to dismiss is denied?
the provisions of the statute of frauds A: The remedies are:
1. Filing of a motion for reconsideration;
Q: What are the statute of frauds? What are unenforceable obligation? 2. Filing a special action for certiorari under rule 65 in case of abuse of
Enumerate them. discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and in the absence of such
3. File his answer to the complaint.
Under Rule 16 you file a motion to dismiss before an answer. You have to file an
answer after receipt of summons within 15 days if regular 10 days if summary. Note appeal is not available in the denial of a motion to dismiss because it is an
interlocutory order.
Q: What is the effect if the motion to dismiss is denied?
A: Then you must file your answer within the balance of the period. Q: If the motion to dismiss is granted what is the remedy of the plaintiff?
A: He may file an appeal.
Q: Summons was received by the defendant B on dec 5, he has until dec
20 within which to file an answer. On dec 18 he filed a motion to dismiss Q: Why does the rule allow the plaintiff to appeal but disallows the
which was later denied, when should he file his answer? defendant to appeal?
A: Note the denial was dec 18, it is not receipt of such denial. Answer should be A: Because an order denying an appeal is merely an interlocutory order while an
filed 5 days after the receipt of the denial. Notice of denial could be received on order of granting a motion to dismiss is already a final order or resolution.
febraury. The rule says you have the balance of the period but not less than 5 days
from notice. NOTE: It must be remembered that only final order or resolution may be appealed.
And because of the fact that there is no other remedy under the ordinary course
Q: What notice is referred to there? of law from the part of the plaintiff, that is why the rule gives him the right to
A: Notice of the denial of the motion to dismiss. If receipt is Feb 5 then you have appeal.
till Feb 10 to file an answer.
NOTE: Remember that the enumeration stated under sec 1 of rule 16 is
EXCLUSIVE. There are no other grounds of a motion to dismiss under Rule 16. In

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other words, there are other grounds for dismissal of actions under other rules but Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in the preceding
not under rule 16 because as it is so provided this motion to dismiss under rule 16 section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon
can only be availed of BEFORE answer is filed. After that you can no longer avail approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
unless for a very, very, very meritorious reason. Just remember that you can no proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
longer file a motion to dismiss under sec 1 rule 16 AFTER you have filed an answer. upon him of the plaintiffs motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
Q: How about the omnibus motion rule where in the exemption is prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from
jurisdiction? notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved
A: It is a ground available at any time, even during certiorari or on appeal… that is in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
exceptional, very extraordinary. Although there is an exception to the exception… paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or
unless you are estopped. Guerero v CA (?) compromised without the approval of the court. (2a)

Q: May a court not resolve a motion to dismiss and order the same to be Failure to Prosecute
resolved together with the case?
A: No, because sec 3 rule 16 the court shall not defer the resolution of the motion Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the
for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on
the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
Q: What is the rationale of the rule of such non deferment of resolution of comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed
a motion to dismiss? upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice
A: To prevent delay, if the court has no jurisdiction then it would only be waste of to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
time for the court to continue. separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (3a)
Now if the court has no jurisdiction why would the court rule on something
it has no authority? It is not even residual jurisdiction. It is a waste of time, RULE 17 ATTY. BRONDIAL’s LECTURE
money and effort for the court in deferring the resolution of the motion on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. After all, if he renders any judgment without Sections 1 and 2 are dismissal of actions by the plaintiff.
jurisdiction then the judgment is totally and absolutely null and void.
Q: Why would the plaintiff who was in the first place cause the action
would cause the dismissal of the action?
C. Dismissal of Actions [Rule 17] A: It should be emphasized that in rule 17 there is no grounds stated, in all others
they all speak of grounds. The rule does not state any grounds for the plaintiff to
Dismissal Upon Notice ask the dismissal of the case because it would always be good for the entire society
as a whole if there are less cases. And there are one to a million grounds that a
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A complaint may be dismissed by plaintiff may use to dismiss a case. He may even state that he was wrong in filing
the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer the case.
or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall
issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the Q: If A files an action against B in RTC Makati, claiming P250k and before
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication summons has been serve to him, he realized that the trial court has no
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent jurisdiction over the subject matter, so he filed a notice (sec 1) of the
court an action based on or including the same claim. (1a) dismissal of action. And it was dismissed and he again filed the case for a
sum of money against the defendant this time for P500k before the RTC
Dismissal Upon Motion because some obligations has matured. And in the end before summons
has been served he found out that the defendant B, is the best friend of

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his former girlfriend, who asked him to drop the case. He could not refuse which does not arises from the same transaction or series of transaction as that of
because several years ago, she also does not refuse….. and again A filed the claim
a notice for the dismissal of the case. Then later on he found out that B
was courting his former girlfriend. Can he again filed a 3rd case against Q: So can there be a compulsory counterclaim without a claim?
B? A: No, a compulsory counterclaim only exists because a claim exists.

A: He can still file, the 2 dismissal rule will not apply if any dismissal is due to lack Q: So if you remove the claim, on what legal footing will the compulsory
of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The 1st notice of dismissal is due to lack of counterclaim stand? So why do you say that in spite of the dismissal of the
jurisdiction over the subject matter that therefore will deprive the adverse party to complaint, a compulsory counterclaim still exist and continues?
question the 2 dismissal rule. The 2 dismissal rule will apply only to causes other A: Because although the plaintiff has caused for the dismissal of the original claim
than jurisdictional. he has already laid the ground for the counterclaim. If the defendant filed a
counterclaim and plaintiff decides to withdraw his claim he has already laid the
Q: When A files a notice of dismissal, when will the dismissal take effect? ground for the counterclaim of the defendant. But the legal rule here under
A: It will take effect upon issuance of the order of the court confirming the dismissal jurisprudence, because it has already caused prejudiced to the defendant that is
of the case. why compulsory counterclaim continues.

NOTE: That order of the court is mandatory without which the dismissal does not A file a case claiming 1M, B the defendant says “I don’t owe you in fact you owe
take effect. Unlike the rules prior to the 1997 rules, there was no need for the order me!” B filed counterclaim of 3M, in the claim atty fees 100k in the counterclaim,
of confirmation but under the present rules, the order of confirmation is necessary atty fees 300K. Suppose it is true, it has already caused prejudice to the defendant,
to effect the notice of dismissal. Notwithstanding the fact that there was no one the defendant already paid his lawyer. He can never go back to his lawyer and say
who was prejudiced here. “return to me the 300K I paid you” the lawyer would say “I will return you my wife
but not my 300K”
Don’t be confused here in what we studied about amendments, it is a matter of
right which is about also the same period before answer has been served. So even NOTE: It should be emphasized that prejudice has been caused here, that is why
if answer is filed if it has not been served still the notice is applicable. Sec 2 does not distinguished whether the counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive. Whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, the dismissal
Section 2 is no longer by notice but by motion by the plaintiff. But this time answer by a motion of the plaintiff is limited only to the complaint.
is already been filed and served to the plaintiff.
Q: So what happens to the counterclaim?
Q: So that if the answer contained a counter claim what is the effect if the A: The defendant has the option whether the counterclaim be prosecuted in a
motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff is granted? separate action or that it be resolve in the same action by giving notice to the court
A: The motion to dismiss merely affects the claim of the plaintiff and not the within 15 days by a motion manifesting his preference to have his counterclaim
counter claim of the defendant. resolved in the same action.

Q: What kind of counter claim is that? Sec. 3 Dismissal by the Defendant or by the Court. These are the only instances
A: The rules apply whether compulsory or permissive counter claim where the dismissal can be done motu proprio. In all cases of the dismissal we
have studied it must be by motion or notice but here it can be done motu proprio.

Q: What is the nature of a compulsory counterclaim as distinguished to Q: What are these instances?
that of a permissive counterclaim? A:
A: A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises from the same transaction or 1. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
series of transaction as that of the claim. While a permissive counterclaim is one the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; or
2. Failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or

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3. Failure to comply with the Rules or any order of the court (a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative
4. If an action is governed by summary procedure the court can dismiss modes of dispute resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof;
an action motu proprio, even without any motion.
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
Q: If there is a motion filed?
A: Good, it would be much better, it does not prohibit a motion to give effect. (c) The issues to be tried or resolved;

Q: How unreasonable is unreasonable length of time? (d) The documents or exhibits to be presented stating the purpose thereof;
A: The unreasonable length of time depends upon the discretion of the court, there
is no hard and fast rule. It depends upon the circumstance surrounding the case. (e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of
discovery procedures or referral to commissioners; and
Do not be mislead by the word evidence in chief, evidence in chief is not only on
the part of the plaintiff, there is also evidence in chief on the part of the defendant. (f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective
testimonies.
NOTE: Sec 3 also applies as counterclaim, crossclaim or any other complaint even
intervention. Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at
the pre-trial. (n)
There are 3 grounds there, but let me add another under the rules on summary
procedure, if an action is governed by summary procedure the court can dismiss
an action motu proprio, even without any motion. RULE 18 ATTY. BRONDIAL’s LECTURE

The term preliminary conference is not limited now in actions governed by

D. Pre-Trial [Rule 18] summary procedure because in the amended Rule 18, they are now using the term
preliminary conference. Now there are preliminary conferences in both actions
AM No. 03 - 1 - 09 governed by summary procedure and by the rules governed by regular procedure.

Failure to Appear at the Pre-trial Q: Is there pretrial in criminal proceedings?

A: Yes, Rule 118. Both in civil and criminal cases, pretrial is mandatory. Unlike
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when before it was mandatory only in civil cases but not criminal cases. Under the
so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of present rule pretrial is mandatory in both civil and criminal cases.
the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the Section 1 After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of
plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pretrial. Hence it is
basis thereof. (2a, R20) no longer the duty of the court but the duty of the plaintiff after the last pleading
has been filed which is a reply, if reply is necessary. If no reply is file the plaintiff
Pre-Trial Brief now can file a manifestation and motion to set the case for pretrial copy furnished
of course.
Section 6. Pre-trial brief. — The parties shall file with the court and serve on the
adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three This motion is not litigated because there is no prejudice to the other party, like
(3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall motion of postponement but it is still necessary to furnish a copy of your
contain, among others: pleading/motion to the adverse party.

Q: What is the purpose of pretrial?

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A: Under section 2: A: Judicial affidavit is that the parties do agree to have testimonies through judicial
a. the possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to affidavit then submission of affidavits will suffice to constitute the direct
alternative modes of dispute resolution testimonies of witnesses subject to cross examination.
b. the simplification of the issues
c. the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings NOTE: Remember that those which have not been marked in the preliminary
d. the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of conference as a general rule shall not be admitted and those which has not been
documents to avoid necessary proof named as witnesses for the parties could not testify. After these the branch clerk
e. the limitation of number of witnesses of court will set a date for pretrial proper.
f. the advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to the commissioner
g. the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary During pretrial proper, court would again try if settlement can be made. If no
judgments, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefore be found to settlement, records in the preliminary conference shall be the basis of the pretrial
exist order. The pretrial order is mandatory that it can be a ground of new trial on the
h. the advisability or necessity of suspending the proceeding basis of irregularity, if the court proceeded without a pretrial order. In the pretrial
i. such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action order it would state the issues, the facts admitted, limiting the issues… kaya
pagdating ng trial maiksing maiksi na. but despite of these umaabot pa rin ng 10
years ang mga trial.
Q: What is the objective of pretrial?
A: The purpose is to expedite the proceeding. Q: Under rule 18 the parties are mandated to be present, what are the
effects if a party is not present?
If the plaintiff does not file a motion for pretrial it is incumbent upon the court to A: If the plaintiff is not present it is ground for the dismissal of the case, this is
set it for pretrial. So the plaintiff is now given the preference here as to when to not one of the grounds in rule 16 neither among the grounds under rule 17. In rule
set it. But now you don’t immediately hold the pretrial but rather you have what 18 non appearance of the plaintiff when so duly notified, in fact he was the one
you call mediation and conciliation proceeding. This is the main amendment to the who set it for pretrial, then he does not appear and he does not have any
pretrial rule. You already went to the barangay, then to the court, the court will representative who has SPA to settle a settlement then the defendant may move
still refer you to a pseudo barangay, I call it pseudo barangay because the for the dismissal of the case. If the defendant is absent, the plaintiff may move to
conciliators and mediators are not lawyers, some of them are retired court be allowed to present evidence ex parte and on the basis of which the court may
personnel. But it is not necessary that they have legal background because the render judgment.
objective here is to help the parties meet and come out with a settlement. Still the
objective is to expedite the proceedings and to avoid trial in court and in effect it NOTE: In the old rule it is a ground for the declaration of a party as in default.
would declog the dockets of the court. Ngayon, as we were discussing rule 9, WALA NG AS IN DEFAULT ORDER.

Q: If there is no settlement what will happen? People v Perez Admissions in the pretrial are binding between the parties
A: They will return to the court, they have the maximum of 30 days to arrived at
an amicable settlement. This 30 day period is extendable to another 30 days and Saguid doctrine Lack of counsel is not a persuasive ground to set aside the order
if there is still no settlement the conciliator will refer the case back to court. Once of as in default. It was also ruled not to belittle the pretrial because it may make
you go to court you proceed to preliminary conference, before the branch clerk of or break your case.
court. And what happens in sec 2 of rule 18 that is now the procedure in the branch
clerk of court…marking of evidence, simplification of issues, stipulations and
admission, naming of witnesses, agree on judicial affidavit etc… but before the E. Intervention [Rule 19]
clerk of court do that, he would still try to arrived at a settlement.
Who may intervene
Q: What is the meaning of judicial affidavit bago yan la pa sa rules?

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Section 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter Q: If the intervenor is interested in the success of the plaintiff, what
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, should he file?
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition A: Complaint in intervention
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or Q: If the interest of the intervenor is in the success of the defendant, what
not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of should he file?
the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully A: Answer in intervention
protected in a separate proceeding. (2[a], [b]a, R12)
Q: If he’s interest is adverse to both plaintiff and defendant what should
When to intervene he file?
A: Complaint in intervention
Section 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleadingin- NOTE: Remember that in intervention, it can only be filed by leave of court. And
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (n) under the rules when you file a motion for leave of court you already attached your
complaint in intervention or answer in intervention. But you cannot immediately
RULE 19 ATTY. BRONDIAL’s LECTURE file your compliant in intervention or answer in intervention you have 1st to file a
motion for leave to admit complaint/answer in intervention and in your motion
Q: What is the rule in intervention? attached already the intervention. Then that would be the basis on granting your
motion.
Q: What is the basis of intervention?
A: Q: If the motion is granted by the court what happens now? Who will be
1. Interest over the subject matter of the litigation; the plaintiff and defendants?
2. Interest in the plaintiffs cause; A: Depends upon the interest of the intervenor, if he is interested in the cause of
3. Interest of the defendants cause or lack of interest in both causes of plaintiff, he shall be a co plaintiff and defendant is still defendant. If he is interested
that of the plaintiff and the defendant. in the cause of defendant, co defendant. But if his interest is adverse to both he is
the plaintiff and both of them are defendant.
Q: How will you illustrate these three (3) situation?
A filed a case against B for recovery of parcel of land, accion publiciana. NOTE: It must be remembered that the intervenor is an outside party.
X is intervenor, what may be the 1st situation on the part of X who
intervened? Q: How can the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
A: X is the possession of said land or he may be a tenant or he may be a mortgagee intervenor?
or he may be an attaching creditor. Having interest on the subject matter. A: By that very motion for leave you already submit yourself in the jurisdiction of
the court. Take note of the payment of docket fees. Kailangan ito kasi you are an
Q: What about the 2nd ground? outsider here. You have to pay the docket fee especially if you have a claim
A: X is mortgagor then he has an interest. depending to the amount of your claim.

Q: 3rd instance? Q: So the intervenor now files his intervention? When can he file this
A: He could have been adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of the intervention?
property. A: Any time before rendition of judgment.

X is the true owner of property then the adjudication of the property to A or to B Note: It does not say before entry of judgment, but before RENDITION of
would adversely affect his right. judgment.

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Yao vs Perello SC allowed intervention of the RP when it is against the rule because filed when
the case was already in the CA. SC allowed the intervention because if not allowed
Q: Requirements of an intervention it will cause delay and if allowed it will not delay.
A:
a. Legal interest (sec 1 rule 19);
b. Whether the adjudication of the rights of the parties may be SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, JR. AND AMPARO O. DE GUZMAN,
delayed or prejudiced; PETITIONERS, VS. CESAR OCHOA AND SYLVIA A. OCHOA, REPRESENTED
c. That the intervenors right cannot be protected in a different BY ARACELI S. AZORES, AS THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RESPONDENTS.
proceeding; G.R. No. 169292, April 13, 2011 SECOND DIVISION

Note: In the delay aspect here even if it can be proceeded upon or against a FACTS: Respondent spouses Ochoa, through respondent Araceli Azores,
separate proceeding but it would only delay the resolution of the issue then it is ostensibly acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced before RTC Pasig Br 160 an
incumbent upon the court to admit the intervention. This is what distinguishes from action seeking the annulment of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate
the doctrine laid down in the Pinlac case. of sale and damages against petitioners Petitioners filed MD on the ground of
failure to state COA o RTC denied; directed parties to submit pre-trial briefs
You can only file an intervention in a case if it is still within the period allowed by Petitioners filed a 2nd MD o alleging that the certification against forum shopping
the court but over and above, you have to establish your legal interest in the attached to the complaint was not executed by the principal parties (plaintiffs) in
intervention, the three (3) requisites. And it would not cause delay. violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the complaint
fatally defective and thus dismissible. o RTC denied; denied ensuing MR
Q: What would have happened if Judge Perello allowed the intervention of Petitioners filed Rule 65 before CA o They pointed out that the Verification and
Yao? Certification of NonForum Shopping attached to the complaint was not signed by
A: It would delay the adjudication of the case. And the fact that the right invoke Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia Ochoa but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as
by Yao is not a clear right, not distinct and questionable. In an intervention your the attorney-in-fact of Cesar Ochoa only. They invited the attention of the RTC to
right must be clear, distinct and beyond questionable. And it can be threshed out the fact that the powers delegated to Azores did not include the authority to
in another proceeding, Yao may file another action. It will not prejudice him if he institute an action in court. CA dismissed petition o agreed with the RTC that
files another action. following the omnibus motion rule, the defects of the complaint pointed out by the
petitioners were deemed waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to
Pinlac vs CA dismiss. It is the position of the petitioners that the second motion to dismiss
does not violate the Omnibus Motion Rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Q: Service of summons through publication allowed on the following Court because the issue raised in the second motion was a question of jurisdiction.
circumstances: o For said reason, the matter of the defective verification and certification cannot
A: be considered to have been waived when it was not interposed at the first instance.
1. When the whereabout of the defendant is unknown; Considering that the issue is jurisdictional, the RTC should have dismissed the
2. When the defendant is temporarily outside the Philippines and complaint motu proprio.
3. In extraterritorial service.
ISSUES: Whether the matter of the defective verification and certification, which
Here publication was allowed because there were several parties and by leave of was not raised in the first MD, was deemed waived such that petitioners can no
court service by publication was made because some of the parties whose longer raise the same in the subsequent MD, pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule
whereabouts are unknown. under Section 8, Rule 15.

Defective publication because published not in a newspaper of general publication. HELD: YES. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which
neither terminates the case nor finally disposes of it, as it leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the

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general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice
special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of may thereby be served.[6] Similarly, the rule requiring the submission of such
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[3] Therefore, an order denying a motion certification of non-forum shopping, although obligatory, is not jurisdictional.[7]
to dismiss may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from The certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall
the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in such cases is to not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this Q practice
file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.[8] As to whether the trial court
appeal from the final judgment.[4] Only in exceptional cases where the denial should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio, the Court rules in the negative.
of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the Court Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is clear that failure to comply with the
allows the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. By "grave abuse of discretion," we requirements on the rule against forum shopping shall be cause for the dismissal
mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of the case "upon motion and after hearing."
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. MAXIMO D. SISON, Respondent. G.R.
hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive No. 185954 February 16, 2010 THIRD DIVISION
duty or to a virtual refusal-to perform the duty enjoined by or to .act all in
contemplation of law.[5] In this case, the petitioners failed to convincingly FACTS: Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the
substantiate its charge of arbitrariness on the part of Judge Fabros. Absent such Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint addressed to
showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or ill motive, the Court cannot but sustain Ombudsman accusing Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials3 of the
the ruling of the CA. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Sison, the Provincial Budget
motion as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to Officer, of
dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions
For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion, must raise of pesos Petitioner Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T. De Jesus,
and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion because Jr., found basis to proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded
under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As provincial officials of Samar Respondent Sison denied the allegations
inferred from the provision, only the following defenses under Section 1, Rule 9, Petitioner found respondent (and the other officials) guilty of grave misconduct,
are excepted from its application: [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
[b] there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause dismissing him from service Sison filed a Rule 43 before CA CA reversed
(litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata); and [d] Ombudsman; insufficient evidence against respondent Petitioner filed an
the action is barred by the statute of limitations or prescription. In the case at Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration
bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective verification and certification CA denied o CA did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene,
of forum shopping only when they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite the because (1) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal
fact that this ground was existent and available to them at the time of the filing of interest in the administrative case against petitioner; (2) the Omnibus Motion for
their first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omis Intervention was filed after the CA rendered its Decision; and (3) the Office of the
sion, the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping was Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decision
deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by the petitioners in their
second motion to dismiss. Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the ISSUE: Whether Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene in the action pending
requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such before CA.
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, and non-
compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. HELD: NO. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to
Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.7 The permissive tenor
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion
of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. In fact, the court may in permitting or disallowing the intervention,8 thus: o SECTION 1. Who may
order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to

232
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the Police Commission v. Mamauag (Mamauag),16 in which this Court qualified and
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency to actively participate in
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention the appeal of decisions in administrative cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled:
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the
and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize ‘either party’ to
proceeding. o SECTION 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP
filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the memberrespondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when
parties.9 (Emphasis supplied.) Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government
persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty. However, the
matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim.10 government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which
Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from
claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved.11 To warrant the service. The government party appealing must be the one that is prosecuting
intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation
the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of
must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the
should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the
separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve Court declared: To be sure when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the were brought to the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can
judgment.12 In support of its argument that it has legal interest, the Office of be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is
the Ombudsman cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr. (Garcia). 13 In the appealed to a higher court for review." o In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil
said case, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) imposed upon its employee, Garcia, Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became
the penalty of forced resignation for gross neglect of duty. On appeal, the Civil an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative cases
Service Commission (CSC) exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested
against him. In accordance with the ruling in Civil Service Commission v. appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," not
Dacoycoy,14 this Court affirmed the standing of the PNB to appeal to the CA the to litigate. Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to
CSC resolution exonerating Garcia. After all, PNB was the aggrieved party which intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More
complained of Garcia’s acts of dishonesty. Should Garcia be finally exonerated, it importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate. It
might then be incumbent upon PNB to take him back into its fold. PNB should, is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where
therefore, be allowed to appeal a decision that, in its view, hampered its right to their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d’etre for such
select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and
name as a premier banking institution in the country.1avvphi1 Based on the must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the
facts above, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Garcia to support its appellate court to decide the issues without the judges’ active participation.17
intervention in the appellate court for the following reasons: o First, Sison was not When judges actively participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way,
exonerated from the administrative charges against him, and was, in fact, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial instead.18 In Pleyto v.
dismissed for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-
interest of the service by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case, CIDG),19 the Court applied this doctrine when it held that the CA erred in granting
OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. Thus, it was Sison who appealed to the CA being, the Motion to Intervene filed by the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit: o The court
unquestionably, the party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal. o Second, the or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when hearing
issue here is the right of the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal
of its decision, not its right to appeal. o And third, Garcia should be read along with before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency
Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals15 and National Appellate Board of the National must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the controversies

233
between parties in accordance with the evidence and applicable laws, regulations Rockland Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no intervention is permitted after
and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and completely state his a decision has already been rendered.25 In light of the foregoing considerations,
findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify further his all other issues raised in the petition are rendered moot and academic and no
judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the further discussion is necessary.
quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably
forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes
personal since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI,
the original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his Petitioners, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by
judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellant’s assignment of errors, BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special Administrator, Respondent. G.R. No.
defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal. Likewise, 178221 December 1, 2010 FIRST DIVISION
the facts reveal that this case was elevated to the CA via a verified Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and Supreme Court Administrative FACTS: 20 December 1966: Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate and
Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995, which govern appeals to the CA from without issue 28 April 1967: His brother, Bernardino filed a petition for the
judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. Rule 43, as well as issuance of LOA before CFI Negros Occidental 17 January 2003: petitioners and
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, provides that the petition for review shall state their siblings filed a manifestation before the intestate court o they introduced
the full names of the parties to the case without impleading the court or agencies themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)—who, in turn, was
either as petitioners or respondents.20 Thus, the only parties in such an appeal revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis. o their
are the appellant as petitioner and appellee as respondent. The court or, in this grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the legal spouse of the
case, the administrative agency that rendered the judgment appealed from, is not latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo. o
a party in the said appeal. Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not Since both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away, they pray that they be
have the legal interest to intervene. As the CA held correctly: o The Office of the allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo
Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in the administrative case G. Jalandoni Intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by
against the petitioner such that it would be directly affected by the judgment that Bernardino filed opposition Intestate court (IC) allowed petitioners to
this Court had rendered. It must be remembered that the legal interest required intervene o The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately
for an intervention must be direct and immediate in character. Lest it be forgotten, establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token,
what was brought on appeal before this Court is the very Decision by the Office of permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her
the Ombudsman. Plainly, the Office of the Ombudsman, as an adjudicator, and not behalf. Estate filed MR o IC denied Estate filed a Rule 65 before CA
an advocate, has no legal interest at stake in the outcome of this Rule 43 Petition. CA granted; nullified IC’s orders o In coming to its conclusion, the Court of
Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the intestate court to have
filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. disregarded the probative value of Sylvia’s birth certificate.31 The appellate court,
In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on July 22, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvia’s birth certificate serves as prima facie
2008, after the Decision of the CA was promulgated on June 26, 2008. In support evidence of the facts therein stated—which includes the civil status of her
of its position, petitioner cites Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego.22 That parents.32 Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have
case, however, is not applicable here, since the Office of the Ombudsman filed the been taken as established. o The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners
motion for intervention during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA. and their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the marriage of
It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was married to
by Sison. The Rules of Court provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriage— the Isabel-Rodolfo union—is a
verified petition for review with the CA, with proof of service of a copy on the court nullity for being bigamous.33 From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as
or agency a quo.23 Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time within the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to
which to file a motion to intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not now be show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist
watchman," not merely a passive onlooker.24 In this case, it cannot be denied ISSUE: Whether petitioners should be allowed to intervene.
that the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly filed. As we held in

234
HELD: NO. The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie
question of whether the intestate court gravely abused its discretion is intricately weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and
linked with the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabel’s convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.52 In
status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. A court’s power to allow or deny the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.
intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth
of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or certificate as untruthful statements made only in order to "save face."53 They urge
proceeding may be allowed to intervene.45 Otherwise stated, a court has no this Court to take note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to
authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is
intervene therein.46 Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance. The allegations of the
an uninterested person to intervene in a case — the mistake is not simply an error petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish
of judgment, bu t one of jurisdiction . In such event, the allowance is made in the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like
excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom
discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would
action for certiorari. themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in
intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries. Ironically, it is
115 the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which,
properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such
writ of certiorari, when it examined the evidence proving Isabel’s right to inherit marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the
from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines whether inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void
the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabel’s interest in ab initio. The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to
Rodolfo’s estate—which, as already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that
justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence presented she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners
by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the
court were issued in excess of the latter’s jurisdiction or with grave abuse of Court of Appeals.
discretion. The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We
agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings
failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of
Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim
that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate. Contrary to the position taken by the
petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis
was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no
marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record. While a
marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO A. HENSON AND ANGEL S. ONG,
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the Complainants, v. COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON M. BATO, JR.,
marriage certificate.48 Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized ISAIAS P. DICDICAN AND EDUARDO B. PERALTA, JR., Respondents. A.M. OCA IPI
as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.49 In the present No. 12-201-CA-J, February 19, 2013 EN BANC
case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the FACTS: Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez (Fernandez) and Antonio A. Henson were
following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) elected in August 2010 to the Board of Directors (Board) of the Nationwide
that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.50 In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s Development Corporation (NADECOR), a domestic corporation organized in 1956,
birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. which owns a gold-copper mining concession Angel S. Ong was among those

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elected to NADECOR’s Board at its stockholders’ meeting held on June 13, 2012. 122782. CA 11th Division issued a TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784,5 stating
August 15, 2011: NADECOR conducted its regular annual stockholders’ meeting, that the three (3) conditions for the issuance of an injunctive relief were present
wherein 94% of NADECOR’s outstanding shares was represented and voted; 2 in the said petition, namely: o (a) the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b)
groups were vying for control of the company, viz: o one group led by Jose G. the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) there is an urgent
Ricafort (JG Ricafort) who then personally controlled 42% of the issued shares, and and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Held that the
o the other group led by Conrado T. Calalang (Calalang), who owned 33%. Elected August 25, 2011 meeting was NULL and VOID The CA petitions were then
to the Board were Calalang, Jose, Jose P. De Jesus (De Jesus), Roberto R. Romulo consolidated Pending resolution of motion for issuance of writ of PI, a previously
(Romulo), Alfredo I. Ayala (Ayala), Victor P. Lazatin, Fernandez, Leocadio Nitorreda announced stockholder’s meeting was held (June 13, 2012) o In the meeting, the
(Nitorreda), and John Engle (Engle). following were taken up: the election of the new Board; the ratification of the
Later elected as Corporate Secretary was Luis Manuel L. Gatmaitan (Gatmaitan). rescission by the Old Board of NADECOR’s MOUs with the St. Augustine; and the
October 20, 2011: Corazon H. Ricafort (CH Ricafort), Jose Manuel H. Ricafort ratification of the subscription of Queensberry to 25% of the capital stock of
(JM Ricafort), Marie Grace H. Ricafort (MG Ricafort), and Maria Teresa R. Santos NADECOR. CA 14th division rendered the assailed resolution which granted
(MT Santos) (plaintiffs Ricafort), wife and children of JG Ricafort claiming that the motion for issuance of writ of PI o Significantly, the Resolution enjoined the
they are stockholders of record, they instituted an action for annulment of the Old Board from acting as a hold-over Board, thereby contravening the TRO issued
August 25, 2011 meeting before RTC Pasig, averring that they were not given prior by the 11th Division. It then allowed the New Board “to continue to act as Board
notice hence failed to attend the same; also contended that they were served with of Directors of NADECOR.” It also enjoined the holding of a stockholders’ meeting
notice only on August 16, 2011, a day after the meeting was held, in violation of on June 13, 2012, and ordered a freeze in the enforcement of all actions taken at
the 3-day prior notice provided in NADECOR’s Bylaws; and that moreover, the the said meeting. In particular, the CA enjoined the ratification of the rescission of
notice announced a time and venue of the meeting different from those set forth all MOUs and related Transaction Agreements with the St. Augustine, the election
in the Bylaws o Impleaded as defendants were NADECOR, the members of the of a new Board of NADECOR, and the ratification of the sale to Queensberry of 25%
incumbent Board, and the Corporate Secretary, Gatmaitan. November 18, 2011: of NADECOR’s authorized capital stock, which would come from its unissued
Gatmaitan filed his Answer to the complaint in SEC Case No. 11-164; Calalang, shares. o The CA Resolution was penned by Justice Bato, the acting senior member
Romulo, Ayala, Fernandez, Engle and Nitorreda filed theirs on November 21, 2011; of the Special 14th Division (formerly 15th Division, following an internal CA
and NADECOR filed its Answer on November 23, 2011 November 30, 2011: the reorganization), vice Justice Lantion who was on a 15-day wellness leave.
plaintiffs Ricafort filed their Answer to the Compulsory Counterclaims. RTC Concurred in by Justices Dicdican and Peralta, the Resolution cited “new and
ruled in favor of Ricafort o Agreed with plaintiffs Ricafort that they were not given subsequent matters” allegedly not contemplated in the RTC’s Order dated
due notice of the annual stockholders’ meeting of NADECOR, and that their December 21, 2011, like the rescission of NADECOR’s MOUs with the St. Augustine,
complaint did not involve an election contest, and therefore was not subject to the and the ratification of the 25% subscription of Queensberry. The CA reasoned that
15-day prescriptive period to file an election protest. 4 petitions for certiorari the above actions of the Board could have injurious consequences on the future
were then filed before CA by the new members of the Board, all with application viability of NADECOR, even as they were not intended to merely “prevent a hiatus
for TRO and writ of PI o (a) CA-G.R. SP No. 122782 - filed on January 5, 2012 by [in the operations of NADECOR] and so as not to unduly prejudice the corporation.”
Director Romulo versus CH Ricafort, JM Ricafort, MG Ricafort and MT Santos The CA thus determined that the petitioners, as stockholders and members of the
(respondents Ricafort). The case was raffled to Justice Lantion, senior member of Board elected on August 15, 2011, have a right in esse to seek the preservation of
the 15th Division; the chairman of the Division was Justice Dicdican, while Justice the only valuable property of NADECOR, its MPSA covering the King-King Mine in
Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) was the junior member. o (b) CA-G.R. SP Compostela Valley. Since, according to the CA, the St. Augustine possessed
No. 122784 - filed on January 5, 2012 by Directors Calalang, Ayala, Engle and technical and financial capabilities to develop the said mine, the rescission of the
Nitorreda versus the respondents Ricafort. Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio (Justice MOUs could lead to the recall of the MPSA by the government, to NADECOR’s grave
Reyes-Carpio) of the 11th Division was the ponente. o (c) CA-G.R. SP No. 122853 and irreparable injury. Complainants filed before SC a Petition for Certiorari
- filed on January 6, 2012 by NADECOR versus the respondents Ricafort. Justice and Prohibition, seeking to annul the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Samuel Gaerlan of the 6th Division was the ponente. o (d) CA-G.R. SP No. 122854 CA’s Special 14th Division. o SC dismissed the complainants’ petition for lack of
- filed on January 6, 2012 by Gatmaitan versus the respondents Ricafort. Justice personality because they were non-parties and strangers to the consolidated CA
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente of the 9th Division was the ponente. CA 15th division petitions. Complainants likewise filed before SC an administrative complainant
denied the application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. against herein respondents (CA Justices)

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of public policy a magistrate cannot be held administratively liable for every
discretionary but erroneous order he issues.40 The settled rule is that “a Judge
ISSUE: Whether herein complainants may question the issuance of writ of PI, cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous
considering their non-intervention in the CA cases. decision rendered by him in good faith.”41 The case of Cortes v. Sandiganbayan42
is instructive. We quote: o It must be stressed that as a matter of policy, the acts
HELD: NO. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of his official
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do
officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to
Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound by an render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected by the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. o
any proceeding to which he is a stranger.34 Moreover, a person not an aggrieved It is also worth mentioning that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
party in the original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for certiorari, will not Code as to “rendering knowingly unjust judgment” refer to an individual judge who
be permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay the injurious writ.35 Such is does so “in any case submitted to him for decision” and has no application to the
the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a person members of a collegiate court such as the Sandiganbayan or its divisions, who
not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective
action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed.36 Stated judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of
differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a
party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.37 collective decision is “unjust” cannot prosper.
The complainants, who at various times served as elected members of the Board The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint
of NADECOR, did not bother to intervene in the CA petitions, hence, they are not against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court
entitled to the service of pleadings and motions therein. Complainant Fernandez for review and correction. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate
was himself a defendant in SEC Case No. 11-164 in the RTC, but he chose not to remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for
join any of the four CA petitions. In this Court’s Resolution38 dated July 18, reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or
2012 in G.R. No. 202218-21, entitled “Jose G. Ricafort, et al. v. Court of Appeals decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. x x x.43 (Citations omitted)
[Special 14th Division], et al.,” involving a petition for certiorari and prohibition It was also emphasized in the above case that as an established rule, an
filed by JG Ricafort, De Jesus, Paolo A. Villar, and Ma. Nalen Rosero-Galang, also administrative, civil or criminal action against a judge cannot be a substitute for an
questioning the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Special appeal.
14th Division of the CA, we ruled that persons who are not parties to any of the
consolidated petitions have no personality to assail the said injunctive writ. In
another Resolution,39 also promulgated on July 18, 2012, in G.R. No. 20225760, DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein complainants to assail the PHILIPPINE CHINESE CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents. G.R. No.
validity of the writ of preliminary injunction in the aforesaid consolidated CA 184589, June 13, 2013 FIRST DIVISION
petitions, we likewise dismissed the petition due to lack of personality of the
petitioners, since they were non-parties and strangers to the consolidated CA FACTS: One Purita Landicho (Landicho) filed before CFI Rizal an Application for
petitions. We pointed out that they should first have intervened below, and then Registration of a piece of land, measuring 125 hectares CFI Rizal granted the
filed a motion for reconsideration from the questioned CA order. On September 19, application; ordered Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) “to
2012, we denied their motion for reconsideration from the dismissal of their comply with Section 21 of Act No. 2347”10 on the issuance of a decree and original
petition. Having established that the herein complainants have no personality to certificate of title (OCT), which the latter did Subject property was thereafter
assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA’s former Special 14th sold many times o The sale of the subject property could be traced from Landicho
Division, we cannot now permit them to harass the CA Justices who issued the to Blue Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI), which acquired TCT No. 344936 in its own name
same. For even granting that the issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter on November 10, 1971; then to Winmar Poultry Farm, Inc. (WPFI), TCT No.

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425582, November 5, 1973; and finally, to herein respondent Philippine Chinese In other words, Intervention would not be allowed after the Decision has become
Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI), TCT No. 482970, July 15, 1975.12 A. final and executory. The issue in the instant Petition is the issuance of a decree of
Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI) then instituted an action before RTC registration and nothing more is being tried. LRA manifested to RTC that it
Pasig Br 167, asserting ownership over the subject land o ADRDI asserted cannot comply with the order o since there were already two existing titles
ownership over the subject property, which was a portion of a bigger tract of land covering the subject property, i.e., TCT No. 70589 of Araneta (traced back to OCT
measuring around 513 hectares, covered by TCT No. 42999, dated February 20, No. 301 of Meerkamp Co.) and TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI (traced back to Landicho’s
1956, in the name of said corporation. Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute TCT No. 167681); and to issue a decree of registration and OCT in Landicho’s name
Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of herein petitioner Deogenes O. would only further aggravate the problem of double titling. PCCAI filed before
Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Landicho then died 7 years after, petitioner Rodriguez CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition o PCCAI lastly maintained that it was an
filed an Omnibus Motion before RTC San Mateo, Rizal Br 75 o Rodriguez alleged indispensable party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 and that it should have been
therein that the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, allowed by the RTC to intervene during the hearing of Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion
1965 of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landicho’s title for the execution of the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and Order dated
over the subject property has not been executed. Rodriguez specifically stated that December 22, 1965 of the CFI. CA granted PCCAI’s petition o Anent the issue
no decree of registration had been issued by the LRC Commissioner (now the of intervention, in the case of Information Technology of the Philippines vs.
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT had been Comelec, G.R. 159139, August 22, 2006, the following doctrine was enunciated, to
ever issued by the ROD in Landicho’s name. RTC San Mateo issued a subpoena wit: “The basic doctrinal rule is that final judgments may no longer be modified,
commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing of Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 set on except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes, or when the judgment is void, or
November 8, 2006 at 9:00 a.m.; to bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration if supervening events or circumstances that transpire after the finality of the
No. SM-02-0229; and to testify in connection therewith. PCCAI filed a Motion decision render its execution unjust and inequitable. In the interest of substantial
for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. o PCCAI justified its justice, this Court has allowed exceptions to this rule. A person who has a legal
intervention by arguing that it was an indispensable party in the case, having interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
substantial legal interest therein as the registered owner of the subject property interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
under TCT No. 482970. o PCCAI likewise pointed out that Rodriguez himself or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof,
submitted a copy of TCT No. 482970, only alleging that said certificate was may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.”
fictitious. PCCAI averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in his Omnibus
Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and subsisting, there being no direct ISSUE: Whether PCCAI may intervene.
action or final court decree for its cancellation. o Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion
constituted a collateral attack on the title of PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law HELD: YES. Finally, intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,
and jurisprudence. Consequently, PCCAI asked the RTC to allow its intervention in pertinent provisions of which read: o SECTION 1. Who may intervene. – A person
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 so it could protect its vested rights and interests over who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
the subject property; to note and admit its Answerin-Intervention; and to deny parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion for utter lack of merit. RTC decided in favor of a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
petitioner’s Omnibus Motion o Consistency dictates and being a mere continuation officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
of the CFI Pasig proceedings, this Court can only reiterate the directives in the court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
Order dated December 22, 1965 . It cannot, however, issue, as prayed for, a writ the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
of execution directing the issuance of a decree of registration and an original intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding o SECTION 2.
certificate of title in the name of [Rodriguez]. PCCAI filed MR RTC denied Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
PCCAI’s Motion for Leave to Intervene and MR o This Court after receiving evidence rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention
that a Decision was rendered in favor of the applicants spouses Landicho as owner shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. The subject
in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, and that no title was issued pursuant property is presently covered by TCT No. 482970 in the name of PCCAI. As the
to the said Decision which has become final and executory even after an Order to registered owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject property. The
that effect was issued, merely reiterated the said Order for the implementation of issuance of another certificate of title to Rodriguez will adversely affect PCCAI,
the Decision dated November 16, 1966, signed by the Hon. Andres Reyes as Judge. constituting a cloud on its TCT No. 482970. Although Rule 19 is explicit on the

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period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in
several cases, viz: o This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been FACTS: Appellant was charged with the rape of a 6-year old girl, Mayia Ponseca
allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the Counsel de officio Atty. Genaro N. Montefalcon assisted appellang during
higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford arraignment, who then pleaded not guilty o Atty. Montefalcon was then allowed by
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even the court to withdraw for health reasons Atty. Roberto Blanco appointed by
after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review the court ass the new counsel de officio At the pre-trial, the prosecution and
of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme defense stipulated on the following facts: o “1. The identity of the accused; o 2.
Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. The accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof; o 3. The
In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca, was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by
Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to her birth certificate; o 4. That after the incident, the child was subjected to a
settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties. In fine, the medicolegal examination to which a medico-legal certificate was issued by Dr.
allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion Editha Divino. The prosecution marked in evidence the birth certificate of the
of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. We stress again victim Mayia O. Ponseca as Exhibit ‘A’, and the medico-legal certificate issued by
that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make Dr. Editha Divino as Exhibit ‘B’. Appellant denied the charges against him;
the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is interposed an alibi; that he was working at a fishpond when the offense was
not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.34 allegedly committed; that he only heard about the rape incident from his manager;
(Citations omitted.) The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify that policemen suddenly arrested him thereafter RTC convicted appellant;
the relaxation of the rules of procedure on intervention. First, the interests of both imposed death penalty Appellant raised 2 arguments: o Appellant contends
PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject property arose only after the CFI Decision that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant points
dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange
executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI on November 13, 1973 t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant
and was issued TCT No. 482970 for the same on July 15, 1975; while Rodriguez stresses that when Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a
bought the subject property from Landicho on November 14, 1996. Second, as man named “Johnny” and did not give any description or any identifying mark.
previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles back to Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after
Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification was not done with
the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the original party in Land Reg. Case the usual police line-up. o even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been
No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved proven beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death
Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion, filed before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in which he penalty. Appellant maintains that the death penalty cannot be imposed on him for
prayed for the execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI failure of the prosecution to prove Mayia’s age by independent evidence. Appellant
moved to intervene in the case only to oppose Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion on the points out that while Mayia’s birth certificate was duly marked during the pre -
ground that the subject property is already registered in its name under TCT No. trial, it was not presented and identified during the trial. Appellant asserts that
482970, which originated from Landicho’s TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after Mayia’s minority must not only be specifically alleged in the Information but must
learning of Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N5098 via the also be established beyond reasonable doubt during the trial.
November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably expected
to oppose the same. Such action was the most opportune and expedient remedy ISSUE: Whether there was a need to present Mayia’s birth certificate during trial
available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of to prove the latter’s age.
registration and OCT in Rodriguez’s name. For this reason, the RTC should have
allowed the intervention of PCCAI. HELD: NO. At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory
disposition of the criminal case. Appellant, assisted by counsel, signed a Pre-Trial
Agreement[28] which, as incorporated in the Pre-Trial Order, stated that: o 3.
The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA, by her birth certificate; During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence
accusedappellant. G.R. No. 142556. February 5, 2003 EN BANC Mayia’s birth certificate as Exhibit “A”.[29] The prosecution submitted its Offer of

239
Evidence[30] which included Exhibit “A”, a certified true copy of Mayia’s birth deposit which she and the petitioner maintained with the same bank.[10] Gina
certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit “A”[31] without any objection from the declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials,
defense. The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea appliances and other personal properties Petitioner filed his answer o claimed
bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of evidence of the that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his
parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondent’s
the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes lawful defenses; meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction
and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and of said house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was
civil aspects of the case.[32] Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre- contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips.
trial bind the parties. Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from
Procedure[33] provides: o “SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial conference, 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house was
the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share
evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs
disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified and business of her parents. From his income in the fishing business, he claimed
by the court to prevent manifest injustice.” (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, Mayia to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was placed in a joint
herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15, account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was
1998, which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident occurred spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties. RTC declared petitioner
on January 17, 1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that she was “8 years in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief, pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No.
old last May 23.”[34] Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 1-89 Petitioner filed an MR o RTC denied MR; allowed PR to present
as shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven (7) months evidence ex parte Petitioner filed another MR o RTC denied RTC
old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the prosecution rendered a decision in favor of PR; ordered, among others partition of the house
has indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at the time appellant Petitioner appealed before CA CA affirmed RTC o The appellate court
raped her. ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the petitioner as in default
became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL and the defendant’s non-compliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to present
COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY, respondents. G.R. evidence ex parte.
No. 150611. June 10, 2003 FIRST DIVISION
ISSUES:
FACTS: PR Gina Rey, 17 years old, married but separated de facto from her
husband, met petitioner and decided to cohabit with him until their relationship Whether petitioner may be excused for non-filing of pre-trial brief. NO
turned sour. The two decided to end their 9-year long cohabitation PR Gina Whether petitioner’s failure to file a pre-trial brief warranted the allowance of PR
filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with to present evidence ex parte. NO
Receivership against petitioner before RTC Boac, Marinduque o She alleged that
from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to HELD: Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present
accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.[20]
of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration[21] showing
properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her. o she deposited part of her excusable neglect.[22] The motion need not really stress the fact that the
earnings in her savings account with First Allied Development Bank.[7] Her Pass defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains
Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08.[8] She his defenses is already on record.[23] In the case at bar, petitioner insists that
further stated that she had a total of P35,465.00[9] share in the joint account his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not represented by

240
counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders, and ordering PR
private respondent to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose Builders to refund petitioner the amount of P2,116,103.31, as well as to pay
at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a damages in the amount of P250,000. o issued a writ of execution against PR
lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file answer,[24] the Builders and its managers, and referred the writ to the office of the Clerk of Court
required answer stating therein the special and affirmative defenses,[25] and of Muntinlupa for enforcement. Deputy Sheriff levied on the subject land
several other motions.[26] If it were true that petitioner did not understand the located in Laguna owned by spouses Pablito Villarin and herein PR Bernadine
import of the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could Villarin PR Bernadine filed before RTC Paranaque City a petition for prohibition
have inquired from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief. with prayer for TRO and writ of PI seeking to enjoin sheriff from proceeding with
Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt of the the public auction o Private respondent alleged that she co-owned the property
April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure subject of the execution sale; that the property regime between private respondent
to file a brief. Pretrial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non- and her husband was complete separation of property, and that she was not a
observance may result in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, party in the HLURB case, hence, the subject property could not be levied on to
they should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they answer for the separate liability of her husband. Public Respondent Judge Perello
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the issued a TRO Public Respondent Judge Perello then issued a resolution
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[27] granting PR’s petition for prohibition and declaring the subject property exempt
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not from execution. More than a month after issuance of said resolution, petitioner
a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in the filed a motion for intervention o Public Respondent Judge Perello denied said
Constitution which mandates that a party in a noncriminal proceeding be motion
represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to a
denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not ISSUE: Whether petitioner had the right to intervene.
indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such
that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or HELD: NO. Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it is essential that
violated.[28] However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity the party who is interested in sustaining the act or acts sought to be prohibited or
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. Thus, as the judgment creditor in
rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be the HLURB case, petitioner claims that he was an indispensable party in the petition
allowed to present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial for prohibition and should have been allowed to intervene in the said case. He was
brief. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called not allowed to do so. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: o SEC.
for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect 2 Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
“[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
appear at the pre-trial,” that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
as in default. aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent
to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
LINCOLN L. YAO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO, in her capacity otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, THE petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
EX-OFICIO SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MUNTINLUPA CITY and BERNADINE order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
D. VILLARIN, respondents. G.R. No. 153828. October 24, 2003 THIRD DIVISION and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided
in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (2a) Consequently, petitioner’s claim
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said provision
Regulatory Board (HLURB) against a certain corporation, PR Builders, Inc. and its requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition.
managers, Enrico Baluyot and Pablito Villarin HLURB rendered a decision On the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant

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has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) IGNACIO, ROSENDO ABUBO, represented by Santos Chavez, SOLEDAD BAUTISTA
consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the DE COLUMNA, represented by Zenaida Valle, MARQUITA/ SEBASTIAN LOPEZ,
original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights represented by Emmanuel Marquez, DELIA DORION, GERARDO L. SANTIAGO,
may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur FIDEL PANGANIBAN, represented by Manuel dela Roca, MATEO and OFELIA
as the first is not more important than the second.[5] In the case at bar, it INOVEJAS, REMEDIOS C. DOVAS, represented by Josefa Capistrano, DOMINGO
cannot be said that petitioner’s right as a judgment creditor was adversely affected ALTAMIRANO and SPOUSES ROLANDO ALTAMIRANO and MINERVA FETALVERO,
by the lifting of the levy on the subject real property. Records reveal that there are BEATRIZ RINGPIS, ROSARIO DE MATA, RUFINA CRUZ, represented by JOSEFA
other pieces of property exclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case MANABAT, SPOUSES ANITA SALONGA-CAPAGCUAN and MAYNARD CAPAGCUAN,
that can be levied upon. Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that DISCORA YATCO, represented by VICTORINA Y. FIRME, and CONSUELO YATCO,
petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he must exercise said right in GENEROSA MEDINA VDA. DE NOGUERA, represented by ATTY. RAYMUNDO M.
accordance with the rules and within the period prescribed therefor. As provided NOGUERA, BEATRIZ SALANDANAN and LOURDES ALONTE-VASQUEZ, PEDRO
in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before COSIO and VICTORINA CARINO, RUTH C. ZARATE, PRECIOSISIMA V. YAPCHULAY,
rendition of judgment by the trial court.[6] Petitioner filed his motion only on April BASILISA B. YAPCHULAY, OFELIA B. YAPCHULAY, FELISA B. YAPCHULAY, FE B.
25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in the rules. The court resolution YAPCHULAY, WILMA B. YAPCHULAY, FELIX B. YAPCHULAY, MARIANO B.
granting private respondent’s petition for prohibition and lifting the levy on the YAPCHULAY, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and other registered OWNERS OF VILAR-
subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002, after the lapse MALOLES (VILMA) SUBDIVISION, respondents. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
of 15 days, the said resolution had already become final and executory. Besides, intervenor. WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the reconsideration of the trial intervenor. G.R. No. 91486. September 10, 2003 SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
court’s resolution is sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant
petition. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for FACTS: Petitioners filed before RTC a complaint for quieting of title over the
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity 3 subject lots
to correct its errors, if any. ALBERTO G. PINLAC, ATTY. ERIBERTO H. DECENA, RTC declared respondents (including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles
RODOLFO F. REYES, FELIPE BRIONES, JUANITO METILLA, JR., FELIPE A. FLORES, (Vilma) Subdivision whose properties were within Lot No. 2); decided in favor of
HERMINIO ELEVADO, NARCISO S. SIMEROS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, petitioners Defaulted title owners filed before CA a Petition to Annul the Partial
ATTY. CORAZON A. MERRERA, ATTY. JEAN MAKASIARPUNO, SERGIO ACABAN, Decision of the trial court CA granted said petition; denied petitioners’ MR o
represented by Atty. Ramon Gerona, ATTY. ROGELIO VELASCO, MARTINA S. ruled that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
NONA, OVIDEO MEJICA, ALFREDO ITALIA, MARIANO GUEVARRA, JESUS YUJUICO, respondents because of defective service of summons by publication. Petitioners
DOMINADOR RIVERA, SATURNINA SALES, represented by Atty. Consolacion elevated to SC via Rule 65 SC affirmed CA Petitioners filed MR SC
SalesDemontano, FRED CHUA, SONIA SY CHUA, LAWRENCE CHUA, CAROLINA C. partially granted MR Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
RUBIO, represented by Tessie Sebastian, GEORGE G. GUERRERO, BEATRIZ Registration Authority (LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
TANTOCO, represented by Filomena Cervantes, ATTY. MARCELA CELESTINO- motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention
GARCIA, FEDERICO GARCIA, ILDEFONSO MORALES, LEONCIA VELASCO, OCRAVIO
F. LINA, ANA MARIA JARAMILLO, ESTRELLA BASA, JOSE ESTEVA, JR., CIRILO ISSUE: Whether the Republic had the right to intervene.
GONZALES, VILLY TOBIAS, MIGUEL DELA PAZ, RUBEN GUILLERMO, FAUSTO
YADAO, represented by Jeremias Panlilio, RICARDO YAP, ROSAURO/PATRICK HELD: YES. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended
MARQUEZ, represented by Emmanuel Marquez, MODESTA FABRIG and MAXIMINO to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is
SALCEDA, MELIA LATOMBO, TERESITA PANGILINAN-RIVERO, ARCH. DANILO C. aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding
DE CASTRO, JOSE S. LEDESMA, JAIME P. ANG, VEICENTE P. ANG, MAURO U. technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.[9] Indeed, in exceptional
GABRIEL, ATTY. VIRGINIA GOMEZ, GIL S. BONILLA, LOURDES BLANCO, cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of
represented by Catalina Blanco, JOSEFA SANCHEZ and ROSALINA VILLEGAS, judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the
represented by Heidi Bobis, SHIRLEY BUCAG, QUIRINA O. TUVERA, represented by petition for review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in
Wilfredo Orejuros, GREGORIO AVENTINO, represented by Enrico Aventino, the Supreme Court.[10] In Mago v. Court of Appeals,[11] intervention was
LEONARDO L. NICOLAS, NICOMEDES PENARANDA, FRANCISCA MEDRANO, OFELIA granted even after the decision became final and executory, thus – o …The

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permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules described in Proclamation No. 1826 “is within the area covered by GLRO Record
to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the No. 1037 (OCT-333) and GLRO Record No. 5975 as plotted in our Municipal Index
same. But needless to say, this discretion should be exercised judiciously and only Sheet (MIS) Nos. 2574-C, 5707-B, 5708-A, 5708-B and 3339-D.” o In a letter
after consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the case. o But it is [Annex “B-2”, Rollo, p. 1330], the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
apparent that the courts a quo only considered the technicalities of the rules on Council certified that within the Project site/jurisdiction of the National Government
intervention and of the petition for relief from judgment. The denial of their motion Center Housing Project (NGCHP) and the NGC-EASTSIDE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT,
to intervene arising from the strict application of the rule was an injustice to the following government buildings, offices and complexes are situated: 1)
petitioners whose substantial interest in the subject property cannot be disputed. House of Representatives; 2) Civil Service Commission (CSC); 3)
It must be stressed that the trial court granted private respondent's petition for Department of Social Works and Development (DSWD); 4)
prohibition with injunction without petitioners being impleaded, in total disregard Sandiganbayan; 5) Commission on Audit (COA); 6) Department
of their right to be heard, when on the face of the resolution of the Community of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Depot; 7) Polytechnic University
Relations and Information Office (CRIO) sought to be enjoined, petitioners were of the Philippines (PUP) – Commonwealth Campus; 8) TESDA Skills
the ones directly to be affected. We need not belabor the point that petitioners Training Center; 9) Several Public Elementary and High Schools, Health
are indeed indispensable parties with such an interest in the controversy or subject Centers and Barangay Halls. o It also certified that the NGCHP under its People’s
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in their absence without affecting, Housing Alternative for Social Empowerment – land Acquisition Development
nay injuring, such interest. In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals where the Program (PHASE-LADP), has already awarded 3,975 TCT’s to its beneficiaries. This
motions for intervention were filed when the case had already reached this Court, program comprises the biggest chunk of the NGCHP with about 117 hectares
it was declared: o It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed intended for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. Further, in line with the National
by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been Government’s thrust of fast-tracking the implementation of the NGCHP, the
concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals remaining 20,696 TCT’s are about to be awarded to qualified beneficiaries.”[13]
and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as
for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the well as government properties located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The
period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court [now Rule Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
19, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure]. o But Rule 12 of the Rules of without due process of law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an
Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and General, while the provision is intended as a protection of individuals against
completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its
Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of properties
contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best RULES 20-22
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end In Tahanan
Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court allowed intervention almost at RULE 20
the end of the proceedings. Accordingly, there should be no quibbling, much less Calendar of Cases
hesitation or circumvention, on the part of subordinate and inferior courts to abide
and conform to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court The Solicitor General Section 1. Calendar of cases. — The clerk of court, under the direct supervision of
summarized the interest of the Republic in Lot No. 3 (originally covered by OCT the judge, shall keep a calendar of cases for pre-trial, for trial, those whose trials
No. 333), as follows: o On March 5, 1979, then President Marcos issued were adjourned or postponed, and those with motions to set for hearing.
Proclamation No. 1826 “reserving for national government center site a parcel of Preference shall be given to habeas corpus cases, election cases, special civil
land situated in the Constitution Hill, Quezon City, Metro Manila, containing an area actions, and those so required by law. (1a, R22)
of four million for hundred forty thousand FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX SQUARE
METERS.” In a certification [Annex “F”, Rollo, p. 1415] issued by the Land Section 2. Assignment of cases. — The assignment of cases to the different
Registration Authority, it attested to the fact that the National Government Center branches of a court shall be done exclusively by raffle. The assignment shall be

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done in open session of which adequate notice shall be given so as to afford documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the
interested parties the opportunity to be present. (7a, R22) subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.

RULE 21 Subpoena The court may quash a subpoena ad testificandum on the ground that the witness
is not bound thereby. In either case, the subpoena may be quashed on the ground
Section 1. Subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. — Subpoena is a process directed that the witness fees and kilometrage allowed by these Rules were not tendered
to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an when the subpoena was served. (4a, R23)
action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the taking
of his deposition. It may also require him to bring with him any books, documents, Section 5. Subpoena for depositions. — Proof of service of a notice to take a
or other things under his control, in which case it is called a subpoena duces tecum. deposition, as provided in sections 15 and 25 of Rule 23, shall constitute sufficient
(1a, R23) authorization for the issuance of subpoenas for the persons named in said notice
by the clerk of the court of the place in which the deposition is to be taken. The
Section 2. By whom issued. — The subpoena may be issued by — clerk shall not, however, issue a subpoena duces tecum to any such person without
an order of the court. (5a, R23)
(a) the court before whom the witness is required to attend;
Section 6. Service. — Service of a subpoena shall be made in the same manner as
(b) the court of the place where the deposition is to be taken; personal or substituted service of summons. The original shall be exhibited and a
copy thereof delivered to the person on whom it is served, tendering to him the
(c) the officer or body authorized by law to do so in connection with investigations fees for one day's attendance and the kilometrage allowed by these Rules, except
conducted by said officer or body; or that, when a subpoena is issued by or on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
or an officer or agency thereof, the tender need not be made. The service must be
(d) any Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals in any case or made so as to allow the witness a reasonable time for preparation and travel to
investigation pending within the Philippines. the place of attendance. If the subpoena is duces tecum, the reasonable cost of
producing the books, documents or things demanded shall also be tendered. (6a,
When application for a subpoena to a prisoner is made, the judge or officer shall R23)
examine and study carefully such application to determine whether the same is
made for a valid purpose. Section 7. Personal appearance in court. — A person present in court before a
judicial officer may be required to testify as if he were in attendance upon a
No prisoner sentenced to death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and who subpoena is sued by such court or officer. (10, R23)
is confined in any penal institution shall be brought outside the said penal
institution for appearance or attendance in any court unless authorized by the Section 8. Compelling attendance. — In case of failure of a witness to attend, the
Supreme Court (2a, R23) court or judge issuing the subpoena, upon proof of the service thereof and of the
failure of the witness, may issue a warrant to the sheriff of the province, or his
Section 3. Form and contents. — A subpoena shall state the name of the court and deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him before the court or officer where his
the title of the action or investigation, shall be directed to the person whose attendance is required, and the cost of such warrant and seizure of such witness
attendance is required, and in the case of a subpoena duces tecum, it shall also shall be paid by the witness if the court issuing it shall determine that his failure to
contain a reasonable description of the books, documents or things demanded answer the subpoena was willful and without just excuse. (11, R23)
which must appear to the court prima facie relevant. (3a, R23)
Section 9. Contempt. — Failure by any person without adequate cause to obey a
Section 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum subpoena served upon him shall be deemed a contempt of the court from which
upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified the subpoena is issued. If the subpoena was not issued by a court, the disobedience
therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, thereto shall be punished in accordance with the applicable law or Rule. (12a R23)

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Section 10. Exceptions. — The provisions of sections 8 and 9 of this Rule shall not (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party
apply to a witness who resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from his for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead, or (2) that the
residence to the place where he is to testify by the ordinary course of travel, or to witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
a detention prisoner if no permission of the court in which his case is pending was place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
obtained. (9a, R23) absence was procured by the party offering the deposition, or (3) that the witness
is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment,
RULE 22 Computation of Time or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time prescribed or such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of
allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of
day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; and
to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period,
as thus computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place (d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. (a) may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and
any party may introduce any other parts. (4a, R24)
Section 2. Effect of interruption. — Should an act be done which effectively
interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption b. Officers to take depositions
shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.
Section 10. Persons before whom depositions may be taken within the Philippines.
The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation — Within the Philippines depositions may be taken before any judge, notary public,
of the period. (n) or the person referred to in section 14 hereof. (10a, R24)

RULES 23-32 Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries.
— In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a
A. Modes of Discovery [Rules 23-29] secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent of the Republic of the Philippines, (b) before such person or officer as may
1. Depositions pending action [Rule 23] be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the person referred
to in section 14 hereof. (11a, R24)
a. Use of Depositions
Section 12. Commission or letters rogatory. — A commission or letters rogatory
Section 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an shall be issued only when necessary or convenient, on application and notice, and
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under on such terms, and with such direction as are just and appropriate. Officers may
the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or be designated in notices or commissions either by name or descriptive title and
represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in letters rogatory may be addressed to the appropriate judicial authority in the
accordance with any one of the following provisions; (a) Any deposition may be foreign country. (12a, R24)
used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of
deponent as a witness; c. Deposition upon written examination

(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition Section 15. Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party
was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give
partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for reasonable notice in writing, to every other party to the action. The notice shall
any purpose; state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of
each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general

245
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he
belongs. On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may (e) As to form of written interrogatories. — Objections to the form of written
for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time. (15, R24) interrogatories submitted under sections 25 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless
served in writing upon the party propounding them within the time allowed for
d. Deposition upon written interrogatories serving succeeding cross or other interrogatories and within three (3) days after
service of the last interrogatories authorized.
Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of
interrogatories. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon (f) As to manner of preparation. — Errors and irregularities in the manner in which
written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a notice the testimony is transcribed or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified, sealed,
stating the name and address of the person who is to answer them and the name indorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with by the officer under sections
or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be 17, 19, 20 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless a motion to suppress the
taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross- deposition or some part thereof is made with reasonable promptness after such
interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition. Within five (5) defect is, or with due diligence might have been, ascertained. (29a, R24)
days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories upon a party who
has served cross-interrogatories. Within three (3) days after being served with re- 2. Depositions before actions or pending appeal [Rule 24]
direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-interrogatories upon the party
proposing to take the deposition. (25, R24) LECTURE on Rules 23 - 24

e. Effects of errors and irregularities Modes of Discovery- SC has been emphasizing this because it really helps in the
speedy imposition of justice.
Section 29. Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions. —
Q: How many modes of discovery?
(a) As to notice. — All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a deposition
are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon the party giving the A: There are 11 modes of discovery.
notice. 1. Deposition pending action (Rule 23)
2. Deposition before action (Rule 24)
(b) As to disqualification of officer. — Objection to taking a deposition because of 3. Deposition pending appeal (Rule 24)
disqualification of the officer before whom it is to be taken is waived unless made 4. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25)
before the taking of the deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the 5. Admission by the adverse parties (Rule 26)
disqualification becomes known or could be discovered with reasonable diligence. 6. Production of documents (Rule 27)
7. Production of things (Rule 27)
(c) As to competency or relevancy of evidence. — Objections to the competency of 8. Inspection of documents (Rule 27)
witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived 9. Inspection of things ( Rule 27)
by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the 10. Physical examination of persons (Rule 28)
ground, of the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if 11. Mental examination of persons (Rule 28)
presented at that time.
Rule 23 inapplicable to CivPro
(d) As to oral examination and other particulars. — Errors and irregularities
occurring at the oral examination in the manner of taking the deposition in the Q: What are the 3 kinds of Evidence?
form of the questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of 1. Real/ Object
the parties and errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if 2. Documentary
promptly prosecuted, are waived unless reasonable objection thereto is made at 3. Testmonial
the taking of the deposition.

246
Q: What is Deposition? relevancy, competency and most importantly, offer.
A: It is testimonial evidence.
Q: What if there is substitution of parties as per R3 S16?
The general rule is; A: Deposition still applicable despite substitution because these are not yet pieces
testimonial evidence must be taken in open court. of evidence of the parties. Offer is important.
The exception is deposition.
Q: Can a deponent use his own deposition as evidence?
Q: Why is leave of court necessary when there is already answer? Why ask A: NO! Self-serving. XPN: Paragraph C, Sec 4. (1) Impeaching a witness. a. May
permission? deposition na siya bakit pa gagamitin? Kasi di pwede as direct evidence pero
A: Because when answers have been filed, issues have been joined. Correlate with pwede indirect evidence. (2) “For any purpose” This time can be direct or indirect
(Sec 16, 17, 18) evidence. (juridical person)

Q: Before whom is deposition taken? Q: What are the 2 ways?

A: A: Oral Examination or Written Interrogatories.
1. Within the Philippines, before any judge (R23 S10), notary public (R23
S10), any person authorized to administer oath as agreed by the parties (R23 S14). (1) Oral Exam, Notices to all parties. Oath (s17) etc…
2. In foreign jurisdiction,
(a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul Q: What Happens when not attended by one giving notice?
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of RP, A: Liable for damages. R 23 SEC 23
(b) letters rogatory or commission, or
(c) any person authorized to administer oath as agreed by the (2) In Written, aside from notice, submit direct examination questions to
parties (R23 S14). the parties.
-Parties can submit cross exam
Q: Distinguish letters rogatory and commission. -10 days – cross
A: -5 days – redirect
Commission – notice to any person -3 days –recross
Letters rogatory – Judicial officer of that particular jurisdiction.
Sabi ni sir, the procedure is “futile” because cross examination questions are taxing
Q: Whose deposition may be taken? without direct examination answers.
A: Anybody, whether a party or a non party. RULE 24 – Pending appeal. It must be taken before trial court. (residual
jurisdiction). In case of remand, deposition can be used as subsequent evidence.
Q: Who can move for deposition?
A: In Rule 23, only parties can take deposition. In Rule 24, non party can take Before action: Sigurado magkakaroon ng kaso. • Perpetuation of testimony is rule
depositions because logically there are no parties yet (before action). 134, but the proper procedure is R24)

Q: Why do you take deposition? Q: whose testimony must be perpetuated?

A: R 23. Sec 4(c) A: A possible witness. E.G. Manong Enrile is 89 years old, he contracted a loan
payable in 25 years. Here there is a highly probably settlement of estate dahil
Q: Whose Witness is the deponent? problema yun ng estate pagkamatay.
A: HE IS NOBODY’S WITNESS. The deposition is only deemed part of the record of
the case. Thus, one must first offer the deposition as evidence. Q: So where should the bank file it?
A: Incapable of pecuniary estimation>> RTC.
SIDE NOTE: Always remember the elements of evidence:

247
VENUE? As provided for by the Rules. R24 Sec1. = Residence of the responded,
i.e. estate of manong enrile. 5. Production or Inspection of Documents or things [Rule 27]

Q: Can manong enrile file it himself? LECTURE on Rule 27 Aka, “ocular inspection”
A: Yes. At the residence of heirs (prospective defendants).
6. Physical and Mental Examination [Rule 28]
3. Interrogatories to parties [Rule 25]
LECTURE on Rule 28
a. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories
Sec 4 is important.
Section 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. — Unless thereafter
allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a GR: Rule 130, privilege communication on doctor/patient relationship.
party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse XPN: - In Crim case -order of the court at the instance of the opposing party.
party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal. (n)
Sec 4 provides, pag humingi ng kopya yung baliw, she is waiving his privilege
LECTURE on Rule 25 communication to all other doctors who examined her. In that action or any other
involving the same controversy.
Any party. There must be an action.

Sec 4. Only one set of interrogatories. Sec 6. A party not served with written Refusal to Comply with Modes of Discovery [Rule 29]
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in
open court. B. Trial [Rule 30]

4. Admission by Adverse Party [Rule 26] Notice

a. Effect of Failure to file and serve request for admission Section 1. Notice of Trial. — Upon entry of a case in the trial calendar, the clerk
shall notify the parties of the date of its trial in such manner as shall ensure his
Section 5. Effect of failure to file and serve request for admission. — Unless receipt of that notice at least five (5) days before such date. (2a, R22)
otherwise allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice a party who fails to file and serve a request for admission on the adverse Adjournments and Postponement
party of material and relevant facts at issue which are, or ought to be, within the
personal knowledge of the latter, shall not be permitted to present evidence on Section 2. Adjournments and postponements. — A court may adjourn a trial from
such facts. (n) day to day, and to any stated time, as the expeditious and convenient transaction
of business may require, but shall have no power to adjourn a trial for a longer
LECTURE on Rule 26 period than one month for each adjournment nor more than three months in all,
except when authorized in writing by the Court Administrator, Supreme Court. (3a,
Q: Look at Sec 1. Why would you avail of it? There is a seeming conflict R22)
between this and S7&8 of R 8, (if used in the pleading deemed admitted
unless denied under oath). Section 3. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for absence of evidence. — A
A: Under rule 26, the document pertained of is non-actionable document. E.g. motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted
voluminous sale invoices, delivery receipts. Imagine, pag iisa isahin yan sa trial, only upon affidavit showing the materiality or relevancy of such evidence, and that
aksaya sa oras. due diligence has been used to procure it. But if the adverse party admits the facts
to be given in evidence, even if he objects or reserves the right to object to their

248
admissibility, the trial shall not be postponed. (4a, R22; Bar Matter No. 803, 21 So you must have heard in Criminal Procedure about the Speedy Trial Act, which
July 1998) only slowed down the administration of justice because it tended to expedite
procedure that it only slowed down.
Section 4. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for illness of party or counsel. —
A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of illness of a party or counsel may be Rule 30 speaks of trial. In the practice of law, trial is the easiest part.
granted if it appears upon affidavit or sworn certification that the presence of such
party or counsel at the trial is indispensable and that the character of his illness is Q:There are 3 parts in the practice of law:
such as to render his nonattendance excusable. (5a, R22) A:
1. Preparation of the pleadings
Order of Trial 2. Trial
3. Execution
Section 5. Order of trial. — Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and
unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to The easiest part is trial because you can always prepare. The next is pleading,
the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows: because you have to research. The more difficult part is execution which is Rule
39. And even academically speaking, it’s quite difficult (Rule 39).
(a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint;
In trial, after all the pleadings have already been accounted for, including the pre-
(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his defense, trial order, the clerk of court now schedules trial. There are instances in the Rules
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaints; where there is no more trial. But that doesn't mean that parties are denied their
day in court.
(c) The third-party defendant if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense,
counterclaim, cross-claim and fourth-party complaint; There are judgments that do not pass through trial and still these judgments may
be considered to be subject to res judicata. In summary judgments, there is no
(d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material trial. In judgment of the pleadings, there is actually no trial.
facts pleaded by them;
And the very good example are actions governed by the rules on summary
(e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded, procedure in civil cases. In fact or in effect, trial is already prohibited. Because
shall adduce evidence in support of their defense, in the order to be prescribed by after submission of the position papers, the rule provides that judgment be
the court; rendered within 30 days from submission of the case for judgment.

(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the So trial is necessary because it provides the parties opportunities to present their
court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce side but it does not necessarily follows that without it there is denial of due process.
evidence upon their original case; and
Now, trial may either last that short or that long. It all depends upon the nature of
(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for the case. But as long as possible, you will note that the Rules already tried to
decision, unless the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective expedite the proceedings by trying to cut short the trial period. One of the new
memoranda or any further pleadings. laws is the Speedy Trial Act but it is not fully or truly implemented.

If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate Q:You will note that in Rule 30, that under the present rules there are only
defenses appear by different counsel, the court shall determine the relative order 2 grounds for postponement.What are the 2 grounds for postponement of
of presentation of their evidence. (1a, R30) trial?
A:
LECTURE on Rule 30 1. Postponement of trial on the ground of absence of evidence.

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2. Postponement of trial on the ground of illness. At trial, the rules also provide for the order of trial. That order of trial must be
distinguished from order of presentation of evidence under Rule 132.
Remember, these two are the only grounds for postponement.
Q:What is the order of trial? (Section 5)
Q:What kind of evidence? A:
A: 1. Plaintiffs shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint
 Documentary evidence, 2. Defendants shall adduce evidence in support of his defense,
 testimonial evidence, counterclaim, cross-claim and 3rd party complaint;
 and real or object evidence. 3. 3rd party defendant, if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense,
counterclaim, cross-claim and 4th party complaint;
Q:When Rule 30 speaks of absence of evidence, what kind of evidence 4. 4th party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material
does it refer to? facts pleaded by them.
A:Refers to any kind of evidence, whether it is testimonial, documentary or real or
object evidence. Q:Why don’t the Rules provide for an intervenor?
A:Because the intervenor would present evidence after all the parties have
Q:How would you distinguish that therefore from absence of a party or presented their evidence. Because the intervention can be done anytime before
counsel? Is that not equivalent to absence of testimonial evidence, if the rendition of judgment. So he cannot be provided for in the Rules because you do
party is not available to testify? not know when the intervention will come. The intervention may be after the
A:Absence of party or counsel is only limited to illness. So that if a party or counsel presentation of the evidence by the prosecution, it can be in the middle or after
is abroad, that is the absence of evidence. What I'm trying to drive at here is that the prosecution has rested. As long as the intervention has not get into the picture,
the rule is very stringent regarding now postponement, limiting the grounds. In the court cannot determine as to when to present evidence.
fact these limitations are the only limitations.
Q:Distinguish that from the order of the presentation of witness (Rule
Q: If you avail of illness as a ground, what is required? 132).
A: A:
1. A motion stating the ground relied upon must be filed; and 1. Direct examination.
2. The motion must be supported by an affidavit or sworn certification showing: 2. Cross examination.
a. The presence of such party or counsel at the trial is indispensable; and 3. Re-direct examination.
b. That the character of his illness is such as to render his nonattendance 4. Re-cross examination.
excusable.
Q:The court should receive evidence from the party. May the court or the
Q:Whose affidavit? judge delegate reception of evidence?
A:By anybody. In fact now, the practice in court is to have a medical certificate A:Yes. Only in 2 instances.
duly notarized. Although the court cannot absolutely require such certificate 1. In defaults and
because there are conditions which do not require medical attention. 2. ex parte presentation which is ordered by the court through a motion.

Example: LBM of lawyers.But if you say pneumonia, then it is time that you submit Q:To whom? A:To the clerk of court who must be a member of the bar, which
a medical certificate. means a lawyer.

Q:How long should the postponement be? Q:How should the trial be conducted? What is the guideline in the conduct
A: One month or three months in all. But that is not really followed, it is only in of the trial? Is there something to be followed?
paper. Although, academically you have to know these things. A:The trial must be conducted as to what is stated in the pre-trial order.Pre-trial
order is mandatory so that if the court does not issue a pre-trial order, that can be

250
an irregularity which is a ground for new trial under criminal procedure and not A:Example given, A files a case for collection of sum of money against B before
civil procedure. Because in civil procedure, new trial is limited to FAME, newly the RTC Manila. A filed another case for specific performance arising from a
discovered evidence. different performance before the RTC Makati.

C. Consolidation or Severance [Rule 31] Q:How are you going to consolidate those cases as cited above?Paano ba
ang mag-consolidate? Do you file an action for consolidation, motion or
Consolidation petition? Paano ba ginagawa?
A:Hindi ba ang caption ng kaso ay Republic of the Philippines, RTC Branch 35
Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or Makati City. A plaintiff vs. B defendant. Civil case # so and so. Pag ni-recast mo
fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all yun, kasi 2 different kinds of action. When you grant consolidation, isa na lang ang
the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated, and caption. A vs. B Civil case # so and so. Then A plaintiff vs. B defendant Civil case
it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid # so and so. Isa na lang. Ni-recast mo. Parehong dramatis personae. It doesn't
unnecessary costs or delay. (1) necessarily follow that you can only consolidate if A is the same plaintiff vs B is the
same defendant. It can be A vs B or A vs X because the rule says common question
Severance of facts or law. The word "same parties" there is not identical parties. But how do
you really consolidate in the example you have given. Collection for sum of money
Section 2. Separate trials. — The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid in RTC Manila and Specific Performance in RTC Makati. You can file in either court
prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION on the basis of Section 1 of Rule 31. It is
third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross- discretionary upon the court and it is not a matter of right. If the court finds that
claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues. (2a) it will facilitate the trial, if it will amount to saving time, money and effort, there
are the same evidence to be presented the court can grant it. Otherwise if it is
LECTURE on Rule 31 prejudicial to the case, the court can deny it.

Q:What is consolidation? Remember, eto ok na ito kasi parehong NCR ang cases. Even if one case is filed in
A:Consolidation involves several actions having a common question of law or fact Manila and another is filed in Baguio, still you can consolidate it. One case filed in
which may be jointly tried. Legaspi City for vehicular accident and another filed between the same plaintiffs
and different defendants in Quezon City, consolidation is allowed.
Q:A files a case for specific performance against B before the RTC Manila.
Can there be consolidation? Q:But if the case is filed before the MTC and another case filed in RTC,
A:None. Because there can only be consolidation if there are more than one case. consolidation is NOT POSSIBLE. Why?
A:Because the issue is jurisdictional. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by the
Q:Can there be severance in the same example as above? agreement of the parties.
A:Yes.
But if it is just a matter of venue, consolidation is allowed because venue can be
Q:What are the 3 forms of consolidating cases? subjected to the agreement of the parties.So that is recasting.
A:
1. Recasting NOTE: In consolidation, if the Makati court has granted the consolidation, the
2. Consolidation proper Manila court will bring the records to the Makati. Different pleadings but the same
3. Combination of both recasting and consolidation proper court which tries the same. Unlike recasting, nilalagay mo na lang sa same
pleading. Complicated cases, consolidation is not allowed because it can be
Q:Give an example of a possible consolidation. prejudicial. 1. There can be no consolidation if the action is cognizable by different
courts of different jurisdictions neither can there be severance.

251
2. There can be no consolidation if there is only one action. But if there are more severance. Or can there be cross-claim. Suppose if A files a case against B and C,
than one action, consolidation is possible. Provided you can establish common then B files a cross-claim against C then C files a counter cross-claim against B. C
question of fact or law. Remember what we have studied in joinder of causes of may ask for severance of his counter cross-claim.
action, it is permissive.
Remember that in severance, isa lang ang kaso. In consolidation, there must at
Very common case of consolidation is ejectment or unlawful detainer under Rule least be two.
70.
Rule 36 (separate judgments) contemplates this kind of severance.
Q: Here is A, A files a case against X, Y, and Z who are the tenants in 3
different apartment units. The contract between A and X is different from D. Trial by Commissioner [Rule 32]
A and Y and A and Z. Can you join causes of action?
Distinguish from Trial with assessors
A:No, because these are different contracts. So you file different cases against
them.But once you have filed them, you ask for consolidation. But chances are it LECTURE on Rule 32
cannot be recasted but can only a simple consolidation. Original cognizable by the
MTC. Wherever you file it, it will be consolidated with the lowest number which was Q: How do you distinguish this from trial with assessor?
the first case you filed. A: Trial with assessor is not included in the present rules. The distinction is that
trial with assessor is still trial by the judge with the help of the assessors while in
Q:What is severance? What are the requirements for severance? If the trial by commissioner it is trial, not by the judge, but by the commissioners.
case is A vs. B and there can be no consolidation, can there be severance?
A: Yes, there can be a severance. Usual concept by lawyers is that the opposite of Q: What are the instances of trial by commissioner? (Section 2)
consolidation is severance. But it is not. In severance, there is only one action. In A:
consolidation, there must be at least 2 cases. 1. Examination of a long account;
2. Taking of an account is necessary;
Q:How will severance apply in the example given? 3. Question of fact, other than upon the pleading arises; or
A: If there is a counterclaim filed by B against A and the court finds that it would 4. Carrying a judgment or order into effect.
be prejudicial to join the issues in one trial, then the court may allow a severance
of action. NOTE: A commissioner refers to either a referee, auditor or anybody appointed by
the court. The best illustration of trial by commissioner is found in Rule 67
NOTE: There can be NO consolidation between civil and criminal actions. There is (Expropriation) and Rule 69 (Partition) because the commissioner there is
even no consolidation in criminal cases. mandated by the court.

Q: You recall when we were studying joinder of causes of action, A files a Q:How would you distinguish the power of a commissioner from that of a
case against B for sum of money in the amount of P100,000. Another cause deposition officer?
of action in the same complaint for P200,000 and another for P300,000. A: A deposition officer cannot rule on the admissibility of the evidence while a
Where should we file it? commissioner may be allowed to rule on the admissibility of the evidence
A: In the RTC because of the totality rule.So there is only one complaint but there submitted.A commissioner has the judicial power, practically that of a judge. It can
are 3 causes of action kasi the obligations incurred by B are different. One was even issue subpoenas. It can rule on the objections. But not a deposition officer.
January, the other is March and the other is April.Now, A can ask for severance.
Meaning to say, he asks for separate trials as far as the obligation of B with regard A commissioner, before taking his job, must take an oath. That oath contains the
to P100,000, with regard to P200,000, and with regard to P300,000. That is an powers entrusted to him.
example of severance. Or it can happen that B files a 3rd party complaint. Isang
kaso pa lang ito, hindi pa nagiging 2. Now, the 3rd party defendant may ask for

252
NOTE: I would like you to give emphasis to one section there regarding the 10day FACTS: American President Lines (APL) instituted an action against Dasma for
period notice. Because ordinarily the period in motion is 3 days, but there in the recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five
ORDER OF REFERENCE it is 10 days. percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation expenses Dasma filed
an Answer with Counterclaim APL filed a motion during the hearing praying
Q:Distinguish Order of Reference from Order of Confirmation. that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei,
A:The order of reference is the order granted by the court appointing a Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be
commissioner to try a case while the order of confirmation which we studied under issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of
Rule 17 is the order confirming the notice of dismissal. There is an order of the Philippines in Taipei . . . " o Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion
confirmation under Rule 68 (Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage). stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in
view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the
Just to illustrate, trial by commissioner, it is even mandatory under Rule 67 President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange
(Expropriation). You will note that there are 2 stages in expropriation. First stage Center, Inc.," it was necessary — and it therefore prayed — " that commission or
is to determine whether the land is or may be subjected to expropriation, will be letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director,
used for the common good. Second stage is the determination of just Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road,
compensation.You will note from Rule 67 that the determination of just Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the
compensation is not left to the court but rather the court should appoint 3 aforenamed persons Dasma opposed the motion on the ff grounds:
commissioners. And these 3 commissioners will now investigate, hear, conduct o a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . .
hearing and arrive at a report. Take note that under Rule 32, the commissioner that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;"
there also will have to submit a report. o (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be
examined before the Philippine Court;" and o (c) the Rules of Court "expressly
Q: And that report, is that binding upon the court? require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not
A:No. That is not binding upon the court. by deposition." ACP submitted the ff to the RTC: o a) the letter received by
its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc.,
Q:What are the options left to the court? Go to Rule 67, there are at least 4 dated November 20, 1989, advising that "this Office can only take deposition upon
options. previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in
A: consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts or
1. The court may accept it. judicial bodies to course their requests through the Department of Foreign Affairs;"
2. The court may reject it. and o (b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by a law firm in Taipei, Lin &
3. The court may accept it in part and reject it in part. Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting information inter alia of the mode by
4. The court may remand it for further proceedings to the commissioner. which, under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged copy" of
documents on file with a Taiwan Court may be obtained. RTC in favor of APL
Ganun din dito sa Rule 32 regarding sa commissioner.So the report of the o opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine
commissioner is not binding on the court. And in fact all the parties must be representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing
furnished with the report. And there is a period of time the parties can question there by deposition, but only upon written interrogatories so as to give defendant
that. But even if the parties do not question that, the court may totally reject the the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination."
report.Although a commissioner is more powerful than a deposition officer. Dasma filed an MR on the ff grounds: o (1) authority of the Asian Exchange
Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions has not been established, it not being one
CASES of those so authorized by the Rules of Court to take depositions in a foreign state;
o (2) AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any such
DASMARIÑAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, authority; o (3) to permit deposition-taking by commission without the authority
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., of the foreign state in which deposition is taken constitutes infringement of judicial
respondents. G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993 SECOND DIVISION sovereignty; and o (4) depositions by written interrogatories have inherent
limitations and are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility of

253
witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "most satisfactory method of may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by
investigation of facts'" and "'affords the greatest protection to the rights and the proponent, under certain
liberties of citizens." RTC denied Dasma’s MR o because "filed out of time"
and being a mere rehash of arguments already passed upon Dasma filed a 126
Rule 65 before the CA CA affirmed RTC; denied Dasma’s petition; denied
ensuing MR Dasma appealed before SC conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations are
governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. o Sec. 4. Use of depositions.
ISSUES: May the subject depositions be taken before a private entity not — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any
authorized by law to take depositions in lieu of oral examination in open court? part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may
YES. Is the taking of deposition a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the
before the action comes to trial? NO. Is the taking of the subject deposition deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following
unfair to Dasma? NO. provisions: (a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness; (b) The
HELD: Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an
means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership,
person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that
mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers
material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that
known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the
discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and
and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
without omission or suppression. Depositions are principally made available by interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the
law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;
they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony (d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party
in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and
oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the any party may introduce any other parts. The principle conceding admissibility
rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: o Sec. 1. to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise
Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found
in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. o Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition
Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. Indeed, any unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. It is apparent
and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the
has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition
is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for crossexamination was afforded "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24,
during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross- Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a)
examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. However, depositions consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such

254
person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" apparent from Form 21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of
(Sec. 11, Rule 24). Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be Court, which requires the inclusion in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the
taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- following paragraph, viz.: o 3. A commission issued by this Court on the ______
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's day of ______, 19__, to take the testimony of (here name the witness or
answer has already been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After answer, whether the witnesses) in (here name the foreign country in which the testimony is to be
deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law taken), before _________________ (name of officer), was returned unexecuted
does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all by __________________ on the ground that ____________, all of which more
that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other fully appears from the certificate of said __________ to said commission and made
party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and a part hereof by attaching it hereto (or state other facts to show commission is
the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name inadequate or cannot be executed) (emphasis supplied). In the case at bar, the
is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class Regional Trial Court has issued a commission to the "Asian Exchange Center, Inc.
or group to which he belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H. Lee and
process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) . . . ." It appears that
notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the said Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry (now Department) of
deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of Authentications"
not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present except the attesting to the identity and authority of Notaries Public and other public officers
parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) of the Republic of China, Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department of Consular
to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted Affairs of the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex N of the petition
in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress for review on certiorari) — a prima facie showing not rebutted by petitioner. It
the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24). Where the deposition is to be taken further appears that the commission is to be coursed through the Department of
in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular No. 4 issued by Chief Justice Claudio
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be Teehankee on April 6, 1987, pursuant to the suggestion of the Department of
taken only "before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or Foreign Affairs — directing "ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
under letters rogatory. Section 12, Rule 24 provides as follows: o Sec. 12. METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL
Commission or letters rogatory. — A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS" "to course all requests
only when necessary or convenient, on application and notice, and on such terms for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing abroad through the Department
and with such directions as are just and appropriate. Officers may be designated of Foreign Affairs" to enable it and "the Philippine Foreign Service establishments
in notices or commissions either by name or descriptive title and to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;" this, "in the interest
letters rogatory may be addressed "To the Appropriate Judicial Authority in (here of justice," and to avoid delay in the deposition-taking. Petitioner would however
name the country)." A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued prevent the carrying out of the commission on various grounds. The first is that
by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the
depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court or tribunal" (Feria, J., Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters
Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of the
rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent in the name Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued
and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause by the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in accordance, moreover,
to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity
witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party.
are addressed" (Feria, J., op. cit., citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 653). Section Dasmariñas also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial
12, Rule 24 just quoted states that a commission is addressed to "officers . . . discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial." Not so. Depositions
designated . . . either by name or descriptive title," while letters rogatory are may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary
addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state." Noteworthy or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of
in this connection is the indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pretrial.
for and issued only after a commission has been "returned unexecuted" as is Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after

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an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their reconsideration of the earlier order dated March 15, 1991 (allowing the taking of
testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, deposition by commission) — one of the reasons adduced by the Regional Trial
Rules of Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and executory Court for the denial was that the motion had been "filed out of time." Evidently,
judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544). Dasmariñas further the Trial Court reached this conclusion because, as the record discloses, the motion
claims that the taking of deposition under the circumstances is a "departure from for reconsideration was filed by Dasmariñas on June 25, 1991, twentyfive (25)
the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court days after notice (on May 20, 1991) of the Order of March 15, 1991 sought to be
where the demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that it is "inherently reconsidered. Denial of the motion on such a ground is incorrect. In the first place,
unfair" to allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its it appears that there was a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' reconsideration, ending on June 25, 1991 which was however not acted on or
of the trial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in granted by the Court. More importantly, the order sought to be reconsidered is an
open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." Of interlocutory order, in respect of which there is no provision of law fixing the time
course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted within which reconsideration thereof should be sought.
and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their
demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that
account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE
precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., Respondents. G.R.
i.e., the use of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the No. 185527 July 18, 2012 THIRD DIVISION
deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing
questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in FACTS: Petitioners were charged with Other Deceits under Art 318 of RPC before
accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence MTC Manila They pleaded not guilty Trial dates were postponed due to the
of any of the exceptions for its admissibility — e.g., "that the witness if out of the unavailability of private complainant Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from
province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial Laos, Cambodia Prosecution filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen
or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity
procured by the party offering the deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the
attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." (Sec. long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. Petitioners opposed
4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis supplied) — is first satisfactorily established (See Lopez MTC granted said Motion; denied ensuing MR Petitioners filed a Rule 65
v. Maceren, 95 Phil. 754). The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking before RTC Manila RTC granted the petition; declared the MTC Order null and
of the depositions of the witnesses in question only by written interrogatories, void; denied ensuing MR o Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of
removing the proponent's option to take them by oral examination, i.e., by going witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific
to Taipei and actually questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of
answers and observations of the parties being recorded stenographically. The prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard
imposition of such a limitation, and the determination of the cause thereof, are to the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to
be sure within the Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court face. Prosecution elevated to CA CA reversed RTC o no grave abuse of
for the condition — that the deposition be taken "only upon written interrogatories" discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the
— is "so as to give defendant (Dasmariñas) the opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows
witnesses by serving cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would
opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded the defendant if the depositions still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make
were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or
the depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.
is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by
proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the crossexamination orally, or opting ISSUES: Is allowing the deposition of private complainant tantamount to a
to conduct said cross-examination merely by serving cross-interrogatories. One violation of petitioners’ rights to public trial and to confront the witnesses face to
other word. In its Order of July 5, 1991 — denying Dasmariñas motion for

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face? YES. Are the rules on deposition on civil cases applicable on all fours in has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
criminal cases? NO. conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
HELD: The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the
prosecution's right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. Since the conditional
To rule otherwise would examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the
effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders
witnesses against him. granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination
Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses in this wise: o The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced
must be done orally before a judge in open court.13 This is true especially in age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However,
criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before
trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language
"safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present
to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility
testifying.14 It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of
the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. Even in criminal Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.18 (Underscoring supplied)
proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a
Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos15 explicitly states that – detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial
o "x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra19 where we further declared that – o
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness
conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses." in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly
(Underscoring supplied)16 The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony
Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of
or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the
administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any rules.20 (Underscoring supplied) It is argued that since the Rules of Civil
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well
oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except as special proceedings, the depositiontaking before a Philippine consular official
reasonable notice in writing to the other party.17 But for purposes of taking the under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.
deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial
forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus: o SEC. 15. Examination of witness o It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of
for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to

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criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily orally in court. x x x"22 (Underscoring supplied)1âwphi1 The right of
governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. o Considering that Rule 119 confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal
adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an
reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise." (Underscoring supplied) opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to
allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.23 The Court explained in
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of People v. Seneris24 that the constitutional requirement "insures that the witness
the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses The CA took a will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury
simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument
fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to the accused, in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to
i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility."25 As the right
14(2), Article III of the Constitution provides as follows: o Section 14. (1) x x x of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far as
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a examination,"26 it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable
speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have testimony in criminal trials. In the American case of Crawford v. Washington,27
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of the US Supreme Court had expounded on the procedural intent of the confrontation
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed requirement, thus: o Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's right to confront witness face
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied) In dismissing to face protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous
petitioners' apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their constitutional rights notions of "reliability". Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above
to a public trial and confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule. o
accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent witness and raise their Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the
objections during the deposition-taking in the same manner as in a regular court right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability
trial. We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It
confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and commands, not
the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo,21 the Court by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a
noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness testifying in open court, thus: judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which
o "The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined."
orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross- (Underscoring supplied)
examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent authority, "demands
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the I nstant Case The CA found the
gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as sufficient and compelling
except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the deposition-taking, following the
answers." There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is ruling in the case of People v. Webb28 that the taking of an unavailable witness'
this – it enables the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and deposition is in the nature of a discovery procedure the use of which is within the
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain trial court's sound discretion which needs only to be exercised in a reasonable
subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law.29 But the ruling in the
testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the factual settings are not
and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. similar.1âwphi1 The accused in the Webb case had sought to take the oral
Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate deposition of five defense witnesses before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of
observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all residents of the
to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies United States who could not be compelled by subpoena to testify in court. The trial

258
court denied the motion of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the FACTS: Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public
deposition taken. When the matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the Document before RTC Cebu The criminal charge arose from the falsification of a
trial court's disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited ground that there deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they
was no necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way of made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as
deposition was considered merely corroborative of the evidence for the defense.30 the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Petitioner
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining Concepcion was then unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due
witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further
cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due treatment Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in
process. Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question o They argued
managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the
September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile constitution mortgage, should first be resolved RTC granted said motion; denied
should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act with Concepcion’s MR Concepcion filed a Rule 65 before CA o This remains pending
zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC before CA until the date of promulgation of this SC decision Concepcion’s counsel
pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should filed a motion before RTC to take her deposition o He explained the need to
have been imperative for the prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age,
Luen Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a non- which limited her freedom of mobility. RTC granted Concepcion’s motion;
resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of denied respondents’ MR o The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities
return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to leave the court's should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion
jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure intended to preserve the was already of advanced age.13 o After several motions for change of venue of
testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no other party. the deposition-taking, Concepcion’s deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001
Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination before at her residence Respondents filed a Rule 65 before CA CA reversed
the MeTC prior to said witness' becoming sick and unavailable, the prosecution RTC; denied Concepcion’s MR o At the outset, the CA observed that there was a
would capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal application of the defect in the respondents’ petition by not impleading the People of the Philippines,
rules on depositions. It must be emphasized that while the prosecution must an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the
provide the accused every opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses that are matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in
material to his defense in order to avoid charges of violating the right of the the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
accused to compulsory process, the State itself must resort to deposition-taking Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said
sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of violating the right of the accused the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of
to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Great care must be observed in Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before the
the taking and use of depositions of prosecution witnesses to the end that no judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not
conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and deposition.31 Thus, before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order,
the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. 18 o In its Resolution dated
taking the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the trial March 12, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CA added that
court's order allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same
place in a venue other than the court where the case is pending. This was certainly court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face.
grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied
suppletorily because the situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, of the rules of criminal procedure
JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners,
vs. RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B. ISSUES:
BONJE, respondents. G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008 THIRD DIVISION

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May Rule 23 on depositions in civil actions apply in the present criminal case? the witnesses’ demeanor.28 This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions,
NO. Is the failure to implead “People” a waivable defect in the petition for Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery
certiorari? YES that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal
HELD: It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, proceedings, Sections 12,29 1330 and 15,31 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
respondents failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
Because of this, the petition was obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses. In the case at
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of
petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides: o Section 15. Examination of
respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
petition.21 However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused
the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
petitioner’s/plaintiff’s failure to comply.22 In this case, the CA disregarded the taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. Petitioners contend
procedural flaw by allowing the petition to proceed, in the interest of substantial that Concepcion’s advanced age and health condition exempt her from the
justice. Also noteworthy is that, notwithstanding the non-joinder of the People of application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus,
the Philippines as partyrespondent, it managed, through the Office of the Solicitor calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. o T he contention
General, to file its Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was does not persuade The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
given the opportunity to refute the respondents’ arguments. Instructive is the Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her
Court’s pronouncement in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer23 in this wise: o There squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states
is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm
purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no
parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be
the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied.
are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been
adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.
they lose the character of the one and become the other, the administration of Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is
justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the
obvious duty.24 Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can
the merits despite the procedural defect. On the more important issue of attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable
whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to the instant case, we rule in the notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted
negative. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and
the case in the presence of the judge.25 This is especially true in criminal cases in answer. At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcion’s
order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the motion and in actually taking her deposition, were the above rules complied with?
witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to The CA answered in the negative. The appellate court considered the taking of
face.26 It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where the case
the credibility of said witnesses.27 Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse

260
of discretion. We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
this wise: o Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section CHERRY VALLEY FARMS LIMITED, respondents. G.R. No. 118438. December 4,
5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present 1998 FIRST DIVISION
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any "judge, or, if not
practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in FACTS: Cherry Valley a corporation based in England, sued Allied Agri for
the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an collection of sum of money before RTC Makati alleging, among others, that the
inferior court to be designated therein," the examination of a witness for the latter purchased in ten (10) separate orders and received several duck hatching
prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure eggs and ducklings which in value totaled £51,245.12 and did not pay the same
(December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court where the case is despite repeated demands Allied filed an Answer denying the allegations and
pending."32 Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a averring, among others, that not all ducks and ducklings covered and represented
prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is pending. by Cherry were actually ordered by Allied Cherry served on Allied’s counsel a
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely Request for Admission on the ff matters: o 1. That the chairman of the board of
be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the directors and president of your corporation is Mr. Ricardo V. Quintos; o 2. That
witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, out of the 3,000,000 subscribed shares of stock, 1,496,000 shares is (sic) owned
as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or by Mr. Ricardo Quintos and 1,432,000 shares is(sic) also owned by his wife, Agnes
conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not dela Torre; o 3. That for a period of six (6) months starting from 1 September
contemplated.33 When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for 1982, your corporation ordered and received from CHERRY VALLEY duck eggs and
interpretation. There is only room for application.34 Petitioners further insist ducklings with a total value of £51,245.12 as reflected on CHERRY VALLEY invoices
that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure apply issued to you; o 4. That you received a letter dated 22 March 1985 from Mr. P.R.C.
suppletorily to criminal cases. It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Braithwaite, solicitor of CHERRY VALLEY, demanding settlement of your unpaid
Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, account of £52,245.12 for the above-stated purchases; o 5. That instead of paying
and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have your obligation to CHERRY VALLEY, Mr. Ricardo Quintos, in his capacity as president
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the of your corporation, sent a letter to CHERRY VALLEY dated 17 July 1985 proposing
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal the setting up of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY refusing acceptance of
Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation your proposal; o 6. That you received a letter dated 26 September 1985 from Mr.
in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or J. Cross, Director and Secretary of CHERRY VALLEY refusing acceptance of your
otherwise. To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for proposal; o 7. That Mr. Ricardo Quintos in a letter dated 8 October 1985 admitted
the purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least your indebtedness in the sum of English Sterling Pounds £51,245.12. o It is further
before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section requested that said sworn admission be made within 10 days from receipt of this
15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this request. Allied filed its Comment/Opposition stating the ff: o (a) the
rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused admissions requested were matters which the private respondent had the burden
may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this to prove through its own witness during the trial and thus petitioner need not
requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness’ answer; and, o (b) the request for admission regarding the ownership set-up of
deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true petitioner corporation was immaterial and improper for not having been pleaded in
when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case. the complaint. Cherry filed its Reply o maintained that there was no need on
its part to produce a witness to testify on the matters requested for admission, for
While we recognize the prosecution’s right to preserve its witness’ testimony to these pertained to incidents personal to and within the knowledge of petitioner
prove its case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the alone RTC issued an Order disregarding Allied’s Comment/Opposition; denied
protection of the accused’s constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during ensuring MR; directed the latter to answer the request for admission within a
trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the nonextendible period of five (5) days from receipt of the order. o in view of its non-
trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules. compliance with Sec. 2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court and directing ALLIED to
answer the request for admission within ten (10) days from receipt of the order,
otherwise, the matters contained in the request would be deemed admitted

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Allied failed to comply with the order Cherry moved for summary judgment request, which must not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within such
o alleging that there was already an implied admission on the matters requested further time as the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a sworn
for admission pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. RTC rendered a statement denying specifically the matter of which an admission is requested; or,
decision against Allied CA affirmed (d) he may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny the matters of which an admission is requested.[13]
ISSUES: Does Cherry have the capacity to sue? YES. Was the summary The records show that although petitioner filed with the trial court its comments
judgment proper? YES. Did Cherry have the burden of proving the matter and objections to the request for admission served on it by private respondent, the
requested upon Allied to be admitted by it? NO. trial court disregarded the objections and directed petitioner after denying its
motion for reconsideration, to answer the request within five (5) days from receipt
HELD: of the directive; otherwise, the matters of which the admission was requested
The petition must fail. We cannot sustain the allegation that respondent CHERRY would be deemed admitted. Petitioner failed to submit the required answer within
VALLEY being an unlicensed foreign corporation lacked the legal capacity to the period. The matter set forth in the request were therefore deemed admitted
institute the suit in the trial court for the recovery of money claims from petitioner. by petitioner, i.e., (a) that for a period of six (6) months starting from 1 September
In fact, petitioner is estopped from challenging or questioning the personality of a 1982, petitioner ordered and received from respondent CHERRY VALLEY duck eggs
corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with and ducklings amounting to £51,245.12; (b) that petitioner received a letter dated
it.[10] The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue or failure of a foreign corporation to 22 March 1985 from private respondent’s lawyer demanding payment of the
acquire a local license was never intended to favor domestic corporations who enter amount of the purchases; (c) that instead of paying the obligation to respondent
into solitary transactions with unwary CHERRY VALLEY, petitioner’s president Ricardo Quintos sent a letter to the former
foreign firms and then repudiate their obligations simply because the latter are not proposing the establishment of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY as one of
licensed to do business in this country.[11] Petitioner cannot also successfully the stockholders; (d) that the proposal was refused by the Director of CHERRY
argue that its failure to answer the request for admission did not result in its VALLEY; and, (e) that petitioner’s president Ricardo Quintos admitted the
admission of the matters stated in the request. Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules indebtedness of his corporation to CHERRY VALLEY in the sum of English Sterling
of Court provides: o SECTION 1. Request for admission. - At any time after issues Pounds £51,245.12. The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom
have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request notice is served to avoid the admission rather than upon the party seeking the
for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant admission.[14] Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a request to admit, it may
document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material not argue that the adverse party has the burden of proving the facts sought to be
and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall admitted. Petitioner’s silence is an admission of the facts stated in the request.[15]
be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished. The This Court finds that the motion for summary judgment filed by respondent
purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of CHERRY VALLEY on the ground that there were no questions of fact in issue since
documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts the material allegations of the complaint were not disputed was correctly granted
which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by by the trial court. It is a settled rule that summary judgment may be granted if
reasonable inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall the facts which stand admitted by reason of a party’s failure to deny statements
be deemed admitted unless within a period designated in the request which shall contained in a request for admission show that no material issue of fact exists.[16]
not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time By its failure to answer the other party’s request for admission, petitioner has
as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files admitted all the material facts necessary for judgment against itself.
and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,
in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those respondent. G.R. No. 132577. August 17, 1999 FIRST DIVISION
matters.[12] Upon service of request for admission, the party served may do any
of the following acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters of which an admission FACTS: Webb was the accused in the criminal case entitled People vs. Webb
is requested, in which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may admit the truth then pending before RTC Paranaque Webb during the proceedings, filed a
of the matters of which admission is requested by serving upon the party Motion To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition, praying that he be allowed to take
requesting a written admission of such matters within the period stated in the the testimonies of certain persons based in US before the general consul, consul,

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vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as taking depositions are to: 1.] Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining
witnesses in court alleging that the said persons are all residents of the United the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an effective means
States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3.] Make available
had no jurisdiction over them. o the taking of the oral depositions of the in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be
aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly ‘material and proved except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in advance of trial as to
indispensable’ to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by the real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements;
Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court Prosecution filed its 5.]Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.]
Comment/ Opposition o 1.] Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation
the representation of respondent-accused, has no application in criminal cases; o and trial.[22] As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with
2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial. In
of discovery, only provides for conditional examination of witnesses for the accused fact, rules on criminal practice - particularly on the defense of alibi, which is
before trial not during trial; o 3.] Rule 119, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on respondent’s main defense in the criminal proceedings against him in the court
Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for below - states that when a person intends to rely on such a defense, that person
the accused/defense outside Philippine jurisdiction RTC denied Webb’s motion must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time provided
on the ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 for filing a pre-trial motion.[23] It needs to be stressed that the only reason of
and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court Webb filed an MR o 1.] The respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses is “to foreclose any
1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions, and o 2.] Section objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of Defense
11 of Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions Exhibits ‘218’ and ‘219’.” This issue has, however, long been rendered moot and
in foreign countries before a consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent academic by the admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the
of the Republic of the Philippines RTC denied MR Webb filed a Rule 65 trial court in its order dated July 10, 1998.[24] In fact, a circumspect scrutiny
before CA o 1.] The taking of depositions pending action is applicable to criminal of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through the deposition-
proceedings; o 2.] Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken taking would be superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful examination of
before a consular officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States; and, o 3.] Exhibits “218” and “219” readily shows that these are of the same species of
He has the right to completely and fully present evidence to support his defense documents which have been previously introduced and admitted into evidence by
and the denial of such right will violate his constitutional right to due process. the trial court in its order dated July 18, 1997 which We noted in Webb, et al. v.
CA reversed RTC; granted Webb’s petition; ordered that the deposition of the People of the Philippines, et al.[25] wherein We pointed out, among others, “[t]hat
witnesses be TAKEN before the proper consular officer of the Republic of the respondent judge reversed this erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132
Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be pieces of evidence after finding that ‘the defects in (their) admissibility have been
cured though the introduction of additional evidence during the trial on the
ISSUES: Is Rule 23 applicable in the present criminal case? NO. May the merits’.”[26] Indeed, a comparison of Exhibit “218-A” which is a U.S.
subject depositions be taken before a consular officer of PH where the witnesses Department of State Certification issued by Joan C. Hampton, Assistant
are stationed? NO. HELD: As defined, a deposition is – o "The testimony of a Authenticating Officer of the said agency, for and in the name of Madeleine K.
witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in open court, but Albright, stating that the documents annexed thereto were issued by the U.S.
in pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by a court, or under a Department of Justice as shown by seal embossed thereon,[27] with other exhibits
general law or court rule on the subject, and reduced to writing and duly previously offered as evidence reveals that they are of the same nature as Exhibits
authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation and upon the trial of a civil “42-H”[28] and “42-M.”[29] The only difference in the documents lies in the fact
or criminal prosecution. A pretrial discovery device by which one party (through that Exhibit “218-A” was signed by Joan C. Hampton for and in behalf of the
his or her attorney) asks oral questions of the other party or of a witness for the incumbent Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright whereas, Exhibits “42-H” and
other party. The person who is deposed is called the deponent. The deposition is “42-M” were signed by Authenticating Officer Annie R. Maddux for and in behalf of
conducted under oath outside of the court room, usually in one of the lawyer’s former Secretary of State Warren Christopher.[30] A comparison of Exhibit
offices. A transcript - word for word account - is made of the deposition. Testimony “218-B”[31] with the other documentary exhibits offered by respondent, likewise
of [a] witness, taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial discloses that its contents are the same as Exhibits “42-I”[32] and “42-N.”[33] The
officer in answer to questions or interrogatories x x x.”[21] o and the purposes of only difference in the three exhibits, which are actually standard issue certification

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forms issued by the U.S. Department of Justice with blanks to be filled up, is that opportunity to present his side.[45] It must be borne in mind in this regard that
Exhibit “218-B” is dated February 5, 1997 and signed by one of the U.S. Attorney due process is not a monopoly of the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due
General’s several Deputy Assistant Attorneys for Administration for and in her process as much as the accused.[46] Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game
behalf, while Exhibits “42-I” and “42-N” are both dated September 21, 1995 with of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
another of the said deputies signing both documents.[34] Still comparing with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
respondent’s Exhibit “218-F,”[35] which is likewise a standard issue U.S. justice.[47] The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion
Department of Justice Certification Form, with other documents previously of the trial judge.[48] The deposition taking can not be based nor can it be denied
introduced as evidence reveals that it is the same as Exhibits “39-D”[36] and “42- on flimsy reasons.[49] Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and
C.”[37] The only differences in these documents are that Exhibit “218-F” is dated in consonance with the spirit of the law. There is no indication in this case that in
October 13, 1995 and is signed by Debora A. Farmer while Exhibits "-“39-D” and denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased,
“42-C” are both dated August 31, 1995 and signed by Cecil G. Christian, Jr., arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave abuse of discretion “x x x implies
Assistant Commissioner, Officer of Records, INS.[38] Still further scrutinizing such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
and comparing respondent’s Exhibit “218-G”[39] which was also introduced and jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibit “207-B”[40] shows that the document despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent
has been earlier introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court an and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
astounding seven (7) times, particularly as Exhibits “34-A”, “35-F”, “39-E”, “42- perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of law.”[50] “Certiorari
D”, “42-P”, “50” and “50-F.”[41] The only difference in these documents is that as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential
they were printed on different dates. Specifically, Exhibits “218-G” as with Exhibits requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has
“34-A”, “35-F”, “50”, and “52-F” were printed out on October 26, 1995[42] acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
whereas Exhibit “207-B” as with Exhibits “39-E”, “42-D” and “42F” were printed amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any
out on August 31, 1995.[43] In fact, the records show that respondent’s: a.] plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose
application for NonCommercial Driver’s License; b.] Documentary records based of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary
on Clet’s Database Response; c.] Computer-generated thumb-print; d.] and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.”[51] “To question the
Documentary records based on still another Clet’s Database Response, and e.] The jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
Certification issued by one Frank Zolin, Director of the State of California’s functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Department of Motor Vehicles, were already introduced and admitted into evidence Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the public
as Defense Exhibits “66-J”, “66-K”, “66-H”, “66-I” and “66-L”, respectively.[44] respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual circumstances only to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition,
serves to underscore the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken but generally refers to ‘capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross
nature and in denying respondent’s motion to take them, the trial court was but as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.’
of the evidence already on record. In this regard, it bears stressing that under “It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed
Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court: o “SEC. 6. Power of the court to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A
to stop further evidence. - The court may stop the introduction of further testimony writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the
upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors
witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule
persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution.” (emphasis and italics 45 of the Rules of Court. “In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
supplied.) Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of caution jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of
in denying respondent’s motion considering that under the prevailing facts of the the lower court. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than errors
defense. Certainly, a party can not feign denial of due process where he had the of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action

264
for certiorari.”[52] Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given o That the lack of a proper notice of hearing was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s
ample opportunity to prove his innocence and whether or not a further prolongation Opposition; o that applying the principle of liberality, the defect may be ignored;
of proceedings would be dilatory is addressed, in the first instance, to the sound that leave of court is not necessary for the taking of Metrobank’s officers’
discretion of the trial judge. If there has been no grave abuse of discretion, only depositions; o that for their case, the issuance of a subpoena is not unreasonable
after conviction may this Court examine such matters further. It is pointed out and oppressive, but instead favorable to Metrobank, since it will present the
that the defense has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four testimony of these officers just the same during the presentation of its own
hundred sixty-four (464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature evidence; o that the documents sought to be produced are relevant and will prove
as those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under whether petitioners have paid their obligations to Metrobank in full, and will settle
the circumstances, We sustain the proposition that the trial judge commits no the issue relative to the validity or invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings; o and
grave abuse of discretion if she decides that the evidence on the matter sought to that the Rules do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own
be proved in the United States could not possibly add anything substantial to the witness. RTC denied petitioners’ motion; denied ensuing MR o The motion
defense evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation that the American under consideration is a mere scrap of paper by reason of its failure to comply with
public officers and the bicycle store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the requirements for a valid notice of hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of
the very person mentioned in the public and private documents. Neither is it shown Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court. o Moreover, the defendant bank and its
in this petition that they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom officers are adverse parties who cannot be summoned to testify unless written
they can identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present in the United interrogatories are first served upon them, as provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule
States and not in the Philippines on the specified dates. 25 of the Revised Rules of Court. o Even if the motion is given consideration by
relaxing Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, no such laxity could be
SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners, vs. accorded to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court which require
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, prior service of written interrogatories to adverse parties before any material and
Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of Bulacan, Respondents. G.R. relevant facts may be elicited from them more so if the party is a private
No. 185145 February 5, 2014 SECOND DIVISION corporation who could be represented by its officers as in this case. In other words,
as the persons sought to be subpoenaed by the plaintiffs-movants are officers of
FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, the defendant bank, they are in effect the very persons who represent the interest
auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages against of the latter and necessarily fall within the coverage of Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25
Metrobank before RTC Malolos Pre-trial was concluded Petitioners filed a of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners the subject motion is not a litigated
Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum7 to require motion CA affirmed RTC; denied petition o petitioners’ Motion is a litigated
Metrobank’s officers8 to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses motion, especially as it seeks to require the adverse party, Metrobank’s officers, to
during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, appear and testify in court as petitioners’ witnesses. It held that a proper notice of
and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those hearing, addressed to the parties and specifying the date and time of the hearing,
covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-square meter was required, consistent with Sections 4 and 5,24 Rule 15 of the Rules. o The CA
land in Meycauayan, Bulacan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20411 o held further that the trial court did not err in denying petitioners’ Motion to secure
The motion contained a notice of hearing directed to the BCC of RTC Malolos Br 7 a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum, ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite clear
Metrobank filed an Opposition o arguing that for lack of a proper notice of in providing that the consequence of a party’s failure to serve written
hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of interrogatories upon the opposing party is that the latter may not be compelled by
petitioners to set a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective the former to testify in court or to render a deposition pending appeal. By failing
and pro forma; o that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules, to serve written interrogatories upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed their right
Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties – may not be compelled to present the bank’s officers as their witnesses. o The CA declared that the
to appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served justification for the rule laid down in Section 6 is that by failing to seize the
with written interrogatories; o that petitioners have not shown the materiality and opportunity to inquire upon the facts through means available under the Rules,
relevance of the documents sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners petitioners should not be allowed to later on burden Metrobank with court hearings
were merely fishing for evidence. Petitioners filed a reply or other processes.

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ISSUES: Is the present motion a litigated motion thereby necessitating a notice what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the
of hearing to the adverse party? YES. May Metrobank and its officers be adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand. Thus, the rule not only
summoned without prior service of written interrogatories upon them? NO. protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise
prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own
HELD: Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "a party case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving
not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court
to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal." The practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own
provision seeks to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the
maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. On the procedural issue, it is court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment. In the present case,
quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of
technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by the filing of the their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be
Opposition.32 Nonetheless, contrary to petitioners’ submission, the case of allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that,
Adorio cannot apply squarely to this case. In Adorio, the request for subpoena to present Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties as well, based
duces tecum was sought against bank officials who were not parties to the criminal on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized
case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The situation is different here, as agents34 – as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to
officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the calling Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is
party’s main witnesses; likewise, they are tasked to bring with them documents tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The
which shall comprise the petitioners’ principal evidence. This is not without burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners
significant consequences that affect the interests of the adverse party, as will be cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party
shown below. As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense. It is true
to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure
upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who has
– o Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories Unless thereafter not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very
allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a principles of justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very
party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may
party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal. not be allowed to do.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be
presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of such
party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later a move by petitioners. As one of their causes of action in their Complaint,
opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the petitioners claim that they were not furnished with specific documents relative to
process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the their loan agreement with Metrobank at the time they obtained the loan and while
proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to willingly provide petitioners with these
might bring. Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse documents even before petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they
party’s testimony,33 compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may were never furnished the same, any inferences generated from this would certainly
result in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party not be useful for Metrobank. One may be that by providing petitioners with these
cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of written documents, Metrobank would be admitting that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners
interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to with these documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement, and while the
the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling loan was outstanding, in violation of the law. With the view taken of the case,
party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless the Court finds it unnecessary to further address the other issues raised by the
and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause. Another reason for the rule parties, which are irrelevant and would not materially alter the conclusions arrived
is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to at.

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14, which vests on the PCGG the power to grant immunity to witnesses provides:
JESUS P. DISINI, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE o Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the PRESIDENTIAL immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Respondents. G.R. No. 180564 testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the
June 22, 2010 EN BANC unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or
accumulated the property or properties in question in any case where such
FACTS: Republic, through PCGG, wanted Disini, who worked for Herminio (who information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his
was the broker of certain Westinghouse contracts believed to have anomalies) to civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the
testify for the government in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to
(Westinghouse) before the United States District Court of New Jersey and in the do so by the latter or by the Commission. Construing the above, the Court has
arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed ruled in a previous case that the scope of immunity offered by the PCGG may
against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of vary.8 It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending
Arbitration. Republic and Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement o Disini on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-
undertook to testify for his government and provide its lawyers with the gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by
information, affidavits, and documents they needed for prosecuting the two cases the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. The language of Section 5, E.O.
o Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two cases, it shall not compel Disini to 14, said the Court, affords latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of that
testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic against criminal immunity.9 In petitioner Disini’s case, respondent Republic, acting through
Herminio o Should the Republic of the Philippines name Herminio T. Disini a the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and civil immunity10 but also immunity
defendant in any of the above-referenced matters, or in any resulting arbitration against being compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign proceeding, other
proceeding, or any other proceeding ancillary to said matters, the Republic of the than the civil and arbitration cases identified in the Immunity Agreement, just so
Philippines shall not call Jesus P. Disini to testify as a witness in said matters on he would agree to testify. Trusting in the Government’s honesty and fidelity, Disini
any claim brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Herminio T. Disini. agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which
Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini’s obligation to provide truthful is the essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its promise. The
information or testimony. Disini complied with the undertaking SB 18 Republic of course points out that the immunity from criminal or civil prosecution
years after, issued an SDT and SAT upon application of Republic o Commanding that Section 5 of E.O. 14 authorizes does not cover immunity from giving evidence
Disini to testify and produce documents before that court on March 6 and 30, 2007 in a case before a court of law. But in reality the guarantee given to petitioner
in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio Disini moved to quash Disini against being compelled to testify in other cases against Herminio constitutes
the subpoena o invoking his immunity agreement with the Republic SB a grant of immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. If Disini refuses to testify in
ignored Disini’s motion; issued another subpoena; directed Disini to testify PCGG those other cases he would face indirect contempt, which is essentially a
issued a resolution revoking and nullifying the Immunity Agreement between prosecution for willful disobedience of a valid court order, a subpoena.11 His refusal
petitioner Disini and respondent Republic insofar as it prohibited the latter from to testify will warrant the imposition against him of the penalty of fine not
requiring Disini to testify against Herminio SB denied Disini’s motion to quash exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or both fine and
Disini elevated to SC imprisonment. Here, petitioner Disini’s refusal to testify as ordered by the
Sandiganbayan is certain to result in prosecution for criminal contempt. It
ISSUE: May Disini be compelled to testify before SB? constitutes criminal contempt since guilt would draw a penalty of fine or
imprisonment or both. Said the Court in Montenegro v. Montenegro:13 o
HELD: NO. One. Respondent Republic contends that the power to grant Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the
immunity given the PCGG covers only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed
It does not cover immunity from providing evidence in court. The Republic even against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an
believes that immunity from the need to testify in other ill-gotten wealth cases act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
would defeat the very purpose of Executive Order 1 which charged the PCGG with disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do
the task of recovering all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his family, something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing
relatives, subordinates, and close associates. Section 5 of Executive Order (E.O.) party therein and is therefore an offense against the party in whose behalf the

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violated order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature, cannot be barred by estoppel based on unauthorized acts of public officers,17 such
but if to compensate, then it is civil.14 o In criminal contempt, the proceedings are principle cannot apply to this case since, as already pointed out, respondent PCGG
regarded as criminal and the rules of criminal procedure apply. What is more, it is acted within its authority when it provided Disini with a guarantee against having
generally held that the State or respondent Republic is the real prosecutor in such to testify in other cases. A contract is the law between the parties. It cannot be
a case.15 The grant, therefore, of immunity to petitioner Disini against being withdrawn except by their mutual consent.18 This applies with more reason in this
compelled to testify is ultimately a grant of immunity from being criminally case where petitioner Disini had already complied with the terms and conditions of
prosecuted by the State for refusal to testify, something that falls within the the Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the Agreement at this
express coverage of the immunity given him. Respondent Republic claims that late stage will run afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a
the grant of immunity to petitioner Disini against being compelled to testify against rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits.19 The Republic also cites the last
Herminio contravenes the state’s public policy respecting the recovery of illegally sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which reads: o Nothing herein
acquired wealth under the regime of former President Marcos. But the same shall affect Jesus P. Disini’s obligation to provide truthful information or
authority that adopted such policy, former President Corazon C. Aquino, is the testimony.20 The Republic interprets this as enjoining Disini, despite the
same authority that gave the PCGG the power to grant immunity to witnesses immunity given him against being compelled to testify in other cases, to "provide
whom it might use to recover illegally acquired wealth during that regime. In the truthful information or testimony" in such other cases. But this reasoning does
case of Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan,16 the Court regarded as valid and binding not sound right. The grant of immunity in paragraph 3 of the agreement quoted
on the government the immunity it gave former National Food Authority above to petitioner Disini against being compelled to testify in "other cases" against
Administrator, Jesus Tanchanco for all "culpable acts of his during his service in Herminio is quite clear and does not need any interpretation. Where a stipulation
the Marcos government," which would include possible prosecution for any illegal in an agreement is clear, its literal meaning controls.21 Besides, Disini undertook
wealth that he may himself have acquired during that service. The Court did not to testify for the Republic in its two foreign cases and provide its lawyers all the
regard such immunity in contravention of the state policy on recovery of ill-gotten information and testimony they needed to prosecute the same. The last sentence
wealth under the auspices of the Marcos regime. True, respondent Republic may in the paragraph that enjoins Disini to "provide truthful information or testimony,"
have other cases in which it also needed petitioner Disini’s testimony. But such despite the guarantee not to be compelled to testify against Herminio, merely
circumstance does not necessarily invalidate the concession it gave him—the emphasizes the fact that such concessions does not affect his obligation to "provide
freedom from being compelled to give evidence in specific cases. It may be truthful information or testimony" in the two cases mentioned in the preceding
assumed that the Republic regarded Disini’s testimony in the two cases covered by paragraphs. The Court should not allow respondent Republic, to put it bluntly,
the agreement more important and critical than those other cases. It is well known to double cross petitioner Disini. The Immunity Agreement was the result of a long
that the cases with Westinghouse before the New Jersey District Court and the drawn out process of negotiations with each party trying to get the best
International Arbitration Tribunal concerning the construction of the Bataan concessions out of it.22 The Republic did not have to enter that agreement. It was
Nuclear Power Plant had so huge a financial impact on the Republic that it was free not to. But when it did, it needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did.
willing to waive its power and right to compel petitioner Disini’s testimony in other More than any one, the government should be fair.
cases. Two. Petitioner Disini argues that respondent Republic, through the
PCGG, should not be allowed to revoke the guarantee it gave him against being PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMEO BUSTAMANTE Y
compelled to testify in other cases, the Republic being in estoppel for making him ALIGANGA, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 189836, June 05, 2013 FIRST DIVISION
believe that it had the authority to provide such guarantee. The Republic rejects
this argument, however, invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution FACTS:
which provides: "The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired Bustamante was charged before RTC Tuguegarao with the rape of his daughter.
by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, He pleaded not guilty During pre-trial, appellant made an admission with
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel." But, first, the estoppel regard to the identity of the victim in this case Trial on the merits ensued RTC
that petitioner Disini invokes does not have the effect, if recognized, of denying convicted Bustamante CA affirmed
the state its right to recover whatever ill-gotten wealth Herminio may have
acquired under the Marcos regime. The action against Herminio can continue, ISSUE: Was the relationship between the private complainant and Bustamante
hampered only by the exclusion of Disini’s testimony. And there are other ways of established?
proving the existence of ill-gotten wealth. Second, although the government

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HELD: YES. It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the Under the old rape law which is applicable in this case, the death penalty shall be
accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is imposed if the crime of rape is committed under certain enumerated circumstances
credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of which would designate the crime as qualified rape. One such particular
things.11 Jurisprudence is likewise instructive that the factual findings of the trial circumstance is when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.12 In the case at bar, both the affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAA to be a credible witness and her the victim. The minority of the victim and her relationship to the accused were duly
testimony worthy of full faith and credit. After a careful review of the records of proven by her birth certificate. However, due to the effectivity of Republic Act No.
this case, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts. 9346, otherwise known as “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
Since the incident at issue happened prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. the Philippines,” the trial court correctly imposed upon appellant the penalty of
8353, the trial court correctly applied Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which reclusion perpetua. In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction
provides: o Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by of appellant for qualified rape for which he is to suffer the penalty of reclusion
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: perpetua without eligibility for parole in consonance with Article 335 of the Revised
1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or Penal Code and Republic Act No. 9346. The award of civil indemnity and exemplary
otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or damages is likewise upheld. However, in line with jurisprudence, the award of
is demented. Therefore, according to the aforementioned provision, the moral damages is increased from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-
elements of rape are (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00).18
such act was accomplished through force and intimidation; or when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successor-in-interest of ASIAN
of age. Clearly, the element of carnal knowledge is present in the foregoing BANK CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON.
narration. Furthermore, despite the absence of any evident force and intimidation, FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and HON. RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA (in their
the same is still appreciated in the case at bar because it is doctrinally settled that capacities as Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Second Division of
the moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it unnecessary to show SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. G.R. No.
physical force and intimidation since, in rape committed by a close kin, such as the 169677 February 18, 2013 FIRST DIVISION
victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.14 In his FACTS: Republic instituted an action before SB against Andres V. Genito, Jr.,
defense, appellant interposes denial while also ascribing ill motive on the part of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants for reversion,
the victim, his own biological daughter, for accusing him of rape. However, it is reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages seeking to recover allegedly
well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents Republic
self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law because denial cannot prevail moved to amend the complaint to implead Asian Bank because it appears that
over the positive, candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as Asian Bank claimed ownership of the subject two parcels of land as the registered
between the positive declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of owner thereof o SB granted Republic then moved to hold a separate trial
the appellant, the former deserves more credence.15 Likewise, the testimonies of against Asian Bank Asian Bank sought the deferment of the action on the
the witnesses presented by appellant failed to buttress his defense of denial as motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and
they merely related to tangential matters which do not seriously affect the issue of documentary evidence the Republic had already presented against the original
AAA’s credibility. With regard to the allegation that the accusation of rape was defendants, and contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if a separate
motivated by ill will and revenge, this Court is not surprised at this rather common trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently apprised about the
excuse being raised by offenders in rape cases. We have consistently held that evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an additional
such alleged motives cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of defendant Republic filed a Reply o maintained that a separate trial for Asian
complainants who remained steadfast throughout the trial.16 Jurisprudence tells Bank was proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely
us that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would distinct and independent from its cause of action against the original defendants;
expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her and that the issue with respect to Asian Bank was whether Asian Bank had actual
charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her own father.17 or constructive knowledge at the time of the issuance of the TCTs for the properties

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in its name that such properties were the subject of the complaint in Civil Case No. defendant bank is concerned is whether there is evidence to show that it acquired
0004, while the issue as to the original defendants was whether they had the titles to the sequestered properties in bad faith. o Neither are we inclined to
"committed the acts complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful accumulation sustain defendant’s bank argument that the Court cannot grant a separate trial in
of wealth which would, as a consequence, justify forfeiture of the said properties this case because it has no jurisdiction over the claim that defendant bank acquired
or the satisfaction from said properties of the judgment that may be rendered in the properties in bad faith. Indeed, the issue of defendant bank’s acquisition of the
favor of the Republic." Asian Bank filed a rejoinder o asserted that the issue properties in bad faith is merely incidental to the main action which is for reversion,
concerning its supposed actual or constructive knowledge of the properties being reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction
the subject of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 was intimately related to the over the
issue delving on the character of the properties as the ill-gotten wealth of the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations
original defendants; that it thus had a right to confront the evidence presented by in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the
the Republic as to the character of the properties; and that the Sandiganbayan had plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein (Russell v. Vestil,
no jurisdiction to decide Asian Bank’s ownership of the properties because the 304 SCRA 738; Saura v. Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA 465). MetroBank substituted
Sandiganbayan, being a special court with limited jurisdiction, could only determine Asian Bank as the latter’s successor in interest; filed a Rule 65 before SC
the issue of whether or not the properties were illegally acquired by the original
defendants SB granted Republic’s motion; denied ensuing MR of Asian Bank ISSUES: Is the holding of a separate trial against Asian Bank (which was
o A cursory reading of the comment filed by defendant Asian Bank to plaintiff’s substituted by MetroBank) proper? NO Does SB have exclusive jurisdiction over
request for a separate trial would readily reveal that defendant is not actually the subject matter involving MetroBank? YES.
opposing the conduct of a separate trial insofar as the said bank is concerned. What
it seeks is the opportunity to confront the witnesses and whatever documentary HELD: Anent the first issue, Metrobank states that the holding of a separate
exhibits that may have been earlier presented by plaintiff in the case before the trial would deny it due process, because Asian Bank was entitled to contest the
Court grants a separate trial. This being the situation, we find no reason to deny evidence of the Republic against the original defendants prior to Asian Bank’s
the motion in light of plaintiff’s position that its claim as against Asian Bank is inclusion as an additional defendant; that Asian Bank (Metrobank) would be
entirely separate and distinct from its claims as against the original defendants, deprived of its day in court if a separate trial was held against it, considering that
albeit dealing with the same subject matter. In fact, as shown by the allegations the Republic had already presented such evidence prior to its being impleaded as
of the Second Amended Complaint where Asian Bank was impleaded as a party an additional defendant; that such evidence would be hearsay unless Asian Bank
defendant, the action against the latter is anchored on the claim that its acquisition (Metrobank) was afforded the opportunity to test and to object to the admissibility
of the subject properties was tainted with bad faith because of its actual or of the evidence; that because Asian Bank disputed the allegedly ill-gotten character
constructive knowledge that the said properties are subject of the present recovery of the properties and denied any involvement in their allegedly unlawful acquisition
suit at the time it acquired the certificates of title covering the said properties in or any connivance with the original defendants in their acquisition, Asian Bank
its name. Consequently, whether or not it is ultimately established that the should be given the opportunity to refute the Republic’s adverse evidence on the
properties are ill-gotten wealth is of no actual significance to the incident pending allegedly illgotten nature of the properties In contrast, the Republic insists that
consideration since the action against defendant bank is predicated not on the the Rules of Court allowed separate trials if the issues or claims against several
claim that it had knowledge of the ill-gotten wealth character of the properties in defendants were entirely distinct and separate, notwithstanding that the main
question but rather on whether or not it had knowledge, actual or constructive, of claim against the original defendants and the issue against Asian Bank involved
the fact that the properties it registered in its name are the subject of the instant the same properties; that the allegations in the case against Spouses Genito and
recovery suit. Besides, plaintiff already admits that the evidence it had presented the other original defendants pertained to the Republic’s claim that the properties
as against the original defendants would not apply to defendant bank for the reason listed in Annex A of the original complaint constituted ill-gotten wealth, resulting
that there is no allegation in the second amended complaint imputing responsibility in the probable forfeiture of the listed properties should the Republic establish in
or participation on the part of the said bank insofar as the issue of accumulation of the end that such original defendants had illegally or unlawfully acquired such
wealth by the original defendants are concerned. Thus, there appears no basis for properties; that although the Republic conceded that neither Asian Bank nor
defendant bank’s apprehension that it would be deprived of its right to due process Metrobank had any participation whatsoever in the commission of the illegal or
if its not given the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses presented prior to unlawful acts, the only issue relevant to Metrobank being whether it had knowledge
its inclusion as party defendant in the case. To reiterate, the only issue insofar as that the properties had been in custodia legis at the time of its acquisition of them

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to determine its allegation of being an innocent purchaser for valuable Federal Courts an d the various US State Courts. In Bowers v. Navistar
consideration; that because the properties were situated in the heart of Quezon International Transport Corporation,22 we find the following explanation made by
City, whose land records had been destroyed by fire in 1998, resulting in the the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on the objectives of
rampant proliferation of fake land titles, Asian Bank should have acted with extra having separate trials, to wit: o The aim and purpose of the Rule is aptly
caution in ascertaining the validity of the mortgagor’s certificates of title; and that summarized in C. Wright and A Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure: The
the series of transactions involving the properties was made under dubious provision for separate trials in Rule 42 (b) is intended to further convenience, avoid
circumstances.19 The Republic posits that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive delay and prejudice, and serve the ends of justice. It is the interest of efficient
original jurisdiction over all cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth judicial administration that is to be controlling rather than the wishes of the parties.
pursuant to Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14 and No. 14-A issued in 1986, The piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single suit is not to be the usual course.
laws encompassing the recovery of sequestered properties disposed of by the It should be resorted to only in the exercise of informed discretion when the court
original defendants while such properties remained in custodia legis and pending believes that separation will achieve the purposes of the rule. As explained
the final resolution of the suit; and that the properties pertaining to Spouses Genito recently by the Second Circuit in United v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 92-6158,
were among the properties placed under the writs of sequestration issued by the 6160 1993 WL 100100, 1 (2d Cir., April 6, 1993), the purpose of separate trials
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), thereby effectively putting under Rule 42 (b) is to "isolate issues to be resolved, avoid lengthy and perhaps
such properties in custodia legis and rendering them beyond disposition except needless litigation . . . and to encourage settlement discussions and speed up
upon the prior approval of the Sandiganbayan The rule on separate trials in civil remedial action." (citing, Amoco Oil v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.
actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads: o Section 1989); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 469
2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, U.S. 1072, 105 S. Ct. 565, 83 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1984) (separate trials are proper to
may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party further convenience or to avoid prejudice); Ismail v. Cohen, 706 F. Supp. 243, 251
complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting, United States v. International Business Machines Corp.,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues. The text of the rule grants to 60 F.R.D. 654, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (separate trials under Rule 42 (b) are
the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross- appropriate, although not mandatory, to "(1) avoid prejudice; (2) provide for
claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any convenience, or (3) expedite the proceedings and be economical.") Separate trials,
number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues however, remain the exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., Response of
should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1976) xxx
convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party. The rule is almost identical with (separation of issues is not the usual course under Rule 42 (b)). The moving party
Rule 42(b) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), a bears the burden of establishing that separate trials are necessary to prevent
provision that governs separate trials in the United States Federal Courts (US prejudice or confusion and serve the ends of justice. Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736
Federal Courts), viz: o Rule 42. Consolidation; Separate Trials (b) Separate F. Supp. 1267, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In Divine Restoration Apostolic Church v.
Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,23 the US District Court for the Southern District
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate of Texas, Houston Division specified that separate trials remained the exception,
trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate and emphasized that the moving party had the burden to establish the necessity
issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party claims, for the separation of issues, viz: o Rule 42 (b) provides that a court has discretion
or issues, always preserving the inviolate right of trial by jury as declared by the to order separate trials of claims "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy."
States. The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several FED. R. CIV. P.42 (b). Thus, the two primary factors to be considered in
principles and parameters whose application in this jurisdiction may be warranted determining whether to order separate trials are efficient judicial administration
because our rule on separate trials has been patterned after the original version of and potential prejudice. Separation of issues for separate trials is "not the usual
Rule 42(b).21 There is no obstacle to adopting such principles and parameters as course that should be followed," McDaniel v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 987 F. 2d 298,
guides in the application of our own rule on separate trials. This is because, 304 (5th Cir. 1993), and the burden is on the party seeking separate trials to prove
generally speaking, the Court has randomly accepted the practices in the US Courts that separation is necessary. 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
in the elucidation and application of our own rules of procedure that have MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2388 (3d ed. 2001).
themselves originated from or been inspired by the practice and procedure in the Still, in Corrigan v. Methodist Hospital,24 the US District Court for the Eastern

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District of Pennsylvania has cautioned against the unfettered granting of separate having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside
trials, thusly: o Courts order separate trials only when "clearly necessary." the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay,
Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1566-67 (N.D. Ill. 1983) expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts."27 Exceptions to the
(citing 5 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice at pp. 42-37 to 42-38 & general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for
n.4 (1982)). This is because a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when
and inconvenience to the parties and the courts." 5 James William Moore, Moore’s separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the
Federal Practice P. 42-03[1], at p. 42-43 (1994); Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote
Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 115 (E.D. La. 1992); Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV. justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties.
V. Apollo Computer, 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1433 (D. Del. 1989). The movant has the Otherwise, the general rule must apply. As we see it, however, the justification
burden to show prejudice. Moore at p. 42-48. x x x A Colorado District Court of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not constitute a special or
found three factors to weigh in determining whether to order separate trials for compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to
separate defendants. These are 1) whether separate trials would further the Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the separate trial would not be
convenience of the parties; 2) whether separate trials would promote judicial in furtherance of convenience. A nd, secondly, the cause of action against Asian
economy; and 3) whether separate trials would avoid substantial prejudice to the Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of action against the original
parties. Tri-R Sys. V. Friedman & Son, 94 F.R.D. 726, 727 (D. Colo. 1982). defendants.1âwphi1 Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against Spouses
In Miller v. American Bonding Company,25 the US Supreme Court has delimited Genito in a separate trial on the basis of the eviden ce adduced against the original
the holding of separate trials to only the exceptional instances where there were defendants, the properties would be thereby adjudged as ill - gotten and liable to
special and persuasive reasons for departing from the general practice of trying all forfeiture in favor of the Republic without Metrobank being given the opportunity
issues in a case at only one time, stating: o In actions at law, the general practice to rebut or explain its side. The outcome would surely be pre judicial towards
is to try all the issues in a case at one time; and it is only in exceptional instances Metrobank. The representation by the Republic in its comment to the petition of
where there are special and persuasive reasons for departing from this practice Metrobank, that the latter "merely seeks to be afforded the opportunity to confront
that distinct causes of action asserted in the same case may be made the subjects the witnesses and documentary exhibits," and that it will "still be granted said right
of separate trials. Whether this reasonably may be done in any particular instance during the conduct of the separate trial, if proper grounds are presented
rests largely in the court’s discretion. Further, Corpus Juris Secundum26 makes therefor,"28 unfairly dismisses the objective possibility of leaving the opportunity
clear that neither party had an absolute right to have a separate trial of an issue; to confront the witnesses and documentary exhibits to be given to Metrobank in
hence, the motion to that effect should be allowed only to avoid prejudice, further the separate trial as already too late. The properties, though already registered in
convenience, promote justice, and give a fair trial to all parties, to wit: o Generally the name of Asian Bank, would be meanwhile declared liable to forfeiture in favor
speaking, a lawsuit should not be tried piecemeal, or at least such a trial should be of the Republic, causing Metrobank to suffer the deprivation of its properties
undertaken only with great caution and sparingly. There should be one full and without due process of law. Only a joint trial with the original defendants could
comprehensive trial covering all disputed matters, and parties cannot, as of right, afford to Metrobank the equal and efficient opportunity to confront and to contest
have a trial divided. It is the policy of the law to limit the number of trials as far as all the evidence bearing on its ownership of the properties. Hence, the
possible, and separate trials are granted only in exceptional cases. Even under a disadvantages that a separate trial would cause to Metrobank would far outweigh
statute permitting trials of separate issues, neither party has an absolute right to any good or benefit that the Republic would seemingly stand to gain from the
have a separate trial of an issue involved. The trial of all issues together is separation of trials. We must safeguard Metrobank’s right to be heard in the
especially appropriate in an action at law wherein the issues are not complicated, defense of its registered ownership of the properties, for that is what our
x x x, or where the issues are basically the same x x x o x x x Separate trials of Constitution requires us to do. Hence, the grant by the Sandiganbayan of the
issues should be ordered where such separation will avoid prejudice, further Republic’s motion for separate trial, not being in furtherance of convenience or
convenience, promote justice, and give a fair trial to all parties. Bearing in mind would not avoid prejudice to a party, and being even contrary to the Constitution,
the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant US case law, we the law and jurisprudence, was arbitrary, and, therefore, a grave abuse of
conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue Sandiganbayan REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the REGIONAL
against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of RESOURCES, REGION III, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR. and

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THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF OLONGAPO CITY, Respondents. G.R. No. 199501 RTC granted Republic’s MR Heirs of Oribello filed a manifestation and
March 6, 2013 SECOND DIVISION motion o bringing to the attention of the trial court the previous 12 September
1997 Order declaring petitioner to have abandoned the reversion case. Oribello’s
FACTS: The subject property located in Olongapo, once classified as forest land heirs pointed out that from the time petitioner received the Order in 1997, it did
by the Bureau of Forest Development, was occupied by one Valentin Fernandez nothing to question the same, making the Order final. RTC found merit on the
(Valentin) in 1968 by virtue of a Residential Permit issued by the same government Heirs’ manifestation and motion; DISMISSED the case Republic appealed
office Upon Valentin’s death, his son, Odillon Fernandez (Odillon), continued to before CA CA affirmed RTC; denied Republic’s appeal; denied ensuring MR o
occupy the property, together with spouses Ruperto and Matilde Apog Odillon held "that the remedy of appeal is no longer available" to petitioner. The appellate
sold the property to Mrs. Florentina Balcita Balcita then sold the same to court agreed with respondents that petitioner has lost its right to participate in the
Enrique Oribello Jr. Oribello filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with DENR proceedings of Civil Case No. 225-0-92 when it failed to question the trial court’s
DENR denied the application as the subject land was still a forest land The 12 September 1997 Order, declaring it to have abandoned the case. As a
same was then declared open to disposition under the Public Land Act thus consequence of petitioner’s inaction, such order inevitably became final. o ruled
prompting Oribello to file another application Director of Lands issued an Order that petitioner is barred by laches and estoppel for failing to challenge the 12
for the issuance of a patent in favor of Oribello o Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. September 1997 Order after almost a decade from receipt thereof. The appellate
12756 and OCT No. P-5004 were issued to Oribello Matilde Apog (Apog) and court stated that "while the general rule is that an action to recover lands of public
Aliseo San Juan (San Juan) claimed to be the actual occupants of the subject domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by laches or estoppel."
land; protested with the DENR the issuance of the sales patent and OCT in favor
of Oribello; prayed or the annulment of the sales patent o arguing that Oribello and ISSUES: Is the RTC Order declaring the Republic to have abandoned the case
Land Inspector Dominador Laxa (Laxa) committed fraud and misrepresentation in interlocutory thus not appealable? YES. Are the consolidated cases subject to
the approval of the Miscellaneous Sales Application of Oribello. They alleged that multiple appeals? YES. Is the property unclassified public forest? SC is not a trier
Laxa submitted a false report to the Director of Lands, by stating that there were of facts, thus, remand to RTC is proper
no other claimants to the property and that Oribello was the actual occupant
thereof, when the contrary was true. Regional Executive Director of the DENR
found substantial evidence that there was fraud on the part of Oribello OSG
instituted a complaint for reversion and cancellation of title before RTC
Olongapo, docketed as Civil Case No. 225-0-92 o The case was thereafter HELD:
consolidated with Civil Case No. 233 - 0 - 91, a complaint for recovery of possession A final order is defined as "one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety
filed by Oribello against Apog and San Juan. RTC during trial warned Republic or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but
on the possible effect of its non-appearance on the next scheduled hearing to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court."16 Conversely,
o The Solicitor General is warned that should his designated lawyer or any of his an interlocutory order "does not dispose of the case completely but leaves
assistants fail to appear on the dates above-stated, the Court will be constrained something to be decided upon"17 by the court. Its effects are merely provisional
to consider the presentation of evidence for the Republic of the Philippines as in character and substantial proceedings have to be further conducted by the court
terminated. OSG was absent on the next hearing date RTC issued an order in order to finally resolve the issue or controversy.18 Based on the records,
that Republic is deemed to have abandoned the case The trial of the consolidated petitioner has presented testimonial evidence on various hearing dates and marked
cases continued and the reception of evidence of the private parties proceeded. numerous documents during the trial of Civil Case No. 225-0-92. Such acts do not
RTC then issued another order dismissing the consolidated cases without manifest lack of interest to prosecute. Admittedly there was delay in this case.
prejudice for non-substitution of the deceased plaintiff (Oribello) and his counsel o However, such delay is not the delay warranting dismissal of the complaint. To be
Considering that the plaintiff’s counsel is already dead, and the plaintiff is likewise a sufficient ground for dismissal, delay must not only be lengthy but also
dead already, there being no substitution of party-plaintiffs or any record showing unnecessary resulting in the trifling of court processes.19 There is no proof that
the heirs or party in interest, these cases are dismissed without prejudice petitioner intended to delay the proceedings in this case, much less abuse judicial
Republic filed an MR; prayed that it be allowed to present evidence o contending processes. While petitioner failed to appear on the hearing of 12 September
that the Order applied exclusively to Civil Case No. 2330-91 (for recovery of 1997, such failure does not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the reversion
possession) and did not affect Civil Case No. 225-0-92 (for reversion of property). complaint for failure to prosecute. Petitioner’s non-appearance on that date should

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simply be construed as a waiver of the right to present additional evidence.20 question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing
We note that prior to the issuance of the 12 September 1997 Order, the trial court or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
already warned petitioner on the likely adverse effect of its nonappearance on the consolidated, and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
next hearing date. If petitioner fails to attend the next scheduled hearing, the trial tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Consolidation is a procedural device
court would consider petitioner’s presentation of evidence as terminated. to aid the court in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the
Termination of presentation of a party’s evidence does not equate to dismissal of business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while
the complaint for failure to prosecute. In fact, the trial court merely "deemed" providing justice to the parties.25 To promote this end, the rule allows the
petitioner to have abandoned the case without stating expressly and unequivocally consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the
that the complaint for reversion was dismissed. Had the trial court declared, in no consolidation of issues within those cases.26 The Court explained, thus: o In the
uncertain terms, that the reversion suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute, context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different
there is no doubt that petitioner would have questioned such ruling, as it now did senses: (1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried,
with respect to the trial court’s 29 June 2005 Order. While it is within the trial in which case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is
court’s discretion to dismiss motu proprio the complaint on the ground of plaintiff’s not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi - consolidation)
failure to prosecute, it must be exercised with caution. Resort to such action must (2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity,
be determined according to the procedural history of each case, the situation at and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is
the time of the dismissal, and the diligence (or the lack thereof) of the plaintiff to illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same
proceed therein.21 As the Court held in Gomez v. Alcantara,22 if a lesser sanction parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint.
would achieve the same result, then dismissal should not be resorted to. Unless (actual consolidation)
a party’s conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to (3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of
nonappearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to
would still amount to achieving the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton failure to observe the In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by petitioner (Civil Case
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at No. 225-0-92) was consolidated with the complaint for recovery of possession filed
bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to by Oribello (Civil Case No. 223-0-91). While these two cases involve common
dismiss.23 (Emphasis supplied) Notably, the trial court, even after its supposed questions of law and fact,28 each action retains its separate and distinct character.
"dismissal" of the case for petitioner’s abandonment, continued to recognize The reversion suit settles whether the subject land will be reverted to the State,
petitioner’s personality in its proceedings. In fact, in its Order of 16 January 1998, while the recovery of possession case determines which private party has the
well beyond the "dismissal" on 12 September 1997, the trial court directed the better right of possession over the subject property. These cases, involving
service of such order to the Solicitor General, to wit: o Should Atty. Dumpit fail to different issues and seeking different remedies, require the rendition and entry of
submit the said offer of evidence, it will be deemed a waiver on his part to do so. separate judgments. The consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably,
Atty. Leyco announced that he is presenting evidence for and in behalf of the the complaint for recovery of possession proceeded independently of the reversion
defendants Oribello in Civil Case No. 225-0-92 and as plaintiff in Civil Case No. case, and was disposed of accordingly by the trial court. Since each action does
233-0-91. o To give way to the filing of said pleadings, cancel the hearing on not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the other is not
February 20, 1998. Let the reception of evidence for the plaintiff Oribellos be set necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There is no rule
on March 20, 1998 at 9:00 a.m.. Attys. Leyco and Dumpit are notified in open or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which
court. Furnish a copy of this order the Solicitor General, DENR Office in Angeles is consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is within the sound discretion
City, as well as Atty. Pascua.24 (Emphasis supplied) In addition, the above Order of the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the
states that Oribello’s counsel was presenting evidence on the two consolidated Rules of Court that the court sever one case from the other cases before a party
cases. This means that Oribello himself continued to recognize the pendency of the can appeal an adverse ruling on such case. In its petition, petitioner contended
reversion suit (Civil Case No. 225-092), contrary to his subsequent allegation that that the subject property remains unclassified public forest, incapable of private
such case has already been dismissed. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court appropriation. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that Oribello committed fraud
provides: o SECTION 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common and misrepresentation in acquiring the subject property. This Court is not a trier

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of facts. Fraud is a question offact. 29 Whether there was fraud and longer present his
misrepresentation in the issuance of the sales patent in favor of Oribello calls for a evidence
thorough evaluation of the parties' evidence. Thus, this Court will have to remand if GRANTED - the case is if GRANTED - accused is
the reversion case to the trial court for further proceedings in order to resolve this dismissed; order of dismissal is acquitted; order of
issue and accordingly dispose of the case based on the parties' evidence on record. a FINAL order, hence acquittal is NOT
appealable appealable; otherwise, it
RULES 33-38 will be a violation of his
right against double
jeopardy
A. Demurrer to Evidence [Rule 33]
if plaintiff appeals and the
appellate court REVERSES -
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has completed the defendant is no longer allowed
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground to present evidence
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is LECTURE – RULE 33
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence. (1a, R35) Q:What is the meaning to demur?
A:To impugn. To question.
Distinguish between CIVIL and CRIMINAL
NOTE: Demurrer to evidence applies to both civil and criminal cases.
CIVIL DEMURRER CRIMINAL
DEMURRER Q:What are the similarities and what are the differences in the application
Demurrer is a kind of a Motion to Dismiss. It is NOT a of demurrer to evidence in civil and criminal cases?
prohibited pleading under the Rules on Summary
Procedure because (1) it is there to similarly expedite the
A:Similarities:
proceedings and (2) it is not among those mentioned under
1. In both civil and criminal cases, you file a demurrer to evidence after
prohibited pleadings
SIMILARITIES the plaintiff has rested its case or after the prosecution, in criminal cases, has
The ground is the same, that is, INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE rested its case.
Only available AFTER the presentation of the evidence of 2. In both civil and criminal cases, they have the same grounds, which is
the plaintiff or prosecution, as the case may be the insufficiency of evidence.
Court may either grant or deny the Demurrer 3. In both civil and criminal cases, it is available only to the defendant or
More difficult to file because Easier to file because the the accused.
the plaintiff is only required to prosecution is required
present his case by to prove the guilt of Differences:
preponderance of evidence accused beyond 1. In civil case, the quantum of evidence needed is preponderance of
reasonable doubt evidence while in criminal case, it must be proof beyond reasonable
DIFFERENCES If DENIED - plaintiff presents if DENIED - distinguish doubt.
evidence whether there had been a. Q: So is it harder to file demurrer to evidence in criminal
prior leave of court (1) if case? No. It is easier because the proof needed is proof
with leave, accused may beyond reasonable doubt.Kasi mataas ang quantum of
proceed with
evidence needed sa criminal cases, so it is easier.
presentation of his
b. Which is more weighty or ano'ng mas mabigat na
evidence; (2) if without
leave, accused can no ebidensya, e mas madaling and demurrer.

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2. In civil cases, there is no need a motion for leave of court while in leave of court he files it at his own risk. Why? Because in case of denial he loses
criminal cases, you can file a demurrer either with leave or without leave of court. his right to present evidence.However, Radiowealth is a civil case.
3. In civil cases, if the motion is granted it amounts to dismissal of the
case while in criminal cases, if the motion is granted it amounts to acquittal of the In case of reversal or an order of dismissal, in a demurrer to evidence, the appellate
accused. court must now render judgment and does not have to remand it because there is
4. Because it amounts to acquittal, in criminal cases there is no appeal no more evidence to receive. The defendant having lost his right to present
while in civil cases there is appeal. evidence.
5. If the ground of the motion, in civil cases, is appealed and then it is
reversed, the defendant loses the right to present evidence while in criminal case
if demurrer to evidence was filed with leave of court and was denied the accused Demurrer in criminal cases is illustrated in the case of Bernardo vs. Court of
may present his evidence and if the demurrer to evidence was filed without leave Appeals. And it is here in this case that the distinction between criminal and civil
of court and was denied the accused can no longer present his evidence and cases has been established.
submits the case for decision based on he prosecution's evidence.
Bernardo v. CA doctrine: Atty. Miravite had a heated argument with the judge. The
Q:Which court? lawyer asked to file for a demurrer to evidence, in open court. The judge denied
A:In criminal cases, the trial court while in civil cases, the appellate court. the demurrer. Then the lawyer again asked for a demurrer to evidence but was
again denied. The doctrine here in this case is that when you file a motion for a
NOTE: Remember it is always available to the defendant or the accused. And in demurrer to evidence without leave of court you risk of waiving your right to
civil cases, after the presentation of plaintiff's evidence and then the defendant present evidence.
files a demurrer to evidence and it is granted the plaintiff will not take that sitting
down. Definitely the plaintiff will appeal, if the appellate court affirms it well and You better be careful in filing a motion for a demurrer to evidence especially in civil
good but if it is reversed then the defendant loses its right to present evidence. cases. In criminal cases, as long as you file a motion for leave and remember what
did we study on Rule 15 on motions that when you file a motion for leave you have
Radiowealth v. Del Rosario doctrine: When the Court of Appeals reverses the trial to already attach a copy of your demurrer. So that under the present practice,
court and denies the demurrer to evidence, it is the duty of the CA to proceed with when your motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence is denied, do not insist
the trial and render judgment. The CA cannot remand the case to the trial court because your demurrer will just be denied.
for further proceedings. Also, Radiowealth loses the right to present evidence. You
do not even have to file a writ of execution with the appellate court except in B. Judgment on the Pleadings [Rule 34]
execution pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39. But even if you file it with
the appellate court, the appellate court will have to order the trial court to issue Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
the writ of execution. or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may; on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However,
NOTE: Do not confuse this with execution because the appellate court cannot in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
execute judgments but always the trial court. the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. (1a, R19)

Radiowealth is now the ruling with regard to reversal of the appellate court of the C. Summary Judgment [Rule 35]
demurrer to evidence.
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to recover upon a
NOTE:Remember that demurrer now is under Section 23 of Rule 119 of the new claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any
criminal procedure. It is wrong to state in criminal cases you can only file demurrer time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
with leave of court because Section 23 of Rule 119 specifically provide that while affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
the accused may file demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court. What or any part thereof. (1a, R34)
you have to look here into is if the accused files a demurrer to evidence without

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Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party against whom a Q:When may the court render a judgment on the pleadings?
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, A:When an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a allegations of the adverse party's pleading.
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (2a, R34)
We have studied one of the cases the Allied case. We have studied it under modes
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion shall be served at least of discovery a request for admission. The defendant files an answer. Therefore the
ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may one who asks for judgment on the pleadings should be the plaintiff.
serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before
the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if Q:May a defendant ever ask a judgment on the pleadings?
the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, A:Yes. With regard to permissive counterclaim. Why? Because a permissive
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material counterclaim requires an answer while a compulsory counterclaim does not require
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (3a, an answer because the allegations therein are deemed controverted.
R34)
Q:How would you distinguish summary judgments (Rule 35) from
Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. — If on motion under this Rule, judgment on the pleadings (Rule 34)?
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a A:
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 1. In judgment on the pleadings, it simply means that the judgment is
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain based solely on the pleadings. And what are these pleadings, it is the complaint,
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and the answer and sometimes the reply. Those are the only bases. That's why a
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts judgment on the pleadings is not availed of in the Allied case but rather summary
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the judgment. In summary judgments, the judgment is based not only on the pleadings
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further but on affidavits, depositions and admissions.
proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed 2. While in Rule 34, it is totally bereft of an issue while in Rule 35 there
established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly. is an issue, only that the issue is not genuine. There are issues but the issues are
(4a, R34) irrelevant and immaterial.

Section 5. Form of affidavits and supporting papers. — Supporting and opposing In summary judgments, apparently, although an expanded judgment on the
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would pleadings by even saying that there can be judgment on the pleading to be moved
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent even by the defendant as far as permissive counterclaim is concerned. But take
to testify to the matters stated therein. Certified true copies of all papers or parts note that specifically in Rule 35, it speaks of a claim by the plaintiff as well as in
thereof referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. Section 2 principally by the defendant.
(5a, R34)
In the Allied case which illustrates a summary judgment, there is a request for
Section 6. Affidavits in bad faith. — Should it appear to its satisfaction at any time admission but the request was never answered. There was an order from the court
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this Rule are presented in bad faith, to answer the request. It was never complied with. Therefore a summary judgment
or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the offending may be asked.
party or counsel to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits D. Entry of Judgments and Final Orders [Rule 36]
caused him to incur including attorney's fees, it may, after hearing further adjudge
the offending party or counsel guilty of contempt. (6a, R34) Several Judgments (Section 4)

LECTURE – RULES 34 and 35

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Section 4. Several judgments. — In an action against several defendants, the court NOTE: Graphically, if you write a circle, that circle represents an executory
may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of judgment. Within that circle is another smaller circle representing a final judgment.
them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. (4) Two circles, one inside the other. if you have the bigger circle, necessarily you have
the smaller circle. But you can have the smaller circle without the bigger circle. Is
Separate Judgments (Section 5) that a sufficient analogy? Want a stronger analogy? If the smaller circle represents
sex, the bigger circle represents love, once there is love necessarily there must be
Section 5. Separate judgments. — When more than one claim for relief is presented sex but there can be sex without love.
in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material
to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or In Rule 36, the final order referred to in here is executory not just final.
occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate
judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with Q: What are the requirements for a judgment?
respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining A:
claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered the court by order may stay its 1. It must be in writing (walang judgment na oral);
enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may 2. The judgment must be personally written by the judge; and
prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the 3. The judgment must be entered. Because a judgment which is not
party in whose favor the judgment is rendered. (5a) entered has only become final but not executory.
4. That every judgment the facts and the law on which its disposition was
Judgments against entities without personality (Section 6) anchored and based.

Section 6. Judgment against entity without juridical personality. — When judgment It is not just a procedural requirement, but this is even a constitutional
is rendered against two or more persons sued as an entity without juridical requirement.
personality, the judgment shall set out their individual or proper names, if known.
(6a) Section 2, second sentence, Rule 36 is IMPORTANT which is "THE DATE OF
FINALITY OF THE JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE THE DATE
LECTURE – RULE 36 OF ITS ENTRY".

A judgment may be final but not executory. But once it is executory it must Q: Explain this sentence.
necessarily be final. A: It means that when the judgment has become executory, the date where the
judgment has become executory shall be the date of its entry.
Q: So what is a final judgment as distinguished from an executory
judgment? Q: What do you mean by entry of judgment?
A: An entry of judgment is the recording of the judgment by the clerk of court in
A: A judgment may be final but not executory but once a judgment is executory is the book of entries of judgment. Bawat korte may libro ng entries of judgment.
must necessarily be final. Because a final judgment is one where the trial court is
left with nothing else to do. The court has completed its task. It has nothing else If the judgment was rendered by the RTC Manila on January 5, 2005, let us assume
to do on the part of the court. It has disposed of the case. Judgment has become that all the parties to that case received a copy of the judgment on January 10, so
final. the parties have until January 25 (15 days) to file Motion for New Trial, Motion for
Reconsideration, or Appeal. After January 25, the judgment has become executory.
But it is not yet executory because the period to appeal or to reconsider or to retry
the case has not expired yet. Only after the expiration of the period for new trial, Q: Suppose the clerk of court entered or recorded the judgment in March
reconsideration or appeal will the judgment become final and executory. 15, 2007, when is the entry of judgment?

278
A: The entry of judgment is January 25. Ito ang ibig sabihin ng second sentence Grounds for New Trial (Section 1)
of section 2 of Rule 36. Hindi kabaliktaran. So the judgment was entered January
25 and not March 15. Grounds for Reconsideration (Section 1)

Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Q: What is the rationale of the law? — Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial
A: Otherwise if it is the actual recording which is the entry of judgment then the court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more
finality of the judgment and its executory character will depend upon the will of of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:
the clerk of court. The entry, when the period to appeal has expired.
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence
Q: Why is the entry of judgment is important? could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has
A: It is very important because there are procedural actions which is counted from probably been impaired in his rights; or
its entry of judgment.
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
Q: Why execution? discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter
A: Judgment can be executed only by motion within a period of 5 years from entry the result.
of judgment. Petition to relief can only be done within a period of 6 months from
entry of judgment. Kaya importante yun. Kaya hindi yung actual recording Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration
although the meaning of entry is the actual recording but the entry is reckoned upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is
when the judgment has become final and executory. When the period for insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order
reconsideration, or appeal has not been availed of and has expired. is contrary to law. (1a)

Q: What are the different kinds of judgment? Effects of a Grant or Denial (Sections 6,7,8)
A:
1. Judgment upon compromise; Section 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial. — If a new trial is granted in
2. Judgment upon confession; accordance with the provisions of this Rules the original judgment or final order
3. Judgment upon the merits; shall be vacated, and the action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded
4. Clarificatory judgment; evidence taken upon the former trial, insofar as the same is material and
5. Judgment non pro tunc (now for then); competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking
6. Judgment sin perjuicio; the same. (5a)
7. Judgment by defaulty (Sec. 3, Rule 9);
8. Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 34); Section 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration. — If the grounds for a motion under
9. Summary judgment (Rule 35); this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than an
10. Several judgment (Sec. 4, Rule 36); of the matter in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the
11. Separate judgment (Sec. 5, Rule 36); court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable
12. Special judgment (Sec. 11, Rule 39); without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (6a)
13. Judgment for specific acts (Sec. 10, Rule 39);
14. Judgment on demurrer to evidence (Rule 33); Section 8. Effect of order for partial new trial. — When less than all of the issues
15. Conditional judgment; and are ordered retried, the court may either enter a judgment or final order as to the
16. Final judgment rest, or stay the enforcement of such judgment or final order until after the new
trial. (7a)
E. Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration [Rule 37]
LECTURE – RULE 37

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This is the remedy of the judgment obligor after the judgment has become final Q: What are the grounds for a motion for new trial?
but not executory. A:
1. Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary
Q: Is it mandatory? prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved
A: No. It is not mandatory except in certiorari as special civil action. party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
2. Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
NOTE: A motion for reconsideration is not mandatory. The remedy is available but diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would
you may or may not avail of it unless the rule asks that you must first file a motion probably alter the result. In answering the grounds for a motion for new trial, you
for reconsideration. Ordinarily, if the case is pending before the appellate court, a have to complete the grounds as stated under Section 1 Rule 37. Kulang daw pag
motion for reconsideration is advisable. fraud, mistake, accident, or excusable negligence or newly-discovered evidence
lang. You have to qualify and that qualification is the complete sentence under the
Q: The time frame, when can one file a motion for reconsideration or a two paragraphs of Section 1 of Rule 37.
motion for new trial?
Q: When is negligence excusable?
A: In cases of notice of appeal, within 15 days or in cases of record on appeal, A: It is excusable: First, as to subject matter. If the subject matter is not that
within 30 days. When you go to special civil action, you will note that there are serious, it can be excused. But watch out for that kind of explanation of excusable
certain appeals which must be taken by record on appeal because there are several negligence because you must have read certain jurisprudence saying that
stages in an action. In fact the best example for a record on appeal is special procedural rules should not be a deterrent to the proper administration of justice.
proceedings in settlement of estates. So that it should give way to the substantive rights of individuals. That is a very
sweeping statement because there are certain procedural rules that must be
Q: But ordinarily it is 15 days. What is the point of reference of the 15 days? A: complied with.
From receipt or notice of judgment.
So there is no hard and fast rule as to when negligence is excusable. It must be
You file an appeal or motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial. We are considered on a case to case basis.
dealing only with motion for new trial or reconsideration. Under the present rules,
the grounds have been delineated. They have been separated unlike before prior Q: What mistake is referred here?
to the 1997 rules they have the same grounds. But now if you file a motion for new A: Mistake of fact and not mistake of law. Because in mistake of law it amounts to
trial, you have to file it on a valid ground. If you file a motion for reconsideration, ignorance of the law. So it must be mistake of fact or misappreciation of facts. In
you have to file it on a valid ground. criminal law you have studied aberratio ictus. Because in civil law, it says ignorance
of the law excuses no one.
NOTE: If you file a motion for new trial on the ground of either under a motion for
reconsideration, your motion will be considered as a motion for reconsideration. Q: How about accident?
On the other hand, if you file a motion for reconsideration on any of the grounds A: Unforeseen, unexpected, or sudden occurrences. How about death, is it
under new trial, your motion will be treated as a motion for new trial. So your accident? Death is not an accident. Death is the most certain uncertainty. So it can
ground is crucial because they have been separated already. But both speak of never be accidental. Sometimes it becomes accidental because you don't know
different grounds. when it will strike. How about missing the bus, train or airplane? No.

Q: What are the grounds for motion for reconsideration? Now let's go to a very important ground which is fraud. Fraud here is not any kind
A: of fraud but rather an extrinsic fraud to be differentiated from intrinsic fraud.
1. Excessive award of damages;
2. Evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or Q: When is there extrinsic and when is there intrinsic fraud?
3. Decision or final order is contrary to law.

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A: Extrinsic fraud connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing party
outside of the trial against the losing party who because of such fraud is prevented People v. Li Ka Kim doctrine (Criminal case):
from presenting his side of the case while an intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party Requisites of newly-discovered evidence:
during the trial which does not affect the presentation of the case. 1. The evidence is discovered after trial;
2. Such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
Q: Give an example. trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and
A: Extrinsic fraud: If A (witness) was paid not to appear before the court for trial. 3. The evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
Intrinsic fraud: When the signature of the party was forged. impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the
judgment.
Remember: we are talking here of new trial. Meaning to say there has been a trial
because you are asking for another trial. If you are asking for another trial because The ground of newly-discovered evidence for a motion for new trial is not only
of fraud, the fraud must have happened outside the proceeding. That is what is available in civil cases but also to criminal cases under Rule 121.
meant by extrinsic, outside the proceeding.
Q: What kind of evidence does the rule refer to?
Q: But if it is intrinsic, it is within the proceeding. Why is it not a ground A: Any kind of evidence may be used. Either testimonial, documentary or real
for new trial? evidence may be used.
A: Because you should have questioned it right there and then but you did not. So
you waive your right. For example, during the proceeding the other party presents Q: But there is a requirement, if it is testimonial evidence, when you file a
a forged document or a fictitious document and it was admitted. Because right motion what is required?
there and then you should have questioned it but because you didn't question it A: When you file for the motion for new trial, you have to attach the affidavits.
the evidence has been admitted, you have considered to have waived your right.
That is the meaning of intrinsic fraud. Q: How about documentary?
A: You have to attach a certified copy of the document that was newlydiscovered.
Q: The other ground is newly-discovered evidence, but how do you qualify
that newly-discovered evidence? Q: How about real evidence?
A: Use the wordings of the rule. Paragraph b, Section 1 of Rule 37 states that A: Describe the real evidence. If it is capable of manual delivery, bring it in court.
"Newly-discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter So any kind of evidence may be newly-discovered. But in applying for that newly-
the result." discovered evidence, you have to comply with the affidavit.

There are two cases, which I have assigned, illustrating the specific requirements NOTE: Also, in the ground of FAME, you also have to comply with an affidavit
for newly-discovered evidence. One is a civil case and the other is a criminal case. requirement of affidavit of merits. You have to state in your affidavit what
constituted fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The court may either
Mendezona v. Ozamis doctrine (Civil Case): deny or grant your motion.
Requisites of newly-discovered evidence:
1. The evidence had been discovered after trial; Q: If it is denied, what is the remedy?
2. The evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence: and A: You appeal from the judgment. Because this is an ad interim remedy.
3. The evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or
impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result. Q: If it is granted, what is the effect of that?
A: Previous judgment is vacated. But this trial de novo must not be understood as
NOTE: All 3 requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at trial de novo prior to the 1997 rules because trial de novo back then was complete
the new trial. setting aside of the decision or judgment or final order. Under the present rules it

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is relative, you set aside the dispositive portion of the judgment but the evidence this question. Though he recognized that for academic reasons, this is allowed
which have been admitted will remain and there is no need for retaking them. because they have different grounds. But practically speaking, it is a waste of time
because if you file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the SC, ordinarily, does
This is different from motion for reconsideration. Because if your motion for not resolve such issue within 15 days. So you run the risk of having the period
reconsideration was denied, your remedy was appeal also or even new trial as the prescribed. So why bother filing for a special civil action of certiorari when it does
case may be if you want to because they have different grounds already. not interrupt the running of the reglementary period for appeal from the denial of
the motion for new trial. It is how these cases can be consolidated that problem
Q: But if it was granted, does it set aside the judgment? arises. Anong kaso ang pipiliin mo?
A: No. It only corrects the judgment. Because look at the grounds for motion for
reconsideration, it is more of an amendment. There is no trial de novo here. F. Relief from Judgments [Rule 38]

Q: Can you file a second motion for reconsideration? Petition for Relief from Judgment (Section 1)
A: No. Except the Supreme Court, where you can file a second, third or even fourth
motion for reconsideration. Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. — When
a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
Q: Can you file a second motion for new trial? against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
A: Yes. Only grounded on newly-discovered evidence. You cannot file a second negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that
motion for new trial on FAME because they were already present or forms part the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. (2a)
within the the proceeding not outside the proceeding. So if you are given a
problem, always remember that the second motion for new trial is solely grounded Petition for Relief from Denial of Appeal (Section 2)
on newly-discovered evidence. Because when you file a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence for the first time, FAME was already existent. Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. — When a judgment or final
But if you file a motion for new trial on the ground of FAME, for the first time and order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident,
it was denied, it is possible that you will still file a second motion for new trial on mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he
the ground of newly-dicovered evidence. may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be
given due course. (1a)
Q: But not in a motion for reconsideration. And that is precisely the
rationale why there is no second motion for reconsideration. Why? Time for Filing Petition (Section 3)
A: Because all the grounds are there already. So why don't you include it in your
first motion for reconsideration. If you find out that the judgment is contrary to Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition provided
law, that the award of damages is excessive, that the evidence is insufficient, aren't for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within
they all present when you file your first motion for reconsideration (answer was sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
yes), then why didn't you include it? So there is no second motion for proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment
reconsideration. or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken, and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
Question from a student: When your motion for new trial was denied your remedy negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
is appeal. When you want to question the denial of the motion for new trial, you substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. (3)
can file a special civil action of certiorari. Now, if your certiorari was given due
course, ordinarily the SC will remand the case for further proceedings to the trial Preliminary Injunction (Section 5)
court. If your appeal was also given in due course, the appellate court will take
cognizance of it. So technically there are two cases pending before two different Section 5. Preliminary injunction pending proceedings. — The court in which the
courts but with the same issues, subject matter and same parties. How are we petition is filed may grant such preliminary injunction as may be necessary for the
going to consolidate or resolve this issue? Atty. Brondial did not squarely answer preservation of the rights of the parties, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond

282
in favor of the adverse party, conditioned that if the petition is dismissed or the 10. If you have 6 months therefrom, you have until July 10. But A came to
petitioner fails on the trial of the case upon its merits, he will pay the adverse party know of the judgment only on July 5. The rule says he has 60 days from
all damages and costs that may be awarded to him by reason of the issuance of knowledge of the judgment within which to file petition for relief from
such injunction or the other proceedings following the petition, but such injunction judgment. Can A still file, in this instance, a petition for relief from
shall not operate to discharge or extinguish any lien which the adverse party may judgment?
have acquired upon, the property, of the petitioner. (5a) A: Yes, A can still file a petition for relief from judgment. A has only 5 days to file
such petition. Because both periods (60 days and 6 months) must be complied
LECTURE – RULE 38 with.

Q: There are two forms of petition for relief: Q: If the entry of judgment was January 10 and A came to know of it in
A: January 20, until when can he file a petition for relief from judgment?
1. Petition for relief from judgment (Section 1) and A: March 20 or March 22 (if leap year). In other words, 60 days lang. Hindi na
2. Petition for relief from denial of an appeal (Section 2). bibilangin from January 10 up to July 10 because you came to know of the
judgment on January 20. So both periods must be complied with.
Q: What are the grounds?
A: Fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same grounds as the The rationale of the law is don't sleep on your rights. You came to know of it
motion for new trial. And because we have the same grounds, the limitation is "had already, you should make a move. In other words, you must know it within the 6
you the opportunity to file a motion for new trial and you did not file a motion for month period. Yan and ibig sabihin ng batas.
new trial due to your own fault or negligence, you lose your right even of filing a
petition for relief." NOTE: If you come to know of it, in our example, by August, you can no longer file
because the entry of judgment was made on January 10. The defense for lack of
These are not alternative remedies. Remove from your mind that once you lose in knowledge is unavailing because the 6 month period must be complied with.
your motion for new trial or reconsideration and you did not appeal you can file a
petition for relief because it is wrong. They have the same grounds. One student wanted to clarify something: The 60 day and 6 month period were
relaxed by the SC in the case of Argana v. Republic (November 19, 2004). That's
Q: What is important here is the time frame. When? new, Atty. Brondial will check on that.
A:
1. Within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, Q: The other one is petition for relief from denial of appeal. How is this?
or other proceeding to be set aside; AND A: The grounds (FAME) are the same. But prayer here is that the appeal be given
2. Not more than 6 months after such judgment or final order was due course.
entered, or such proceeding was taken.
Q: What happens if the petition for relief was granted (either Sec 1 or Sec
Q: We studied under Rule 36 regarding entry of judgment. When is 2)?
judgment entered? A: In effect as if the court grants a new trial under Section 1. Under Section 2, Rule
A: The entry of judgment is the date of finality. It is not the actual recording of the 40-42 apply already. Since the appeal has been granted, you have to elevate the
judgment in the book of entries. Judgment becomes final when the period for records to the appellate court.
appeal, new trial or reconsideration has already expired and one did not avail it,
the judgment becomes final and executory. And when the judgment has become NOTE: Please take note that when a party files a petition for relief from judgment,
final and executory it is the date of entry. And from that date of entry, you count the judgment is already executory. In other words, by filing a petition for relief
6 months within which to file your petition for relief from judgment. from judgment, it will not stop the executory character of the judgment. So the
judgment can be executed because the judgment has become final and executory.
Q: A was a judgment obligor (in other words he lost in the case). No motion for
new trial, reconsideration or appeal was filed. Judgment was entered on January

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Q: So what is your remedy? A: Together with your petition for relief, you avail of Thus, when there was already a lapse of period within which to file the petition for
the provisional remedy of the preliminary injunction or TRO. Otherwise, if you don't relief, the client is already barred from filing such petition.
do that, the petition for relief will become useless because it will not change the
executory character of the judgment. Q: Incidentally, do you understand this notice? Di ba, sabi sa petition for
relief, you file it within 60 days when you learn of the judgment. Hindi ba
Remember here that the petitioner for relief from judgment, chances are would be when you learn of the judgment, your remedy is appeal? When do you
the judgment obligor. And because you were not able to get an injunctive relief the learn the judgment, when you receive a copy of the judgment. So, does it
judgment is executed. follow that when you receive the copy of the judgment, you don't appeal
na lang but file a petition for relief?
Q: What happens now if the judgment is executed and then the petition
for relief was granted without preliminary injunction? A: No. you cannot do that. Notice referred to there, to the party who will file a
petition for relief is notice other than the regular notice coming from the court. In
A: Let me give a concrete example. Mr. A files an action for the recovery of sum of other words, the petitioner came to know of it other than the regular way. Because
money against B for P1M. Judgment was rendered in favor A. B did not file a motion an ordinary party or any party for that matter, once you receive a copy of the
for new trial, reconsideration or appeal without his fault. So his remedy is petition judgment, the natural and usual reaction would be to appeal.
for relief from judgment. But the judgment in favor of A was already executory.
B's injunctive relief was denied. So the judgment was executed. Thereafter B was MARIO J. MENDEZONA and TERESITA M. MENDEZONA, LUIS J.
granted the injunctive relief. Now what will happen? B can file for claim for damages MENDEZONA and MARICAR L. MENDEZONA and TERESITA ADAD VDA. DE
or restitution. That's why petition for relief is not often granted. MENDEZONA, petitioners, vs. JULIO H. OZAMIZ, ROBERTO J.
MONTALVAN, JOSE MA. OZAMIZ, CARMEN H. OZAMIZ, PAZ O.
Mesina v. Meer doctrine: "Any court" only means the MTC and RTC. It does not MONTALVAN, MA. TERESA O.F. ZARRAGA, CARLOS O. FORTICH, JOSE
extend to CA or SC. The CA and SC are governed by separate rules. The SC said LUIS O. ROS, PAULITA O. RODRIGUEZ, and LOURDES O. LON,
that Rule 38 is only available before the MTC and RTC. respondents. G.R. No. 143370. February 6, 2002 SECOND DIVISION

The SC cited the historical background for this. Because prior to the 1997 rules, if
the judgment is rendered by an inferior court, the petition for relief is filed with the FACTS: Mendezonas alleged that they were the owners of a parcel of land
RTC. If the decision is rendered by the RTC, it is filed with the RTC. Under the 1997 situated in Lahug, Cebu, tracing their titles of ownership over their respective
rules, petition for relief under Rule 38, you file it where the case was decided. So properties from a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed
if it was decided with the MTC, you file it with the MTC. If it was decided with the in their favor by Carmen Ozamiz for and in consideration of P1,040,000.00
RTC, you file it with the RTC. Mendezonas then filed an action before RTC Cebu for quieting of title against
respondents to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused by the
NOTE: But take note, it is not a motion but a petition. In other words, it is a inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens, which came about as a result of an
separate action. With that qualification that while it is a separate action where you incident in a a proceeding for guardianship over the person and properties of
can file it anywhere, the limitation is you file it in the court where the judgment Carmen Ozamiz initiated by the respondents In said guardianship proceeding,
was rendered. Suppose, if it's the MTC, you file it with the MTC and if it's the RTC, the parties agreed that Carmen Ozamiz that Paz O. Montalvan be appointed as
you file it with the RTC. Unlike before, prior to the 1997 Rules, if it is decided by guardian over Carmen’s person and petitioner Mario J. Mendezona, respondents
the MTC, you file the petition for relief with the RTC. If the decision emanates from Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz as guardians over her properties. Said
the RTC, you file it with the RTC. Ngayon, pinantay na lang yan. And it was because guardians submitted an inventory of properties which stated, among others, that
of Rule 5 on uniform procedure before the court. the Lahug property was disposed of to them by Carmen Respondents filed
an opposition in the action for the quieting of title o the titles issued in the
Mercury Drug v. CA doctrine: Q: When do you count the 60-day period? From petitioners names are defective and illegal, and the ownership of the said property
notice. Notice to whom? Yun ang doctrine dito. Notice to counsel is notice to client. was acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration for the
sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable o at the time of the sale on April 28,

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1989 Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession of her mental held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was
faculties; and that her properties having been placed in administration, she was in necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to
effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners. RTC in favor of Mendezonas the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to
CA reversed RTC o the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the
simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove that the consideration was facts in question, especially where information was not sought from co-parties;
actually paid, and, furthermore, that at the time of the execution of the contract there is a failure to seek evidence available through public records; there is a failure
the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired o Deed of to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining party; there is a
Absolute Sale of April 28, 1989 is null and void Mendezonas filed an MR failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize
Mendezonas then filed an MNT and/or for reception of evidence o contended, available discovery procedures.[18] Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be
among other things, that the appellate court totally ignored the testimony of Judge considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial. Factual findings
Teodorico Durias regarding the mental condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month before of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court which is not a trier of
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question o the appellate court totally facts. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh evidence all
ignored the testimony of Judge Teodorico Durias regarding the mental condition of over again. However, this rule is not without exception. If there is a showing that
Carmen Ozamiz a month before the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in the appellate court’s findings of facts complained of are totally devoid of support i
question, which was taken in the guardianship proceeding o alleged that Judge n the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse
Durias’s testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which could not have been of discretion, this Court must discard such erroneous findings of facts. [19] We find
discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence. that the exception applies in the case at bench. Simulation is defined as “the
CA denied both MR and MNT declaration of a fictitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in
order to produce, for the purposes of deception, the appearances of a juridical act
ISSUES: May the testimony of Judge Durias be considered as newly discovered which does not exist or is different from what that which was really executed.”[20]
evidence so as to warrant a new trial? NO. May the factual findings of CA in this The requisites of simulation are: (a) an outward declaration of will different from
case be reviewed by SC? YES. Was the alleged simulation of contract proven? the will of the parties; (b) the false appearance must have been intended by mutual
NO. agreement; and (c) the purpose is to deceive third persons.[21] None of these
were clearly shown to exist in the case at bar. Contrary to the erroneous
HELD: We shall first rule on the issue of whether to consider the testimony of conclusions of the appellate court, a simulated contract cannot be inferred from
Judge Durias as newly discovered evidence. A motion for new trial upon the ground the mere non-production of the checks. It was not the burden of the petitioners
of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence to prove so. It is significant to note that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28,
of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after 1989 is a notarized document duly acknowledged before a notary public. As such,
trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence
and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon
if admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must its face.[22] Payment is not merely presumed from the fact that the notarized
characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial. We find that Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 has gone through the regular procedure
the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As as evidenced by the transfer certificates of title issued in petitioners’ names by the
early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already Register of Deeds. In other words, whosoever alleges the fraud or invalidity of a
cropped up as a possible witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the notarized document has the burden of proving the same by evidence that is clear,
respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of convincing, and more than merely preponderant.[23] Therefore, with this well-
evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his recognized statutory presumption, the burden fell upon the respondents to prove
witness. Neither can Judge Durias’ testimony in another case be considered as their allegations attacking the validity and due execution of the said Deed of
newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which Absolute Sale. Respondents failed to discharge that burden; hence, the
were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the presumption in favor of the said deed stands. But more importantly, that notarized
petitioners at the trial below.[16] The testimony of Judge Durias has been in deed shows on its face that the consideration of One Million Forty Thousand Pesos
existence waiting only to be elicited from him by questioning.[17] It has been (P1,040,000.00) was acknowledged to have been received by Carmen Ozamiz.

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Simulation cannot be inferred from the alleged absence of payment based on the said TCT During the pendency of the case, said TCT No. 166074 was cancelled
testimonies of Concepcion Agac-ac, assistant of Carmen Ozamiz, and Nelfa Perdido, and replaced by TCT No. 216518 issued in the name of Spouses Mesina, it
part-time bookkeeper of Carmen Ozamiz. The testimonies of these two (2) appearing that the subject property was transferred to the latter before the notice
witnesses are unreliable and inconsistent. While Concepcion Agac-ac testified of lis pendens. The transfer of the title from Lerma Bunquin to petitioners was
that she was aware of all the transactions of Carmen Ozamiz, she also admitted effected only on June 15, 1994 because of some requirements imposed by the
that not all income of Carmen Ozamiz passed through her since Antonio National Housing Authority. Meer impleaded Spouses Mesina as additional party
Mendezona, as appointed administrator, directly reported to Carmen Ozamiz.[24] defendants RTC the alleged sale between Meer and Banquin was fraudulent.
With respect to Nelfa Perdido, she testified that most of the transactions that she However, petitioners were adjudged buyers in good faith and thus were entitled to
recorded refer only to rental income and expenses, and the amounts thereof were the possession of the subject property. Meer filed an MR o RTC denied
reported to her by Concepcion Agac-ac only, not by Carmen Ozamiz. She does not Meer appealed to RTC RTC reversed MTC o petitioners were not purchasers
record deposits or withdrawals in the bank accounts of Carmen Ozamiz.[25] Their in good faith, reasoning that it is the registration of the Deed of Sale, and not the
testimonies hardly deserve any credit and, hence, the appellate court misplaced date of its consummation that will confer title to the property. Since the Deed of
reliance thereon. Considering that Carmen Ozamiz acknowledged, on the face Sale was registered subsequent to the annotation of the lis pendens, petitioners
of the notarized deed, that she received the consideration at One Million Forty were bound by the outcome of the case Spouses Mesina appealed to CA
Thousand Pesos (P1,040,000.00), the appellate court should not have placed too CA affirmed RTC on May 10, 2000 Spouses Mesina (On July 17, 2000 and
much emphasis on the checks, the presentation of which is not really necessary. after reglementary period for appeal has lapsed) filed a Petition for Relief from
Besides, the burden to prove alleged non-payment of the consideration of the sale Judgment (PRJ) and prayed that the Court of Appeals set aside its Resolution dated
was on the respondents, not on the petitioners. Also, between its conclusion based May 10, 2000 for the following reasons: (a) extrinsic fraud was committed which
on inconsistent oral testimonies and a duly notarized document that enjoys prevented petitioners from presenting his case to the court and/or was used to
presumption of regularity, the appellate court should have given more weight to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy; (b) mistake and
the latter. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written excusable negligence has prevented the petitioner from taking an appeal within
document that speaks a uniform language.[26] Furthermore, the appellate court the prescribed period; and (c) petitioner has good and substantial defense in his
erred in ruling that at the time of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on action o On the first ground, petitioners argued that there has been collusion
April 28, 1989 the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously between the respondent and the Bunquins during the trial of the case at the
impaired.[27] It placed too much reliance upon the testimonies of the respondents’ Metropolitan Trial Court. Had the Bunquins testified in court as to the validity of
witnesses. However, after a thorough scrutiny of the transcripts of the testimonies the Deed of Sale as well as the authenticity of the respondent’s signature,
of the witnesses, we find that the respondents’ core witnesses all made sweeping petitioners argued that the result would have been in their favor. o Anent the
statements which failed to show the true state of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the second ground, petitioners averred that their failure to file the requisite appeal on
time of the execution of the disputed document. The testimonies of the time was largely due to the delay of counsel of record to produce the requested
respondents’ witnesses on the mental capacity of Carmen Ozamiz are far from documents of the case. o Finally, petitioners claim that they have good and
being clear and convincing, to say the least. substantial defense CA denied the PRJ o “As aptly pointed out by the
respondent, the first ground raised by the petitioner spouses should have been
filed before the court of origin, the Metropolitan Court of Manila, pursuant to
SPOUSES MICHAELANGELO and GRACE MESINA, petitioners, vs. HUMBERTO D. Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended. As to
MEER, respondent. G.R. No. 146845. July 2, 2002 THIRD DIVISION the second ground, the petitioner spouses who were the prevailing party before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, did not mention the alleged extrinsic fraud
FACTS: Meer, allegedly the registered owner of the subject parcel of land, when the case was on appeal before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners cannot
needed money and thus applied for a loan. He discovered, however, that his now challenge the decision of this Court for the fraud allegedly perpetrated in the
certificate of title has been cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 166074, was issued court of origin. o Besides, it is extremely doubtful that the remedy of a petition for
in the name of spouses Sergio and Lerma Bunquin, who allegedly acquired said relief under Rule 38 may be availed of from a judgment of the Court of Appeals in
property by virtue of a deed of sale dated June 3, 1985 purportedly executed by the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Spouses Mesina filed an MR o CA
Meer in their favor. Meer sought the cancellation of said TCT before MTC denied Spouses Mesina filed with SC a Petition for Review raising as issue
Manila. On the same day, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of the availability of Petition for Relief under Rule 38, as a remedy against the

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judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated in the exercise of its appellate The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform
jurisdiction. If the remedy is thus available, petitioners pray that this Court rule procedure for municipal and regional trial courts and designation of
whether or not the grounds relied by them are sufficient to give due course to the municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of record. While Rule 38 uses the
petition phrase “any court”, it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial
courts. The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are
ISSUES: Are the Spouses Mesina entitled to a relief from judgment? NO. governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court[24] and may, from time to
Where should a petition for relief from judgment be filed? The same court which time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
rendered the assailed decision. through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals[25] allow the remedy of petition for
HELD: After careful examination of the case, we resolve to deny the petition. relief in the Court of Appeals. Petitioners beg this Court, on equitable grounds,
Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional not to strictly construe the Rules, arguing that their “only earthly possession” is at
circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is stake.[26] Indeed, in certain occasions, this Court has, in the interest of substantial
present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a justice and in exercise of its equity jurisdiction, construed the Rules of Court with
motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself liberality. Nevertheless, the circumstances obtaining in the present case do not
of this remedy. Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for convince this Court to take exception. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the Appeals, the petitioners’ allegation of extrinsic fraud should have been brought at
judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe that the default of the
with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned this from the
upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings and actively presented
action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the their defense. And their efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled
same court which rendered the decision, viz: o “Section 1. Petition for relief from in their favor. When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial
judgment, order, or other proceedings.- When a judgment or final order is entered, Court, they never raised this issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed
or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through the finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals sustained this reversal,
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This Court will not
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence. The
aside.”[19] As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now same is true with regard to the defenses forwarded by the petitioners in support
allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued of their petition. These contentions should have been raised in the MeTC, as they
the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief from have been available to them since the beginning. Finally, it is a settled rule that
the judgment or final order of municipal trial courts should be filed with the regional relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of
trial court, viz: o “Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for Relief from the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence,
Judgment of inferior court.- When a judgment is rendered by an inferior court on or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be
a case, and a party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either
has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure by
an appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province in counsel.[27] Petitioners, however, place the blame on their counsel and invoke
which the original judgment was rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside honest mistake of law. They contend that they lack legal education, hence, were
and the case tried upon its merits. o Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance not aware of the required period for filing an appeal.[28] In exceptional cases,
for relief from the judgment or other proceeding thereof.- When a judgment order when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence,
is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of First this Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this
Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have
petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or squandered the various opportunities available to them at the different stages of
proceeding be set aside.” Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to
present Rule extends the remedy of relief to include judgments or orders of the reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to
Court of Appeals since the Rule uses the phrase “any court”.[20] We disagree. delay the administration of justice.

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HELD: When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole
HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner, vs. EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent. case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as
G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007 SECOND DIVISION the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.29 At that
juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless
FACTS: Choi was charged with violation of BP 22 He pleaded not guilty the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or
After prosecution rested its case, Choi filed a Demurrer to Evidence o asserting reserved.30 If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly
that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial court should,
the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act
MTC Makati granted; dismissed the case; denied prosecution’s ensuing MR or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is
Park (private complainant in the BP 22 case) appealed the civil aspect to the any.31 For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable.
RTC Makati o contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
its civil aspect. RTC granted appeal o while the evidence presented was action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
insufficient to prove respondent’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
his civil liability. Choi filed an MR RTC granted MR; reversed itself; only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
remanded the case to MTC; denied Park’s ensuing MR o "for further proceedings, based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.32 The civil action
so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
of the case." Park elevated to CA (Rule 65) CA sustained RTC; dismissed final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
petition o 1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to liability may arise did not exist.33 In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with
the petition does not fully comply with Section 4, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2- leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies
10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court, because it does not give the assurance that the demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case
the allegations of the petition are true and correct based on authentic records. o because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence
2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as
portions of the record, (i.e., motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, demurrer to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil
to evidence and the opposition thereto, and the Municipal [sic] Trial Court’s Order aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime
dismissing Criminal Case No. 294690) as would support the allegations of the beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to
petition (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.). o 3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence. On the other hand,
the Regional Trial Court attached to the petition is an uncertified and illegible mere if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt,
machine copy of the original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.). o 4. Petitioners failed to it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a
implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in the petition. Unless preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on
the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when
actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the c riminal action for the there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case
plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v. People,35 held: o If demurrer
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The sec ond is the civil is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that
accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. 36 In
multiplicity of suits. the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without
any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
ISSUE: May Park still appeal the civil aspect of the case, notwithstanding the exist. Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized
rule that a grant of a demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal, a final order which is that there is basis for a remand. Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense
not appealable? YES. that he merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing the interest,
and that he already made a partial payment of P1,590,000. Petitioner counters,

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however, that the payments made by respondent pertained to other her evidence, this case is deemed submitted for decision”[7] by directing the trial
transactions.37 Given these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the court to set Crim. Cases Nos. Q93-46792 and Q-93-46793[8] "for trial for reception
case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the of evidence for the petitioner."[9] Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration of
trial court to resolve the same. Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived the decision of the Court of Appeals but her motion was denied on 7 February 1995.
his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of Bernardo elevated to SC by way of rule 45 o on the ground that when it
the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33,38 and (2) when refused to allow petitioner to demur to the evidence the appellate court decided
respondent orally opposed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration pleading that the matter not in accordance with law and applicable decisions of this Court.[10]
proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue o Petitioner’s o Petitioner submits that when her counsel moved for leave to file a demurrer to
position is tenuous. Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. evidence on 20 May 1994 this meant that she intended to make a written demurrer
Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the after extensive research and with proper authorities to support the same; that
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court when the trial court denied her motion, it was in effect a denial only of the motion
necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. for leave to file demurrer to evidence and not the demurrer to evidence itself and,
One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising therefore, the order of respondent appellate court allowing petitioner to present
from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules her evidence was premature. Petitioner further contends that she should first be
of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading given the opportunity to file her demurrer to evidence and wait for its denial with
that gives rise to the suit.39 As for petitioner’s attribution of waiver to finality before she could be directed to present her evidence before the trial court
respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the records the nature of
the alleged oral objections of respondent to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration ISSUES: Was the denial of the Demurrer proper? YES. May petitioner be
of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present allowed to present evidence? NO.
evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of
the waiver is frowned upon,40 hence, courts must indulge every reasonable HELD: For an orderly procedure in the disposition of criminal cases the Rules of
presumption against it.41 This Court therefore upholds respondent’s right to Court provides that the prosecution and the defense present their evidence in the
present evidence as reserved by his filing of leave of court to file the demurrer. order prescribed in Sec. 3, Rule 119, after which, evaluating the evidence
presented, the trial court renders judgment either of acquittal or conviction. Under
Sec. 15 of the same Rule, after the prosecution has rested its case, the court may
PAZ T. BERNARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence either on its own
and FLORITA RONQUILLO-CONCEPCION, respondents. G.R. No. 119010. initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, or on motion of
September 5, 1997 FIRST DIVISION the accused filed with prior leave of court. If the court denies the demurrer or
motion to dismiss, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
FACTS: Paz T. Bernardo was originally charged with four (4) counts of violation accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the
of B.P. Blg. 22 before RTC QC During one of the hearings, prosecution rested its right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
case Counsel for Bernardo orally moved that he would file a Demurrer RTC evidence for the prosecution. The new rule on demurrer to evidence was first
Judge advised him that he cannot do so without leave of court Counsel for incorporated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which significantly changed
accused then orally moved that he be granted leave of court to file a Demurrer the ruling in People v. Mamacol[1] and Abriol v. Homeres[2] that when a motion
RTC orally denied the oral motion for leave Counsel for Bernardo then orally to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence is denied the accused has a right to present
moved that he be allowed to present evidence RTC orally denied the oral evidence in his behalf. Earlier the rule was, when after the prosecution has rested
motion to present evidence; ruled that Bernardo has already waived his right to its case, and the accused files a motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence, he
present evidence as the Demurrer was filed without leave; ; likewise orally denied waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
the ensuing oral MR Bernardo elevated to CA by way of certiorari, prohibition basis of the evidence of the prosecution.[3] The rule was further modified in 1988
and mandamus. o Petitioner argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of to the effect that only when the accused files a demurrer or motion to dismiss on
discretion in considering her to have waived her right to present evidence after the insufficiency of evidence without express leave of court that the accused may be
denial of her motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence. CA modified RTC’s deemed to have waived his right to present evidence and the case considered
order o "the defense having been considered to have waived her right to present submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. If the

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accused has obtained prior leave of court, in case of denial of his motion to dismiss, motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In such case, the only right
he retains his right to present evidence in his behalf. The court may also motu petitioner has under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court after having been
proprio dismiss the case on insufficiency of evidence, but before doing so, it should denied leave to submit a demurrer is to adduce evidence in her defense. However,
give the prosecution an opportunity to be heard and to oppose the motion. We even without express leave of the trial court, nay, after her motion for leave was
cannot sustain petitioner. As the trial court observed, her move, expressed denied, petitioner insisted on filing a demurrer instead of presenting evidence in
through counsel, was merely "dilatory."[12] But neither can we affirm the ruling of her defense. Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is
respondent Court of Appeals directing the trial court to receive the evidence of the discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow the accused to present evidence
defense after its motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence was denied. It is after he was denied prior leave to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior
contrary to the letter and spirit of Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court. The leave is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to
implications and consequences of obtaining prior leave before the accused files a dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present
demurrer to evidence were discussed by the Committee on the Revision of the evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide the case on the basis of
Rules as reflected in its Minutes of 18 February 1997. Mr. Justice Jose Y. Feria, the evidence presented by the prosecution. And, unless there is grave abuse
Co-Chairman of the Committee, explained - o Objections were raised against the thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the
new Rule on the ground that it was prejudicial to the accused. Hence, the present instant case, the trial court’s denial of prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or
amended provision was adopted. It is only when the accused files such a motion motion to dismiss may not be disturbed.[17] However, any judgment of conviction
to dismiss without express leave of court that he waives the right to present by a trial court may still be elevated by the accused to the appellate court.
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution x x x x [13] Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Chairman of the RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Spouses VICENTE and MA.
Committee, suggested that - o x x x there may be instances where it is very SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO, respondents. G.R. No. 138739. July 6, 2000 THIRD
plain that the evidence is insufficient, but there are also instances where the DIVISION
court is in doubt x x x x it is the court that will now determine whether a demurrer
should be filed or not after getting the opinion of both sides x x x x If the accused FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario solidarily executed in
asks for leave of court and the court supports it, it is good; but x x x if it finds the favor of and delivered to Radiowealth a PN: o “FOR VALUE RECEIVED, on or before
motion dilatory, then it denies it. But x x x there should be no waiver if the date listed below, I/We promise to pay jointly and severally Radiowealth
the demurrer is with leave of court, because there may be a situation where the Finance Co. or order the sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND NINE
court itself may want to dismiss the case x x x x If leave is denied, and the accused HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT Pesos (P138,948.00) without need of notice or demand,
still files the demurrer, then there is waiver (underscoring supplied). [14] The in installments as follows: o P11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months starting
Committee finally approved the following propositions of the Chief Justice: (a) The on ________ 19__ until the amount of P11,579.00 is fully paid. Each installment
court on its initiative can dismiss the case after giving prior notice to the shall be due every ____ day of each month. A late payment penalty charge of two
prosecution; (b) The accused can file a demurrer only if he is granted prior leave and a half (2.5%) percent per month shall be added to each unpaid installment
of court; (c) If the motion for leave or the demurrer is denied, the accused can from due date thereof until fully paid. o It is hereby agreed that if default be made
present his evidence, and there is no waiver; and, (d) If the accused files a in the payment of any of the installments or late payment charges thereon as and
demurrer without leave, his right to present evidence is waived.[15] In fine, when the same becomes due and payable as specified above, the total principal
under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a sum then remaining unpaid, together with the agreed late payment charges
demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused thereon, shall at once become due and payable without need of notice or demand.
obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence o If any amount due on this Note is not paid at its maturity and this Note is placed
if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or in the hands of an attorney or collection agency for collection, I/We jointly and
after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and severally agree to pay, in addition to the aggregate of the principal amount and
submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This interest due, a sum equivalent to ten (10%) per cent thereof as attorney’s and/or
power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound collection fees, in case no legal action is filed, otherwise, the sum will be equivalent
discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in to twenty-five (25%) percent of the amount due which shall not in any case be
filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.[16] In the case at bar, less than FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) plus the cost of suit and other litigation
petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20 May 1994 the trial court denied her expenses and, in addition, a further sum of ten per cent (10%) of said amount

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which in no case shall be less than FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00), as and for Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the consequence on appeal of a demurrer to
liquidated damages. Spouses defaulted on the monthly payment despite evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent provision of Rule 33 reads
several demands Radiowealth instituted an action before RTC Manila RTC as follows: o “SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed
then issued an Order terminating the presentation of evidence for the petitioner. the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
Spouses filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action. ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If
RTC granted the demurrer; dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
substantiate its claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay. granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to
Radiowealth appealed to CA (Rule 45) CA reversed and remanded to RTC have waived the right to present evidence.”[14] Explaining the consequence of
o the judicial admissions of respondents established their indebtedness to the a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana[15]
petitioner, on the grounds that they admitted the due execution of the Promissory pronounced: o “The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical.
Note, and that their only defense was the absence of an agreement on when the The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event
installment payments were to begin. Indeed, during the pretrial, they admitted that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff’s
the genuineness not only of the Promissory Note, but also of the demand letter evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable
dated July 12, 1991. Even if the petitioner’s witness had no personal knowledge law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal
of these documents, they would still be admissible “if the purpose for which [they motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in
are] produced is merely to establish the fact that the statement or document was the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which
in fact made or to show its tenor[,] and such fact or tenor is of independent should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant’s evidence so that all the
relevance.” o Besides, Articles 19 and 22 of the Civil Code require that every person facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for
must -- in the exercise of rights and in the performance of duties -- act with justice, adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is
give all else their due, and observe honesty and good faith. Further, the rules on lost. The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the
evidence are to be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and to conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of an trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record,
action. thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material before
them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding
ISSUE: Was the remand proper? the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the
possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The
HELD: NO. When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is
appeal, the reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings. granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the
Rather, it should render judgment on the basis of the evidence proffered by the movant losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been
plaintiff. Inasmuch as defendants in the present case admitted the due execution deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff’s case and
of the Promissory Note both in their Answer and during the pretrial, the appellate evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal
court should have rendered judgment on the bases of that Note and on the other shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence.”
pieces of evidence adduced during the trial. Petitioner contends that if a In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence
demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant should be deemed to retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them;
have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court should render if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees
judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right
trial court "for further proceedings" would be an outright defiance of Rule 33, to present their own evidence.[16] The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court. On the other hand, respondents argue that the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to
the petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its claim, simply on the ground that discourage prolonged litigations.[17] In the case at bar, the trial court, acting
they lost their right to present evidence in support of their defense when the on respondents’ demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the ground that
Demurrer to Evidence was reversed on appeal. They stress that the CA merely the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the
found them indebted to petitioner, but was silent on when their obligation became appellate court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due
due and demandable. The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by

291
defendants. Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA raised in its answer both factual and legal issues which could only be ventilated in
should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the a full-blown trial. RTC later issued a summary judgment o held that the
petitioner. While the appellate court correctly ruled that “the documentary mortgage executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void o [A]t the
evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated time that the defendants Magpayo spouses executed the mortgage in favor of the
xxx,” and that “the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary exhibits defendant PBCom on March 5, 1981, the said spouses were not yet the owners of
xxx enumerated in the appealed order,”[18] we agree with petitioner that the CA the property. CA reversed RTC; denied Garcia’s ensuing MR o plaintiff-
had sufficient evidence on record to decide the collection suit. A remand is not appellee was not in possession of the property at the time of the execution of the
only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of the deed of sale
facts on record.
ISSUE: Is a summary judgment available only to the plaintiff? NO.
JOSE MA. T. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. LUISITO & MA.
LUISA MAGPAYO AND PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents. G.R. HELD: Petitioner's third assignment of error that he alone as plaintiff in the trial
No. 133140 August 10, 1999 court is entitled to a summary judgment merits scant attention. A summary
judgment is one granted by the court, upon motion by either party, for an
expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important questions or issues of fact
148 are involved (except the determination of the amount of damages) and that
therefore the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.6 Under
FIRST DIVISION Rule 34, either party may move for a summary judgment — the claimant by virtue
of Section 1 and the defending party by virtue of Section 2, viz.: o Sec. 1. Summary
FACTS: Atty. Pedro Garcia, registered owner of the subject parcel of land, sold judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counter-claim,
the same, with consent of his wife, to their daughter and her husband (the or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading
Magpayos) The Magpayos then mortgaged the land to PBCom Pedro’s title in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary
was cancelled and a new one was issued to the Magpayos; the mortgage was then judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. o Sec. 2. Summary judgment
annotated therein Magpayos failed to pay the loan which then resulted to the for defending party. — A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
foreclosure of mortgage They were unable to redeem the property hence the is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting
consolidation of title in favor of PBCom Magpayos filed an action for affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. It is
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and true that petitioner made the initial move for summary judgment. Nonetheless,
PBCom's title o This was dismissed for failure to prosecute PBCom then filed PBCom likewise moved for a summary judgment with supporting affidavit and
an action for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land before RTC Makati documentary exhibits, to wit: o COUNTER-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Writ of possession was then issued to petitioner Garcia, brother of Mrs. Magpayo, PBCom Is Entitled To A Summary Judgment The procedure for summary
who was then in possession of the same o Refused to honor it Garcia filed an judgment may be availed of also by the defending parties who may be the object
action for recovery of realty and damages against PBCom, the Magpayos and the of unfounded claims as clearly shown in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 34.
RTC Sheriff o he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render summary
Garcia, and that PBCom acquired no right thereover. PBCom filed an Answer judgment in PBCom's favor by DISMISSING plaintiff's Complaint as well as Sps.
o Garcia's claim over the land is belied by the fact that it is not among the Magpayo's Cross-Claim for being sham and frivolous.7 Needless to state, there
properties owned by his mother listed in the Inventory of Real Estate filed at the was no error on the part of the appellate court in resorting to summary judgment
then CFI of Pasay City, Branch 27, in SP Proc. No. 2917-P, "In the Matter of the as prayed for by both parties.
Intestate Estate of Remedios T. Garcia Petition for Letters of Administration, Pedro We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
V. Garcia Petitioner-Administrator. Magpayos also filed their Answer o Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to
asserted that title over the land was transferred to them by Mrs. Magpayo's parents his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.8
to enable them (Magpayos) to borrow from PBCom. Garcia filed a Motion for Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose
Summary Judgment RTC denied the motion o on the ground that PBCom of the thing by way of sale.9 Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised

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their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to then filed a motion to remand the case for new trial. In his motion, appellant
the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of would attempt to overturn his conviction or, at the very least, to be given a chance
a thing or the enjoyment of a right.10 Literally, to possess means to actually and for a new trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of because of newly discovered evidence, i.e., his passport which would establish his
two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder.11 "A true identity as Huang Xiao Wei, a Chinese National, and as having entered the
possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims Philippines as a tourist. Invoking his constitutional right to an effective counsel,
to be so."12 On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder appellant chides his former counsel for having failed to secure and present his
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, travel documents.
whether his belief be right or wrong."13 The records show that petitioner occupied
the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by ISSUE: Was Lim Ka Kim entitled to a new trial? NO.
his parents. We held in Caniza v. Court of Appeals 14 that an owner's act of allowing
another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent and HELD: The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Consequently, it is of no are that - (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not
moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. On reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
the other hand, petitioner's subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely
mother's share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not change the judgment. Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant.
included in the inventory of the estate submitted by his father to the intestate Appellant’s passport could have easily been presented and produced during the
court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no longer considered trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellant’s passport, would hardly be material
owned by petitioner's parents. We also uphold the Court of Appeals in holding that to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution
the mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly, appellant even
transfer certificate of title over the property was issued to them after the mortgage identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei,9 that bolsters
contract was entered into. Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely the conclusion that appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the
evidence of such ownership over a particular property.15 The deed of sale operates nefarious enterprise. The Court has great respect for the judgment of the trial
as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to court in passing upon the credibility of witnesses. It is often said that, unless there
use the document as proof of ownership.16 All said, the Magpayo spouses were appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and substance, and
already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom there is none, which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted,14 an appellate court will not interfere in the factual findings of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LI KA KIM alias ED, appellant. G.R. No. trial court. There is merit, however, in appellant’s contention that the court a
148586 May 25, 2004 EN BANC quo erred in imposing the penalty of death. Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure requires the recitation in the information of aggravating or qualifying
FACTS: Lim Ka Kim was convicted by RTC for violation of Section 15, Article III, circumstances in order to be appreciated as such. The use of a motor vehicle
of Republic Act No. 6425, as so amended by Republic Act 7659 which imposed considered by the trial court in decreeing the death penalty is inappropriate, that
upon him death penalty. o Finding the prosecution’s evidence far more credible aggravating circumstance not having been aptly alleged in the Information. The
than that of the defense and to have overwhelmingly established the elements of pertinent provisions of the rules read: o "Sec. 8 Designation of the offense. - The
the crime charged, the trial court convicted appellant and decreed the penalty of complaint of information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
death. In arriving at that penalty, the trial court considered the use of a motor statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
vehicle to be an aggravating circumstance. Kim was initially represented by one qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
Atty. Eldorado Lim. On 04 October 2002, Fernandez, Pacheco & Dizon Law Offices reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. o
filed its entry of appearance as being the new counsel for appellant only to be "Sec. 9 Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as
substituted later by Guzman, Tanedo, & Acain Law Offices. On 10 June 2003, the constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
Court noted and granted the request of the law firm to be furnished with copies of stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used
all motions, orders, resolutions and judgment in connection with the case. Kim in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding

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to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating 60 days after petitioners learn of the judgment and nor (sic) more than six (6)
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment." (underscoring supplied.) months after such judgment or order was issued. o Even if counsel did not inform
The requirements are mandatory not only to afford the accused the right to his client of the judgment for reasons only known to him still such failure is ruled
object to the presentation of evidence showing such aggravating circumstances not by the Supreme Court as an act binding upon his clients and in this case the herein
so alleged but also to preclude the court from even taking such aggravating petitioners. o Motion for relief from judgment is, subject to a fixed period
circumstances into account. Quite recently, the Court has held that the inextendible, never interrupted and cannot be subjected to any condition or
provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 8, Rule contingency.’ Spouses appealed to CA CA reversed RTC o the Court of
110, thereof, must be given retroactive effect in the light of the well-settled rule Appeals held inapplicable the general rule that notice to counsel is notice to client.
that statutes or rules regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as The Court of Appeals considered that it was precisely the inaction of the counsel of
being applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their the YEES in not informing them of the decision which resulted in the lapse of the
passage.16 The quantity of the drugs seized from appellant, which is 994.773 period to appeal forcing them to file their petition for relief through another lawyer.
grams of "shabu," warrants the application of the penalty under Section 16, in Their former counsel also failed to point out the
relation to Section 17, of Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise also known as "An Act erroneous finding of the lower court that it was MERCURY, which, constructed the
to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes," of reclusion perpetua to building subject of the lease contract. Such finding, which was later corrected by
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. the trial court, was the basis for said court’s ruling that the YEES were bound to
Applying the provisions of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the lesser penalty accept low rentals inasmuch as the building supposedly constructed by MERCURY
should be imposed, there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances would in the end be owned by the YEES after the expiration of the lease. o There,
that can be considered, for the commission of the offense as in this case, the very allegations in the petition for relief justify the setting aside
of the assailed Decision and the remand of the case to the court a quo to hear and
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration has been
APPEALS, and the SPOUSES EDUARDO AND CARMEN YEE, respondents. G.R. No. granted by it (Rule 38 sec. 6, Rules of Civil Procedure). Mercury filed an MR
138571 July 13, 2000 THIRD DIVISION o CA denied Mercury contends that the respondents’ petition for relief from
judgment failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court inasmuch
FACTS: Spouses Yee and Mercury entered into a contract of lease whereby they as the petition was filed more than sixty days from the receipt by their lawyer of
stipulated, among others, that the latter will lease the building owned by the former the decision of the RTC. Petitioner argues that it is long established by
Spouses demanded for increase in rentals, which was refused by Mercury on the jurisprudence that notice to the counsel is binding upon the client and that the
ground that there was no official devaluation of the peso thus no basis for a rental client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The failure of the YEES’ lawyer to
increase. Spouses then filed before RTC CDO an action for annulment and/or inform them of the decision resulting in the failure to appeal therefrom is not the
reformation of the contract of lease praying that the contract be either annulled or accident, mistake or excusable negligence referred to in the Rules that would
the rentals increased from P6,900,00 a month as originally stipulated therein to warrant the granting of the petition for relief. The petitioner further argues that
P50,000.00 a month RTC in favor of Mercury o ‘However, in the spirit of equity respondents’ counsel did not corroborate their allegation that they only learned of
and human justice as defendant has not shown any unwillingness to quiet the the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-055 against them on March 24, 1995. It should
unease of the plaintiffs if the obligation is not every burdensome and onerous the be presumed that their lawyer, Attorney Willkom, communicated to the
defendant corporation, to maintain the good and harmonious relations between the respondents receipt by him of the judgment. MERCURY also maintains that the
parties herein, is hereby ordered to pay a relative increase in rent over the property YEES cannot claim that they were denied due process considering that the YEES
in question, to the plaintiffs spouses Spouses’ counsel received a copy of the were given a chance to present and submit their evidence during the trial of the
decision on 3 March 1995 but did not inform petitioners nor take any step to protect merits of the case. Their failure to appeal the decision against them cannot be
the interests of his clients by presenting a motion for reconsideration or taking an considered a denial of due process for the right to appeal is purely statutory and
appeal Spouses learned of the judgment only on 24 March 1995 when they must be prosecuted within the time and pursuant to the procedure prescribed for
visited his office The 15-day period within which to appeal lapsed Spouses it.
then filed with RTC thru their present counsel a petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38 on 15 May 1995 RTC denied o It is true that under Sec. 2, Rule
38 of the New Rules of Court the verified petition such as this must be filed within

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ISSUES: Are the Spouses Yee entitled to a relief from judgment? NO. Is the of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform
present case an exception to the general rule that an act of the counsel binds his him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a
client? NO. ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.14

HELD: A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38 – "RELIEF We find no basis for respondents’ insistence on the application of the doctrines
FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS" - of the 1997 Rules on enunciated by this court in Legarda vs. Court of Appeals15 and People’s Homesite
Civil Procedure.8 Sections 1 and 3 of the aforementioned rule read: o "Section 1. and Housing Corporation vs. Tiongco16 , where this Court departed from the
Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. – When a judgment established rule that notice to counsel is notice to the client considering that in said
or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party cases, the lawyers miserably failed in their duty to maintain their client’s cause and
in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file that the lawyers’ inaction and wanton disregard of procedural rules were extremely
a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or reckless and grossly negligent and amounted to a deprivation of their client’s
proceeding be set aside. o Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. property without due process of law. First, this Court reversed its ruling in
– A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of the Rule must be Legarda on reconsideration in a Resolution dated October 16, 199717 for the
verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, reason that the judgment sought to be annulled became final when the petitioner
final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months failed to avail of the remedies available to her such as filing a motion for
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and reconsideration or appealing the case despite her claim that her lawyer never
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or informed her of the decision against her. This Court emphasized the need to impose
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good finality on judgments and that public policy and sound practice demand that, at
and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be." A petition for the risk of occasional errors, judgments should become final at some definite date
relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional fixed by law. And when judgments of lower courts become final, not even the
cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has Supreme Court can in anyway review or modify them directly or indirectly.18 This
another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or Court clearly recognized that the negligence of the petitioner’s counsel in failing to
appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by protect her interests was binding upon her despite counsel’s failure to inform her
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking of the adverse decision of her case. Second, the case of People’s Homesite is
such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.9 In order for a petition for not squarely in point. In said case, we gave due course to a petition for relief from
relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that judgment despite the fact that it was filed out of time, the lawyer having failed to
he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38.10 It is also inform his clients of the scheduled hearing of the case which was heard in their
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the absence.1âwphi1 When judgment was rendered against them, their lawyer failed
reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60) days after to take any steps to protect the interest of their clients. In giving due course to the
the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set petition for relief, this Court found that "there was something fishy with the
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was actuations" of their lawyer which deprived the petitioners of their day in court.
entered, or such proceeding was taken).11 And the rule is that the reglementary Consequently, we ruled that the client was denied due process and gave due course
period is reckoned from the time the party’s counsel receives notice of the decision to their petition. The circumstances in the case at bar are different. We are not
for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section persuaded by the YEES’ claim that they were denied due process inasmuch as they
3 of Rule 38.12 In the present case, the YEES were served a copy of the were not denied their day in court. In fact, they were able to prosecute their action
judgment of the lower court through their counsel, Attorney Ralph Lou I. Willkom and actively participated through counsel in the proceedings before the lower court.
on March 3, 1995. Thus, the YEES are considered to have received notice on March Their failure to file an appeal from the decision rendering it final and executory is
3, 1995 when their counsel was served notice and not on March 24, 1995 when not a denial of due process. They may have lost their right to appeal but they were
they actually learned of the adverse decision. Consequently, their petition for relief, not denied their day in court. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of
which was filed on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days from notice of their counsel, due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
was filed out of time. This Court has consistently held that the failure of a party’s manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.19 In the same manner,
counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal the YEES’ failure to file their petition for relief within the period provided for under
therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable.13 However, notice sent to counsel the Rules is not tantamount to a denial of due process. More important, no evidence

295
was presented to support respondents’ bare and selfserving allegation that their motion and the case was declared closed and terminated. Spouses Dela Cruz
lawyer did not inform them of the decision against them. It bears stress that we (May 6, 2002) filed with CA petition for relief from judgment praying that the
are not concerning ourselves with the lawyer’s duty to his client but with the dismissal of their petition for review be set aside since the gross negligence of their
timeliness of the filing of the petition for relief which cannot be given due course previous counsel did not bind them CA denied petition and ensuing MR o It
on the simple and expedient claim of a party that their lawyer failed to inform them ruled that petitioners were bound by the action of their counsel as well as by his
of the decision in the case. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance mistake or negligence. It added that petitioners could not belatedly complain on
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of remedy at law was due to his petition or appeal about their counsel’s incompetence since they could have easily
own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to dismissed him at the initial or trial stage if they were not satisfied with his
appeal which had been lost+- though inexcusable negligence.20 Parenthetically, performance. Since petitioners slept on their rights, they had no one to blame but
it is noted that in its decision, the Court of Appeals stated that the finding of themselves.
ownership was a pivotal consideration for the trial court’s ruling to the effect that
the YEES were bound to accept low rentals because the building which was ISSUE: Can petitioners avail of a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the 1997
supposed to be constructed by MERCURY would ultimately be owned by the YEES. Rules of Civil Procedure from a judgment of the Court of Appeals due to their
However, a reading of the trial court’s decision shows that the primary basis for its counsel’s negligence when he signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping? NO.
ruling was that there was no devaluation in currency, which would entitle the YEES
to a reformation of their contract. On the contrary, the trial court, in granting the HELD: After considering the submission of the parties, we deny the petition for
YEES an increase in the stipulated rentals contained in their contract with MERCURY lack of merit. A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
based its ruling on the "meteoric boom" that the City of Cagayan de Oro was of Civil Procedure is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases
experiencing which equity and human justice could not ignore. Moreover, when there is no other available or adequate remedy.7 It may be availed of only
MERCURY did not show unwillingness to the said adjustments in order to maintain after a judgment, final order or other proceeding was taken against the petitioner
good and harmonious relations with the YEES. Thus, even assuming arguendo that in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.8 While
the YEES’ petition for relief is given due course, the judgment of the trial court the law uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and
denying the YEES’ principal prayer to reform the contract on the ground of the Regional Trial Courts.9 The procedure in the Court of Appeals and this Court are
devaluation of the currency is not affected for the reason that the finding of the governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time,
trial court as to whether it is Mercury or the YEES who built the building is irrelevant be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by this Court through resolutions
to the determination of whether there was indeed a devaluation in the currency. or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals allows the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of
SPS. ROLANDO DELA CRUZ and TERESITA DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. SPS. Appeals.10 Moreover, under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
FELICIANO ANDRES and ERLINDA AUSTRIA, and the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Procedure, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment is subject only to a
Respondents. G.R. No. 161864 April 27, 2007 SECOND DIVISION special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. In seeking to reverse the appellate
court’s decision denying their petition for relief from judgment by a petition for
FACTS: Spouses Dela Cruz filed a complaint for annulment of title and/or review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy
reconveyance with damages against Spouses Austria and Director of Lands before twice. 11 Nevertheless, even if this Court were to delve into the merits of this
MCTC Nueva Ecija MCTC ordered Director of Lands to cancel Original petition, the same must still be denied. What petitioners’ counsel did in this case
Certificate of Title No. 11859 insofar as the 410 square meters owned and occupied was to attach an improper Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to their petition for
by petitioners were concerned Spouses Austria appealed to RTC RTC review with the appellate court. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple
reversed Spouses Dela Cruz filed a petition for review with CA CA negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the
affirmed RTC; denied petition and ensuing MR o The appellate court dismissed the proceedings below. For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing
petition since the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Atty. Villarosa short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown.12 The negligence
instead of of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court, the result
petitioners in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of which is that he is deprived of his property without due process of law. Thus,
Spouses Dela Cruz’s new counsel (March 20, 2002) requested for an extension where a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
of time to file their petition before SC. Later, Spouses Dela Cruz abandoned the cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be

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heard is the very essence of due process.13 Here, the case underwent a full-blown to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the
trial. Both parties were adequately heard, and all issues were ventilated before the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal
decision was promulgated. It should be pointed out that in petitions for relief amounts to an acquittal. But because some have in the past used the demurrer
from judgment, meritorious defenses must be accompanied by the ground relied in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat.
upon, whether it is fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, extrinsic fraud When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to
or lack of jurisdiction.14 In the instant case, there being neither excusable nor have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered
gross negligence amounting to a denial of due process, meritorious defenses submitted for judgment.11 On occasions, this presents a problem such as when,
cannot alone be considered. While it is true that rules of procedure are not cast like the situation in this case, the accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the
in stone, it is equally true that strict compliance with the Rules is indispensable for RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not
the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is. This Court held in Enojas,
judicial business.15 Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by Jr. v. Commission on Elections12 that, to determine whether the pleading filed is
harking on the policy of liberal construction a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the
allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is
filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it. Here, the pertinent
ANTONIO CABADOR, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. portions of petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss read as follows: o 2. On
G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009 SECOND DIVISION November 9, 2001, the accused was arrested and subsequently brought to the
Quezon City jail through a commitment order dated November 21, 2001 where he
FACTS: Cabador was accused of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun had been detained during the course of this case. o 3. The accused was arraigned
N. Valerio before RTC QC After presenting only five witnesses over five years of on January 8, 2002 and trial began soon after. o 4. UP-OLA entered its appearance
intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end the prosecution’s presentation of as counsel for the accused on January 20, 2005. o 5. On February 10, 2006, the
evidence and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its Honorable Court terminated the presentation of evidence for the prosecution
documentary evidence within 15 days from notice Prosecution instead of filing considering that the case has been going on for 5 years already and during that
its formal offer, filed a Motion for Extension of Time Cabador without knowing period the prosecution has only presented 5 witnesses. Moreover, xxx there had
the filing of said Motion, filed an MD complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in been numerous postponements due to failure of the prosecution to ensure the
the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy presence of its witnesses. o 6. In an order dated March 31, 2006, the Honorable
trial. Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not court required the public prosecutor to submit its formal offer of evidence within
consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered. He also fifteen (15) days from receipt of such order. o 7. On April 17, 2006, the public
pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged prosecutor was again absent so the presentation of evidence for the accused was
part in the crime charged. RTC treated the MD as a Demurrer; since the same reset to June 6, 2006. o 8. During the same hearing, the Prosecution was again
was filed without leave, Cabador is deemed to have waived his right to present granted an additional fifteen (15) days within which to file their formal offer of
evidence; declared the case submitted for decision Cabador filed an MR evidence. o 9. On June 6, 2006, the public prosecutor again failed to appear and
RTC denied MR Cabador went up to CA via Rule 65 CA affirmed RTC; to file their formal offer of evidence. In an order, the Honorable Court again
denied ensuing MR of Cabador Cabador elevated to SC via Rule 45 extended to the prosecution an additional fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order within which to file their formal offer of evidence. o 10. On June 28, 2006,
ISSUES: Was the MD a Demurrer to Evidence? NO. May Cabador still present the Honorable Court issued an order granting the prosecution a thirty-day
his evidence? YES. extension, or until July 28, 2006 within which to file their formal offer of evidence
since the public prosecutor was on leave. o 11. Upon the expiration of the extension
HELD: The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the granted by the Honorable Court, the prosecution failed to file their formal offer of
prosecution’s presentation of evidence against the accused and, second, the evidence. o 10. (Sic) Despite three (3) extensions, the prosecution failed to file
accused’s presentation of evidence in his defense. If, after the prosecution has formal offer of evidence. o 11. (Sic) Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides
presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." A
trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of fact
second stage and dismiss the criminal action.10 There is no point for the trial court and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at

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the trial (Ong vs. CA, GR No. 117103). Hence, without any formal offer of evidence, he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal
this Honorable Court has no evidence to consider. offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss.16 To say that
o 12. The charge against the accused has no leg to stand on. The witnesses that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man,
had been presented by the prosecution testified mainly on the occurrences on the touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
night of the incident and had no knowledge of any connection with or any Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested
participation by the accused in the incident. o 13. The hearings of the case have its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads: o
been delayed since 2001 through no fault of the defense to the prejudice of the Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss
rights of the accused to a speedy trial, mandated by no less than Art. III, Sec. 16 the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after
of the Constitution. o 14. Since UP-OLA had entered its appearance in 2005, the giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the
case had been reset for twelve (12) times, most of which are due to the fault or evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. (Emphasis
absence of the prosecution. For the five year duration of the case, the prosecution supplied)1awphi1 Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on
still has not presented any evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond August 1, 2006, the same day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court
reasonable doubt. Meanwhile, the accused has been unduly stripped of this liberty still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of those exhibits.
for more than five (5) years upon an unsubstantiated charge. o 15. The accused It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the
was injured and debilitated in the course of his arrest which resulted in the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion to
amputation of his left leg. His movement is severely hampered and his living dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before the trial
conditions are less adequate. To subject him to further delays when there is no court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could
substance to the charge against him would tantamount to injustice.13 It can be not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to
seen from the above that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out in paragraphs evidence. In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds
2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, "10 (sic)," 13, 14, and 15 above how trial in the case that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his
had painfully dragged on for years. The gaps between proceedings were long, with right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot be declared to have
hearings often postponed because of the prosecutor’s absence. This was further waived his right to present evidence in his defense. On a final note, a demurrer
compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecution’s repeated motions for extension to evidence shortens the proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must, however, be
of time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within such time. Cabador then exercised17 in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to
invoked in paragraph 13 above his right to speedy trial. But the RTC and the CA present evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the
simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated Cabador’s gravity of the penalty involved.
motion as a demurrer to evidence because of a few observations he made in
paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12 regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against GREGORIO SINGIAN, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (3RD DIVISION), THE
him. In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONON GOOD
of the accused’s right to speedy trial.14 This denial is characterized by GOVERNMENT, Respondents. G.R. Nos.195011-19 September 30, 2013
unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by SECOND DIVISION
unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.15 This was the
main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up FACTS:
for a ruling by the trial court. Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion
to dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12, saying that the trial court "has no Singian was charged with nine counts of violation of Section 3(e),7 and another
evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that "the witnesses nine counts of violation of Section 3(g),8 of Republic Act No.3019 (RA 3019), or
x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
in the incident." But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of 2629726314, the cases involved the purported granting of behest loans by the
trial had accomplished. The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what government’s Philippine National Bank (PNB) to Integrated Shoes, Inc. (ISI), in
is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did not state what evidence the prosecution various amounts and on different dates as above-enumerated. Trial ensued after
had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet Singian (and other co-accuse) pleaded not guilty Singian then filed a
the elements of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any Demurrer o Grounds: (1) lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official; (2) the
particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, contracts with PNB contained provisions that are beneficial, and not manifestly and

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grossly disadvantageous, to the government; (3)the loans could not be although petitioner is a private person, he was shown to have connived with his
characterized as behest loans because they were secured by sufficient collaterals co-accused. Second, ISI and PNB entered into several loan transactions and credit
and ISI increased its capitalization; and (4) assuming the loans are behest loans, accommodations. Finally, the loan transactions proved disadvantageous to the
petitioner could not be held liable for lack of any participation. Prosecution government. At the outset, we emphasize that "the resolution of a demurrer to
filed an Opposition o insisted that conspiracy may be inferred from the following evidence should be left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower court’s
pattern of events: a. The frequency of the loans or closeness of the dates at order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not review
which they were granted; b. The quantity of the loans granted; c. The failure the prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide whether such evidence has
of PNB to verify and to take any action on ISI’s failure to put up additional established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused
capitalization and additional collaterals; and d. The eventual absence of any action has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, there by
by PNB to collect full payment from ISI. o prosecution noted that petitioner’s amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will
arguments in his Demurrer to Evidence constitute matters of defense which should not suffice."46 "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical
be passed upon only after trial on the merits. SB denied the Demurrer; denied exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent
ensuing MR Singian elevated to SC via Rule 65 to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
ISSUES: Were the arguments of Singian proper for a Demurrer? NO Did SB a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Demurrer? NO. is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility."47 In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of
HELD: The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan abused, much more, gravely abused, its
discretion of the court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the discretion in denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. We agree with the PCGG’s
absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. "A demurrer to the evidence is an observation that the Sandiganbayan arrived at its conclusion after a careful and
objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which deliberate examination and assessment of all the evidence submitted. A closer
his adversary produced is in sufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make scrutiny of the assailed Resolutions would indeed show that the Sandiganbayan
out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of meticulously discussed both testimonial and documentary evidence presented by
the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency the prosecution.48 It was only after a careful analysis of the facts and evidence
of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there presented did the respondent court lay down its findings and conclusions.49
is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict Based on the evidence presented, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that all three
of guilt."42 "Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto elements of Section 3(g), RA 3019 were satisfactorily established. It found that
is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial PNB and ISI entered into several contracts or loan transactions. The
or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered Sandiganbayan also assessed that petitioner conspired with his co-accused in
sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, defrauding the government considering "(1) the frequency of the loans or closeness
and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused." For one to of the dates at which they were granted; (2) the quantity of the loans granted; (3)
be successfully prosecuted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the following elements the failure of the bank to verify and to take any action on the failure of ISI to put
must be proven: "1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered up additional capitalization and additional collaterals; and (4) the eventual absence
into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or of any action by the Bank to collect full payment from ISI."50 The Sandiganbayan
transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government."44 ratiocinated that – o x x x the loans subject of this case refer to not just one but
However, private persons may likewise be charged with violation of Section 3(g) several loans. The first two loans were granted in a span of two months x x x The
of RA 3019 if they conspired with the public officer. Thus, "if there is an allegation first loan was in the amount of P16,287,500.00 when the capital stock of ISI
of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public officer, amounted to onlyP1,000,000.00. This was followed by two additional loans in
in consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act January and March 1973 x x x then another loan x x x in the following year x x x.
which is ‘to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which Two years later x x x ISI obtained another loan x x x which was succeeded by an
may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. The additional loan x x x. Still, ISI was granted two more loans x x x. However, all
Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution presented sufficient or competent loans subject of this case were granted despite failure of ISI to raise its working
evidence to establish the three material elements of Section 3(g) of RA3019. First, capital, and to put up additional collateral. The Certificate of Filing of Amended

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Articles of Incorporation and the Amended Articles of Incorporation likewise show demurrer to evidence. Public respondent found that the prosecution’s evidence
that ISI last increased its authorized capital stock toP7,000,000.00 on April 27, satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged. Correspondingly,
1973, when the indebtedness of the corporation was already P16,360,000.00. there is nothing in the records of this case nor in the pleadings of petitioner that
Indeed, it would appear that inaction on the part of the PNB to notify ISI to further would show otherwise.54 o At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the issues
increase its capital and the corresponding inaction on the part of ISI to comply with raised herein are almost the same as those raised by petitioner before the Court
its undertaking indicate conspiracy between the accused. Accused-movant when he questioned the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his Motion for Re-determination
further negates his liability by asserting that his name does not appear in the Deed of Existence of Probable Cause.55 In resolving petitioner’s contention that he
of Undertaking, and neither has he signed the same. A cursory examination of the should not be made liable for ISI’s failure to put up additional capitalization and
Deed, however, reveals otherwise. It also bears stressing at this point that as he collaterals because he is not a member of the Board of Directors, the Court declared
has never denied his position as Executive VicePresident of ISI, he would that:
undeniably have participation in its transactions, especially where loan
accommodations of the corporation are concerned.51 The Sandiganbayan also o True, the power to increase capitalization and to offer or give collateral to secure
found that the loan transactions were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to indebtedness are lodged with the corporation’s Board of Directors. However, this
the government. Based on the documentary evidence presented by the does not mean that the officers of the corporation other than the Board of Directors
prosecution, it noted that ISI was undercapitalized while the loans were cannot be made criminally liable for their criminal acts if it can be proven that they
undercollateralized. It also noted that the government was only able to foreclose participated therein. In the instant case, there is evidence that petitioners
properties amounting to P3 million whereas ISI’s indebtedness stood at more than participated in the loan transactions when he signed the undertaking. x x x56
P71 million. Based on the foregoing, we find no showing that "the conclusions Anent the issue regarding the sufficiency of ISI’s collateral, we also declared the
made by the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution same to be "a matter of defense which should be best ventilated in a full-blown
at the time the prosecution rested its case, were manifestly mistaken."52 The trial."57 Moreover, we declared that – o Fifth. It is petitioner's view that the
Sandiganbayan did not exercise its judgment in a whimsical or capricious prosecution failed to adduce evidence that he took part in any conspiracy relative
manner.1âwphi1 As we aptly held: o Given the sufficiency of the testimonial and to the grant of the loan transactions. Suffice it to state that the alleged absence of
documentary evidence against petitioner, it would, therefore, be premature at this any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
stage of the proceedings to conclude that the prosecution’s evidence failed to defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
establish petitioner’s participation in the alleged conspiracy to commit the crime. merits.58 In fine, we hold that "the presence or absence of the elements of the
Likewise, the Court cannot, at this point, make a categorical pronouncement that crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon
the guilt of the petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As there after a full-blown trial on the merits," and "the validity and merits of a party's
is competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
charged, it behooves petitioner to adduce evidence on his behalf to controvert the better ventilated during trial proper."59 Petitioner's claims and defenses in his
asseverations of the prosecution. Withal, respondent court did not gravely abuse Demurrer to Evidence can best be tackled during trial. In the presentation of his
its discretion when it found that there was a prima facie case against petitioner defense, he shall have the opportunity to explain or show why he should not be
warranting his having to go forward with his defensive evidence. o The made liable. For example, if there is any truth to the allegation in his Demurrer of
determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence presented by the Evidence that the Deed of Undertaking was altered, or that the signature therein
prosecution as to establish a prima facie case against an accused is left to the affixed is not his own, such that there arise serious doubts as to his participation
exercise of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a clear showing of a grave in the execution of said document, this can be resolved only upon proof presented
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the trial court’s during trial. Petitioner must present evidence regarding such claim, the truth of
denial of a motion to dismiss or a demurrer to evidence may not be disturbed. which he can demonstrate during trial. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, there
Similarly, we have also ruled that: o When there is no showing of such grave abuse, is no way that this issue can be resolved by this Court at this stage of the
certiorari is not the proper remedy. Rather, the appropriate recourse from an order proceedings.
denying a demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial, after
which the accused may file an appeal from the judgment of the lower court
rendered after such trial. In the present case, we are not prepared to rule that the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. SALVINO SUMINGWA, Appellant. G.R.
Sandiganbayan has gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner’s No. 183619 October 13, 2009 THIRD DIVISION

300
later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through
FACTS: Sumingwa was charged with two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, intimidation or monetary consideration.37 Like any other testimony, it is subject
four (4) counts of Rape, three (3) counts of Unjust Vexation, one (1) count of Other to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on
Light Threats,8one (1) count of Maltreatment, and one (1) count of Attempted the demeanor of the witness on the stand.38 As correctly held by the CA,
Rape for acts committed against his minor11 daughter AAA Sumingwa AAA’s testimony is credible notwithstanding her subsequent retraction. o Clearly,
Pleaded not guilty Prosecution adduced evidence AAA thereafter filed an the retraction made by the Victim is heavily unreliable. The primordial factor that
Affidavit of Recantation25 claiming that while appellant indeed committed impelled the Victim to retract the rape charges against her father was her fear and
lascivious acts against her, she exaggerated her accusations against him. She concern for the welfare of her family especially her four (4) siblings. It does not go
explained that appellant did not actually rape her, as there was no penetration. against reason or logic to conclude that a daughter, in hopes of bringing back the
She added that she charged appellant with such crimes only upon the prodding of harmony in her family tormented by the trauma of rape, would eventually cover
her mother and maternal grandmother. Sumingwa then filed a Demurrer for the dastardly acts committed by her own father. Verily, the Victim’s subsequent
RTC dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 1647 for Rape; 1648 for Unjust Vexation; retraction does not negate her previous testimonies accounting her ordeal in the
1650 for Other Light Threats; 1652 for Unjust Vexation; and 1653 for hands for (sic) her rapist. The attempt that the RPC punishes is that which has
Maltreatment, on the basis of the Demurrer RTC convicted Sumingwa of six a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; and that which is the
(6) counts of acts of lasciviousness,26 one (1) count of attempted rape27 and one beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
(1) count of unjust vexation CA affirmed with modification o GUILTY of directly to its realization and consummation.59 In the instant case, the primary
qualified rape; CIVILLY LIABLE for attempted rape o The appellate court concluded question that comes to the fore is whether or not appellant’s act of removing AAA’s
that, notwithstanding AAA’s retraction of her previous testimonies, the prosecution pants constituted an overt act of Rape. o We answer in the negative. Overt or
sufficiently established the commission of the crime of Rape. It added that the external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were adequately proven. intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
ISSUES: What crimes was Sumingwa guilty of, considering the earlier grant of being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
his Demurrer? qualified rape, AoL, and unjust vexation. perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.60 The
evidence on record does not show that the above elements are present. The
HELD: First, in light of the recantation of AAA, appellant questions the credibility detailed acts of execution showing an attempt to rape are simply lacking. It would
of the prosecution witnesses and insists that his constitutional right to be presumed be too strained to construe appellant’s act of removing AAA’s pants as an overt act
innocent be applied.31 Second, he argues that in Criminal Case No. 1651 for that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. Hence, appellant must be
Attempted Rape, he should only be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness, there being acquitted of Attempted Rape. Neither can we hold appellant liable for Other Light
no overt act showing the intent to have sexual intercourse.32 Lastly, he insists that Threats for threatening AAA with a bolo; for Unjust Vexation for undressing her
he could not be convicted of all the charges against him for failure of the without her consent, causing disturbance, torment, distress, and vexation; nor for
prosecution to show that he employed force, violence or intimidation against AAA; Maltreatment for boxing the right side of AAA’s buttocks. Although all of the above
neither did the latter offer resistance to appellant’s advances.33 In rape acts were alleged in the Information for Attempted Rape in the Order dated
cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends September 24, 2004, Criminal Case Nos. 1650, 1652 and 1653 involving the above
almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. By the very nature crimes were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence based on the demurrer to
of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for evidence filed by appellant. The order granting appellant’s demurrer to evidence
herself. When a rape victim’s testimony is straightforward and marked with was a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounted to an acquittal. Any
consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the proscription
cannot be discarded.34 If such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to on double jeopardy.61 Accordingly, appellant’s conviction of any of the above
establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it, crimes, even under Criminal Case No. 1651, would trench in his constitutional right
notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness against double jeopardy.
does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony. 35
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts.36 It is
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may

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PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JOSE C. GO and the conclusion of the RTC that Spouses Go admitted paragraphs 3, 4 and 7 of the
ELVY T. GO, Respondents. G.R. No. 175514 February 14, 2011 SECOND complaint. It found the supposed admission to be insufficient to justify a rendition
DIVISION of summary judgment in the case for sum of money, since there were other
allegations and defenses put up by Spouses Go in their Answer which raised
FACTS: Jose Go contracted 2 loans from PBCom (P17,982,222.22 for the first genuine issues on the material facts in the action. o The CA agreed with Spouses
loan, and P80 million for the second loan) As security, he executed 2 pledge Go that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the complaint merely dwelt on the fact that a
agreements covering his shares of stock in Ever Gotesco Resources and Holdings, contract of loan was entered into by the parties, while paragraph 7 simply
Inc However, 2 years later, the market value of the said shares of stock plunged emphasized the terms of the promissory notes executed by Go in favor of PBCom.
to less than P0.04 per share PBCom then wrote to Go that it was renouncing the The fact of default, the amount of the outstanding obligation, and the existence of
pledge agreements PBCom then filed before RTC a complaint for sum of a prior demand, which were all material to PBCom’s claim, were "hardly
money against Go and his wife, Elvy Spouses Go filed an Answer o 8. The admitted"18 by Spouses Go in their Answer and were, in fact, effectively
promissory note referred to in the complaint expressly state that the loan obligation questioned in the other allegations in the Answer. PBCom contentions: o
is payable within the period of ten (10) years. Thus, from the execution date of PBCom argues that the material averments in the complaint categorically admitted
September 30, 1999, its due date falls on September 30, 2009 (and not 2001 as by Spouses Go obviated the necessity of trial. In their Answer, Spouses Go
erroneously stated in the complaint). Thus, prior to September 30, 2009, the loan admitted the allegations in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Complaint pertaining to the
obligations cannot be deemed due and demandable. In conditional obligations, security for the loans and the due execution of the promissory notes,21 and those
the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already in paragraph 7 which set forth the acceleration clauses in the promissory note.
acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the Their denial of paragraph 5 of the Complaint pertaining to the Schedules of
condition. (Article 1181, New Civil Code) o 9. Contrary to the plaintiff’s proferrence, Payment for the liquidation of the two promissory notes did not constitute a specific
defendant Jose C. Go had made substantial payments in terms of his monthly denial required by the Rules.22 o Even in the Comment23 of Spouses Go, the clear,
payments. There is, therefore, a need to do some accounting works (sic) to categorical and unequivocal admission of paragraphs 3, 4, and 7 of the Complaint
reconcile the records of both parties. o 10. While demand is a necessary had been conceded.24 o PBCom faults the CA for having formulated non-existent
requirement to consider the defendant to be in delay/default, such has not been issues pertaining to the fact of default, the amount of outstanding obligation and
complied with by the plaintiff since the former is not aware of any demand made the existence of prior demand, none of which is borne by the pleadings or the
to him by the latter for the settlement of the whole obligation. records.25 o The Spouses Go, PBCom argues, cannot negate or override the legal
effect of the acceleration clauses embodied in each of the two promissory notes
11. Undeniably, at the time the pledge of the shares of stock were executed, their executed by Go. Moreover, the non-payment of arrearages constituting default was
total value is more than the amount of the loan or at the very least, equal to it. admitted by Go in his letters to PBCom dated March 3 and April 7, 2000,
Thus, plaintiff was fully secured insofar as its exposure is concerned. o 12. And respectively.26 Therefore, by such default, they have lost the benefit of the period
even assuming without conceding, that the present value of said shares x x x went in their favor, pursuant to Article 119827 of the Civil Code. o Further, PBCom claims
down, it cannot be considered as something permanent since the prices of stocks that its causes of action are supported by authentic documents and voluntary
in the market either increases (sic) or decreases (sic) depending on the market admissions which cannot be contradicted. It cites the March 3 and April 7, 2000
forces. Thus, it is highly speculative for the plaintiff to consider said shares to have letters of Go requesting deferment of interest payments on his past due loan
suffered tremendous decrease in its value. More so, it is unfair for the plaintiff to obligations to PBCom, as his assets had been placed under attachment in a case
renounce or abandon the pledge agreements. PBCom filed a motion for filed by the BSP.28 PBCom emphasizes that the said letters, in addition to its letters
summary judgment o the Answer interposed no specific denials on the material of demand duly acknowledged and received by Go, negated their claim that they
averments in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the complaint such as the fact of default, the were not aware of any demand having been made. Spouses contentions: o
entire amount being already due and demandable by reason of default, and the The core contention of Spouses Go is that summary judgment was not proper under
fact that the bank had made repeated demands for the payment of the obligations. the attendant circumstances, as there exist genuine issues with respect to the fact
Spouses Go filed an Opposition o they had tendered genuine factual issues of default, the amount of the outstanding obligation, and the existence of prior
calling for the presentation of evidence. RTC granted the motion; rendered a demand, which were duly questioned in the special and affirmative defenses set
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff; denied Spouses’ ensuing MR CA forth in the Answer. Spouses Go agree with the CA that the admissions in the
reversed; remanded; denied PBCom’s ensuing MR o The CA could not agree with pleadings pertained to the highlight of the terms of the contract. Such admissions

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merely recognized the existence of the contract of loan and emphasized its terms which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face
and conditions.30 Moreover, although they admitted paragraphs 3, 4, and 7, the the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and
special and affirmative defenses contained in the Answer tendered genuine issues admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
which could only be resolved in a full-blown trial.31 o On the matter of specific prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor,
denial, Spouses Go posit that the Court decisions cited by PBCom32 do not apply therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a
on all fours in this case. genuine issue as to any material fact. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which
Moreover, the substance of the repayment schedule was not set forth in the requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
complaint. It, therefore, follows that the act of attaching copies to the complaint is contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or
insufficient to secure an implied admission. Assuming arguendo that it was undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and
impliedly admitted, the existence of said schedule and the promissory notes would summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has
not immediately make private respondents liable for the amount claimed by the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or
PBCom.33 Before respondents may be held liable, it must be established, first, that that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to
they indeed defaulted; and second, that the obligations has remained constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render
outstanding.34 o Spouses Go also state that although they admitted paragraphs summary judgments and may do so only when there is cl early no genuine issue
3, 4 and 7 of the Complaint, the fact of default, the amount of outstanding as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or
obligation and the existence of prior demand were fully questioned in the special contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial .41
and affirmative defenses. (Underscoring supplied.) Juxtaposing the Complaint and the Answer discloses
that the material facts here are not undisputed so as to call for the rendition of a
ISSUE: Was an admission on the part of the Spouses so as to warrant a summary judgment. While the denials of Spouses Go could have been phrased
summary judgment? NO. more strongly or more emphatically, and the Answer more coherently and logically
structured in order to overthrow any shadow of doubt that such denials were indeed
HELD: The Court agrees with the CA that "[t]he supposed admission of made, the pleadings show that they did in fact raise material issues that have to
defendants-appellants on the x x x allegations in the complaint is clearly not be addressed and threshed out in a full-blown trial. PBCom anchors its
sufficient to justify the rendition of summary judgment in the case for sum of arguments on the alleged implied admission by Spouses Go resulting from their
money, considering that there are other allegations embodied and defenses raised failure to specifically deny the material allegations in the Complaint, citing as
by the defendants-appellants in their answer which raise a genuine issue as to the precedent Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals,42 and Morales
material facts in the action."36 The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine v. Court of Appeals. Spouses Go, on the other hand, argue that although
issues as to three material facts, which have to be addressed during trial: first, the admissions were made in the Answer, the special and affirmative defenses
fact of default; second, the amount of the outstanding obligation, and third, the contained therein tendered genuine issues. Under the Rules, every pleading
existence of prior demand. Under the Rules, following the filing of pleadings, if, must contain, in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings, supporting affidavits, statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
depositions and admissions on file show that, "except as to the amount of defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.43
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving To specifically deny a material allegation, a defendant must specify each material
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,"37 summary judgment may be allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable,
rendered. This rule was expounded in Asian Construction and Development shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his
Corporation v. Philippine Commercial International Bank,38 where it was written: denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall
o Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as to the specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder.
amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state,
may be allowed.39 Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique and this shall have the effect of a denial.44 Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of
aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation Civil Procedure contemplates three (3) modes of specific denial, namely: 1) by
thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.40 Under the specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which
Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the

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substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial; (2) by averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue.58 The Warner Barnes case
specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and cited above sprung from a suit for foreclosure of mortgage, where the document
denying only the remainder; (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge that defendant denied was the deed of mortgage sued upon and attached to the
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in complaint. The Court then ruled that it would have been easy for the defendants
the complaint, which has the effect of a denial.45 The purpose of requiring the to specifically allege in their answer whether or not they had executed the alleged
defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the matters alleged in mortgage. Similarly, in Capitol Motors, the document denied was the promissory
the complaint which he succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the note sued upon and attached to the complaint. In said case, the Court ruled that
matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The parties are compelled to lay although a statement of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
their cards on the table.46 Again, in drafting pleadings, members of the bar are as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint was one of the modes of
enjoined to be clear and concise in their language, and to be organized and logical specific denial contemplated under the Rules, paragraph 2 of the Answer in the
in their composition and structure in order to set forth their statements of fact and said case was insufficient to constitute a specific denial.59 Following the ruling in
arguments of law in the most readily comprehensible manner possible. Failing such the Warner Barnes case, the Court held that it would have been easy for defendant
standard, allegations made in pleadings are not to be taken as stand-alone to specifically allege in the Answer whether or not it had executed the promissory
catchphrases in the interest of accuracy. They must be contextualized and note attached to the Complaint.60 In Morales v. Court of Appeals,61 the matter
interpreted in relation to the rest of the statements in the pleading. In this case, denied was intervenor’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s having claimed ownership of
as in Gaza, the admissions made by Spouses Go are to be read and taken together the vehicle in contention. The Court therein stated: o Yet, despite the specific
with the rest of the allegations made in the Answer, including the special and allegation as against him, petitioner, in his Answer in Intervention with
affirmative defenses. For instance, on the fact of default, PBCom alleges in Counterclaim and Crossclaim, answered the aforesaid paragraph 11, and other
paragraph 8 of the Complaint that Go defaulted in the payment for both promissory paragraphs, merely by saying that "he has no knowledge or information sufficient
notes, having paid only three interest installments covering the months of to form a belief as to its truth." While it may be true that under the Rules one could
September, November, and December 1999. In paragraph 6 of the Answer, avail of this statement as a means of a specific denial, nevertheless, if an allegation
Spouses Go denied the said allegation, and further alleged in paragraphs 8 to 13 directly and specifically charges a party to have done, performed or committed a
that Go made substantial payments on his monthly loan amortizations. The particular act, but the latter had not in fact done, performed or committed it, a
alleged default and outstanding obligations are based on the Statement of Account. categorical and express denial must be made. In such a case, the occurrence or
This Court agrees with the defendants that since the substance of the document non-occurrence of the facts alleged may be said to be within the party’s knowledge.
was not set forth in the complaint although a copy thereof was attached thereto, In short, the petitioner herein could have simply expressly and in no uncertain
or the said document was not set forth verbatim in the pleading, the rule on implied terms denied the allegation if it were untrue. It has been held that when the
admission does not apply.53 It must also be pointed out that the cases cited by matters of which a defendant alleges of having no knowledge or information
PBCom do not apply to this case.1avvphi1 Those two cases involve denial of lack sufficient to form a belief, are plainly and necessarily
of knowledge of facts "so plainly and necessarily within [the knowledge of the party within his knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be
making such denial] that such averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue."54 considered as specific denial. His denial lacks the element of sincerity and good
Also, in both cases, the documents denied were the same documents or deeds faith, hence, insufficient.62 Borrowing the phraseology of the Court in the Capitol
sued upon or made the basis of, and attached to, the complaint. In Philippine Motors case, clearly, the fact of the parties’ having executed the very documents
Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals,55 the Court ruled that the sued upon, that is, the deed of exchange, deed or mortgage or promissory note,
defendant’s contention that it had no truth or information sufficient to form a belief is so plainly and necessarily within the knowledge of the denying parties that any
as to the truth of the deed of exchange was an invalid or ineffectual denial pursuant averment of ignorance as to such fact must be palpably untrue. In this case,
to the Rules of Court,56 as it could have easily asserted whether or not it had however, Spouses Go are not disclaiming knowledge of the transaction or the
executed the deed of exchange attached to the petition. Citing Capitol Motors execution of the promissory notes or the pledge agreements sued upon. The
Corporations v. Yabut,57 the Court stated that: o x x x The rule authorizing an matters in contention are, as the CA stated, whether or not respondents were in
answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient default, whether there was prior demand, and the amount of the outstanding loan.
to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect These are the matters that the parties disagree on and by which reason they set
of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is forth vastly different allegations in their pleadings which each will have to prove by
asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge that his presenting relevant and admissible evidence during trial.

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speculative, if not an isolated one. Elsewhere, we find several cellsite towers
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Petitioner, vs. ARSENIO ALDECOA, JOSE B. scattered (sic) allover, both of the Smart, Globe, and others, nay even in thickly
TORRE, CONRADO U. PUA, GREGORIO V. MANSANO, JERRY CORPUZ and populated areas like in Metro Manila and also in key cities nationwide, yet they
ESTELITAACOSTA, Respondents. G.R. No. 166330 September 11, 2013 have not been outlawed or declared nuisance as the respondents now want this
FIRST DIVISION Court to heed. To the thinking of the Court, the respondents are harping imagined
perils to their health for reason only known to them perhaps especially were we to
FACTS: Smart entered into a contract with Florentino Sebastian where the latter consider that the Brgy. Captain of Vira earlier gave its imprimatur to this project.
agreed to lease his land in Isabela to the former Smart, through its contractor, Noteworthy is the fact that the alleged cluster of residential houses that abut the
Allarilla Construction, immediately constructed and installed a cellular base station cellsite tower in question might be endangered thereby, the respondents are but a
on the leased property, which had antennas and transmitters and a power house few of those residents. If indeed, all those residents in Vira were adversely affected
open on three sides containing a 25KVA diesel power generator Around and close for the perceived hazards posed by the tower in question, they should also have
to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments, been joined in as respondents in a class suit. The sinister motive is perhaps
including the properties of respondents Arsenio Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U. obvious. Respondents appealed to CA CA reversed o declared the cellular
Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano, Jerry Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta. Respondents base station of petitioner a nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the
filed an action before RTC for abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for residents of Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela because: (1) the locational clearance
TRO and WPI o This tower is powered by a standby generator that emitsnoxious granted to petitioner was a nullity due to the lack of approval by majority of the
and deleterious fumes, not to mention the constant noise it produces, hence, a actual residents of the barangay and a barangay resolution endorsing the
hazard to the health, not only of the respondents, but the residents in the area as construction of the cellular base station; and (2) the sound emission of the
well Smart filed an Answer with Motion to Oppose Temporary Restraining generator at the cellular base station exceeded the Department of Environment
Order with Compulsory Counterclaim o Petitioner should not in anyway be liable and Natural Resources (DENR) standards. Smart filed an MR o (1) the basis
for fraud or bad faith as it had painstakingly secured the consent of majority of the for the judgment of the appellate court that the cellular base station was a nuisance
residents surrounding the location of the Tower in order to seek their approval had been extinguished as the generator subject of the Complaint was already
therewith Respondents filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim o As removed; and (2) there had been substantial compliance in securing all required
admitted, petitioner has not secured the required Environmental Compliance permits for the cellular base station. CA denied MR o We have gone over
Certificate (ECC). It has not even obtained the initial compliance certificate (ICC). [petitioner’s] other arguments and observed that they are merely repetitive of
In short,petitioner should have waited for these documents before constructing its previous contentions which we have judiciously ruled upon
tower, hence, it violated the law and such construction is illegal and all the more
sustains the assertions of respondents Smart then filed a pre-trial brief ISSUE: Was RTC correct in rendering a summary judgment? NO.
Smart on the same day, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment o There is no
need for a full-blown trial as the causes of action and issues have already been HELD: Nonetheless, while jurisdiction over respondents’ Complaint for
identified in all the pleadings submitted to this Honorable court by both abatement of nuisance lies with the courts, the respective judgments of the RTC
respondents and petitioner o There is clearly no genuine issue as to any material and the Court of Appeals cannot be upheld. At the outset, the RTC erred in
fact or cause in the action o There is no extreme urgency to issue a Preliminary granting petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering the dismissal of
Mandatory Injunction as stated in an affidavit executed by SMART Senior respondents’ Complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. Summary judgments
Supervisor Andres V. Romero in an affidavit hereto attached as Annex "A" o are governed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which state:
Petitioner seeks immediate declaratory relief from respondents’ contrived o SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim,
allegations as set forth in their complaint Respondents after filing their pre- counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at
trial brief, filed an Opposition to the Motion o maintaining that there were several any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
genuine issues relating to the cause of action and material facts of their Complaint. summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. o SEC. 3. Motion and
They asserted that there was a need for a full blown trial to prove the allegations proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before
in their Complaint, as well as the defenses put up by petitioner. RTC granted the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
the motion; dismissed respondents’ complaint o Now, as to the Court’s assessment depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the
of the circumstances obtaining, we find the claim of the respondents to be highly hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

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supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to periphery of the communications tower. x x x34 o Likewise constituting real or
the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that genuine issues for trial, which arose from subsequent events, are the following:
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphases supplied. whether the generator subject of respondents’ Complaint had been removed;
In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation,33 the Court discussed extensively when a whether said generator had been replaced by another that produces as much or
summary judgment is proper: o For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant even more noise and fumes; and whether the generator is a nuisance that can be
must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any abated separately from the rest of the cellular base station. Furthermore, the
material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the Court demonstrated in AC Enterprises, Inc. the extensive factual considerations of
motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. a court before it can arrive at a judgment in an action for abatement of nuisance:
Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents o Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the air conditioning units of the
appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to Feliza Building is nuisance is to be resolved only by the court in due course of
produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, proceedings.1âwphi1 The plaintiff must prove that the noise is a nuisance and the
the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment. A genuine issue is an issue consequences thereof. Noise is not a nuisance per se. It may be of such a character
of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue as to constitute a nuisance, even though it arises from the operation of a lawful
which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim. The trial court can business, only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in
determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar
affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an
appear uncontested or undispute d, then there is no real or genuine issue or actionable nuisance. In the conditions of present living, noise seems inseparable
question as to any fact and summary judgment called for. On the other hand, from the conduct of many necessary occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the
where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for popular sense in which that word is used, but in the absence of statute, noise
a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the
be viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener.
given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the What those limits are cannot be fixed by any definite measure of quantity or
evidence. Courts must be critical of the papers presented by the moving party quality; they depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. They may be
and not of the papers/documents in opposition thereto. Conclusory assertions are affected, but are not controlled, by zoning ordinances. The delimitation of
insufficient to raise an issue of material fact. A party cannot create a genuine designated areas to use for manufacturing, industry or general business is not a
dispute of material fact through mere speculations or compilation of differences. license to emit every noise profitably attending the conduct of any one of them. o
He may not create an issue of fact through bald assertions, unsupported The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously
contentions and conclusory statements. He must do more than rely upon affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes
allegations but must come forward with specific facts in support of a claim. Where beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of
the factual context makes his claim implausible, he must come forward with more holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the
persuasive evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. (Emphases supplied; emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable
citations omitted.) Judging by the aforequoted standards, summary judgment bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a
cannot be rendered in this case as there are clearly factual issues disputed or noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it. o
contested by the parties. As respondents correctly argued in their Opposition to Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become
petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment: o 1. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of
there are several genuine issues as to the cause of action and material facts related life and property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be
to the complaint. For one there is an issue on the structural integrity of substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the
the tower, the ultra high frequency (UHF) radio wave emission radiated by the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The determining
communications tower affecting the life, health and well being of the[respondents] factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It
and the barangay residents, especially their children. Also, the noxious/deleterious is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and
fumes and the noise produce[d] by the standby generator and the danger posted annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less
by the tower if it collapses in regard to life and limb as well as the property of the comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial
[respondents] particularly those whose houses abut, or are near/within the and unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent

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upon all the circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to hotels and resorts within the Philippines. He performed work for EGI until he
what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance. The courts have made it clear that in met an accident and had to go back to Australia While in AU, he was informed
every case the question is one of reasonableness. What is a reasonable use of one’s by Ganzon, EGI’s VP, that his services were no longer needed because the project
property and whether a particular use is an unreasonable invasion of another’s use will no longer push through McBurnie filed an illegal dismissal case against
and enjoyment of his property so as to constitute a nuisance cannot be determined EGI EGI claimed that the agreement that they entered into was to jointly
by exact rules, but must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case, invest in and establish a company for the management of hotels. o They did not
such as locality and the character of the surroundings, the nature, utility and social intend to create an employer-employee relationship, and the execution of the
value of the use, the extent and nature of the harm involved, the nature, utility employment contract that was being invoked by McBurnie was solely for the
and social value of the use or enjoyment invaded, and the like. Persons who live purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an alien work permit in the Philippines. At
or work in thickly populated business districts must necessarily endure the usual the time McBurnie left for Australia for his medical treatment, he had not yet
annoyances and of those trades and businesses which are properly located and obtained a work permit. LA McBurnie was illegally dismissed EGI
carried on in the neighborhood where they live or work. But these annoyances and appealed to NLRC o filed their Memorandum of Appeal8 and Motion to Reduce
discomforts must not be more than those ordinarily to be expected in the Bond9, and posted an appeal bond in the amount of P100,000.00 o In their Motion
community or district, and which are incident to the lawful conduct of such trades to Reduce Bond, they contended that an award of "more than P60 Million Pesos to
and businesses. If they exceed what might be reasonably expected and cause a single foreigner who had no work permit and who left the country for good one
unnecessary harm, then the court will grant relief. A finding by the LGU that the month after the purported commencement of his employment" was a patent nullity
noise quality standards under the law have not been complied with is not a and claimed that they were experiencing business NLRC denied the motion
prerequisite nor constitutes indispensable evidence to prove that the defendant is to reduce bond and EGI’s ensuing MR o in cases involving monetary award, an
or is not liable for a nuisance and for damages. Such finding is merely corroborative employer seeking to appeal the [LA’s] decision to the Commission is
to the testimonial and/or other evidence to be presented by the parties. The unconditionally required by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond in the amount
exercise of due care by the owner of a business in its operation does not constitute equivalent to the monetary award NRLC dismissed EGI’s appeal considering
a defense where, notwithstanding the same, the business as conducted, seriously its failure to post the full amount of the bond and denied its ensuing MR EGI
affects the rights of those in its vicinity.35 (Citations omitted.) filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Prayers for the Immediate
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction)
is largely dependent on the particular factual circumstances involved in the instant CA reversed NLRC; granted EGI’s petition; denied McBurnie’s ensuing MR o
case, which is exactly why a trial for threshing out disputed or contested factual directed the NLRC, McBurnie, and all persons acting for and under their authority
issues is indispensable. Evidently, it was the RTC which engaged in speculations to refrain from causing the execution and enforcement of the LA’s decision in favor
and unsubstantiated conclusions. For the same reasons cited above, without of McBurnie, conditioned upon the respondents’ posting of a bond in the amount
presentation by the parties of evidence on the contested or disputed facts, there of P10,000,000.00 McBurnie filed a Rule 45 before SC SC denied
was no factual basis for declaring petitioner's cellular base station a nuisance and petition; denied McBurnie’s ensuing MR o on the ground of McBurnie’s failure to
ordering petitioner to cease and desist from operating the same. Given the comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and to sufficiently show that the
equally important interests of the parties in this case, i.e., on one hand, CA committed any reversible error McBurnie filed a Motion for Leave (1) To
respondents' health, safety, and property, and on the other, petitioner's business File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and (2) To Admit the Attached
interest and the public's need for accessible and better cellular mobile telephone Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration SC denied; treated the said motion
services, the wise and prudent course to take is to remand the case to the RTC for as a 2nd MR, a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court
trial and give the parties the opportunity to prove their respective factual claims. CA (in the meantime) allowed EGI’s motion to reduce appeal bond and
directing the NLRC to give due course to their appeal; ordered remand to NLRC o
ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE, Petitioner, vs. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS, On the issue28 of the NLRC’s denial of the respondents’ motion to reduce appeal
INC. and E. GANZON, INC., Respondents. G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117 G R. Nos. bond, the CA ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
186984-85 October 17, 2013 EN BANC immediately denying the motion without fixing an appeal bond in an amount that
was reasonable, as it denied the respondents of their right to appeal from the
FACTS: McBurnie, an Australian national, allegedly signed an employment decision of the LA.29 The CA explained that "(w)hile Art. 223 of the Labor Code
agreement with EGI, a PH company to oversee the management of the company’s requiring bond equivalent to the monetary award is explicit, Section 6, Rule VI of

307
the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, recognized as exception a motion to HELD: At the outset, the Court emphasizes that second and subsequent motions
reduce bond upon meritorious for reconsideration are, as a general rule, prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of the
grounds and upon posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the Rules of Court provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment
monetary award."30 o On the issue31 of the NLRC’s dismissal of the appeal on the or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." The rule rests on the
ground of the respondents’ failure to post the additional appeal bond, the CA also basic tenet of immutability of judgments. "At some point, a decision becomes final
found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, explaining that an appeal and executory and, consequently, all litigations must come to an end."58 The
bond in the amount of P54,083,910.00 was prohibitive and excessive. Moreover, general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration
the appellate court cited the pendency of the petition for certiorari over the denial admits of settled exceptions. For one, the present Internal Rules of the Supreme
of the motion to reduce bond, which should have prevented the NLRC from Court, particularly Section 3, Rule 15 thereof, provides: o Sec. 3. Second motion
immediately dismissing the respondents’ appeal. McBurnie filed an MR; for reconsideration. ― The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
argued that CA should decide the case on the merits NLRC (in the meantime) reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher
dismissed McBurnie’s complaint o It explained that based on records, McBurnie was interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its
never an employee of any of the respondents, but a potential investor in a project actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when
that included said respondents, barring a claim of dismissal, much less, an illegal the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust
dismissal. Granting that there was a contract of employment executed by the and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage
parties, McBurnie failed to obtain a work permit which would have allowed him to to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before
work for any of the respondents.36 In the absence of such permit, the employment the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the
agreement was void and thus, could not be the source of any right or obligation. Court’s declaration. In a line of cases, the Court has then entertained and
SC 3rd division reversed CA insofar as its grant to EGI to reduce the appeal granted second motions for reconsideration "in the higher interest of substantial
bond o respondents’ failure to post a bond equivalent in amount to the LA’s justice," as allowed under the Internal Rules when the assailed decision is "legally
monetary award was fatal to the appeal.39 Although an appeal bond may be erroneous," "patently unjust" and "potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
reduced upon motion by an employer, the following conditions must first be irremediable injury or damage to the parties." In Tirazona v. Philippine EDS
satisfied: (1) the motion to reduce bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; Techno-Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.),59 we also explained that a second motion for
and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the reconsideration may be allowed in instances of "extraordinarily persuasive reasons
appellant. Unless the NLRC grants the motion to reduce the cash bond within the and only after an express leave shall have been obtained."60 In Apo Fruits
10-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal from a judgment of the LA, the Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,61 we allowed a second motion for
employer is mandated to post the cash or surety bond securing the full amount reconsideration as the issue involved therein was a matter of public interest, as it
within the said 10-day period.40 The respondents’ initial appeal bond of pertained to the proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right in
P100,000.00 was grossly inadequate compared to the LA’s monetary award. EGI the government’s implementation of its agrarian reform program. In San Miguel
filed an MR McBurnie on the basis of the SC decision, he filed with NLRC an Corporation v. NLRC,62 the Court set aside the decisions of the LA and the NLRC
MR with motion to recall and expunge from the records the NLRC Decision dated that favored claimants-security guards upon the Court’s review of San Miguel
November 17, 2009 o NLRC granted EGI after denial of their 1st MR, filed Corporation’s second motion for reconsideration. In Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine
with SC a Motion for Leave to Submit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et al.,63 the Court en banc reversed on a third motion for
and Second Motion for Reconsideration SC granted motion for leave o reconsideration the ruling of the Court’s Division on therein private respondents’
McBurnie was allowed to submit his comment on the second motion, and the claim for wages and monetary benefits. It is also recognized that in some
respondents, their reply to the comment. On January 25, 2012, however, the Court instances, the prudent action towards a just resolution of a case is for the Court to
issued a Resolution49 denying the second motion "for lack of merit," "considering suspend rules of procedure, for "the power of this Court to suspend its own rules
that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading x x x. (became or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice
final and executory on March 14, 2012) EGI filed its 3rd MR require it, cannot be questioned."64 In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,65 the Court,
thus, explained: o The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
ISSUE: May EGI’s 3rd MR be taken cognizance by the SC? YES. to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality.

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This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and thereby.73 (Citations omitted) As we shall explain, the instant case also qualifies
encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared as an exception to, first, the proscription against second and subsequent motions
to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case. x x x. o The Rules of Court for reconsideration, and second, the rule on immutability of judgments; a
was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice reconsideration of the Decision dated September 18, 2009, along with the
but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be Resolutions dated December 14, 2009 and January 25, 2012, is justified by the
mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is higher interest of substantial justice. To begin with, the Court agrees with the
precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact respondents that the Court’s prior resolve to grant , and not just merely note, in a
ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, Resolution dated March 15, 2010 the respondents’ motion for leave to submit their
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way second motion for reconsideration already warranted a resolution and discussion
around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, of the motion for reconsideration on its merits. Instead of doing this, however, the
"should give way to the realities of the situation." x x x.66 (Citations omitted) Court issued on January 25, 2012 a Resolution74 denying the motion to reconsider
Consistent with the foregoing precepts, the Court has then reconsidered even for lack of merit, merely citing that it was a "prohibited pleading under Section 2,
decisions that have attained finality, finding it more appropriate to lift entries of Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
judgments already made in these cases. In Navarro v. Executive Secretary,67 we amended."75 In League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. Commission on
reiterated the pronouncement in De Guzman that the power to suspend or even Elections,76 we reiterated a ruling that when a motion for leave to file and admit
disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore
that which this Court itself has already declared final. The Court then recalled in allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the
Navarro an entry of judgment after it had determined the validity and second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading. Similarly in
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9355, explaining that: o Verily, the Court had, this case, there was then no reason for the Court to still consider the
on several occasions, sanctioned the recall of entries of judgment in light of respondents’ second motion for reconsideration as a prohibited pleading, and deny
attendant extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even disregard it plainly on such ground. The Court intends to remedy such error through this
rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which resolution. More importantly, the Court finds it appropriate to accept the pending
this Court itself had already declared final. In this case, the compelling concern is motion for reconsideration and resolve it on the merits in order to rectify its prior
not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would disposition of the main issues in the petition. Upon review, the Court is constrained
be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties to rule differently on the petitions. We have determined the grave error in affirming
thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the the NLRC’s rulings, promoting results that are patently unjust for the respondents,
[Local Government Code (LGC)] with respect to the creation of local government as we consider the facts of the case, pertinent law, jurisprudence, and the degree
units. x x x.68 (Citations omitted) In Munoz v. CA,69 the Court resolved to recall of the injury and damage to the respondents that will inevitably result from the
an entry of judgment to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This justification was implementation of the Court’s Decision dated September 18, 2009.
likewise applied in Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico,70 wherein the Court held that:
o The recall of entries of judgments, albeit rare, is not a novelty. In Muñoz v. CA , A. Appeal from MTC to RTC [Rule 40]
where the case was elevated to this Court and a first and second motion for
reconsideration had been denied with finality , the Court, in the interest of Perfection of Appeal
substantial justice, recalled the Entry of Judgment as well as the letter of
transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals.71 (Citation omitted) In Barnes Section 4. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — The perfection of the appeal and
v. Judge Padilla,72 we ruled: o A final and executory judgment can no longer be the effect thereof shall be governed by the provisions of section 9, Rule 41. (n)
attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
highest court of the land. However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to Docket Fees
serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, Section 5. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. — Within the period for
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered
by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is the judgment or final order appealed from the full amount of the appellate court
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment thereof shall be transmitted to the

309
appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal, as the Section 5. Notice of appeal. — The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the
case may be. (n) appeal, specify the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify
the court to which the appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing
Appeals from order of Dismissal the timeliness of the appeal. (4a)

Section 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — Section 6. Record on appeal; form and contents thereof. — The full names of all
If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without the parties to the proceedings shall be stated in the caption of the record on appeal
a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case and it shall include the judgment or final order from which the appeal is taken and,
may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction in chronological order, copies of only such pleadings, petitions, motions and all
over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed judgment or final order for the
shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of proper understanding of the issue involved, together with such data as will show
reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings. that the appeal was perfected on time. If an issue of fact is to be raised on appeal,
the record on appeal shall include by reference all the evidence, testimonial and
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the documentary, taken upon the issue involved. The reference shall specify the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it documentary evidence by the exhibit numbers or letters by which it was identified
has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the when admitted or offered at the hearing, and the testimonial evidence by the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and names of the corresponding witnesses. If the whole testimonial and documentary
additional evidence in the interest of justice. (n) evidence in the case is to be included, a statement to that effect will be sufficient
without mentioning the names of the witnesses or the numbers or letters of
B. Appeal from RTC to CA [Rule 41] exhibits. Every record on appeal exceeding twenty (20) pages must contain a
subject index. (6a)
Modes of Appeal
Perfection of Appeal
Section 2. Modes of appeal. —
Section 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's appeal by notice of
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing time.
a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect
appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in
or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In such cases, the record due time.
on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by of the other parties.
petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on the expiration of the appeal of the other parties.
certiorari in accordance with the Rule 45. (n)
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal,
Notice of Appeal vs. Record on Appeal the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve

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compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal
in accordance with 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (9a) in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (9a,
R41)
C. Petition for Review from RTC to CA [Rule 42]
(b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the appeal
How appeal taken shall stay the judgment or final order unless the Court of Appeals, the law, or these
Rules shall provide otherwise. (a)
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate D. Appeals from CTA and QJA to CA [Rule 43]
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying
at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other Contents of Petition
lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional
Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be Section 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full
filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and
in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by
amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment,
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such
period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers;
further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last
case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (n) paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates
showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (2a)
Failure to comply with requirements
Action on Petition
Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment Section 8. Action on the petition. — The Court of Appeals may require the
of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the respondent to file a comment on the petition not a motion to dismiss, within ten
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the (10) days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (n) without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration. (6a)
Perfection of Appeal
Effect of Appeal
Section 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — (a) Upon the timely filing of a
petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful Section 12. Effect of appeal. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment,
fees, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner. final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall
direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. (10a)
The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other E. Ordinary Appealed Cases to the CA [Rule 44]
parties.
Appellants Brief
However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition, the Regional
Trial Court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the Section 7. Appellant's brief. — It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve court, within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the

311
evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of Coverage, Grounds, Period
his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two
(2) copies thereof upon the appellee. (10a, R46) Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
Appellees Brief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. (n)
Section 8. Appellee's brief. — Within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the
appellant's brief, the appellee shall file with the court seven (7) copies of his legibly Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the
typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
thereof upon the appellant. (11a, R46) F. Appeal by Certiorari [Rule 45]
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
Contents of Petition availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. (n)

Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, Section 3. Period for filing action. — If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be
with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
petitioner and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner before it is barred by laches or estoppel. (n)
and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates Contents
showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof
was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and Section 4. Filing and contents of petition. — The action shall be commenced by
when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement filing a verified petition alleging therein with particularity the facts and the law
of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and
of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk
of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and The petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies, together with sufficient
such material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e) contain copies corresponding to the number of respondents. A certified true copy of the
a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original copy of the
section 2, Rule 42. (2a) petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner.

Requirements The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition affidavits of witnesses or
documents supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn certification that
Section 7. Pleadings and documents that may be required; sanctions. — For he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in
purposes of determining whether the petition should be dismissed or denied the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
pursuant to section 5 of this Rule, or where the petition is given due course under tribunal or agency if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
section 8 hereof, the Supreme Court may require or allow the filing of such status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary within such proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate, and impose the Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
corresponding sanctions in case of non-filing or unauthorized filing of such undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
pleadings and documents or non-compliance with the conditions therefor. (n) thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (n)

G. Annulment of Judgment [Rule 47] Effect

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Section 7. Effect of judgment. — A judgment of annulment shall set aside the
questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and void,
without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. However, CECILIA B. ESTINOZO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SIXTEENTH
where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 150276
extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if February 12, 2008 THIRD DIVISION
a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. (n)
FACTS: Estinozo allegedly represented to Gaudencio Ang, Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo
H. Dismissal of Appeal [Rule 50] Cabardo, Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar, and Mariza
Florendo that she recruits persons to work abroad and convinced them to pay a
Grounds; Material Data Rule total of P15,000.00 each as placement fees. They were, however, never
deployed and sent abroad. After demands from said persons and albeit executing
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the PNs, Estinozo failed to refund the money paid. Prosecutor filed 7 Informations
Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following for estafa against Estinozo before RTC Southern Leyte RTC convicted Estinozo
grounds: of 7 counts of estafa Estinozo appealed to CA CA affirmed RTC o Her
defense that she was merely an agent of the real recruiter was deemed as merely
(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was taken a last-ditch effort to absolve herself of authorship of the crime. The CA noted that
within the period fixed by these Rules; Ramirez was never mentioned when petitioner conducted her recruitment
activities, and no evidence was further introduced to show that petitioner remitted
(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period the said fees to Ramirez
prescribed by these Rules; Estinozo filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for
Reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period to file an appeal or a
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in petition for review CA denied the motion pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of
section 5, Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41; (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February the Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court
1998) of Appeals (RIRCA); denied Estinozo’s ensuing MR Estinozo filed a Rule 65
before SC o (1) her previous counsel, by filing a prohibited pleading, foreclosed her
(d) Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record on right to file a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s decision, and consequently an
appeal as provided in section 4 of Rule 44; appeal therefrom;30 (2) she should not be bound by the mistake of her previous
counsel especially when the latter’s negligence and mistake would prejudice her
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his substantial rights and would affect her life and liberty;31 (3) the appellate court
brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules; gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed petitioner’s conviction for the other
four (4) criminal cases—Criminal Cases Nos. 1264, 1265, 1267 and 1269—absent
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page any direct testimony from the complainants in those cases;32 (4) she was deprived
references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of her constitutional right to cross-examine the complainants in the aforementioned
of Rule 44; 4 cases;33 and (5) she presented sufficient evidence to cast reasonable doubt as
to her guilt in all the seven (7) criminal cases.
(g) Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the correction or
completion of the record within the time limited by the court in its order; ISSUES: Was CA correct in denying the Motion for Extension of Time to file an
MR? NO. Is a Rule 65 the correct remedy to question the CA Resolution denying
(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under Rule 48 a Motion for Extension of Time to File an MR? NO.
or to comply with orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable
cause; and HELD: Immediately apparent is that the petition is the wrong remedy to question
the appellate court’s issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly
(i) The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable. (1a) provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order

313
or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for review on certiorari.35 to administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court. o The
Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she Court may impose motu propio, based on res ipsa loquitor, other disciplinary
effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious
limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there petitions for certiorari.
is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.36
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, namely: EDUARDO
under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M. RETERTA, Petitioners, vs.
appeal or any other adequate remedy.37 The nature of the questions of law SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 159941
intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those August 17, 2011 FIRST DIVISION
questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order
was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: Heirs of Spouses Reterta instituted an action for quieting of title and
This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.38 reconveyance before RTC Trece Martirez, averring that they were the true and real
Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate owners of the subject property as they inherited the same from their father; that
remedy, still this Court cannot grant the writ prayed for because we find no grave their father had been the grantee of the said land and that his predecessors have
abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the challenged issuances. The rule, as been in OCEN possession of the same but the discovered that their father had
it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period for purportedly executed an affidavit whereby he waived his rights over the subject
appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, land in favor of Lorenzo Mores and that a TCT was issued to the latter Spouses
except in cases before this Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound Mores filed an MD on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction of RTC as the land
discretion grant the extension requested.39 This rule also applies even if the is a friar land and (2) lack of personality of petitioners to institute the action RTC
motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended.40 Thus, granted the MD; denied Heirs’ ensuing MR o Considering that plaintiffs in this
the appellate court correctly denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File case sought the review of the propriety of the grant of lot 2938 of the Sta. Cruz de
a Motion for Reconsideration. It is well to point out that with petitioner’s Malabon Friar Lands Estate by the Lands Management Bureau of the defendant
erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with her non-filing of a motion Lorenzo Mores through the use of the forged Affidavit and Sales Certificate No. V-
for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA’s decision, the challenged 769 which eventually led to the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-64071 to defendant
decision has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this Court. Lorenzo Mores and wife Virginia Mores, and considering further that the land
The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal41 — subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently
certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the winning party of the f ruits of Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of
the judgment in his or her favor .42 When a decision becomes final and executory, Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the
the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have determination whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the
the power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this
and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this action. On
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling the second ground relied upon by the defendants in their Motion To Dismiss, suffice
justiciable controversies with finality.43 We reiterate what we stated in Amatorio it to state that the Court deemed not to discuss the same. Heirs filed a Rule
v. People44 that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from 65 before CA CA dismissed petition o Thus, the basic requisite for the special
the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own civil action of certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure. As a final note, we remind adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. o In the case at bench, when the
party-litigants and their lawyers to refrain from filing frivolous petitions for court rendered the assailed decision, the remedy of the petitioners was to have
certiorari. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by appealed the same to this Court. But petitioners did not. Instead they filed the
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, now provide that: o However, the court may dismiss the present special civil action for certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the decision of the
petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for court a quo has become final. o The Order dismissing the case was issued by the
delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require court a quo on 29 October 2001, which Order was received by the petitioners on
consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble November 16, 2001. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration dated November
costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel 26, 2001 but the same was denied by the court a quo on 21 February 2002. The

314
Order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioners on has ‘become final’ (or ‘executory’ as of right [final and executory]), is definite and
20 March 2002. o Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari on May 15, 2002. settled. A ‘final’ judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
Certiorari, however cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on
the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares
ISSUES: Was CA correct in dismissing the Rule 65 before it? YES. In the categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is
present case, is a Rule 65 before the CA the correct remedy against the RTC in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for
Resolution granting the MD? NO. If the case were decided today, would the instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is
answer still be the same? NO. Should the RTC have taken cognizance over the ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities
original complaint? YES. of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except
to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of
HELD: The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately,
title and reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or, to use
(RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of such a complaint the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory.’ o Conversely, an
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being friar land under order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities
manifest grave abuse of discretion that can be corrected through certiorari. The as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done
CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that by the Court, is ‘interlocutory,’ e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
the order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading,
from an interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for
course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a
its being availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate ‘final’ judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
remedy in the ordinary course of law . 8 Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that ‘interlocutory’ order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an
a special civil action for certiorari was their proper remedy to assail the order of appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
dismissal in light of certain rules of procedure, specifically pointing out that the Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court ("An order denying petitioners, indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners’
a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action
appeal from the judgment or final order") prohibited an appeal of a denial of the upon the respondents’ motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly: o
motion for reconsideration, and that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
of the Rules of Court ( "No appeal may be taken from: xxx An order denying a – An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the
motion for n ew trial or reconsideration") expressly declared that an order denying remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order. The restriction against
a motion for reconsideration was not appealable. They remind that the third an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a judgment
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided that in the instances "where or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting
the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 ." case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on
o The petitioners’ position has no basis. For one, the order that the petitioners the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages
really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the respondents’ motion awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or
to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.10 By denying a
granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court
of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and
for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy. The fundamental leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail
distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself. The
order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of
Appeals,9 viz: o The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as distinguished from one which Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court – the version in force at the time when the

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CA rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 – included an order denying a from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit: o Section 1. Subject of beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other
appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules usually determine the propriety of certiorari.12 A remedy is plain, speedy and
to be appealable. o No appeal may be taken from: (a) An order denying a motion adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
for new trial or reconsideration; (b) An order denying a petition for relief or any judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.13 It is understood,
similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) An interlocutory order; (d) then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of
An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) An order denying a motion to appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for
set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.14 Nor should the
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) An order of petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper
execution; (g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond
parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise
complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to
therefrom; and (h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice. make it conformable to law and justice.15 Verily, the instances in which certiorari
will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness
o In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n) discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari
It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise
2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by
a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non- all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require."
appealable orders, and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong
retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on that basis would not be right or to do substantial justice.16 The petitioners’ complaint – self-styled as being
and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in force for the "quieting of title and reconveyance, declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales
at the time when it issued its assailed final order. Certificate, reconveyance and damages" – would challenge the efficacy of the
The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when respondents’ certificate of title under the theory that there had been no valid
appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given transfer or assignment from the petitioners’ predecessor in interest to the
due course to and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, respondents of the rights or interests in the land due to the affidavit assigning such
namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due rights and interests being a forgery and procured by fraud. The petitioners’ cause
course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the of action for reconveyance has support in jurisprudence bearing upon the manner
petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss by which to establish a right in a piece of friar land. According to Arayata v. Joya,17
on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave in order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. On occasion, the Court may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be
has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval
or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. and registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a
Court of Appeals,11 the Court has declared that the requirement that there must holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. In other words, where a person
be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights thereon, such
law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable transfer must conform to certain requirements of the law. Under Director of Lands
damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and v. Rizal,18 the purchaser in the sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120 is already
whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of treated by law as the actual owner of the lot purchased even before the payment
justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where of the full payment price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance,
the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) subject to the obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of
in case of urgency. Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal the Government becoming that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.19 Thus,
as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120,20 had grantee Teofilo Reterta perfected

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his title, the petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him and taken title from occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed
him upon his death. By law, therefore, should the execution of the deed in favor of to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price
the respondents be held invalid, the interests of Teofilo Reterta should descend to so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the office of the Chief of Bureau of Public
the petitioners and the deed should issue in their favor. Adding significance to the Lands xxx and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all
petitioners’ claim was their allegation in the complaint that they were in possession accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said
of the land. Moreover, as alleged in the petitioners’ opposition to the motion to land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and
dismiss of the respondents, Teofilo Reterta had partially paid the price of the become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two
land.21 Given the foregoing, the petitioners’ complaint made out a good case of the Land Registration Act xxx. o Section 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of
for reconveyance or reversion, and its allegations, if duly established, might well the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until
warrant the reconveyance of the land from the respondents to the petitioners. It approved by the Secretary of the Interior.1awphi1 As the provisions indicate,
did not matter that the respondents already held a certificate of title in their the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and
names. In essence, an action for reconveyance respects the incontrovertibility of disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners’ action for reconveyance.
the decree of registration but seeks the transfer of the property to its rightful and LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a
legal owner on the ground of its having been fraudulently or mistakenly registered private person and title duly issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the petitioners’
in another person’s name. There is no special ground for an action for showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding
reconveyance, for it is enough that the aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.
property superior to the claim of the registered owner, and that the property has Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.22 On this score, it to lack of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and
is also worthy to stress that the title of a piece of a friar land obtained by a grantee capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.26
from the Government without conforming with the requirements set by the law The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
may be assailed and nullified. Was the petitioners’ action for reconveyance duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
within the jurisdiction of the regular court? o We answer the query in the contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
affirmative. The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa manner by reason of passion or hostility.27 The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-
Blg. 129,23 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,24 which provides: o Section 983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners bereft of any remedy to protect
19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such, they would suffer grave
original jurisdiction: xxx (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or injustice and irreparable damage. In that situation, the RTC’s dismissal should be
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy was to do justice to the
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil unjustly aggrieved
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES
or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial J. CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO,
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; Conformably JR. and JOEL JONGCO, Petitioners, vs. ISMAEL VELOSO III, Respondent. G.R. No.
with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on 171365 October 6, 2010 FIRST DIVISION
one’s title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless FACTS: Manaloto et.al. won an unlawful detainer case against Veloso before MTC
the assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance QC RTC reversed o [Respondent] was ordered to pay arrearages from May
the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). 23, 1997 up to the date of the decision but he was also given an option to choose
Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of between staying in the leased property or vacating the same, subject to the
the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief reimbursement by [petitioners] of one-half of the value of the improvements which
thereby sought.25 The respondents’ reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of it found to be in the amount of P120,000.00. [Respondent] was also given the right
Act No. 1120 to sustain their position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) to remove said improvements pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code, should
instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. The provisions read: o Section [petitioners] refuse to pay P60,000.00. Both parties filed their MRs RTC
12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and modified its previous decision by increasing the value of the improvements from

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P120,000.00 to P800,000.00. After appeals to CA and SC the RTC decision received a copy of the said resolution on September 26, 2003, and he only had 15
became final and executory The present case is an offshoot of said unlawful days from such date to file his appeal, or until October 11, 2003. Respondent,
detainer case and occurred during the pendency of the appeal before RTC Br. 8 instead, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution on October 10, 2003,
Veloso filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Manaloto which left him with only one more day to file his appeal. The RTCBranch 227
et.al. before RTC Br 227 o The first cause of action was for damages because the subsequently denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated
respondent supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on February 20, 2004.
distributed copies of the above-mentioned MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer Respondent only had until the following day, February 21, 2004, to file the appeal.
case to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village while respondent's appeal was still However, respondent filed his Notice of Appeal only on March 1, 2004. Hence,
pending before the Quezon City RTC-Branch 88. o The second cause of action was petitioners conclude that the dismissal of respondent's complaint in Civil Case No.
for breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make continuing repairs Q-02-48341 already attained finality.
on the subject property to preserve and keep it tenantable. Manaloto et.al.
filed an Omnibus Motion o Petitioners argued that respondent had no cause of ISSUES: Was the Notice of Appeal timely filed? YES. May the Neypes doctrine
action against them because the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was apply in the present case? YES.
a matter of public record and its disclosure to the public violated no law or any
legal right of the respondent. o Moreover, petitioners averred that the HELD: We note, at the outset, that the propriety of the dismissal by the RTC-
respondent's present Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages was barred Branch 227 of respondent's second cause of action against petitioners (e.g., for
by prior judgment since it was a mere replication of respondent's Answer with breach of contract) was no longer disputed by the parties. Thus, the present appeal
Compulsory Counterclaim in the unlawful detainer case before the MeTC. The said pertains only to respondent's first cause of action (e.g., for damages), and in
unlawful detainer case was already judicially decided with finality. RTC Br 227 connection therewith, we are called upon to resolve the following issues: (1)
granted the motion; dismissed Veloso’s complaint for violating the rule against whether respondent timely filed his appeal of the Resolution dated September 2,
splitting of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the pendency 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 before the Court of Appeals; and (2) whether
of a related case Veloso received the Order dismissing his complaint on respondent is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages.
September 26, 2003; filed an MR on October 10, 2003 RTC Br 227 denied the o We answer the first issue on the timeliness of respondent's appeal affirmatively.
MR on December 30, 2003 Veloso received the Order denying his MR on Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule," according to which, an ordinary
February 20, 2004; filed a Notice of Appeal on March 1, 2004 RTC denied the appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the
Notice of Appeal for being filed out of time. Veloso received the Order denying Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the
his Notice of Appeal on April 30, 2004; filed an MR on May 3, 2004 RTC Br 227 original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial
granted the MR because it was "convinced that it is but appropriate and fair to court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
both parties that this matter of whether or not the Appeal was filed on time, be In Sumiran v. Damaso,17 we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh
resolved by the appellate court rather than by this Court." o The RTC-Branch 227 period rule: o As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court
then ordered that the records of the case be forwarded as soon as possible to the of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and
Court of Appeals for further proceedings. CA granted Veloso’s appeal; held create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15
that Manaloto et.al. were liable for damages; affirmed RTC’s decision but only days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the
insofar as the dismissal due to the 2nd COA is concerned o The appellate court, order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
however, held that RTC-Branch 227 should have proceeded with the trial on the This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with
merits of the first cause of action (i.e., damages) in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341, the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the
because "[a]lthough [herein respondent] may have stated the same factual Court stated: o To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal
antecedents that transpired in the unlawful detainer case, such allegations were within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15
necessary to give an overview of the facts leading to the institution of another case days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial
between the parties before the RTC acting in its original jurisdiction." Manaloto or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of
et.al. filed a Rule 45 with the SC o Petitioners assert that respondent's appeal only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
of the RTC-Branch 227 Resolution dated September 2, 2003, which dismissed the after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. The
latter's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341, was filed out of time. Respondent foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes,

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to wit: o Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
September 2005 while the present Petition was already pending before us. x x x o undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules
With the advent of the "fresh period rule" parties who availed themselves of the of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in
remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in
within fifteen days from the denial of that motion. o The "fresh period rule" is not furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.19 (Emphases
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that supplied.) In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution
the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil
order appealed from." The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days thereafter, on
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution.
the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision The RTC-Branch 227 denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on February 20, 2004.
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," x x x. o The "fresh On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order denying his Motion
period rule" finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under
should be counted - from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of the fresh period rule, respondent was able to file his appeal wellwithin the
"final order" appealed from. Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. prescriptive period of 15 days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due
Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal which was course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610. We likewise agree with the Court
purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within of Appeals that the RTC-Branch 227 should not have dismissed respondent's
which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the complaint for damages on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
therein petitioner's motion for reconsideration. We followed suit in Elbiña v. According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or
Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days within omission by which a party violates a right of another. When the ground for
which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. The test, therefore, is whether,
we held that a party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment could
days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein.
the order denying the motion for reconsideration. In De los Santos v. Vda. de
Mangubat, we applied the same principle of "fresh period rule," expostulating that
procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE, Petitioner, vs. LUIS ESTEBAN LATORRE,
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws Respondent. G.R. No. 183926 March 29, 2010 THIRD DIVISION
do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably FACTS: Luis and one Ifzal Ali entered into a contract of lease stipulating, among
procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to others, that Ali will be leasing the subject property located at Dasmarinas Village,
be computed or determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions Makati City and that Luis was the sole owner of said property Generosa filed
pending upon its effectivity, such as the present case, without danger of violating an action for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with
anyone else's rights.18 (Emphases supplied.) Also in Sumiran, we recognized application for Injunction against her own son, Luis, and Ali before RTC Muntinlupa
the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to cases pending and Generosa contended in her complaint that she and Luis were co-owners of the
undetermined upon its effectivity: o The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases property. To protect her rights as co-owner, Latorre formally demanded from Ifzal
where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes the payment of her share of the rentals, which the latter, however, refused to heed.
on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in FilEstate Properties, Luis filed an MD on the ground that the venue was improperly laid o Since
Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus: The determinative issue is whether the the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that petitioner
"fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City.
the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was Ali also filed his MD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, asserting that he
promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule was immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development Bank,

319
an international organization. RTC issued a TRO restraining Ali from paying Muntinlupa City.18 In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature
his rentals to respondent and enjoining the latter from receiving from the former of an action is determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by
the aforesaid rentals and directing Ali and Luis to pay Generosa’s share in the its title or heading.19 It is also a settled rule that what determines the venue of a
rentals RTC denied Luis’ MD o RTC ruled that the nature of an action whether case is the primary objective for the filing of the case.20 In her Complaint,
real or personal was determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the strength of
of whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the claims asserted - a two basic claims that (1) she did not execute the deed in favor of respondent; and
matter resolved only after, and as a result of, a trial. Luis filed an Answer Ad (2) thus, she still owned one half (½) of the subject property. Indubitably,
Cautelam insisting, among others, that the case was a real action and that the petitioner's complaint is a real action involving the recovery of the subject property
venue was improperly laid and that the funds from the rentals were used to take on the basis of her co-ownership thereof. Second. The RTC also committed a
care of Generosa’s needs RTC dismissed Generosa’s claim against Ali RTC procedural blunder when it denied respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground
then dismissed the action; ruled in favor of Luis; denied Generosa’s ensuing MR of improper venue. The RTC insisted that trial on the merits be conducted even
o While the case herein filed by the plaintiff involves recovery of possession of a when it was awfully glaring that the venue was improperly laid, as pointed out by
real property situated at 1366 Caballero St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, the respondent in his motion to dismiss. After trial, the RTC eventually dismissed the
same should have been filed and tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even as it invoked, as justification, the
who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear the matter as aforementioned the same rules and jurisprudence on venue. Despite the conduct of trial, the RTC failed to
being clearly a real action. Generosa filed a Rule 45 before SC During the adjudicate this case on the merits. Third. Respondent also did not do very well,
pendency of the petition before the SC, Generosa died. Thus, petitioner's counsel procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to Dismiss, respondent could have
prayed that, pending the appointment of a representative of petitioner's estate, filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion
notices of the proceedings herein be sent to petitioner’s other son, Father Roberto was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
A. Latorre. discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.21 However, despite this lapse, it is
clear that respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of improper venue,
ISSUES: Did Generosa correctly file her complaint before RTC Muntinlupa? NO. contrary to petitioner's assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied,
Should RTC have granted the MD on the ground of improper venue? YES. respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his
Was Generosa correct in resorting to a Rule 45 in assailing the Order of the RTC Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his ground that the case ought to be
dismissing her complaint? NO. dismissed on the basis of improper venue. Finally, petitioner came directly to
this Court on a Petiti on for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule
HELD: 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v.
As early as the filing of the complaint, this case had been marred by numerous Consul,22 we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised
procedural infractions committed by petitioner, by respondent, and even by the Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the
RTC, all of which cannot be disregarded by this Court. First. Petitioner filed her three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal
complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead of the RTC of Makati City, the or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action
latter being the proper venue in this case. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 by the RTC in the exercise of its orig inal jurisdiction ; (2) petition for review, where
Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of venue.16 Actions judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction ;
affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court. The first mode of appeal,
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact
over the area where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule
actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts where 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme
of the principal defendants resides.17 The action in the RTC, other than for Court only on questions of law. A question of law arises when there is doubt as
Collection, was for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale involving to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
the subject property, which is located at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmariñas the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.23 Our ruling in
Village, Makati City. The venue for such action is unquestionably the proper court Velayo-Fong v. Velayo24 is instructive: o A question of law arises when there is
of Makati City, where the real property or part thereof lies, not the RTC of doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of

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fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a “Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment” agreeing with petitioner. The OSG
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the submits that the “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” was correctly treated by the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The NLRC as an appeal, on the principle that technical rules and procedure should be
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set liberally applied in labor cases. Respondents counter that granting without
of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence admitting, that the NLRC did indeed correctly treat petitioner’s “Motion for Partial
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question Reconsideration” as an appeal, nonetheless, it still behooves petitioner to comply
is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party with the other requisites for perfection of an appeal. Respondents point out that
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue said motion contained no statement when petitioner received a copy of the Labor
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question Arbiter’s decision to determine the timeliness of the motion cum appeal, as
of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.25 In her Reply to respondent’s required by Section 3,[10] Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. Respondents
Comment,26 petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on the merits. To do also point to petitioner’s failure to pay the necessary filing fees. They submit that
so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the appellate court committed no reversible error when it ruled that petitioner’s
the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” failed to comply with the requisites of a valid
adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It appeal, hence fatally defective, e.g. for want of verification and absence of proof
thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court that it was filed within the reglementary period. The first issue involves a
ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct question of substance versus form. Strictly speaking, a motion for reconsideration
resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless of a decision, order, or award of a Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule
the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. But said rule likewise allows that a motion for
Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal provided it meets all the requisites of
the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.27 an appeal. Petitioner insists that his pleading was in form a motion for
Accordingly, we find no merit in the instant petition. Neither do we find any reconsideration, but in substance it was an appeal which complied with all the
reversible error in the trial court’s dismissal of the case ostensibly for want of technical requirements. Respondents counter that the formal requisites take
jurisdiction, although the trial court obviously meant to dismiss the case on the precedence. We have minutely scrutinized the records of this case, particularly
ground of improper venue. the questioned “Motion for Partial Reconsideration,” but we find no basis for the
appellate court’s finding that said pleading did not contain a statement as to when
ARIEL A. TRES REYES, petitioner, vs. MAXIM’S TEA HOUSE and JOCELYN POON, petitioner received a copy of the decision in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-0877397.
respondents. G.R. No. 140853. February 27, 2003 SECOND DIVISION The lead paragraph of said motion reads: o Complainant ARIEL A. TRES REYES,
thru counsel, most respectfully moves to reconsider the Decision dated July 20,
FACTS: Reyes was employed by Maxim’s as driver with the duty of fetching and 1998 rendered by the Honorable Labor Arbiter Ernesto S. Dinopol in the
bringing the employees to their homes. Reyes met an accident and collided with abovecaptioned case (copy of which was received by the Complainant on
a truck while he was about to fetch some employees He and 7 of his passengers September 28, 1998), and alleges as follows:[11] Note that all that Section 3,
sustained physical injuries Maxim’s asked Reyes for a written explanation Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure requires with respect to material dates is
Maxim’s then terminated Reyes Reyes filed an illegal dismissal case against “a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision.” We
Maxim’s LA sustained the validity of his dismissal Reyes instead of filing rule that petitioner’s declaration in his motion that he received a copy of the Labor
an appeal, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the NLRC NLRC Arbiter’s decision on September 28, 1998 is more than sufficient compliance with
treated it as an appeal NLRC reversed LA; ordered reinstatement; denied said requirement imposed by Section 3, Rule VI. We likewise find that the motion
Maxim’s MR Maxim’s filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA CA in question was filed with the NLRC on October 8, 1998 or on the tenth (10th) day
reversed NLRC from the date of receipt by petitioner of his copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Otherwise put, said pleading was filed within the reglementary ten-day period, as
ISSUE: Was the Motion for Partial Reconsideration correctly treated as an appeal? provided for in Section 1,[12] Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. The law[13]
on the timeliness of an appeal from the decision, award, or order of the Labor
HELD: YES In the instant case, we note that the Office of the Solicitor General Arbiters, states clearly that the aggrieved party has ten (10) calendar days from
(OSG), whom we required to comment on the petition, filed instead a

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receipt thereof to appeal to the Commission.[14] Needless to say, an appeal filed notice of appeal CA 3rd division gave due course to DAR’s petition for review:
at the last minute of o trial court is ordered to recompute the compensation based on the selling price
the last day of said period is, for all intents and purposes, still seasonably filed. of palay at 213.00 per cavan. Petitioner is ordered to pay legal interest at 6% of
In CA-G.R. SP No. 54110, the Court of Appeals accepted respondents’ averment the compensation so fixed from 1990 until full payment is made by the
that petitioner’s “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” was not verified. The records, government. CA 4th division dismissed LBP’s ordinary appeal; denied LBP’s
however, contradict their averments. We find that petitioner verified his motion to ensuing MR o LBP availed of the wrong mode of appeal LBP brought a Rule
reconsider the Labor Arbiter’s decision on October 8, 1998, or on the same day 45 to SC
that it was filed.[15] We must, perforce, rule that petitioner has substantially
complied with the verification requirement as provided for in Section 3, Rule VI of ISSUE: Did LBP avail of the correct mode of appeal?
the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. Anent respondents’ claim that petitioner
failed to pay the requisite appeal fee in NLRC CA No. 0 17339-98, the NLRC stated HELD: YES. (but after the finality of this resolution, the correct mode should be a
in its decision that: o A review of the record shows that October 8, 1998, petition for review) In affirming the dismissal by the appellate court of LBP’s
complainantappellant paid the amount of P110.00 in cash as appeal fee. For this ordinary appeal, this Court held that Section 608 of RA 6657 (The Comprehensive
he was issued, O.R. #0073761.[16] o This finding refutes respondents’ claim. The Agrarian Reform Law) is clear in providing petition for review as the appropriate
records clearly show the basis for the finding of the Commission that the appeal mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 619 (the
fees were paid.[17] Thus, on this point respondents’ averment, without any provision on which LBP bases its argument that ordinary appeal is the correct mode
supporting evidence and contradicted by the records, deserves scant consideration. of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts) merely makes a general
How the Court of Appeals could have been misled by respondents’ allegations of reference to the Rules of Court and does not categorically prescribe ordinary appeal
technical deficiencies with respect to the questioned “Motion for Partial as the correct way of questioning decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Thus, we
Reconsideration” in NLRC CA No. 0 17339-98, is surprising. Had the court a quo, interpreted Section 61 to mean that the specific rules for petitions for review in the
to use its own words, “carefully perused the case records,” it would have readily Rules of Court and other relevant procedures of appeals shall be followed in
seen that said pleading had complied with the technical requirements of an appeal. appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. We likewise held that Section 60
Hence, we are constrained to conclude that the appellate court had no basis for of RA 6657 is constitutional and does not violate this Court’s power to "promulgate
concluding that the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion when the NLRC gave rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings,
due course to the motion and treated it as an appeal. In labor cases, rules of practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.[18] They are Integrated Bar and legal assistance to the underprivileged."10 We ruled that the
merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict Rules of Court does not categorically prescribe ordinary appeal as the exclusive
application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. The reference by Section
justice, technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to 61 to the Rules of Court in fact even supports the mode of a petition for review as
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations the appropriate way to appeal decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts.
of the parties.[19] Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the Furthermore, the same Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed. quoted by LBP states that "rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court." Since
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO Section 60 is a special procedure and this Court has not yet provided for a particular
DE LEON, respondents. G.R. No. 143275. September 10, 2002 THIRD DIVISION process for appeals from decisions of agrarian courts, the said section does not
encroach on our rule-making power. Hence, LBP filed the instant motion for
FACTS: Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered owners of the reconsideration and supplement to the motion for reconsideration reiterating its
subject land located in Tarlac They filed a petition to fix the just compensation claim in the petition for review that Section 60 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional. LBP
of a parcel of land before RTC Tarlac (acting as a Special Agrarian Court) RTC still maintains that a legislative act like Section 60 infringes on the exclusive rule-
rendered summary judgment fixing the compensation of the subject property as making power of this Court in violation of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In
follows: o (1) P1,260,000 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland and (2) P2,957,250 the event that said argument is again rejected, LBP pleads that the subject Decision
for the 30.4160 hectares of sugarland. DAR and LBP filed separate appeals should at least be given prospective application considering that more than 60
using different modes o DAR petition for review o LBP ordinary appeal by similar agrarian cases filed by LBP via ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals

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are i n danger of being dismissed outright on technical grounds on account of our whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
ruling herein. This, according to LBP, will wreak financial havoc not only on LBP as enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
the financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program but also administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
on the nationa l treasury and the already depressed economic condition of our takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as
country.11 Thus, in the interest of fair play, equity and justice, LBP stresses the the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates
need for the rules to be relaxed so as to give substantial consideration to the as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
appealed cases. On the first ground, we find it needless to re-discuss the reasons procedure. (italics supplied) o We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for
already propounded in our September 10, 2002 Decision explaining why Section review as the proper mode of appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts,
60 of RA 6657 does not encroach on our constitutional rule-making power. Be is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given
that as it may, we deem it necessary to clarify our Decision’s application to and retroactive application, it will prejudice LBP’s right to appeal because pending
effect on LBP’s pending cases filed as ordinary appeals before the Court of Appeals. appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright on mere technicality
It must first be stressed that the instant case poses a novel issue; our Decision thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new
herein will be a landmark ruling on the proper way to appeal decisions of Special doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view
Agrarian Courts. Before this case reached us, LBP had no authoritative guideline and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine. o In the
on how to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts considering the seemingly 1992 case of Spouses Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals,17 respondent Pe, whose
conflicting provisions of Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657. More importantly, the land was foreclosed by Development Bank of the Philippines in 1977 and
Court of Appeals has rendered conflicting decisions on this precise issue. On the subsequently sold to petitioners Benzonan in 1979, tried to invoke a 1988 Supreme
strength of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Feliciano Buenaventura, penned Court ruling counting the five-year period to repurchase from the expiration (in
by Associate Justice Salvador Valdez, Jr. of the Court of Appeals, certain 1978) of the one-year period to redeem the foreclosed property. Said 1988 ruling
decisions12 of the appellate court held that an ordinary appeal is the proper mode. reversed the 1957 and 1984 doctrines which counted the five-year period to
On the other hand, a decision13 of the same court, penned by Associate Justice repurchase from the date of conveyance of foreclosure sale (in 1977). Using the
Romeo Brawner and subject of the instant review, held that the proper mode of 1988 ruling, respondent Pe claimed that his action to repurchase in 1983 had not
appeal is a petition for review. In another case,14 the Court of Appeals also yet prescribed.
entertained an appeal by the DAR filed as a petition for review. On account of o However, this Court refused to apply the 1988 ruling and instead held that the
the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding 1957 and 1984 doctrines (the prevailing ruling when Pe filed the case in 1983)
the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the should govern. The 1988 ruling should not retroact to and benefit Pe’s 1983 case
conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for to repurchase. Thus, the action had indeed prescribed. This Court justified the
availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on the prospective application of the 1988 ruling as follows: o We sustain the petitioners'
Buenaventura ruling, LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February
the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Hence, 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on
in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979. o At that
the prospective applic ation of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended
prospective application of our Decision is not only grounded on equity and fair play was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan
but also based on the constitutional tenet that rules of procedure shall not impair and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article
substantive rights. In accordance with our constitutional power to review rules 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
of procedure of special courts,15 our Decision in the instant case actually lays down Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our
a rule of procedure, specifically, a rule on the proper mode of appeal from decisions decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the
of Special Agrarian Courts. Under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
Constitution, rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit,
rights. In determining whether a rule of procedure affects substantive rights, the non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity
test is laid down in Fabian vs. Desierto,16 which provides that: o [I]n determining is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that
whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]). o The same

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consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions Borras o there was a perfected contract of sale between the spouses Godofredo
enunciating new doctrines. o The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely and Carmen and the spouses Armando and Adelia. o The trial court concluded that
on our rulings in Monge and Tupas when they purchased the property from DBP in the Subsequent Buyers were not innocent purchasers. Not one of the Subsequent
1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under the rulings in these two cases, the period Buyers testified in court on how they purchased their respective lots. Spouses
to repurchase the disputed lot given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982. Alfredo and Subsequent Buyers appealed to CA CA affirmed RTC in toto o
He failed to exercise his right. His lost right cannot be revived by relying on the ruled that the handwritten receipt dated 11 March 1970 is sufficient proof that
1988 case of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the subject lot had already Godofredo and Carmen sold the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia upon payment
become vested as of that time and cannot be impaired by the retroactive of the balance of the purchase price. The Court of Appeals found the recitals in the
application of the Belisario ruling.18 (emphasis supplied) WHEREFORE, the receipt as “sufficient to serve as the memorandum or note as a writing under the
motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and the supplement to the Statute of Frauds.”[5] The Court of Appeals then reiterated the ruling of the trial
motion for reconsideration dated November 11, 2002 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. court that the Statute of Frauds does not apply in this case. o The Court of Appeals
While we clarify that the Decision of this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, held that the contract of sale is not void even if only Carmen signed the receipt
our ruling therein that a petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from dated 11 March 1970. Citing Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo Aldon,[6] the appellate
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts shall apply only to cases appealed after the court ruled that a contract of sale made by the wife without the husband’s consent
finality of this Resolution. is not void but merely voidable Spouses Alfredo and Subsequent Buyers
brought a Rule 45 to SC
SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO, SPOUSES
ARNULFO SAVELLANO and EDITHA B. SAVELLANO, DANTON D. MATAWARAN, ISSUE: Should SC review the factual circumstances surrounding the case?
SPOUSES DELFIN F. ESPIRITU, JR. and ESTELA S. ESPIRITU and ELIZABETH
TUAZON, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON HELD: NO. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews
BORRAS, respondents. G.R. No. 144225. June 17, 2003 FIRST DIVISION only errors of law and not errors of facts.[9] The factual findings of the appellate
court are generally binding on this Court.[10] This applies with greater force when
FACTS: Spouses Alfredo are the registered owners of the subject land located in both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their
Bataan They mortgaged the subject land to DBP for P7,000.00 To pay the factual findings.[11] In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of
debt, they allegedly sold the same to Spouses Borras o for P15,000.00, the buyers the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the trial and appellate courts are borne
to pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest, and the balance to be paid in out by the record. We agree with the conclusions drawn by the lower courts from
cash to the sellers. The debt was paid, mortgage cancelled and OCT delivered these facts.
to Spouses Borras Spouses Borras learned, however, that Spouses Alfredo re-
sold certain portions of the land Spouses Borras filed an adverse claim with PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH “BETH” CORPUZ, appellant.
the Register of Deeds of Bataan o Learned that Spouses Alfredo acquired a new G.R. No. 148198 October 1, 2003 FIRST DIVISION
OCT after filing a petition before the court for the issuance of a new copy Spouses
Borras filed a complaint for specific performance against Spouses Alfredo before FACTS: Private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda
RTC Bataan o They then amended their complaint to include the following persons Pascual and Restian Surio applied as factory workers in Taiwan through Alga-
as additional defendants: the spouses Arnulfo Savellano and Editha B. Savellano, Moher International Placement Services Corporatio Corpuz was the one who
Danton D. Matawaran, the spouses Delfin F. Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S. Espiritu, and received their documents and processing fees and informed them to await their
Elizabeth Tuazon (“Subsequent Buyers”) Spouses Alfredo and Subsequent contracts Private complainants demanded for refund but Corpuz failed to comply
Buyers filed an Answer o unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds o there is They then filed their complaint before the NBI Corpuz was then charged with
no written instrument evidencing the alleged contract of sale over the Subject Land Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under Sec. 6 (l)
in favor of Armando and Adelia. Petitioners objected to whatever parole evidence and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the “Migrant
Armando and Adelia introduced or offered on the alleged sale unless the same was Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of l995 During the pendency of the case
in writing and subscribed by Godofredo. Petitioners asserted that the Subsequent before RTC, private complainants received their refund, hence, executed an
Buyers were buyers in good faith and for value. As counterclaim, petitioners sought affidavit of desistance RTC convicted Corpuz Corpuz appealed directly
payment of attorney’s fees and incidental expenses. RTC in favor of Spouses to SC

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Owen Amor and the latter’s cousin, Salvador Gonzales wait for them in line They
ISSUE: Should SC review the factual circumstances surrounding the case? were not able to board the flight, which left at 7:30AM They then sought an
afternoon flight o Unfortunately, the 2:30 p.m. flight, PR 278, was cancelled due
HELD: YES. (Corpuz was acquitted by the SC) The trial court convicted appellant to “aircraft situation”.[11] o Private respondents were told to wait for the 5:30
based on its findings that despite the suspension of the agency’s license, appellant p.m. flight, PR 180. They checked-in their luggage and gave their tickets
still convinced the applicants to give their money with the promise to land a job However, they were again unable to board the same because they were only
abroad. Moreover, as the registered secretary of the agency she had management waitlisted and considered as non-revenue passengers Judy Amor et al filed a
control of the recruitment business. It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the complaint for damages against RTC Sorsogon RTC in favor of Judy Amor et al
trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and probative CA affirmed in toto; denied PAL’s MR
weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this
Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of ISSUE: Should SC review the factual circumstances surrounding the case?
the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment
and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court.[12] However, HELD: YES. (but SC still affirmed CA’s decision, albeit with modifications) In
this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by
would alter the outcome of the case.[13] The exception obtains in this case. The this Court.[18] Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us
records of the case show that Alga-Moher International Placement Service especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court.[19] This is
Corporation is a licensed land-based recruitment agency. Its license was valid until because it is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.[20]
August 24, 1999.[14] Likewise, appellant was its registered secretary while Mrs. However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to wit: o (a) where there is grave
Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes is its President/General Manager.[15] Part of its regular abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
business activity is to accept applicants who desire to work here or abroad. surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
Appellant, as secretary of the agency, was in charge of the custody and absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based
documentation of the overseas contracts. It is clear that all appellant did was on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f)
receive the processing fees upon instruction of Mrs. Reyes. She neither convinced when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
the private complainants to give their money nor promised them employment case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
abroad. (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the
respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[21] o
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDY AMOR, JANE Petitioner invokes exception (b). As to the first issue: Whether or not private
GAMIL, minors GIAN CARLO AMOR represented by ATTY. OWEN AMOR, and CARLO respondents checked-in on time for PR 178. The determination of this issue is
BENITEZ represented by JOSEPHINE BENITEZ, respondents. G.R. No. 127473. necessary because it is expressly stipulated in the airline tickets issued to private
December 8, 2003 SECOND DIVISION respondents that PAL will consider the reserved seat cancelled if the passenger
fails to check-in at least thirty minutes before the published departure time.[22]
FACTS: After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to disturb the affirmance
Judy Amor purchased 3 confirmed plane tickets for her and her infant son, Gian by the CA of the findings of the trial court that the private respondents have
Carlo Amor, and her sister Jane Gamil for flight PR 178 (7:10 a.m) bound for Manila checked-in on time; that they reached the airport at 6:20 a.m., based on the
from Legaspi They arrived at the Legaspi airport at 6:20 a.m. for PR 178 testimonies of private respondent Judy Amor, and witnesses Salvador Gonzales
Since the minor Gian was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of one Dra. Emily and Atty. Owen Amor who were consistent in their declarations on the witness
Chua, Judy went to the counter to make arrangements therefor while one Atty. stand and corroborated one another’s statements; and that the testimony of

325
petitioner’s lone witness, Lloyd Fojas is not sufficient to overcome private of evidence is only preponderance of evidence. As aptly observed by the CA
respondents’ evidence. We have repeatedly held that the truth is established which we hereby adopt: o Ironically for the defendant, aside from appellant’s
not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies.[23] In the assumption that Baltazar could be a disgruntled former employee of their company
present case, it cannot be said that the quality of the testimony of petitioner’s lone and could be biased (which same reason could be attributed to Lloyd Fojas) due to
witness is greater than those of the private respondents. Fojas testified that when a distant relationship with the plaintiff, it offered no proof or evidence to rebut,
respondents went to the check-in counter, there were no more persons in that area demean and contradict the substance of the testimony of Baltazar on the crucial
since all the passengers already boarded the plane.[24] However, the testimonies point that plaintiffs-appellees were bumped off to accommodate non-revenue,
of Manuel Baltazar and Judy Amor together with the manifest, Exhibits “E”, “E-1” waitlisted or go-show passengers. On this fact alone, defendant’s position weakens
and “E-2”, point to the fact that many passengers were not able to board said while credibly establishing that indeed plaintiffs arrived at the airport on time to
flight, including confirmed passengers, because of overbooking.[25] It is a well- check-in for Flight PR 178. Further emphasis must be made that Lloyd Fojas even
entrenched principle that absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any affirmed in court that he can not recall how many PR 178 boarding passes he had
palpable error in its findings, this Court will not question the probative weight at the check-in counter because management has authority to accommodate in
accorded by the lower courts to the various evidence presented by the parties. As any flight and correspondingly issue boarding passes to non-revenue passengers
we explained in Superlines Transportation Co. Inc., vs. ICC Leasing & Financing (pages 15-16, TSN, January 24, 1990).[31] Indeed, petitioner, through its lone
Corporation:[26] o The Court is not tasked to calibrate and assess the probative witness Fojas, could only answer during his examination on the witness stand that
weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over again…So long as he is unable to recall the circumstances recommending the issuances of boarding
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are consistent with or are not palpably passes to waitlisted and that it is the management which has the authority to issue
contrary to the evidence on record, this Court shall decline to embark on a review boarding passes to non-revenue passengers.[32] Even in the afternoon flight, PR
on the probative weight of the evidence of the parties.[27] (Emphasis supplied) 180, Fojas could not squarely deny that confirmed paying passengers were
It is also well established that findings of trial courts on the credibility of bumped-off in favor of nonrevenue ones We have noted an inconsistency in the
witnesses is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal except on testimony of private respondents’ witness, Salvador Gonzales in the direct and
very strong and cogent grounds.[28] Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the trial cross-examinations. In his direct testimony, Gonzales stated that while he was
court committed any error in upholding the testimonies of private respondents’ waiting in line at the check-in counter, with four persons still ahead of him, Lloyd
witnesses. We find that the CA committed no reversible error in sustaining the Fojas asked him to approach the counter, took private respondents’ tickets and
findings of facts of the trial court. Private respondents who had confirmed tickets wrote something on them. It was only later on when his turn came, that he found
for PR 178 were bumped-off in favor of non-revenue passengers. Witness Manuel out that what Fojas wrote on the tickets was “late check-n 7:05”. On cross-
Baltazar, a former Acting Manager of petitioner, evaluated the manifest for PR 178 examination, Gonzales testified that it was only after the four persons ahead of
and found that there were non-revenue passengers allowed to go on board. He him were accommodated that Fojas wrote on the tickets “late check-in 7:05”.
specifically identified the family of Labanda, a certain Mr. Luz, petitioner’s former However, upon clarificatory questions propounded by the trial court, Gonzales was
branch manager, and, a certain Mr. Moyo. [29] Although petitioner had every able to clarify that Fojas had written the time on the ticket before the four persons
opportunity to refute such testimony, it failed to present any countervailing ahead of him were entertained at the counter.[36] Understandably, the lower
evidence. Instead, petitioner merely focused on assailing the credibility of Baltazar courts found no cogent reason to discredit the testimony of witness Gonzales.
on the ground that he was a disgruntled employee and a relative of private We have held in an earlier case that a witness may contradict himself on the
respondents. Apart from the bare allegations in petitioner’s pleadings, no evidence circumstances of an act or different acts due to a long series of questions on cross-
was ever presented in court to substantiate its claim that Baltazar was a disgruntled examination during which the mind becomes tired to such a degree that the witness
employee that impelled him to testify against petitioner. As to his relationship does not understand what he is testifying about, especially if the questions, in their
with private respondents, this Court has repeatedly held that a witness’ relationship majority are leading and tend to make him ratify a former contrary declaration.[37]
to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.[30] In fine, the findings of fact of the trial court, as sustained by the CA, have to be
While this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same respected. As we have consistently held, trial courts enjoy the unique advantage
principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness’ relationship of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of witnesses
with a party does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where as they give their testimonies. Thus, assignment to declarations on the witness
the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no stand is best done by them who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh firsthand
reason why the same principle should not apply in civil cases where the quantum the testimony of a witness.[38] Anent the second issue as to whether or not the

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damages awarded are excessive, we rule in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals that she felt “ashamed” when the plane took off and they were left at the airport
committed an error in sustaining the ruling of the trial court requiring petitioner to since there were many people there who saw them including dentists like her. She
reimburse private respondents the amount of four plane tickets, including the ticket also related that she missed the Philippine Dental Convention scheduled on the 8th
for private respondent minor Carlo Benitez. As admitted by private respondent of May, 1988 where she was supposed to attend as a dentist and officer of the
Judy in her testimony, the only confirmed tickets for the morning flight (PR 178) Sorsogon Dental Association. They tried to look for buses bound for Manila but
are the tickets for herself, her infant son, Gian Carlo and her sister Jane Gamil. missed those scheduled in the morning. They went back to the airport but still
They had another ticket which Judy bought for a certain Dra. Emily Chua who failed to take an afternoon flight. Hence, she was forced to take a bus that evening
backed out and whose ticket they had intended to be transferred to Carlo for Manila which did not allow her to sleep that night.[46] Private respondent Judy
Benitez.[39] Although it is clearly stated in the ticket that the same is non- however did not miss the whole convention as she was able to leave on the night
transferrable,[40] Judy testified that a PAL employee issued another ticket in the of the first day of the week-long convention. While there is no hard and fast rule
name of Carlo Benitez in lieu of the ticket issued for Dra. Chua. However, an for determining what would be a fair amount of moral damages, generally, the
examination of the ticket issued, Exhibit “C”, discloses that it does not state therein amount awarded should be commensurate with the actual loss or injury
the flight number or time of departure. Consequently, in the absence of competent suffered.[47] The CA erred in upholding the trial court’s award of moral damages
evidence, private respondent Carlo Benitez’ complaint should be dismissed. based on Judy Amor’s claim that there was a denigration of her social and financial
We find no justifiable reason that warrants the award of P100,000.00 as actual standing. Private respondent Judy failed to show that she was treated rudely or
damages in favor of all private respondents. Article 2199 of the Civil Code, disrespectfully by petitioner’s employees despite her stature as a dentist. As we
provides that actual or compensatory damages may only be given for such held in Kierulf vs. Court of Appeals[48] The social and financial standing of Lucila
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. We explained in Chan vs. cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. The factual circumstances prior
Maceda[41] that: o …A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork to the accident show that no “rude and rough” reception, no “menacing attitude,”
as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proo f no “supercilious manner,” no “abusive language and highly scornful reference” was
that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable given her. The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may
evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts which could be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne contemptuous conduct despite the offender’s knowledge of his or her social and
.[42] All that was proved by herein private respondents was the amount of the financial standing.[49] (Emphasis supplied) Nevertheless, we hold that private
purchase price of the plane tickets of private respondents Judy, Jane and Gian respondent Judy Amor is entitled to moral damages. In a number of cases, we
Carlo. Only said amounts should therefore be considered in awarding actual have pronounced that air carriage is a business possessed with special qualities.
damages. As borne by the records, private respondent Judy Amor paid P466.00 In Singson vs. Court of Appeals,[50] we explained that: o A contract of air carriage
each for her ticket and that of Jane; while she paid P46.60 for her infant Gian is a peculiar one. Imbued with public interest, common carriers are required by
Carlo.[43] The amount of actual damages should therefore be reduced to P978.60, law to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
payable to private respondent Judy Amor. As to moral damages. It should be using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the
stressed that moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at he expense circumstances. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
of the defendant but are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, degree from any other contractual relation. And this because its business is mainly
diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has with the traveling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages
undergone due to the defendant’s culpable action.[44] We emphasized in Philippine it offers. The contract of carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals that moral damages are not punitive in nature public duty. Failure of the carrier to observe this high degree of care and
but are designed to somehow alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, extraordinary diligence renders it liable for any damage that may be sustained by
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, its passengers.[51] As the lower courts have found, evidence positively show
social humiliation and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. We have held that petitioner has accommodated waitlisted and non-revenue passengers and had
that even though moral damages are incapable of pecuniary computation, it should overbooked more than what is allowed by law, to the prejudice of private
nevertheless be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. respondents who had confirmed tickets. Overbooking amounts to bad faith[52]
And, to be recoverable, such damage must be the proximate result of a wrongful and therefore petitioner is liable to pay moral damages to respondent Judy Amor.
act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the Considering all the foregoing, we deem that the award of P250,000.00 as moral
aggrieved party. [45] In the case at bar, private respondent Judy Amor testified damages in favor of private respondent Judy Amor is exorbitant. Where the

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damages awarded are far too excessive compared to the actual losses sustained RD informed Cleofe, upon presentation of the OCT, that the owner’s copy had
by the aggrieved party, the same should be reduced to a more reasonable already been issued to Ruben Augusto, pursuant to an Order issued by the court
amount.[53] We find the amount of P100,000.00 to be sufficient, just and dated August 23, 1996, and that based on the record, the same was in the
reasonable. We consider the award of actual damages in favor of private possession of Atty. Noel Archival. Cleofe filed a petition before the RTC o
respondent Jane Gamil to be inappropriate considering the testimony of Judy Amor alleging that as lawful co-owner and possessor of Lot No. 4429, she had every right
that she was the one who paid for the tickets.[54] Likewise, the appellate court to have and hold the owner’s duplicate of the said OCT. She prayed that after due
erred in sustaining the award of moral damages in favor of Jane Gamil as she never proceedings, the respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival be ordered
testified in court. It has been held that where the plaintiff fails to take the witness to surrender the owner’s copy of the said title Augusto et al the deed of sale
stand and testify as to his social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral executed in favor of Guillermo and Cleofe was fictitious RTC ruled as follows:
damages cannot be recovered”.[55] As to the award of exemplary damages, o The trial court declared that, based on the pleadings of the parties, the issue of
Article 2234 of the Civil Code provides that the claimant must show that he would ownership over the property had been raised, a matter which the court, sitting as
be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may a cadastral court, could not pass upon. The trial court further ruled that pending
consider the question whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. resolution of the issue of ownership over the property in an appropriate
Consequently, private respondent Jane Gamil, not being entitled to actual and proceedings therefor, there was a need for the annotation of the petitioners’
moral damages, is not entitled to exemplary damages. The award of exemplary interest over the property. The respondents therein filed a “Motion for a Partial
damages in favor of private respondent Judy Amor is warranted in this case.[56] Reconsideration” of the Order alleging that Cleofe’s interest over the property had
Waitlisted and non-revenue passengers were accommodated while private been sufficiently protected by the annotation of her adverse claim. Augusto et
respondent Judy Amor who had fully paid her fare and was a confirmed passenger al suggested in their motion: o it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court
was unduly deprived of enplaning. Petitioner was guilty of overbooking its flight to to partially reconsider its Order dated 22 October 1997 and issue a new order
the prejudice of its confirmed passengers. This practice cannot be countenanced enjoin (sic) the respondent to produce the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560 before
especially considering that the business of air carriage is imbued with public the Office of the Register of Deeds, Lapu-Lapu City on 25 November 1997 at 2:30
character. We have ruled that where in breaching the contract of carriage, the p.m. Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for under the premises.
airline is shown to have acted in bad faith, as in this case,[57] the award of RTC denied the motion Augusto et al filed a Rule 65 before SC
exemplary damages in addition to moral and actual damages is proper.[58]
However, as in the matter of the moral damages awarded by the trial court, we ISSUES: What is the nature of the subject Order? Ad cautelam. Is Rule 65
consider the amount of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages to be far too the correct remedy? NO.
excessive. The amount of P25,000.00 is just and proper. We find the award of
attorney’s fees in this case to be in order since it is well settled that the same may HELD: Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be
be awarded when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to taken only from a final order, and not from an interlocutory one.[6] A final order
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what
RUBEN AUGUSTO and ATTY. NOEL D. ARCHIVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE has been determined.[7] An order or judgment is deemed final if
TEODORO K. RISOS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights
City, CLEOFE OMOLON, respondents. G.R. No. 131794. December 10, 2003 of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate
SECOND DIVISION branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. Where no
issue is left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance with the terms
FACTS: Felisa Augusto and her siblings, Jose Augusto, Magdalena Augusto and of the order, such order is final and appealable.[8] In contrast, an order is
Alfonso Augusto were the co-owners of the subject land located in Cebu They interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case.
then sold the same to Guillermo Omolon. Guillermo and his wife, Cleofe, caused
the aforesaid document to be registered in the Office of the City Assessor In the In this case, the order of the public respondent directing the petitioners to
meantime, the same property was registered in the names of Monico, Felisa, Jose, produce the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560 in the Office of the Register of Deeds
Filomeno, Teofilo and Sinfroso, all surnamed Augusto Guillermo died Cleofe for the annotation of the private respondent’s interest over the property is merely
filed a petition for reconstitution of her OCT before the RTC o RTC granted interlocutory and not final; hence, not appealable by means of a writ of error. The

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public respondent had not fully disposed of the case as it had not yet ruled on token, it has been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather,
whether to grant the private respondent’s prayer for the surrender of the owner’s of mere procedure, which may be waived. It is not amiss to state likewise that
copy of OCT No. 3560. As gleaned from the order of the respondent judge, he where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right
believed that he had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership of registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over
over the property and was disposed to dismiss the petition. Before so doing, he it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their respective exhibits
believed it was necessary that the petitioner’s claim over the property be annotated to defeat one another’s claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which
at the dorsal portion of the title before the institution of an ordinary motion for the case, registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the
resolution of the conflicting claims of ownership over the property: o Going over court first decided it.[11] Earlier, we ruled in Averia, Jr. v. Caguioa,[12] thus: o
the pleadings of the parties, the court gathers that ownership over the land in The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction
question is disputed by the parties, which this court, sitting as a cadastral court, vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by
cannot pass upon. However, since the petitioner has also shown enough basis for the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
claiming possession of the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560, by virtue of the Deed of multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by
Absolute Sale (Annex “A”), and in view of the willingness of Atty. Archival to have conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications
petitioner’s interest annotated at the back of the title, the court feels that for the for “original registration” but also “over all petitions filed after original registration
protection of both parties, the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560 in the possession of of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
Atty. Noel Archival must be produced, in order that petitioner’s interest may be applications or petitions.” o Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section
annotated therein pending resolution of the issue on ownership in the proper 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is
proceedings. o WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Noel Archival is hereby directed to no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief
produce the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560, before the Office of the Clerk of Court only in cases where there was “unanimity among the parties” or none of them
within ten (10) days from receipt of this order to allow the annotation of petitioner’s raised any “adverse claim o erious objection.” Under the amended law, the court
interest, after which the title may be returned to the respondent.[9] In fine, the is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but
assailed order of the respondent judge partook of the nature of an ad cautelam even the contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which
order. This is not to say that the respondent court sitting as a cadastral court had were beyond its competence before.
no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership over the property.
Apropos is our ruling in Vda. de Arceo v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[10] viz: o The
first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have held
that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as
circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law. We
said that the Decree “has eliminated the distinction between the general CORAZON L. ESCUETA, assisted by her husband EDGAR ESCUETA, IGNACIO E.
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred RUBIO, THE HEIRS OF LUZ R. BALOLOY, namely, ALEJANDRINO R. BALOLOY and
upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court.” The BAYANI R. BALOLOY, Petitioners, vs. RUFINA LIM, Respondent. G.R. No. 137162
amendment was “[a]imed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has January 24, 2007 FIRST DIVISION
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts the
authority to act not only on applications for ‘original registration’ but also ‘over all FACTS: Rufina Lim alleged that she bought the hereditary shares of Ignacio
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine Rubio [and] the heirs of Luz Baloloy, namely: Alejandrino, Bayani, and other co-
all questions arising from such applications or petitions.” At any rate, we have also heirs, paying therefor [a down payment] or earnest money in the amount of
stated that the limited jurisdiction-rule governing land registration courts is subject P102,169.86 and P450,000 However, Rubio allegedly refused to receive the
to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or have balance of P100,000 Escueta, in spite her knowledge of the said sale, was
acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they executed in her favor a deed of sale by Rubio Escuata, Rubio, Baloloys filed
have been given full opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court separate Answers o Lim has no COA Baloloys failed to appear at the pre-trial
has considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that the same is RTC declared the Baloloys; allowed evidence ex parte in favor of Lim;
sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial issues. By the same rendered a partial decision against Baloloys Baloloys filed a petition for relief

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from judgment and supplemental petition o RTC denied Baloloys appealed has been made by them. Pre-trial is mandatory.10 The notices of pre-trial had
to CA CA initially affirmed RTC BUT later on reversed; then denied Baloloys’ been sent to both the Baloloys and their former counsel of record. Being served
MR Baloloys’ arguments: o First, the CA did not consider the circumstances with notice, he is
surrounding petitioners’ failure to appear at the pre-trial and to file the petition for "charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him."11 He must "see
relief on time. o As to the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was fraud, to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial."12 What the
accident and/or excusable neglect, because petitioner Bayani was in the United Baloloys and their former counsel have alleged instead in their Motion to Lift Order
States. There was no service of the notice of pre-trial or order. Neither did the of As In Default dated December 11, 1991 is the belated receipt of Bayani Baloloy’s
former counsel of record inform him. Consequently, the order declaring him in special power of attorney in favor of their former counsel, not that they have not
default is void, and all subsequent proceedings, orders, or decision are void. o received the notice or been informed of the scheduled pre-trial. Not having raised
Furthermore, petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed with a power of attorney to the ground of lack of a special power of attorney in their motion, they are now
appear on behalf of Bayani at the pre-trial conference. o Second, the sale by deemed to have waived it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at this late stage of the
Virginia to respondent is not binding. Petitioner Rubio did not authorize Virginia to proceedings. For lack of representation, Bayani Baloloy was properly declared in
transact business in his behalf pertaining to the property. The Special Power of default. Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states: o SEC. 3. Time for
Attorney was constituted in favor of Llamas, and the latter was not empowered to filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either of the
designate a substitute attorney-in-fact. Llamas even disowned her signature preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after
appearing on the "Joint Special Power of Attorney," which constituted Virginia as the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
her true and lawful attorney-in-fact in selling Rubio’s properties. o Third, the aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was
contract between respondent and Virginia is a contract to sell, not a contract of entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits
sale. The real character of the contract is not the title given, but the intention of showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the
the parties. They intended to reserve ownership of the property to petitioners facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense,
pending full payment of the purchase price. Together with taxes and other fees as the case may be There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of
due on the properties, these are conditions precedent for the perfection of the sale. the above-cited rule. "The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party
Even assuming that the contract is ambiguous, the same must be resolved against acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from the date
respondent, the party who caused the same. o Fourth, Respondent failed to he actually read the same."13 As aptly put by the appellate court: o The evidence
faithfully fulfill her part of the obligation. Thus, Rubio had the right to sell his on record as far as this issue is concerned shows that Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr.,
properties to Escueta who exercised due diligence in ascertaining ownership of the the former counsel of record of the Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision
properties sold to her. Besides, a purchaser need not inquire beyond what appears dated June 23, 1993 on April 5, 1994. At that time, said former counsel is still their
in a Torrens title. counsel of record. The reckoning of the 60 day period therefore is the date when
the said counsel of record received a copy of the partial decision which was on April
ISSUE: Should SC review the factual circumstances surrounding the case? 5, 1994. The petition for relief was filed by the new counsel on July 4, 1994 which
means that 90 days have already lapsed or 30 days beyond the 60 day period.
HELD: NO. The petition lacks merit. The contract of sale between petitioners and Moreover, the records further show that the Baloloys received the partial decision
respondent is valid. Bayani Baloloy was represented by his attorney-in-fact, on September 13, 1993 as evidenced by Registry return cards which bear the
Alejandrino Baloloy. In the Baloloys’ answer to the original complaint and amended numbers 02597 and 02598 signed by Mr. Alejandrino Baloloy.
complaint, the allegations relating to the personal circumstances of the Baloloys
are clearly admitted. "An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and HEIRS OF PETRA
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof."6 The "factual CAPISTRANO PIIT, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL
admission in the pleadings on record [dispenses] with the need x x x to present TRIAL COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,
evidence to prove the admitted fact."7 It cannot, therefore, "be controverted by DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), DAR
the party making such admission, and [is] conclusive"8 as to them. All proofs REGION X DIRECTOR, ROSALIO GAMULO, FORTUNATO TELEN, EMERITA OLANGO,
submitted by them "contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored THERESA MONTUERTO, DOMINGO H. CLAPERO, JOEL U. LIM, JENEMAIR U.
whether objection is interposed by a party or not."9 Besides, there is no showing POLLEY, FIDELA U. POLLEY, JESUS BATUTAY, NICANOR UCAB, EMERIA U. LIM,
that a palpable mistake has been committed in their admission or that no admission EMILITO CLAPERO, ANTONINA RIAS, AURILLIO ROMULO, ERWIN P. CLAPERO,

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EVELITO CULANGO, VILMA/CRUISINE ALONG, EFREN EMATA, GREGORIO judgments. Petitioners, however, contend that the RTC may take cognizance of the
CABARIBAN, and SABINA CANTORANA, Respondents. G.R. NO. 142628 annulment case since Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 vests the RTC with general
February 6, 2007 THIRD DIVISION jurisdiction and an action for annulment is covered under such general jurisdiction.
According to petitioners, "this is but a logical consequence of the fact that no other
FACTS: Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de Oro City. She courts were expressly given the jurisdiction over such actions."19 Petitioners
then sold Lot No. 2291-C to Springfield DAR then issued a Notice of Coverage further argue that the CA was in error when it summarily ignored their application
placing the property under the coverage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the for a writ of prohibition, as it was necessary to restrain the DARAB from enforcing
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 Heirs of Piit filed an opposition its void decision; and even if the DARAB decision was valid, the writ of prohibition
thereto before the DARAB DARAB rendered a decision declaring the nature of could have enjoined the execution of the DARAB decision since there have been
the property as residential and not suitable for agriculture DAR filed a Notice changes which will make the execution unjust and inequitable. In their Joint-
of Appeal before the Provincial Adjudicator o Provincial Adjudicator disallowed Comments, the farmer-beneficiaries and the DARAB (respondents) refute
the same for being pro forma and frivolous The DARAB decision then became petitioners' allegation that they were not afforded due process in the DARAB
final and executory and Springfield proceeded with the possession of the property proceedings, stating that petitioners were impleaded as a party thereto, and in
DAR filed a petition for relief from judgment before the DARAB o DARAB fact, they attended some of the hearings although their counsel was absent.
granted the same; gave due course to the Notice of Coverage; ordered Springfield Respondents also adopt the CA's ruling that the RTC is not vested with any
and Heirs of Piit to pay the farmerbeneficiaries Springfield and Heirs filed a jurisdiction to annul the DARAB decision. As stated at the outset, the main issue
petition for annulment of the DARAB decision before RTC CDO RTC dismissed in this case is whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the
the petition for lack of jurisdiction Springfield and Heirs filed before CA a DARAB. Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the DARAB
special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the decision was filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997, before the advent of the 1997
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order o Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, the applicable
alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the law is B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, enacted on August
annulment of judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a 10, 1981. It is also worthy of note that before the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 129, a
different color. According to petitioners, what it sought before the RTC is an court of first instance has the authority to annul a final and executory judgment
annulment of the DARAB Decision and not certiorari, as the DARAB Decision is void rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court.
ab initio for having been rendered without due process of law CA dismissed This was the Court's ruling in Dulap v. Court of Appeals.20 Yet, in subsequent
the petition o ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB cases,21 the Court held that the better policy, as a matter of comity or courteous
Decision because it is a co-equal body Springfield and Heirs filed an MR CA interaction between courts of first instance and the branches thereof, is for the
thereafter issued an Order to elevate the DARAB records before it o declaring annulment cases to be tried by the same court or branch which heard the main
that it "overlooked the fact that petitioners likewise applied for a writ of prohibition action. The foregoing doctrines were modified in Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo,22
against the enforcement of the DARAB decision which they claim to be patently where the Court expressed that pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the
void." doctrine of non-interference between concurrent and coordinate courts should be
regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the judgment
CA then denied the MR of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by
any court of concurrent jurisdiction. With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129,23
ISSUES: Is DARAB a co-equal body with the RTC? YES. Did the RTC correctly the rule on annulment of judgments was specifically provided in Section 9(2), which
dismiss the petition for relief from judgment for lack of jurisdiction? YES. Was a vested in the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the CA) the exclusive original
Rule 65 the correct remedy of Springfield and Heirs from the RTC order dismissing jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs. Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg.
said petition for relief from judgment? NO. But the case was r emanded to CA for 129 also vested the CA with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
the resolution of the application for writ of injunction judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
Should the SC review the factual circumstances of the case? NO. quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
HELD: Petitioners argue that under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, there is no the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third
provision that vests with the CA jurisdiction over actions for annulment of DARAB paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the

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Judiciary Act of 1948." As provided in paragraph 16 of the Interim Rules and petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC
Guidelines implementing B.P. Blg. 129, the quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same. This brings to fore the
are exclusively appealable to the CA are those, which under the law, R.A. No. issue of whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be
5434,24 or its enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the CA. Significantly, brought to the CA . As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the
B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any power of the RTC to annul CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but
judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. However, in BF Northwest Homeowners only those rendered by the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to
Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,25 the Court ruled that the RTCs annul judgments of quasijudicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano,30
have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the decisions of the National Water the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a
Resources Council, which is a quasi - judicial body ranked with inferior courts, petition for annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section
pursuant to its original j urisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction
mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation to acts or omissions of over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts." This was
an inferior court. This led to the conclusion that despite the absence of any reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals,31 where the Court ruled that that the CA
provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC had the power to entertain petitions for is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of judgment of a final
annulment of judgments of inferior courts and administrative or quasi-judicial decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Recent rulings on similar
bodies of equal ranking. This is also in harmony with the "pre-B.P. Blg. 129" rulings cases involving annulments of judgments of quasijudicial bodies are also quite
of the Court recognizing the power of a trial court (court of first instance) to annul instructive on this matter. In Cole v. Court of Appeals,32 involving an annulment
final judgments.26 Hence, while it is true, as petitioners contend, that the RTC had of the judgment of the HLURB Arbiter and the Office of the President (OP), filed
the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertained only to final with the CA, the Court stated that, "(U)nder Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the
judgments rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking remedy of annulment of judgment is confined to decisions of the Regional Trial
with such inferior courts. The foregoing statements beg the next question, i.e., Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction x x x." The Court
whether the DARAB is a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an inferior court such further ruled, viz.: o Although the grounds set forth in the petition for annulment
that the RTC may take cognizance of an action for the annulments of its judgments. of judgment are fraud and lack of jurisdiction, said petition cannot prosper for the
o The answer is no. simple reason that the decision sought to be annulled was not rendered by the
The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and Regional Trial Court but by an administrative agency (HLU Arbiter and Office of the
129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers and functions. The DARAB President), hence, not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. There is no
Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on December 26, 198827 specifically provides such remedy as annulment of judgment of the HLURB or the Office of the President.
for the manner of judicial review of its decisions, orders, rulings, or awards. Rule Assuming arguendo that the annulment petition can be treated as a petition for
XIV, Section 1 states: o SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same should have
decision, order, award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any agrarian been dismissed by the Court of Appeals, because no error of judgment was imputed
dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, to the HLURB and the Office of the President. Fraud and lack of jurisdiction are
enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations beyond the province of petitions under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as it covers
promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of only errors of judgment. A petition for annulment of judgment is an initiatory
a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as provided in the next remedy, hence no error of judgment can be the subject thereof. Besides, the
succeeding section. Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision Arbiter and the Office of the President indisputably have jurisdiction over the cases
of the Board or Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately executory. brought before them in line with our ruling in Francisco Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of
Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly Appeals, promulgated on March 17, 2000, where the aggrieved townhouse buyers
provides for an appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA. The rule is that may seek protection from the HLURB under Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise
where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative known as "Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree."33 (Emphasis
bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co - equal w ith the RTC, in terms supplied) In Macalalag v. Ombudsman,34 the Court ruled that Rule 47 of the
of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Given that 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on annulment of judgments or final orders and
DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the resolutions covers "annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders
DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies could

332
no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner." Thus, the Court adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture, while
concluded that judgments or final orders and resolutions of the Ombudsman in the remaining approximately 100 hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and
administrative cases cannot be annulled by the CA, more so, since The Ombudsman found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-
Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives beneficiaries.1awphi1.net o A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, and the of the Revised Rules of Court36 was then filed with the Court, which was contested
right to appeal is not to be considered granted to parties aggrieved by orders and by the Office of the Solicitor General on the ground that the proper remedy should
decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases. While have been to file a petition for review directly with the CA in accordance with Rule
these cases involve annulments of judgments under the 1997 Rules of Civil 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. o In resolving the issue, the Court recognized the
Procedure, as amended, still, they still find application in the present case, as the rule that the Supreme Court, CA and RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to
provisions of B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. However, due to compel ling
annulment of judgments are identical. reasons and in the interest of speedy justice, the Court resolved to take primary
jurisdiction over the petition in the interest of speedy justice, after which the Court
Consequently, the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to annul nullified the act of the OP in re - opening the case and substantially modifying it s
judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies like the DARAB March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, as it was
indicates its lack of such authority. Further, petitioners are also asking the Court in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
to take cognizance of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of prohibition, which administrative determinations. It must be stressed at this point that the Court,
they claim was not acted upon by the CA, citing the Court's action in Fortich v. as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
Corona35 where the Court took cognizance of the petition previously filed with the obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances,
CA due to compelling reasons. The Court is not persuaded to do so. o Fortich such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment
involved a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling
the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.37 The Court finds no compelling
(NQSRMDC), which was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte Philippines, circumstances in this case to warrant a relaxation of the foregoing rule. The Fortich
Inc. for a period of 10 years. During the existence of the lease, the DAR placed the case is not analogous with the present case such that the Court is not bound to
entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land abandon all rules, take primary jurisdiction, and resolve the merits of petitioners'
value at P2.38 million. When the NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial application for a writ of prohibition. In the present case, the assailed DARAB
Development Association) filed an application for conversion due to the passage of Decision dated October 5, 1995 granting the petition for relief from judgment and
Resolution No. 6 by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon and Ordinance giving due course to the Notice of Coverage was made pursuant to a petition for
No. 24 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, reclassifying the area relief from judgment filed by the DAR, albeit petitioners are contesting the validity
from agricultural to industrial/institutional, the same was disapproved by the DAR of the proceedings held thereon. On the other hand, in Fortich, the OP's "Win/Win"
Secretary and instead, the property was placed under the compulsory coverage of resolution dated November 7, 1997 was made motu proprio, as a result of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program for distribution to all qualified hunger strike staged by the farmer-beneficiaries. Further, the OP's "Win/Win"
beneficiaries. This prompted Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon to file an Resolution dated November 7, 1997 in the Fortich case is a patently void judgment
appeal with the OP, while NQSRMDC filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, and since it was evident that there was already an existing final and executory OP
prohibition with preliminary injunction. o The OP then issued a Decision dated Decision dated March 29, 1996. In this case, the assailed DARAB Decision dated
March 29, 1996 reversing the DAR Secretary's decision and approving the October 5, 1995 appears to be regular on its face, and for its alleged nullity to be
application for conversion. Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denied the DAR's resolved, the Court must delve into the records of the case in order to determine
motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period the validity of petitioners' argument of lack of due process, absent notice and
of 15 days, and it was also declared that the OP Decision dated March 29, 1996 hearing. Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases
had already become final and executory. o Because of this, the farmer-beneficiaries involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
staged a hunger strike on October 9, 1997, protesting the OP's decision. In order entertain cases involving factual issues.38 The question of whether the DARAB
to resolve the strike, the OP issued a so-called "Win/Win" resolution on November Decision dated October 5, 1995 is null and void and enforceable against petitioners
7, 1997, modifying the decision in that NQSRMDC's application for conversion is for having been r endered without affording petitioners due process is a factual
approved only with respect to the approximately 44-hectare portion of the land question which requires a review of the records of this case for it to be judiciously

333
resolved. The Court notes that the CA, indeed, failed to resolve petitioners' to pay notwithstanding demands Diona filed an action before RTC praying
prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition, which, significantly, focuses on that the Php450K amount be paid and for the issuance of a decree of foreclosure
the alleged nullity of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995. On this score, of sale at public auction Balangues failed to file Answer and were thus declared
the CA found that the application for the issuance of the writ of prohibition was in default; Diona was thus allowed to present evidence ex parte RTC ruled in
actually a collateral attack on the validity of the DARAB decision. But, a final and favor of Diona; ordered the Balangues to pay the amount and, in case of non-
executory judgment may be set aside in three ways;39 and a collateral attack, payment, that an order of foreclosure will be issued Diona filed a Motion for
whereby in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is Execution Balangues filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, as they were not
nevertheless made as an incident thereof,40 is one of these. This tenet is based informed of their co-defendant Sonny of the existence of the case against them;
upon a court's inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records.41 Despite prayed that a new trial be conducted RTC granted Motion for Execution;
recognizing the need to resolve petitioners' application for the writ of prohibition in issued Writ of Execution Writ, however, cannot be satisfied. Diona then moved
its Resolution dated January 12, 1999, the CA nonetheless summarily denied for the public auction of the mortgaged property o RTC granted Dona won in
petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated February 23, 2000,42 the public auction and a certificate of sale was issued in her favor Balangues
leaving the matter hanging and unresolved. At first, the Court considered filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale o
resolving the merits of petitioners' motion for reconsideration concerning their claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that
application for a writ of prohibition against enforcing the DARAB Decision dated petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint.
October 5, 1995. Thus, in a Resolution dated June 5, 2006, the Court directed the Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from
CA to transmit the records of DARAB Case No. 0555, which was previously required March 2, 1991 until full payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the
by the CA to be forwarded to it per Resolution dated December 20, 1999.43 exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from
However, as of even date, the CA has not complied with the Court's Resolution. P124,400.00 to P652,000.00. RTC granted said motion; modified the interest
Withal, upon re - examination of the issues involved in this case, the Court deems rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum Balangues filed a Motion
it more judicious to remand th is case to the CA for immediate resolution of for Leave To Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation21 in the total amount of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, re: their application for the writ of P126,650.00 Diona filed a Rule 65 before CA CA declared RTC decision
prohibition. null and void o declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5%
Moreover, the radical conflict in the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused
the DARAB as regards the nature of the subject property necessitates a review of its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12% per annum. o
the present case. In this regard, the CA is in a better position to fully adjudicate Indeed, We are convinced that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
the case for it can delve into the records to determine the probative value of the granted 5% monthly interest instead of the 12% per annum prayed for in the
evidence supporting the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and of the DARAB. complaint. However, the proper remedy is not to amend the judgment but to
In addition, the CA is empowered by its internal rules to require parties to submit declare that portion as a nullity. Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
additional documents, as it may find necessary to promote the ends of substantial judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
justice, and further order the transmittal of the proper records for it to fully obligation (Leonor vs. CA, 256 SCRA 69). No legal rights can emanate from a
adjudicate the case. After all, it is an avowed policy of the courts that cases should resolution that is null and void Balangues filed with CA a Petition for
be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages.26 o They contended
their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly interest rate
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right
to due process. According to respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it
LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA, was the verbal agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioner’s family can
Petitioner, vs. ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. continue occupying respondents’ residential building located in Marulas, Valenzuela
BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE, JR., Respondents. G.R. No. 173559 for free until said loan is fully paid. CA initially dismissed petition Balangues
January 7, 2013 SECOND DIVISION filed an MR CA granted MR and reinstated petition CA reversed RTC
o In setting aside portions of the RTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision, the CA ruled
FACTS: The Balangues obtained a loan of Php 45K from Diona which was secured that aside from being unconscionably excessive, the monthly interest rate of 5%
by a REM over the subject property the subject property in Valenzuela. They failed was not agreed upon by the parties and that petitioner’s Complaint clearly sought

334
only the legal rate of 12% per annum. Following the mandate of Section 3(d) of amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is under the Rules.37 But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in
void for being in excess of the relief sought in the Complaint default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and
limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in
ISSUES: Was CA correct in taking cognizance of the Balangues’ petition for the Complaint. It provides: o (d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment
annulment of judgment? YES. May the RTC judgment still be set aside, rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in
notwithstanding that it has attained finality? YES. kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages. The raison d’être in
limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that
HELD: The great of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default
given not supported by the evidence presented violates the opposing party’s right had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in
to due process and may be declared void ab initio in a proper proceeding. kind from that sought in the Complaint.38 No doubt, the reason behind
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final judgment rule; Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to due
grounds therefor. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of
Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies "the sporting
party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new idea of fair play"39 and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly was not given the opportunity to be heard thereon. In the case at bench, the
provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the
the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage40 executed by
is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of the parties does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her
finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from her "the
and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the
has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest."32 rate of 12% per annum"41 and sought payment thereof. She did not allege or pray
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified
Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks
jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to basis and disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement because
annul a judgment.34 In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court declared that a respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5%
final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and
thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant
or for lack of due process of law. Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint. Neither can
the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioner’s
due process. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the general prayer for "other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the
pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant premises x x x."42 To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has
a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and
process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported covered by the party’s cause of action.43 Besides, even assuming that the awarded
by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during
Philippines v. Teston,36 this Court expounded that: o Due process considerations trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably
justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope reduced in accordance with applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma,44
of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party this Court held: o In the case of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of Medel
an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v. Court of Appeals, Spouses Bautista v. Pilar
purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the Development Corporation and the recent case of Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, this
measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. Notably, the Rules Court considered the 3% interest per month or 36% interest per annum as
is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who excessive and unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the said case, equitably
was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, reduced the rate of interest to 1% interest per month or 12% interest per annum.

335
(Citations omitted) It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their property
default order for, as alleged in their Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn without due process of law. In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of
or run away from their just and valid obligation."45 Nonetheless, their waiver to new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies through their own fault. It
present evidence should never be construed as waiver to contest patently can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which
erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as well as prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents
applicable jurisprudence. Respondents’ former counsel was grossly negligent in for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations
handling the case of his clients; respondents did not lose ordinary remedies of new that their lawyer would amply protect their interest during the trial of the case.52
trial, petition for relief, etc. through their own fault. Ordinarily, the mistake, Here, "respondents are plain and ordinary people x x x who are totally ignorant of
negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client.1âwphi1 This is based the intricacies and technicalities of law and legal procedures. Being so, they
on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or completely relied upon and trusted their former counsel to appropriately act as
implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the their interest may lawfully warrant and require."53 As a final word, it is worth
rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their noting that respondents’ principal obligation was only P45,000.00. Due to their
client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their client’s property without former counsel’s gross negligence in handling their cause, coupled with the RTC’s
due process of law.46 In which case, the courts must step in and accord relief to a erroneous, baseless, and illegal award of 5% monthly interest, they now stand to
client who suffered thereby.47 The manifest indifference of respondents’ former lose their property and still owe petitioner a large amount of money. As aptly
counsel in handling the cause of his client was already present even from the observed by the CA: o x x x If the impugned judgment is not, therefore, rightfully
beginning. It should be recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a Motion to nullified, petitioners will not only end up losing their property but will additionally
Extend Period to Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass owe private respondent the sum of P232,000.00 plus the legal interest said balance
without filing an Answer, which resulted to respondents being declared in default. had, in the meantime, earned. As a court of justice and equity, we cannot, in good
His negligence was aggravated by the fact that he did not question the awarded conscience, allow this unconscionable situation to prevail.54 Indeed, this Court
5% monthly interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision on November 13, 2000.48 is appalled by petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
A simple reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision readily reveals that Petitioner does not contest as she even admits that the RTC made a glaring mistake
it awarded exorbitant and unconscionable rate of interest. Its difference from what in awarding 5% monthly interest.55 Amazingly, she wants to benefit from such
is being prayed for by the petitioner in her Complaint is so blatant and very patent. erroneous award. This Court cannot allow this injustice to happen.
It also defies elementary jurisprudence on legal rate of interests. Had the counsel
carefully read the judgment it would have caught his attention and compelled him NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. JOSE EVANGELISTA, respondent.
to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client. But he did not. G.R. No. 140945. May 16, 2005 SECOND DIVISION
Instead, he filed in behalf of his clients a Motion to Set Aside Judgment49 dated
January 26, 2001 based on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction, oblivious to the FACTS: The subject property located in QC was originally awarded in 1968 by
fact that the erroneous award of 5% monthly interest would result to his clients’ the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (NHA’s predecessor) to a certain
deprivation of property without due process of law. Worse, he even allowed the Adela Salindon After Adela’s death, her heirs executed an extrajudicial
RTC Decision to become final by not perfecting an appeal. Neither did he file a settlement where the property was transferred to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros
petition for relief therefrom. It was only a year later that the patently erroneous Florendo, Beatriz Florendo and Eloisa Florendo-Kulphongpatana However, in the
award of 5% monthly interest was brought to the attention of the RTC when case entitled Arsenio Florendo, Jr., et al. vs. Hon. Perpetuo D. Coloma, Presiding
respondents, thru their new counsel, filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment Judge of Branch VII, City Court of Quezon City, et al. the SC nullified and set aside
and To Set Aside Execution Sale. Even the RTC candidly admitted that it "made a the award in favor of Salindon for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction;
glaring mistake in directing the defendants to pay interest on the principal loan at Florendo was declared the owner of the property Despite said decision, the
5% per month which is very different from what was prayed for by the plaintiff."50 Florendos auctioned off the property, where one Luisito Sarte was the highest
"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in bidder Sarte was then issued a TCT by the RD NHA then filed a case against
the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning Sarte, the QC Treasurer and QC RD While the case was pending, Sarte sold the
and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except same to Jose Evangelista NHA then filed a motion for leave to file
in accordance with the law."51 Judging from how respondents’ former counsel supplemental complaint seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star
handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly negligent in Agri-Business Corporation and BPI Agricultural Development Bank as defendants

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NHA filed another action for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of is no available or other adequate remedy.[19] Jurisprudence and Section 2, Rule
Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, 47 of the Rules of Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for annulment
and Damages, against Sarte, respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business of judgment may be brought, i.e., (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of jurisdiction
Corporation, BPI Agricultural Development Bank and the Register of Deeds of or denial of due process.[20] Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of
Quezon City o RTC dismissed the same on the ground of the pendency of the jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of
1st action RTC (1st case of recovery) rendered a decision in favor of NHA; the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final order and resolution are
provided, among others: o Any transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of void.[21] A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either
whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by
Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant service of summons.[22] In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never
case are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be
title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are
of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such not bound by judgment rendered by the court.[23] Yet, the assailed paragraph 3
TCTs Evangelista filed before CA a petition for annulment of the trial court’s of the trial court’s decision decreed that “(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or
judgment o particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by
nullity of any transfer, assignment, sale or mortgage made by Sarte o alleged defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency
extrinsic fraud as ground o since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, of the instant case are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer
he was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or interest over the property, certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the
and the judgment was not binding on him, as the trial court did not acquire Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the
jurisdiction over his person. CA granted the petition; denied NHA’s MR o cancellation of such TCTs.” Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as
declared null and void paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the trial court’s he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte, and title was
decision insofar as petitioner’s title to the property is concerned.[16] The CA found already transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow respondent’s
that respondent was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 and the trial court title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in
did not acquire any jurisdiction over his person. The CA also ruled that the support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount
judgment violated respondent’s right against deprivation of the property without to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
due process of law NHA brought a Rule 45 before the SC property without due process of law.[24] Clearly, the trial court’s judgment is void
insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned. Petitioner argues
ISSUE: Was Evangelista’s resort to annulment of judgment of RTC before the CA that it should not bear the consequence of the trial court’s denial of its motion to
correct? include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-9110071. True, it was not
petitioner’s fault that respondent was not made a party to the case. But likewise,
HELD: YES. Petitioner insists that it should not be faulted for the trial court’s it was not respondent’s fault that he was not given the opportunity to present his
denial of its motion to include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91- side of the story. Whatever prompted the trial court to deny petitioner’s motion to
10071. Petitioner also claims that the auction sale of the property by the City include respondent as defendant is not for the Court to reason why. Petitioner
Treasurer could have brought the trial court’s denial to the CA on certiorari but it did not.
of Quezon City is void ab initio because it was never supposed to be included in Instead, it filed Civil Case No. Q-95-23940 for Annulment of Deed of Assignment,
the auction sale as petitioner, which has been declared by the Court in G.R. No. L- Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and
60544 as the owner of the property, is exempt from payment of taxes. Hence, 126639, and Damages, against herein respondent Sarte and others. Unfortunately
Sarte cannot claim any right over the same and respondent, having bought it from for petitioner, this was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Sarte, does not acquire any better right thereto. Petitioner also alleges that (Branch 82) on the ground of litis pendentia. Be that as it may, the undeniable
respondent is not a buyer in good faith because the latter was aware of the pending fact remains -- respondent is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, and
litigation involving the property.[18] The sole issue in this case is whether or paragraph 3, or any portion of the trial court’s judgment for that matter, cannot
not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3 of the trial court’s decision on grounds be binding on him. Petitioner also claims that respondent is not a buyer in good
of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law. Annulment of judgment is faith, citing as badge of knowledge, respondent’s alleged awareness of the pending
a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there lawsuit over the property. Petitioner claims that respondent had admitted that

337
before TCT No. 122944 was issued to the latter, the notice of lis pendens was must be threshed out in a full-blown trial for that purpose in an appropriate case
already annotated at the back of the title. Respondent, however, denied having and in the proper forum. Also, CA-G.R. CV No. 52466, which is the appeal from
made such admission.[25] There is merit to respondent’s denial. Based on the trial court’s decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, is pending before the CA,
petitioner’s claim, one would assume that the notice of lis pendens was annotated and it would be premature and unwarranted for the Court to render any resolution
on the title preceding TCT No. 122944, which is TCT No. 108070 in the name of that would unnecessarily interfere with the appellate proceedings. Insofar as
Sarte. However, there is nothing in TCT No. 108070 which shows any annotation this petition is concerned, what the Court declares is that the notice of lis pendens
of a notice of lis pendens or adverse claim. The last entries on TCT No. 108070 cannot serve as constructive notice to respondent for having been annotated after
were Entry No. 4172 made on May 24, 1994, canceling Entry No. 674, which is an the transfer of the property to him and that he is entitled to have paragraph 3 of
annotation of a mortgage,[26] and a registration of the Deed of Assignment the trial court’s decision annulled.
between Sarte and respondent, which was made on December 21, 1994.[27] It
was already after respondent acquired the property and after TCT No. 122944 was
issued in his name that petitioner’s adverse claim (Entry No. 7159) and a notice of ________________________________________________
lis pendens (Entry No. 1367) were annotated.[28] It should also be pointed out
that the notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of respondent’s title refers to
Civil Case No. Q-95-23940, and not Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It was in RULE 39 – Execution and Satisfaction of Judgments
petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim that Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 was
indicated. To repeat, as records show, at the time the notice of lis pendens and A. Kinds of Execution
adverse claim was annotated, the Deed of Assignment has already been entered
into by respondent and Sarte, and TCT No. 122944 was already issued in 1. Matter of right, ministerial
respondent’s name on December 21, 1994. Petitioner filed Civil Case No. Q-91-
10071 way back in 1991. TCT Nos. 108070 and 108071 were issued in Sarte’s Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders . — Execution shall issue as a
name on May 13, 1994;[29] TCT No. 122944 was issued in respondent’s name on matter of right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
December 21, 1994.[30] Petitioner had enough opportunity to have its adverse proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
claim and a notice of lis pendens annotated on Sarte’s title before the latter been duly perfected. (1a)
assigned the property to Evangelista, but it did not do so. The adverse claim was
annotated only on May 4, 1995 and the notice of lis pendens, on May 31, 1995.[31] If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
While a notice of lis pendens “serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee,
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final
his hands off the same, unless he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation,” order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
such constructive notice operates as such from the date of the registration of the adverse party.
notice of lis pendens,[32] which in this case, was, at the earliest, on May 4, 1995.
This was long after title to the property was transferred to respondent. Note also The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice
must be made that respondent was not furnished by petitioner of a copy of its so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (n)
motion for leave to file supplemental complaint.[33] Thus, it cannot be said that
respondent knew of the existence of Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. Moreover, the 2. Discretionary
filing of Civil Case No. Q-95-23940 against respondent and other defendants was
made only on May 31, 1995, and at that point, TCT No. 122944 was already issued Section 2. Discretionary execution . —
in respondent’s name. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not declaring that
respondent is a purchaser of the property in good faith. This is an issue that cannot (a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. — On motion of the
be dealt with by the Court in this forum, as the only issue in this case is whether prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
or not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3 of the trial court’s decision on grounds jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the
of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law. Whether or not respondent record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said
is a purchaser in good faith is an issue which is a different matter altogether that

338
court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
before the expiration of the period to appeal. limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also
be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction the motion for execution pending appeal by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)
may be filed in the appellate court.
C. Manner of Execution
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order after due hearing. 1. When party is dead

(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments. — A several, separate or Section 7. Executi on in case of death of party . — In case of the death of a party,
partial judgment may be executed under the same terms and conditions as execution may issue or be enforced in the following manner:
execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. (2a)
(a) In case of the death of the judgment obligee, upon the application of his
a. stays of discretionary execution executor or administrator, or successor in interest;

Section 3. Stay of discretionary execution . — Discretionary execution issued under (b) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, against his executor or
the preceding section may be stayed upon approval by the proper court of a administrator or successor in interest, if the judgment be for the recovery of real
sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the party against whom it is directed, or personal property, or the enforcement of a lien thereon;
conditioned upon the performance of the judgment or order allowed to be executed
in case it shall be finally sustained in whole or in part. The bond thus given may be (c) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, after execution is actually levied
proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety. (3a ) upon any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment
obligation, and the officer making the sale shall account to the corresponding
b. judgments not stayed by appeal executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands. (7a)

Section 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. — Judgments in actions for injunction, 2. When judgment is for money
receivership, accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or
may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after Section 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. —
their rendition and shall not, be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless
otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in (a) Immediate payment on demand. — The officer shall enforce an execution of a
its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate
injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support. payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The
judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the
considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party. judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his
(4a) authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall
be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the
B. Mode of Execution said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the
writ.
1. By MOTION
2. By INDEPENDENT ACTION If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive
payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same

339
is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check issued in the name
government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality. of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment obligee within
ten (10) working days from service of notice on said garnishee requiring such
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to delivery, except the lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the court.
the account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver
said payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient
if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be to satisfy the judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have the right to
retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In no case shall indicate the garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount
the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable to him. due, otherwise, the choice shall be made by the judgment obligee.

(b) Satisfaction by levy. — If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with
obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to respect to delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a)
the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment
obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed, of for value 3. When judgment is for specific act
and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. —
to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the
officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real (a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts; vesting title. — If a
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or personal property, or
to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform, any other specific act in
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the
judgment obligor which has been levied upon. court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some
other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy as if done by the party. If real or personal property is situated within the
the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may by an order
property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and
effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. (10a)
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any
interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and (b) Sale of real or personal property. — If the judgment be for the sale of real or
with like effect as under a writ of attachment. personal property, to sell such property, describing it, and apply the proceeds in
conformity with the judgment. (8[c]a)
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. — The officer may levy on debts due the
judgment obligor and other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, (c) Delivery or restitution of real property. — The officer shall demand of the person
royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable of manual delivery against whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is
in the possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice rendered and all persons claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate the
upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession or control such property within three (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the
credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only judgment obligee, otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with
such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees. the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and employing such
means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or
service of the notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same manner as a
has sufficient funds or credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the judgment for money. (13a)
report shall state how much funds or credits the garnishee holds for the judgment

340
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. — When the (f) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for four months;
property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted
by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or (g) The professional libraries and equipment of judges, lawyers, physicians,
remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon pharmacists, dentists, engineers, surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other
motion of the judgment obligee after the hearing and after the former has failed professionals, not exceeding three hundred thousand pesos in value;
to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. (14a)
(h) One fishing boat and accessories not exceeding the total value of one hundred
(e) Delivery of personal property. — In judgment for the delivery of personal thousand pesos owned by a fisherman and by the lawful use of which he earns his
property, the officer shall take possession of the same and forthwith deliver it to livelihood;
the party entitled thereto and satisfy any judgment for money as therein provided.
(8a) (i) So much of the salaries, wages, or earnings of the judgment obligor for his
personal services within the four months preceding the levy as are necessary for
4. When it is a special judgment the support of his family;

Section 11. Execution of special judgments. — When a judgment requires the (j) Lettered gravestones;
performance of any act other than those mentioned in the two preceding sections,
a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall (k) Monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner growing
be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or out of any life insurance;
upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such
party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment. (9a) (l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such
support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government;
D. Properties Exempt from Execution
(m) Properties specially exempted by law.
Section 13. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from But no article or species of property mentioned in this section shall be exempt from
execution: execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its price or upon a judgment of
foreclosure of a mortgage thereon. (12a)
(a) The judgment obligor's family home as provided by law, or the homestead in
which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection therewith; E. Third Party Claim

(b) Ordinary tools and implements personally used by him in his trade, Section 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. — If the property
employment, or livelihood; levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent,
and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession
(c) Three horses, or three cows, or three carabaos, or other beasts of burden, such thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the
as the judgment obligor may select necessarily used by him in his ordinary officer making the levy and copy thereof, stating the grounds of such right or tittle,
occupation; and a serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon
the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless
(d) His necessary clothing and articles for ordinary personal use, excluding jewelry; such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the
court to indemnity the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the
(e) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and used for that property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
purpose by the judgment obligor and his family, such as the judgment obligor may determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for
select, of a value not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos; the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the

341
action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the is of personal property capable of manual delivery, it must be sold within view of
filing of the bond. those attending the same and in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest
price. The judgment obligor, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, property, real or personal shall be sold, when such property consists of several
to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall known lots or parcels which can be sold to advantage separately. Neither the officer
prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property conducting the execution sale, nor his deputies, can become a purchaser, nor be
in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in interested directly or indirectly in any purchase at such sale. (21a)
the same or a separate action against a thirdparty claimant who filed a frivolous or
plainly spurious claim. Section 20. Refusal of purchaser to pay. — If a purchaser refuses to pay the amount
bid by him for property struck off to him at a sale under execution, the officer may
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or again sell the property to the highest bidder and shall not be responsible for any
any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and loss occasioned thereby;
in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he
shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual but the court may order the refusing purchaser to pay into the court the amount
damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such of such loss, with costs, and may punish him for contempt if he disobeys the order.
funds as may be appropriated for the purpose. (17a) The amount of such payment shall be for the benefit of the person entitled to the
proceeds of the execution, unless the execution has been fully satisfied, in which
F. Execution Sale event such proceeds shall be for the benefit of the judgment obligor. The officer
may thereafter reject any subsequent bid of such purchaser who refuses to pay.
Section 17. Penalty for selling without notice, or removing or defacing notice. — (22a)
An officer selling without the notice prescribed by section 15 of this Rule shall be
liable to pay punitive damages in the amount of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos Section 21. Judgment obligee as purchaser. — When the purchaser is the judgment
to any person injured thereby, in addition to his actual damages, both to be obligee, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of
recovered by motion in the same action; and a person willfully removing or the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment. If it does, he shall pay
defacing the notice posted, if done before the sale, or before the satisfaction of the only the excess. (23a)
judgment if it be satisfied before the sale, shall be liable to pay five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos to any person injured by reason thereof, in addition to his actual Section 22. Adjournment of sale. — By written consent of the judgment obligor
damages, to be recovered by motion in the same action. (19a) and obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, the officer may adjourn the
sale to any date and time agreed upon by them. Without such agreement, he may
Section 18. No sale if judgment and costs paid. — At any time before the sale of adjourn the sale from day to day if it becomes necessary to do so for lack of time
property on execution, the judgment obligor may prevent the sale by paying the to complete the sale on the day fixed in the notice or the day to which it was
amount required by the execution and the costs that have been incurred therein. adjourned. (24a)
(20a)
Section 23. Conveyance to purchaser of personal property capable of manual
Section 19. How property sold on execution; who may direct manner and order of delivery. — When the purchaser of any personal property, capable of manual
sale. — All sales of property under execution must be made at public auction, to delivery, pays the purchase price, the officer making the sale must deliver the
the highest bidder, to start at the exact time fixed in the notice. After sufficient property to the purchaser and, if desired, execute and deliver to him a certificate
property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no more shall be sold and any of sale. The sale conveys to the purchaser all the rights which the judgment obligor
excess property or proceeds of the sale shall be promptly delivered to the judgment had in such property as of the date of the levy on execution or preliminary
obligor or his authorized representative, unless otherwise directed by the judgment attachment. (25a)
or order of the court. When the sale is of real property, consisting of several known
lots, they must be sold separately; or, when a portion of such real property is Section 24. Conveyance to purchaser of personal property not capable of manual
claimed by a third person, he may require it to be sold separately. When the sale delivery. — When the purchaser of any personal property, not capable of manual

342
delivery, pays the purchase price, the officer making the sale must execute and
deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale. Such certificate conveys to the Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of
purchaser all the rights which the judgment obligor had in such property as of the redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, "when
date of the levy on execution or preliminary attachment. (26a) confirmed by an order of the court, . . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights
Sec tion 25. Conveyance of real property; certificate thereof given to purchaser of redemption as may be allowed by law." 22 Such rights exceptionally "allowed
and filed with registry of deeds. — Upon a sale of real property, the officer must by law" (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted
give to the purchaser a certificate of sale containing: by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the
General Banking Act (R.A. 337). 23 These laws confer on the mortgagor, his
(a) A particular description of the real property sold; successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to
redeem the property sold on foreclosure — after confirmation by the court of the
(b) The price paid for each distinct lot or parcel; foreclosure sale — which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year,
counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of
(c) The whole price paid by him; Property.

(d) A statement that the right of redemption expires one (1) year from the date of But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of
the registration of the certificate of sale. a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In
such a case, the foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an order of the court . . .
Such certificate must be registered in the registry of deeds of the place where the shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their
property is situated. (27 a) rights in the purchaser." There then exists only what is known as the equity of
redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
Section 26. Certificate of sale where property claimed by third person. — When a mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within
property sold by virtue of a writ of execution has been claimed by a third person, the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in
the certificate of sale to be issued by the sheriff pursuant to sections 23, 24 and accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its
25 of this Rule shall make express mention of the existence of such third-party confirmation. (Limpin vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-70987, September 29, 1988)
claim. (28a)
2. Who may redeem
G. Redemption
Section 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real property sold as
1. Right of Redemption vs. Equity of Redemption provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be
redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons:
The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be confused
with the right of redemption. (a) The judgment obligor; or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of
the property;
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage — understood in the sense of a
prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure (b) A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage on
sale — exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the lien under which the
such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner. (29a)
is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution.
3. Effects of Redemption
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor
the right of redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriffs Section 29. Effect of redemption by judgment obligor, and a certificate to be
certificate of foreclosure sale. delivered and recorded thereupon; to whom payments on redemption made. — If

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the judgment obligor redeems he must make the same payments as are required proceedings to be given to any party to the action in such manner as it may deem
to effect a redemption by a redemptioner, whereupon, no further redemption shall proper. (39a)
be allowed and he is restored to his estate. The person to whom the redemption
payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption 3. Appointment of receiver
acknowledged before a notary public or other officer authorized to take
acknowledgments of conveyances of real property. Such certificate must be filed Section 41. Appointment of receiver. — The court may appoint a receiver of the
and recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated property of the judgment obligor; and it may also forbid a transfer or other
and the registrar of deeds must note the record thereof on the margin of the record disposition of, or any interference with, the property of the judgment obligor not
of the certificate of sale. The payments mentioned in this and the last preceding exempt from execution. (43a)
sections may be made to the purchaser or redemptioner, or for him to the officer
who made the sale. (31a) 4. Sale of ascertainable interest

H. Other Remedies to Fully Satisfy Judgment Se ction 42. Sale of ascertainable interest of judgment obligor in real estate. — If
it appears that the judgment obligor has an interest in real estate in the place in
1. Examination of judgment obligor which proceedings are had, as mortgagor or mortgagee or other- wise, and his
interest therein can be ascertained without controversy the receiver may be
Section 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied. — When ordered to sell and convey such real estate or the interest of the obligor therein;
the return of a writ of execution issued against property of a judgment obligor, or and such sale shall be conducted in all respects in the same manner as is provided
any one of several obligors in the same judgment, shows that the judgment for the sale of real state upon execution, and the proceedings thereon shall be
remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the judgment obligee, at any time after approved by the court before the execution of the deed. (34a)
such return is made, shall be entitled to an order from the court which rendered
the said judgment, requiring such judgment obligor to appear and be examined I. Judgment: Principal vs. Surety
concerning his property and income before such court or before a commissioner
appointed by it at a specified time and place; and proceedings may thereupon be Section 46. When principal bound by judgment against surety. — When a judgment
had for the application of the property and income of the judgment obligor towards is rendered against a party who stands as surety for another, the latter is also
the satisfaction of the judgment. But no judgment obligor shall be so required to bound from the time that he has notice of the action or proceeding, and an
appear before a court or commissioner outside the province or city in which such opportunity at the surety's request to join in the defense. (48a)
obligor resides or is found. (38a)
J. Effect of Judgment
2. Examination of obligor of judgment obligor
1. in rem 2. in personam 3. over judicata
Section 37. Examination of obligor of judgment obligor. — When the return of a
writ of execution against the property of a judgment obligor shows that the Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
judgment remain unsatisfied, in whole or in part, and upon proof to the satisfaction order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
of the court which issued the writ, that a person, corporation, or other juridical judgment or final order, may be as follows:
entity has property of such judgment obligor or is indebted to him, the court may,
by an order, require such person, corporation, or other juridical entity, or any (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to
officer, or member thereof, to appear before the court or a commissioner appointed the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or
by it, at a time and place within the province or city where such debtor resides or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular
is found, and be examined concerning the same. The service of the order shall bind person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon
all credits due the judgment obligor and all money and property of the judgment the title to the thing, the will or administration or the condition, status or
obligor in the possession or in the control of such person corporation, or juridical relationship of the person, however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of
entity from the time of service; and the court may also require notice of such

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administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or NOTE: A judgment which can be executed is only a judgment which is not just final
intestate; but also executory.

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly Q: There are 2 kinds of execution:
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been missed in relation thereto, 1. As a matter of right and
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest, by title subsequent 2. Leave of court, otherwise known as discretionary, or execution pending
to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same appeal.
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
Section 1 which is execution as a matter of right.
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order Q: When do you execute it? That is the most important element there. You can
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and execute it only within a period of 5 years from entry of judgment. You can execute
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (49a) that judgment only within a period of 5 years. Thereafter you can no longer execute
the judgment, you have to first revive the judgment. That's why some books say
K. Effect of Foreign Judgment that there are two ways to execute the judgment, either by motion or by action.
You find that in Section 6 of Rule 39.
Section 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the So if the 5-year period is counted from entry of judgment, the time of entry of
judgment or final order is as follows: judgment is very very important. That's why we discussed that in Section 2, second
sentence of Rule 36. Pina-underline ko sa inyo. Because this is where you count
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final the judgment to be executed by motion. So when the judgment has become final
order, is conclusive upon the title to the thing, and and executory, the judgment obligee (winner in the case) will have to file a motion
with the trial court (where the main action was filed). In matters of execution, no
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final appellate court can issue a writ of execution. Whether that appellate court is the
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their RTC, the CA or the SC, they cannot issue a writ of execution. It must always go
successors in interest by a subsequent title. back to the court of origin.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want So there are 2 instances therefore. If the case is filed with the MTC and judgment
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law was rendered by the MTC and the judgment was not appealed and therefore
or fact. (50a) became final and executory, you file your motion for the issuance of the writ of
execution with the MTC.

If the judgment was appealed to the RTC. You cannot execute it, as a matter of
LECTURE right because it is not yet executory. And as long as the appellate court is
concerned, the judgment is not
RULE 39 EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECTS OF JUDGMENT yet final because the appellate court has something else to do yet. Now suppose,
the appellate court affirm in toto the decision of the MTC and there is no more
This is execution of judgment and final order. I told you before that there are 3 appeal to the CA, the judgment becomes final and executory.
stages in the process of law: preparation of pleadings, trial and execution. And the
most difficult is Rule 39 as well as the most important in practice. Because no Q: Which judgment?
matter how good you are in the 1st two stages but you cannot execute, you only A: The judgment affirming the decision of the MTC.
win by paper.

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Q: But what is the judgment that you are going to execute? What you are Sandiganbayan, several pleadings were filed. And you know before the
going to execute is the judgment of the MTC. So where will you file the Sandiganbayan, the complainant or the plaintiff was the PCGG. The PCGG was later
motion? on represented by the OSG. In the course of the hearing, after several pleadings,
A: You file it with the MTC and not with the RTC. motions and postponements filed, they came out with a compromise agreement.
There was a compromise agreement between the Arganas and the PCGG. This
The old rule says that in order for the trial court to rule on your motion for the compromise agreement principally states that 75% of the properties of the Arganas
issuance of your writ of execution, it must have the copies of the records of the will be ceded in favor of the government and only 25% will remain with the
case because as you will find out in Rules 40-42, when the case is appealed, one Arganas. Take note, percentage ang pinaguusapan. 75% of the properties subject
of the requirements for appeal is to elevate the records to the appellate court. And matter of the case of ill-gotten wealth will be given back to the government and
when the appellate court affirms and it becomes final and executory, ibabalik yung only 25% will remain with the Arganas.. The PCGG agreed and the compromise
records sa baba. agreement was executed and even approved by President Fidel Ramos. And so, on
the basis of the compromise agreement submitted to the Sandiganbayan, the
Now, you don't have to wait anymore for the records from the appellate court. You Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment on compromise. So there was a judgment on
can file a motion even if the records are still with the appellate court in the trial compromise. Later on, the OSG, upon review of the compromise agreement, even
court. But the requirement is you get a certified true copy of the judgment of the after the judgment of compromise has already been rendered, found out that it
appellate court together with the entry of judgment. And then you file it with the was entered fraudulently. In other words, the compromise agreement was very
trial court. So motion for the issuance of the writ of execution must strictly comply very unfavorable to the government. Why? Because the 75% property ceded to
with Rule 15 on motion, otherwise it must be in writing, it must be set for hearing, the government was worth only about Php 4 million. The 25% remaining with the
and it must be served on the adverse party (Sec 4 of Rule 15). Arganas was worth Php 3.++ BILLION. In other words, the 75% was only .15%
worth of the entire property while the 25% was worth 99.85%. So this was very
Q: Rationale? unconscionable. It was entered into in connivance with the PCGG Commissioners
A: To give the judgment obligor the chance to contest it. and the heirs of Argana. So upon the review of the OSG, the government filed a
motion to rescind together with a prayer of annulment of the judgment on
Q: And what is the basis for contesting? compromise. Remember that a judgment on compromise is immediately
A: Because remember, it is not discretionary on the part of the court to issue or executory, it is not appealable. But because this was entered in fraud of the
not to issue a writ of execution. The issuance of the writ of execution is ministerial government, what the OSG did was to file a motion to rescind the compromise
on the part of the trial court. So that if the trial court does not issue the writ of agreement with prayer of cancellation or nullification on the judgment on
execution, the trial court may be subjected to mandamus. But under the present compromise. Hindi pwedeng i-appeal, certiorari has already lapsed because in
rule, you don't have to recourse to mandamus anymore because you file your certiorari you have only 60 days. Matagal na ito. The Sandiganbayan, looking into
motion with the trial court simply attaching a certified copy of the decision of the it, did not dismiss the case but treated the motion to rescind as a petition for relief
appellate court together with the entry of judgment. Set it for hearing. And as a from judgment. Yun ang catch. The motion to rescind was treated as a petition for
matter of course, the trial court will issue the writ of execution. relief from judgment because there was a prayer for annulment of the judgment
on compromise. The respondent this time (Arganas) says, if this is a petition for
Argana v Republic of the Philippines (443 SCRA 184) November 19, 2004 So it is relief, it was filed out of time, because under Section 3 of Rule 38, it must be filed
wrong to say. That statement is wrong in the book because of that decision. I went within 60 days from knowledge of the judgment and 6 months from entry of
over it. I've read it. You must have read it too. And I admonish you to read that judgment. Matagal na ito e. It is already outside of the reglementary period. When
case so you would know. FACTS: This is the case against the heirs of the former the Sandiganbayan went over the case, they discovered that it was filed 67 days
mayor of Muntinlupa Argana and company. Marami ito. 8 individuals and 2 from knowledge but within the 6 month period from entry of judgment or from
corporations are the defendants here in the original case. This is a case filed before judgment. Because a judgment on compromise, being immediately executory, has
the Sandiganbayan. And the nature of the action was ill-gotten wealth of former no entry of judgment or the entry of judgment becomes immaterial. So that the
Mayor Argana of Muntinlupa City. Now in the course of the hearing, definitely, 60 day period being a judgment on compromise and the 6 month period cannot be
because this is an ill-gotten wealth case under EO 14-A in relation to the creation counted from knowledge or entry but it must be counted (both 60 days and 6
of the PCGG. This particular case, while it was in progress before the month period) from rendition of judgment. And counting from the rendition

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judgment, being the time that the parties came to know of it, 67 days have lapsed
outside of the 60 day period SUPREME COURT DECISION: The SC, on certiorari, Q: Under Section 1, when is it a matter of right?
said (and i would emphasize this statement) both periods provided for in Sec 3 of A: When the judgment has become executory, it is ministerial on the part of the
Rule 38 must be STRICTLY complied with but nonetheless, it does not mean that trial court to issue the writ of execution. Ministerial to issue the writ of execution.
there is no exception to the rule. So the rule remains that it must be complied with
STRICTLY. The 60 day period and the 6 month period from knowledge and from Q: If it is ministerial, why is it required on the part of the judgment obligee
entry of judgment. This Argana case is an exception. And in fact the rule in Section or the judgment creditor to file a motion? A: In order to afford the judgment
3 of Rule 38 will not strictly apply. Why? Because first, there is no point from which obligor due process. Because he may still file an objection.
knowledge should be counted from or from which entry should be counted from
because it is a judgment on compromise. And secondly, it was not a petition for Q: And what is the possible ground for objection?
relief per se but it was a motion to rescind taken as a petition for relief. A: The finality of the judgment. Because as I was saying, as far as the court is
concerned the judgment may become already executory but as far as the judgment
Q: Why did the SC make this as an exception? obligor the judgment is not executory yet because it was not received by him or
he did not know about the judgment having been received by other party or
A: First, because the government is involved. For it will be disadvantageous to the persons other than himself.
government. Second, Fraud was the reason. Against the government.
NOTE: Another thing we should remember here is that only the trial court that can
Therefore, petition denied. Panalo ang gobyerno. What do you expect? issue the writ of execution. Whether that case has already reached the SC, the SC
cannot and should not issue the writ of execution.
NOTE: The Supreme Court can always relax cases. Because the SC is not governed
by the Rules. Because one time the SC can decide one way while on another time, So if it started with the MTC, and it reached the SC, when it comes to execution, it
the SC can decide on another way. Like for example the execution pending appeal is still the MTC which should execute.
we are dealing here. Before, Old Age is not a good reason for execution pending
appeal, but later on, i think it is 403 SCRA in the case of Far East Bank and Trust Q: If it is the MTC or if it is the trial court, as the case may be, which should
Co. vs. Toh, Sr., the SC said that old age is a good reason for execution pending execute? What is necessary?
appeal. See? Bakit ganoon? You try to read the case and look also who was the A: Simply a motion for the issuance of the writ of the execution complying with
lawyer for Toh. The lawyer for Toh was the very famous Mike Arroyo. Rule 15 particularly Sections 4-6. By then it is ministerial on the part of the judge
or the court to issue the writ of execution. Q: But suppose the case started with
Those doctrinal cases never change. May side changes but these are not ratio the MTC but upon finality of the judgment, the judgment was appealed to the RTC.
decidendi decisions but an obiter dictum. Settled? So we maintain na tama pa din And then the RTC affirms the judgment, and the judgment obligor never went up
ang lecture ko. to the CA, therefore, the judgment has become final and executory. Which
judgment has become final and executory? A: Technically, it is the judgment
Villamor case 441 SCRA. Read it. affirming the decision of the MTC.

So let's proceed with execution. Q: But what are we supposed to execute?

A: Not the judgment of the RTC but the judgment of the MTC.
Q: I was telling you yesterday that there are two kinds of execution of a
judgment. A: GENERAL RULE is that a judgment which can be executed must be Q: How do you go about it?
a judgment not just final but executory. In other words, the right to appeal as well A: You still file your motion for execution with the MTC. Never with the RTC. As a
as the right for reconsideration or new trial, the period has already lapsed. So matter of procedure, the MTC, which should now issue the writ of execution, should
under Section 1, it is execution as a matter of right. Under Section 2, it is execution await the records from the RTC. But under the present rules there is no need for
by leave of court, otherwise known as discretionary execution or execution pending that. Because by simply getting a copy of the entry of judgment (which judgment?
appeal. So when you read those 3 terms, pare-pareho lang yun. the judgment affirming the judgment of the MTC) as well as the judgment of the

347
RTC, affirming the judgment of the MTC, attaching the same to your motion for Q: What are the instance when a judgment cannot be stayed? Why?
execution filed in the MTC on that basis, the MTC can already issue the writ of
execution. A: Because of their very nature. You find that in Section 4. Injunction, Receivership,
Accounting, Support or such other judgments declared to be immediately
Q: Suppose the MTC does not issue the writ of execution, what is now your executory unless otherwise ordered by the trial court.
remedy? A: Ordinarily, the remedy is mandamus. Because the issuance of the
writ of execution is only a ministerial act. But under the present rules, you don't To illustrate: If you get an injunctive relief, it is a matter of urgency. So if you stay
have to file mandamus. It is very easy now, you simply file a motion with the RTC the implementation of a writ of preliminary injunction then you defeat the very
(which is the appellate court here) praying that an purpose for an injunctive relief. That is why it cannot be stayed. The same thing
order be issued directing the MTC to issue the writ of execution. No need for with support. Humihingi ng support kasi mamamatay na sa gutom. But if you can
mandamus. Although mandamus is a remedy, but it is a very lengthy procedure still stay that, you defeat the very purpose of order of support.
as a remedy.
NOTE: The writ of execution is not addressed to any party but rather it is addressed
Section 2 speaks of Execution pending Appeal. So in the same example that I gave, to the sheriff, that is why a party, for not complying with the writ of execution,
the MTC renders judgment, under Rule 40, that judgment is appealable within a cannot be held liable for contempt. Only the sheriff may be liable for contempt
period of 15 days with the RTC. Within that period, the judgment obligee wants to because the writ of execution is addressed to the sheriff. And the sheriff must
execute it pending appeal he may file a motion for execution pending appeal with implement the writ of execution immediately. If he does not implement the writ of
the MTC. execution, he may be held liable for contempt of court.

Q: Suppose the appellant has already filed his notice of appeal, since the Q: But suppose the sheriff found out that the judgment obligee is dead?
notice of appeal under Rule 40 must be filed with the Trial Court, when
should the motion for execution pending appeal be filed? A: Therefore the sheriff may cause, still, the implementation of the writ of
A: Notwithstanding the filing of the notice of appeal, the motion for the issuance execution through the executor, administrator or successor-in-interest of the
of the writ of execution must still be filed with the trial court, in this instance the judgment obligee.
MTC, as long as the records of the case have not been transmitted to the RTC. This
is what you call exercise of residual jurisdiction. Q: But in the case the judgment obligor is dead? A: The writ of execution
can only be implemented against the executor or administrator of the
Q: Suppose the records of the case, pursuant to the notice of appeal, have judgment obligor if the action is for recovery of real or personal property
already been transmitted to the RTC, where will you file? or for enforcement of a lien thereon. Why is this so?
A: Since the notice of appeal renders loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter
as far as the MTC is concerned, you file your motion for execution pending appeal Because of Section 1 of Rule 86 and because of Section 20 of Rule 3 which we have
with the RTC. Should the RTC resolve your motion in your favor, nevertheless the studied. Money claims, specially if it is based on contracts, Section 20 - Contractual
RTC cannot issue the writ of execution. It can only issue an order directing the MTC Money Claims of Rule 3. Upon the death of the defendant, the case shall not be
to issue the writ of execution pending appeal. dismissed but it should continue up to entry of judgment. And no writ of execution
can issue because it will be charged as a money claim against the estate under
Q: How do you stay the execution of a judgment? Rule 86. NOTE: That is why it's said there if a writ of execution is supposed to be
A: You stay that by filing a supersedeas bond. This is one meaning of a supersedeas implemented against a deceased judgment obligor, take note, that it can be
bond found in the Rules. Don't confuse that with the supersedeas bond found in implemented against the executor or administrator only, if the action is recovery
Rule 70 (unlawful detainer and forcible entry). Because the supersedeas bond of real or personal property or enforcement of a lien thereon. Otherwise, it should
referred to in Rule 70 is equivalent to the amount of unpaid rentals. The be filed as a claim against the estate.
supersedeas bond here is in the amount subject to the discretion of the court. We
should answer for any damages that the judgment or the appellant might incur. The sheriff, who is implementing the writ, is bound to make a return. And the
return must be made copy furnished the judgment obligee within a period of 30

348
days. And every 30 days thereafter, if there is no full satisfaction yet of the NOTE: Let me warn you again that there are 2 books in remedial law that say
judgment. otherwise. They say that the judgment is the same and therefore it must be filed
in the same court. I DISAGREE! You better qualify what kind of judgment it is. If it
Section 6 is important. Q: These are the 2 ways by which a judgment may is a judgment for money, your claim is already within the jurisdiction of a different
be executed or a writ of execution may be implemented. court. But if it is a judgment which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, no
choice, but you have to file it with the RTC. But not in the same court. I'll not
A: The first way is by motion. And the second is by action. The writ can only be mention to you the book. Kayo ng bahalang maghanap dun. I've talked already to
executed by motion, meaning to say you get a writ of execution which you seek to the author of that book and he said he'll revise it.
implement by motion from the date of the entry of judgment and 5 years
therefrom. So the time limit is only 5 years. Thereafter, you can no longer secure So if by January 2006, the judgment obligee files an action to revive judgment.
a writ by motion, but if you want to implement the judgment you have to file an And it was revived, the revived judgment is separate and distinct from the original
action. And the action that you have to file will be an action to revive the judgment. judgment. This judgment must again be entered and the entry of the revived
judgment must be the basis for execution of the judgment either by motion or by
Let me illustrate: If on January 1, 2000, judgment was entered, the judgment action.
obligee can only execute the judgment by applying for the issuance of the writ of
execution through a motion which he can file up to December 31, 2005 only. So 5 Suppose you file your action to revive judgment in January 20, 2006, and it was
years ha, from entry of judgment. So he can file it either in 2001, 2002, 2003, revived by the Court in February 5, 2006, and the entry of judgment was entered
2004 or 2005 because the judgment was entered on January 1, 2000. If it is 15 days after. The 5 year period will start from February 20, 2006 and you will
already January 5, 2006, he can no longer ask for the issuance of the writ of have until February 19, 2011 within which you can get a writ of execution by
execution because the writ will no longer issue through motion. motion. If by February 19, 2011 you have not gotten taking writ of execution by
motion, you can again avail file an action to revive judgment. The judgment that
Q: So what can he do? you seek to revive is the revived judgment. This is a second revival of judgment.
This is possible.
A: He files an action to revive judgment. He files an action.
There is no limit as to the number of revival of judgment unless the prescription of
Q: Where should he file it? 10 years sets in.
A: It depends. It does not necessarily mean that it is the trial court because this
action is a different action. You are seeking for a different judgment, the judgment
that you seek to revive, once revived, is a separate and distinct judgment from the Q: And where do you count the 10 year period?
original judgment. So if a decision for money in the amount of the Php 500,000 A: From entry, not of the original judgment but of the judgment that you seek to
was rendered by the RTC and entered January 1, 2000, and you were able to secure implement. So you can only revive the original judgment which was entered
a writ of execution on December 2001 you can only implement that writ of January 1, 2000 up until December 31, 2010. The judgment which you have
execution up to December 31, 2005. If by January 5, 2006, you were able to collect revived on January 2006 and entered in February 20, 2006, you still have until
only Php 400,000 you cannot use anymore the writ of execution issued in 2001 to 2011 within which to revive it by motion. But you can revive it either by motion or
have it implemented in 2006. by action only up to February 2016 because you count the prescription from the
entry of the revived judgment.
Q: So what do you have to do?
A: Because there is still a deficiency judgment, you file an action to revive Tuloy-tuloy yan basta hindi lang mag-expire yung 10-year period. But the 10-year
judgment. period must never be counted from the original one because as i said a revived
judgment is separate and distinct from the original judgment.
Q: Where will you file it?
A: Not with the RTC, because your claim is only Php 100,000.

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Going back to the old doctrine of Luzon, kasi binago yun, you can only revive once. the judgment obligor, be careful. If you're the judgment obligee, accompany the
But latest jurisprudence has gone back to the original ruling that you can revive as sheriff. This is if it is in cash.
many times as possible provided it does not prescribe.
Q: If obligor, B, pays a check in the name of the sheriff Juan Dela Cruz, is
Section 9. The writ of execution is addressed to the sheriff. Then the sheriff must it valid?
implement the writ according to the tenor of the writ. That's why it is required now A: No, it is invalid. It must be paid to the order of the judgment obligee.
that when you file a motion for a writ of execution, you should state what you want
and the writ of execution must also state what is to be executed. Walang Q: Suppose it is payable to cash?
generalities dito. You cannot say, for example, "I move for the execution of the A: No it is not valid, because it is not handed to the judgment obligee. If it is
judgment entered January 10, 2005." No, you have to state specifically that you handed to the sheriff, the sheriff will encash it, for sure. The sheriffs now are like
are praying for the issuance of the writ of execution in the amount of Php 100,000 the tax collectors in the Bible, most of them. Rule 39 is the Bible of the Sheriffs.
as principal obligation, 20,000 as interest thereto, 10,000 as attorney's fees, 5,000 They know it. Most lawyers usually rely on the sheriffs. The sheriffs abuse their
as cost of suit. In other words, it must be specific, because the writ of execution power. So we must be educated by studying it.
will also follow your motion. And this is addressed to the sheriff.

Aside from the sums of money, if it is for sum of money halimbawa, stated in the So when you try to execute a judgment, then accompany your client whether he
writ of execution, the sheriff is also entitled to his legal fees. Bago na ngayon, dati is a judgment creditor or debtor. Up to the end. Walang iwanan.
Php 4 per 100,000 or 1M.
There is another way of satisfaction of judgment, and we call this GARNISHMENT.
Q: So, let's say it's a judgment for money. The sheriff now, armed with a Garnishment is much better that Levy.
writ of execution, goes to judgment obligor B. The judgment obligee is A.
A was able to get a writ of execution addressed to the Sheriff X. So X now Q: What is garnishment?
would go to B. The sheriff implements the writ of execution which the A: It is taking legal custody of money, ordinarily from a bank or financial institution.
judgment amounts to Php 1M. Then B goes in his room and gets his Php Under the Rules, paragraph c of Section 9, in garnishment, you simply furnish a
1M cash and pays directly to the sheriff. Is that a valid satisfaction of copy of the writ of execution and the entry of judgment together with a copy of the
judgment? judgment to the branch manager of the bank or a financial institution. And when
A: That is condition. Because payment to the sheriff may not be a valid satisfaction he receives that, under the rule, he is bound, within a period of 5 days, to inform
of judgment. It is only payment to judgment of obligee. But in the course of the the sheriff or the court whether or not the judgment debtor has money in the bank.
execution, if the judgment obligee is not there, once the sheriff receives the money And thereafter, 10 days after, he has to remit the money to the judgment obligee.
in satisfaction of the judgment, the rule provides that the sheriff should turn the Mas madali ang garnishment kaysa sa levy.
money over to the clerk of court or deposit it with a reputable bank within a period
of 24 hours. Now the other one is what you call LEVY.

So when you get to become lawyers, never execute a judgment in the afternoon. Q: How do you levy?
Because the bank closes at 3pm and the clerk of court closes, supposedly at 5pm A: Levy is taking legal custody of either real or personal properties.
but at 2pm the clerk of court is not there anymore. So the sheriff might keep it.
That is not satisfaction of judgment. Q: What can be subject of levy?
A: Real or personal properties.
In the case of PAL, it was handed out to the sheriff and the sheriff did not remit it
to the judgment obligee. PAL contended that there was execution already but the If it is personal property, then the sheriff takes actual custody of it if it is capable
judgment obligee denied. The sheriff is nowhere to be found. The SC said there is of manual delivery. If it is not capable of manual delivery, then the personal
no satisfaction of judgment. It must be given to the judgment obligee. So if you're property must be duly ascertained that it is in the place. By giving a copy of the
writ of execution to the one in charge of that property and by that the property

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becomes in CUSTODIA LEGIS. If it is real property, it is a matter of annotation in Suppose in this ejectment case again, the property owned by the judgment obligee
the office of the register of deeds of the place where the property is located. That is a land. On the land is built a barong-barong built by the judgment obligor. So
is how to levy. you have to demolish the premises.

This example that I’ve given is judgment for money, but not all judgments are Q: When you execute the judgment to vacate, can you demolish the
judgment for money. So if this is a judgment for specific performance, the sheriff premises right away?
must undertake that the judgment obligor does something as ordered by the court. A: No you cannot do that. You have to secure from the court a writ of demolition.
These are specific ways by which to execute a judgment.
Suppose it is a judgment to withdraw money, it is not a judgment for money but a
judgment for specific performance. So the sheriff must accompany the judgment Q: So the sheriff, for sum of money in the amount of P 1M, was not able to
obligor and ask him to withdraw money from the bank. And that in one case, this collect it from judgment obligor B. So what should the sheriff do?
is considered as a special kind of judgment. In other words, it is a judgment which A: He levies on the properties of the judgment obligor.
cannot be performed by any other person except the judgment obligor because if
this can be performed by other persons other than the judgment obligor, and he Q: What properties should the sheriff levy on?
does not want to do it, then the Sheriff can ask other persons to do it at the expense A: Either real or personal properties.
of the judgment obligor.
But under the rules now, the judgment obligor has the option as to which property
Example: A judgment to build a house. That is a judgment for specific should first be levied. And that privilege or option does not belong to the judgment
performance. But the judgment obligor does not want to build the house. Ask obligee or the sheriff but belong to the judgment obligor.
someone to build the house at the expense of the judgment obligor.
So when the sheriff goes to the house and determines that the judgment obligor
If it is a judgment for delivery of specific property, then if the judgment obligor cannot pay in cash or check, the sheriff has no other choice but to levy on his
does not want to deliver, then ask someone to deliver it in behalf of the judgment property. If the sheriff chooses the judgment obligor's car (Mercedes Benz) to be
obligor, and at the expense of the judgment obligor. levied, the judgment obligor can oppose or contest. The judgment obligor can point
to other properties to satisfy his judgment debt. Like the JVC flat screen TV which
Special mention must be made regarding unlawful detainer. This is a judgment to is already P299,000, or the 15 cubic feet freezer which is already P 100,000, or the
vacate and delivery of the property to the judgment obligee. Remember that under other car (Toyota, model 1965). In other words, the judgment obligor has the
Rule 70 the execution of that judgment, you have to give at least 3 or 5 days, in option.
the case of residence and 3 or 5 days in the case of lot. So you cannot just
immediately oust the judgment obligor. You have to implement the written The problem is when the judgment obligor is not present. Considering that no one
execution by telling the judgment obligor to vacate the premises within 3 - 5 days. can exercise the option, so it is now incumbent upon the sheriff to levy on any
property that he sees. But the sheriff must first levy personal properties over real
Q: If after 5 days, the sheriff goes back to the judgment obligor and the properties.
judgment obligor is still there, will the judgment obligor be liable for
contempt? Q: If what the sheriff was able to levy only was a Toyota 1965 Corolla,
A: No. The sheriff must ask police officers or must secure help from public which is only P30,000 (out of P 1M), the sheriff levies on real properties.
authorities (NBI) to forcibly eject the judgment obligor. But the sheriff cannot cite How does he go about it?
the judgment in contempt because the writ of execution is addressed to the sheriff. A: The sheriff goes to the register of deeds and tries to examine whether there are
properties in the name of the judgment obligor. If there are, the sheriff furnishes
Now the property is already vacated. Then after 10 - 30 days the sheriff came back the register of deeds of a copy of the writ of execution, together with the judgment,
and saw the judgment obligor occupying the same property, the sheriff can now and ask the register of deeds to annotate on the original transfer certificate of title
cite the judgment obligor in contempt. belonging or in the name of the judgment debtor. And by that levy, that is what

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you call levy on real property. By that annotation, that property is now in contemplated by the rules. Because the guns and ammunitions were used for
CUSTODIA LEGIS. business. What the rules contemplate are tools and implements used for livelihood.

Suppose the property is not titled. So the sheriff goes to the office of the Municipal Take note that there is no limit in annuities but regarding libraries of lawyers,
or City Assessor and get a copy of the tax declarations in the name of the judgment doctors, engineers and teachers, the limit is P 300,000. That is very small, one
obligor. And armed with the copy of the tax declarations, the sheriff goes back to SCRA costs P 860.
the register of deeds and have it recorded in the book of unregistered properties.
So that is how to levy an unregistered property. Let me proceed to execution proper. Auction sale.

Otherwise, if it is personal property, capable of manual delivery, the sheriff takes Section 15. Notices.
it. So the sheriff levies a Toyota Corolla car, he takes actual custody of the car and
drives it to the court and keeps it there. The sheriff should not keep it at home and Q: What are the requirements before auction can be undertaken?
use it for personal matters. A: Remember 3 requirements and qualify them as to what they are required.
1. Notice
If the sheriff personally uses the car and he was accosted by a TMG Officer, and 2. Posting
the latter finds out that the car is a levied property, and the sheriff uses the judge 3. Publication
as an excuse (dinamay ang judge). Both the sheriff and the judge were
administratively charged. The sheriff was discharged and the judge was Notice, irrespective of what is to be auctioned, is mandatory.
suspended. Decided case yan by the SC. So keep the property in the premises of
the court, and considering that you have levied on this property, you have now to Q: Notice to whom?
set the auction sale of the property. A: Notice to the judgment obligor. So that if there is no notice to the judgment
obligor, the auction becomes irregular and may even be invalidated.
Section 13 are those properties which are exempt from execution. You just go over
them. Madaling tandaan because Section 13 of Rule 39 have 13 exempt properties. Q: When is posting necessary depending on what is to be auctioned?
A: Because the date of posting depends on the object of auction.
Q: Have you ever wondered why it uses 3 horses, 3 carabaos, or 3 cows?
A: 1 kay tatay, 1 kay nanay at 1 para sa anak. Because it is an ideal family and If it is perishable goods, posting may be required but only for a day or two. If it is
the perfect family is the holy family (Joseph, Mary and Jesus). personal properties, capable of manual delivery, it may be 5 days, otherwise, it
may be more depending now on the court.
The horses contemplated herein are for the use of the family. They are not race
horses. Because if you can keep race horses, the race horse's value would be P Q: Where should the posting be done?
500K - P 1M. Several years ago, Brondial gave an exam and gave a question about A: There are places stated in the rules and they are not mandatory. They are only
levy. A very rich person with 3 race horses. Pina-levy ni Brondial yun. He asked suggestions. The rationale behind the law is where as many people as possible that
kung pwedeng i-exempt yun. - The race horses can be levied and what is can read it. Municipal building, public market, post offices. Di ba may public market
contemplated by the rules are horses used for livelihood. Even if the horses, in din sa SM, pwede and posting dito.
kalesa, were used to be race horses. They are still exempt.
Although the problem is when the post is being defaced or removed. The person
Tools and implements in paragraph b of Section 13 have a decided case. Here is a who defaced the post is liable for the amount of not more than P 5,000. But it is
security agency, was sued and judgment was rendered for money. The agency very hard to search or even identify the person who defaced the post.
could not pay so the sheriff levied properties. The properties levied were guns and
ammunitions. The agency filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the Now, if the auction is of a real property, publication is not needed. But when the
ground that these are tools in the implement of the business. The SC said that property is worth more than P50,000 then publication is needed once a week in 2
these are not exempt from execution because they are not tools and implements consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. In the case I have

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assigned to you, in Pinlac v. CA, the SC described what is a newspaper of general
circulation. Because if you don't comply with that, then there is no valid publication, In replevin (recovery of personal property), under Rule 60, there is also a 3rd party
the auction is irregular and may be invalidated. claim. Remember, that before you can be granted the writ of replevin, you have to
file a bond.
It is further said that the auction sale must be done between the hours of 9am -
2pm. And it can be adjourned from time to time depending on the agreements of Q: How much is the bond?
the parties or if the parties are not around, depending on the sheriff after giving A: Twice the value of the property. We will study that once we get to Rule 60.
notice to the parties.
What Brondial is trying to say is that in replevin there is a 3rd party claim. Aside
Have you attended an auction sale? You better attend one because there are from putting a bond twice the value of the property, you have to, still, put up
auction sales that do not comply with the rules. Not that the sheriff who does not another bond equivalent to the value of the property.
comply with it but because of the absentee lawyers, absentee obligors, or even the
absentee obligees. As lawyers, you must be present so you can oppose if there are Example: Mercedes Benz car is worth P1M. Then in replevin you have to put up a
irregularites because there are prices which are unconscionable. Aside from the bond in the amount of P3M (twice the value of the bond and the another bond
fact that the judgment obligor has the option as to which should be first sold. TV equivalent to the value of the property) because of the 3rd party claim. But in Rule
set, Freezer or other properties that can easily satisfy his debt. If the judgment 39, the bond must be equivalent to the value of the property.
obligor is absent, there can be connivance between the sheriff and the judgment
obligee and connive with what property to be auctioned and on what amount the No damages may be filed against the sheriff after a period of 120 days. 120 days
property can be auctioned at. As when there are no other bidders, the sheriff may means prescription. So if you want to file for damages, you have to file it within
allow the obligee to bid at a very low amount thus there would still be a insufficiency 120 days. The case is Young v. Valdez. So this is 3rd party claim, Section 16. Then
judgment. notices filed in Secs. 17, 18 and 19.

GENERAL RULE: If the judgment obligee is the purchaser at the auction sale, the If what is auctioned is a real property, the judgment obligor has the right of
judgment obligee is not bound to pay. redemption. If what is auctioned is personal property, there is no right of
redemption.
EXCEPTION: Section 16, where there is a 3rd party claim. The judgment obligee,
even if he is the highest bidder, must pay because there is a question as to A car is a personal property, so if it is sold in an auction, the purchaser of the
ownership of property auctioned. property may ask for a deed of sale. And the deed of sale must be executed by the
sheriff and not the owner anymore, because the property is in custodia legis.
Q: A 3rd party claim is different from a 3rd party complaint. We've studied
3rd party complaint already. The right and interest of the purchaser retroacts to the time of the judgment or
A: A 3rd party claim happens on auction sale on execution, foreclosure, or preliminary attachment. Correlate it with the rule on preliminary attachment.
attachment. We have the rules which are inter-related. In Rule 39, inter-relate it
with Rule 57 on attachment and Rule 68 on foreclosure of real estate mortgage. If what is sold is real property, it is mandatory that a deed of sale must be executed
Lahat ng ito ay may rule on 3rd party claim. And they have practically the same and a certificate of sale must be issued and registered in the office of the register
provisions. of deeds. That is very important because the right of redemption begins from the
time that the certificate of sale is registered with the office of the register of deeds.
Q: So that if there is a 3rd party claim, how does the 3rd party claim must The period, therefore, starts to run from the registration of a certificate of sale and
go about it? not from the sale, auction or the levy. That is the right of redemption.
A: He must execute an affidavit stating that he is the owner of the property. He
gives that to the sheriff. The sheriff copy furnishes the judgment obligee. If the In foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68, there is no right of
judgment obligee does not put up a bond, then the sheriff will not be liable for the redemption. There is only equity of redemption. And equity of redemption is
delivering the property to the 3rd party claimant. different from right of redemption. Right of redemption is the authority or privilege

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or right of the judgment debtor or obligor or redemptioner to redeem the property the Mazda Motor vehicle to private respondent are hereby SET ASIDE. The writ of
within a period of 1 year from the registration of certificate of sale. execution dated December 2, 1996 and the Order dated December 10, 1996
granting the motion filed by the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the subject
Q: Section 27, who may redeem? house and motor vehicle to the administrator of the partnership are also SET
A: 2 lang ang pwedeng mag-redeem. ASIDE. o As prayed for by petitioner, the Administrator of the conjugal partnership
1. judgment obligor or his succesors-in-interest. is hereby ordered to cause the reimbursement by counsel for the private
2. redemptioner. respondent [Aida Bañez] of the amount of P100,000.00 released to him as advance
payment of attorney’s fees. RTC grave due course to Gabriel’s Notice of Appeal
Please memorize the meaning or rather the definition or description of what a Aida filed with CA an MD on the ground that Gabriel had failed to file with the
redemptioner is. A redemptioner is one who has a lien over the property appellate court a Record on Appeal.
subsequent to the lien under which the property is sold. Brondial said he is just o CA denied; likewise denied ensuing MR Both Aida and Gabriel filed a Rule
paraphrasing the provision in paragraph b under Section 27 of Rule 39. Ang 45 before SC The 2 petitions were consolidated
importanteng word ay ang "subsequent".
ISSUES: Was the execution of judgment pending appeal justified? NO. Are
CASES multiple appeals allowed in a petition for legal separation? NO.

AIDA P. BAÑEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ, respondent. G.R. No. HELD: As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991),
132592. January 23, 2002 AIDA P. BAÑEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding
BAÑEZ, respondent. G.R. No. 133628. January 23, 2002 SECOND urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ.
DIVISION Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may
well become a tool of oppression and inequity.[11] In this case, considering the
FACTS: RTC Cebu declared the legal separation of Aida and Gabriel on the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior or urgent
ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity o the dissolution of their conjugal property circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were
relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent’s ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondent’s
one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2)
payment to petitioner’s counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorney’s fees to be other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had
taken from petitioner’s share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent none at all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for
of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule
house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common rather than the exception.[12] Similarly, we are not persuaded that the
children within 15 days from receipt of the decision. Aida filed an urgent ex- P100,000 advance payment to petitioner’s counsel was properly granted. We see
parte motion to modify said decision o RTC granted Gabriel filed a Notice no justification to pre-empt the judgment by the Court of Appeals concerning said
of Appeal Aida then filed another motion to modify the decision, praying for amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial court’s judgment was already on
moral and exemplary damages Aida then filed a motion for execution appeal. In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA
Gabriel filed his Consolidated Opposition and MR RTC denied Aida’s motion 186, 194 (1996), this Court held: o xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special
to modify the decision BUT gave due course to the motion for execution Gabriel proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for
filed a Rule 65 before the CA CA reversed RTC; denied Aida’s ensuing MR partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain
o WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 1, 1996 and the Omnibus Order dated and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal
November 22, 1996, insofar as (1) it authorized the release of the sum of in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a
P100,000.00 to private respondent’s counsel as the advanced share of private separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In said
respondent [Aida Bañez] in the net remaining conjugal assets, and (2) granted the case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject
motion for execution pending appeal by ordering petitioner [Gabriel Bañez] to of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter
vacate the premises of the small residential house situated in Maria Luisa Estate pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence,
Park Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City, and to surrender the use and possession of splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against

354
multiplicity of appeals. The same holds true in an action for legal separation. ISSUE: Was Sheriff Quitalig remiss of his duty as regards the implementation of
The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital the writ of execution?
relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as
entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute HELD: YES. A review of the records of this case reveals that respondent enforced
community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the Writ of Execution dated March 7, 2000 only on August 24, 2000, as shown by
the decree of legal separation.[19] They are not separate or distinct matters that his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. Within 30 days from receipt thereof and
may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree every 30 days thereafter until the judgment is fully satisfied, a sheriff is required
of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation.[20] Thus, by the Rules of Court to render a report on the action taken on a writ of execution.
they may not be subject to multiple appeals. Petitioner’s alternative prayers that Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules provides the manner in which the execution is
in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return the records to the trial court and to be implemented, as follows: o “SEC. 14. Return of Writ of Execution. The writ of
require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to the trial execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment
court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within
untenable. If we grant the first, we are effectively saying that the instant case is thirty days (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the
one involving multiple appeals, which it is not. If we allow the second, we are court and state the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect during the
effectively applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall
Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support therefor in law or jurisprudence. make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon
until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or
FERNANDO FAJARDO, complainant, vs. Sheriff RODOLFO V. QUITALIG, Municipal periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be
Trial Court in Cities, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, respondent. A.M. No. P-02-1535. filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.” Evidently,
March 28, 2003 respondent was not only remiss in his implementation of the Writ, but likewise
derelict in his submission of the returns thereof. Respondent should have
FACTS: Reverend Fernando Fajardo was one of the plaintiffs in the case entitled immediately implemented and made a return of the Writ after duly serving it upon
Spouses Fernando Fajardo and Evangeline Perez vs. Maria Datuin . Judgment was the defendant on March 9, 2000. Nonetheless, because of the request of the
favorable to him, hence, he, through his counsel, filed a motion for execution. defendant and her promise that she would vacate the premises on March 23, 2000,
After the 2-week period asked by the defendant in the said case for the transfer he allowed her to remain there. However, when he came back on March 24, 2000,
of the latter’s things, Fajardo went to Quitalig re Writ of Execution but he was he was unable to enforce the Writ because of a TRO issued by the RTC of San
informed by the latter that a restraining order was issued by the court Carlos, Pangasinan. He averred that he was finally able to execute the Writ on
Fajardo learned from the court that there was no such restraining order August 24, 2000 and to submit his Return thereof on the next day. We find
Quitalig allegedly did nothing but asked the defendant to move her things respondent’s explanation to be utterly wanting. He is guilty of dereliction of his
Fajardo then filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Quitalig for duty as a sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the Writ within 30 days from his
onduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and/or dereliction of duty. receipt thereof, (2) submit his Report of Service within the same period, (3) make
Quitalig filed an MD periodic reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied, and (4) furnish
o He asked for the dismissal of the case, because he had already implemented the the parties with copies of the Reports. By his own words, respondent admitted
Writ on August 24, 2000 as evidenced by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service.[4] his dereliction of duty. First, as we have said earlier, he should have immediately
He also pointed out that he had made an inventory of the personal properties executed the Writ when he served it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000.
recovered from the subject premises. That he had done so was attested to by Second, he should have immediately reported to the MTCC that he was unable to
defendant’s mother, Rufina Datuin, and witnessed by the barangay captain and enforce the Writ because another court had issued a TRO enjoining him from doing
two councilors. OCA found respondent to have been negligent in the so. Third, he should have informed the parties, particularly the plaintiff or his
performance of his duty as a sheriff o recommended that respondent be ordered counsel, about his inability to enforce the Writ. Fourth, he should have immediately
to pay a fine of P5,000 and warned that a repetition of the same or a similar offense enforced it twenty days after its issuance. Fifth, he should have made periodic
would be dealt with more severely. Reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied and the parties furnished
a copy thereof. Sixth, within thirty days from his receipt of the Writ, he should
have promptly made his Return, a copy of which he should have immediately

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furnished the parties. Clearly, the actuations of respondent constitute proclaimed winner Santos filed an election protest before RTC RTC in
disrespect, if not outright defiance, of the MTCC’s authority. In the absence of favor of Santos o trial court found that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes while
instructions to the contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a Writ with reasonable respondent received only 2,105 Santos filed a motion for execution pending
celerity and promptness in accordance with its mandate. In several cases,[9] appeal Panulaya appealed to the COMELEC before RTC could have acted on
the Court has said that the failure to make a return of a writ within the required Santos’ motion COMELEC issued a writ of PI against the RTC’s decision
period is nonfeasance. In Bautista v. De Castro,[10] the provincial sheriff of COMELEC then dismissed Panulaya’s appeal and lifted the earlier WPI Santos
Zambales and his deputy were suspended without pay for 30 and 15 days, posted bond RTC issued a writ of execution o thereby installing petitioner
respectively, for dereliction of duty. In Barola v. Abogatal,[11] a sheriff who had as Municipal Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental Santos then took his oath and
received a writ of execution on January 15, 1978, but made a return thereof only assumed duties Panulaya filed an MR before the COMELEC Panulaya
on May 22, 1978, was fined a month’s salary. In Lapeña v. Pamarang,[12] a sheriff pending resolution of his MR, he filed another petition before the COMELEC, which
whose Return was four days late was fined P2,000. Casal v. Concepcion Jr.[13] contained the same prayers COMELEC then issued an order directing the
ordered the dismissal of respondent sheriff from the service and the forfeiture of parties to maintain the status quo ante and enjoining Santos from assuming the
all his benefits, with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch or service of the functions of Mayor Santos filed an MR before COMELEC 1st Division
government including government-owned and controlled corporations. After the COMELEC 1st Division did not refer the MR to the COMELEC En Banc Santos
lapse of two years from the issuance of the original Writ in a simple ejectment filed a Rule 65 before the SC Santos filed an Omnibus Motion before the
case, he not only failed to exert reasonable efforts to fully implement its COMELEC o (1) To Dissolve The Status Quo Order As It Was Based On An Unverified
subsequent issuances, but likewise failed to account for the amounts he got from And Dismissed Petition With Pending Motion For Reconsideration; And (2) To Refer
complainant. Furthermore, he abandoned his work during the time that the This Motion To The Commission En Banc Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC
charges against him were being investigated. In Concerned Citizen v. Torio,[14] Rules of Procedure. COMELEC granted the omnibus motion
the respondent therein was suspended for a year without pay when he failed to act
promptly on the Writs of Execution issued from 1998-2001. And in Lumbre v. Dela ISSUES: Did Panulaya commit forum shopping? YES. Was there grave abuse
Cruz,[15] respondent, after being found guilty of an inexcusable seven-month of discretion on the part of RTC? NO. Was the COMELEC correct in setting aside
delay in carrying out a lawful Writ of Execution was fined P5,000. Justifying the the RTC order which granted the motion for execution pending appeal? NO.
penalty, the Court said: o “When a writ of execution is placed in the hands of a
sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of contrary instructions, to have it implemented HELD: It is at once apparent from the records, as shown above, that respondent
forthwith. The sheriff is primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service was guilty of forum-shopping when he instituted SPR No. 37-2002 with the
of all court processes and writs originating from the court and its branches, COMELEC. Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment
including such as may be properly delegated to him by other courts. The delay of or order has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable
more than seven months, from the time the writ of execution was issued by the opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.
court on 07 August 1998 to the time when respondent sheriff posted the notice of It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
sale or levy on 23 March 1999, is an inordinately long period for respondent to act the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
thereon. The importance of the role played by all court personnel in the favorable disposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity of parties, or at
administration of justice is never to be taken lightly. It is the sheriffs particularly least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity
who are depended on, and who must properly attend to, the proper implementation of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
of court decrees and orders, and they are expected to do so with utmost diligence and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered
and dispatch.” in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.[15] In the case at bar, respondent
EDGAR Y. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION) obtained an adverse decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002 was dismissed
and PEDRO Q. PANULAYA, respondents. G.R. No. 155618. March 26, 2003 EN by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and a
BANC supplemental petition, praying for the nullification of the trial court’s order for the
execution of its decision pending appeal. Two days after filing the supplemental
FACTS: Edgar Santos and Pedro Panulaya were candidates for Mayor of the petition, and while the same was very much pending before the COMELEC, he filed
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the 2001 elections Panulaya a wholly separate petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he

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pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the supplemental petition. This is plainly of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved
evident from the respective prayers in the supplemental petition and the petition or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of
for certiorari as reproduced hereinabove. In doing so, respondent, before allowing the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been
the COMELEC to fully resolve the incidents in SPR No. 20-2002, both of which were pending (italics supplied).[23] The decision of the trial court in Election Protest
at his own instance, sought to increase his chances of securing a favorable decision No. 1-M(2001) was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after almost one year of trial and
in another petition. He filed the second petition on the supposition that the revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate with the
COMELEC might look with favor upon his reliefs. Forum-shopping is considered plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the
a pernicious evil; it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the Mayor continued to run. The
clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the will of the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the election protest, had
judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes.[16] The most important to be respected and given meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis
factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even while the election protest was
courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially determined to have been chosen
or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs.[17] by the people. Between the determination by the trial court of who of the
Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of forum-shopping when he candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to
filed SPR No. 37-2002, his petition should have been dismissed outright by the whom to proclaim, it is the court’s decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently
COMELEC.[18] Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary explained in the case of Ramas v. COMELEC[24] in this wise: o All that was required
dismissal of the case, and constitutes direct contempt of court.[19] The petition for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that
for certiorari in SPR No. 37-2002 assailed the trial court’s orders for the execution the immediate execution should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a
of its decision pending appeal. The grant of execution pending appeal was well special order.” The rationale why such execution is allowed in election cases is, as
within the discretionary powers of the trial court. In order to obtain the annulment stated in Gahol v. Riodique,[25] “to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial
of said orders in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that the trial court judge’s decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation
gravely abused its discretion. He should show not merely a reversible error by the board of canvassers.” Thus: Why should the proclamation by the board
committed by the trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or of canvassers suffice as basis of the right to assume office, subject to future
excess of jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice?
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers is composed of persons
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or who are less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots,
personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion apart from their being more apt to yield to extraneous considerations, and that the
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all board must act summarily, practically racing against time, while, on the other
in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.[20] We find hand, the judge has benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court. In its order admittedly better technical preparation and background, apart from his being
granting execution pending appeal, it held: o It is of judicial notice that for the allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature deliberation before
public official elected last May 14, 2001 elections only a short period is left. rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the
Relative to this Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case, the settled rule that the immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the protestees,
mere filing of the notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as
over the case and to resolve pending incidents, i.e., motion for execution pending there are, in the sound discretion of the court, good reasons therefor. o To deprive
appeal (Asmala vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 745) need not be overemphasized.[21] trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in the words
However, the COMELEC set aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC,[26] bring back the ghost of the “grab-the-proclamation-
term alone is not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending appeal. o prolong the protest” techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the
We disagree. While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a
office and posting a bond are not good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v. consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate.[27] Thus, the COMELEC
COMELEC[22] that: o A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course, instead of dismissing
appeal requires that it should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a special outright, the petition in SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clear showing that respondent
order.” The following constitute “good reasons” and a combination of two or more

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was guilty of forum-shopping; and in setting aside the trial court’s order granting settlement nor to deny the holding of a pre-trial conference on the ground that no
execution pending appeal. compromise agreement was turned over to the court a quo CA dismissed
RCBC’s petition; denied ensuing MR RCBC filed a Rule 45 before the SC
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MAGWIN Arguments: o In the instant case, petitioner maintains that the trial court cannot
MARKETING CORPORATION, NELSON TIU, BENITO SY and ANDERSON UY, coerce the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to execute a compromise agreement
respondents. G.R. No. 152878. May 5, 2003 SECOND DIVISION and penalize their failure to do so by refusing to go forward with the pre-trial
conference. To hold otherwise, so petitioner avers, would violate Art. 2029 of the
FACTS: RCBC filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money with prayer Civil Code which provides that “[t]he court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants
for a writ of preliminary attachment Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise,” and this Court’s ruling in
Benito Sy and Anderson Uy RTC issued the writ of attachment However, Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[23] where it was held that the trial
the writ was returned partially unsatisfied and only a parcel of land purportedly court cannot dismiss a complaint for failure of the parties to submit a compromise
owned by defendant Benito Sy was attached. Summonses were served All agreement. o On the other hand, respondent Anderson Uy filed his comment after
defendants answered except Gabriel Cheng who was dropped without prejudice as several extensions asserting that there are no special and important reasons for
party-defendant as his whereabouts could not be located RCBC filed a motion undertaking this review. He also alleges that petitioner’s attack is limited to the
for the issuance of an alias writ of attachment RCBC after talks with the Order dated 8 September 2000 as to whether it is conditional as the Court of
defendants, it approved a debt payment scheme for the conformity of respondent Appeals so found and the applicability to this case of the ruling in Goldloop
Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager of Magwin Marketing Corporation and Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. Respondent Uy claims that the Order
respondent Benito Sy as Director thereof. o Only Tiu was able to sign RTC on reconsidering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-518 without prejudice is on its face
its own initiative, dismissed the case without prejudice for failure of RCBC to contingent upon the submission of the compromise agreement which in the first
“prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time” RCBC filed an MR, place was the principal reason of petitioner to justify the withdrawal of the Order
notifying RTC of the acquiescence thereto of respondent Nelson Tiu as an officer of declaring his failure to prosecute the civil case. He further contends that the trial
Magwin Marketing Corporation and defendant in the civil case RTC granted court did not force the parties in the civil case to execute a compromise agreement,
the MR o Plaintiff is directed to submit the compromise agreement within 15 days the truth being that it dismissed the complaint therein for petitioner’s dereliction.
from receipt hereof. Failure on the part of plaintiff to submit the said agreement
shall cause the imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing of o Finally, respondent Uy contests the relevance of Goldloop Properties, Inc. v.
this case RCBC filed a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Court of Appeals, and refers to its incongruence with the instant case, i.e., that the
Conference alleging that “[t]o date, only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his complaint of petitioner was dismissed for failure to prosecute and not for its
signature on the May 10, 2000 letter which informed the defendants that plaintiff reckless disregard to present an amicable settlement as was the situation in
[herein petitioner] already approved defendant Magwin Marketing Corporation’s Goldloop Properties, Inc., and that the dismissal was without prejudice, in contrast
request for restructuring of its loan obligations to plaintiff but subject to the terms with the dismissal with prejudice ordered in the cited case. For their part,
and conditions specified in said letter o Followed by a Supplemental Motion to respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy waived their
Plaintiff’s Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference affirming right to file a comment on the instant petition and submitted the same for
that petitioner “could not submit a compromise agreement because only defendant resolution of this Court.
Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May 10, 2000 letter x x x RTC
denied RCBC’s motion RCBC filed a Notice of Appeal o from the 8 September ISSUES: May RTC compel the parties to enter into an amicable settlement? NO.
2000 Order of the trial court as well as its undated Order in Civil Case No. 99-518 Did the failure of RCBC to submit the compromise agreement warrant the
RTC issued two (2) Orders, o one of which inserted the date “6 November dismissal of the case? NO.
2000” in the undated Order rejecting petitioner’s motion for pre-trial in the civil
case, and o the other denying due course to the Notice of Appeal on the ground HELD: The petition of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation is meritorious. It
that the “Orders dated 8 September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are interlocutory directs our attention to questions of substance decided by the courts a quo plainly
orders and therefore, no appeal may be taken x x x.” RCBC elevated the said in a way not in accord with applicable precedents as well as the accepted and usual
Orders to the CA via Rule 65 o petitioner argued that the court a quo had no course of judicial proceedings; it offers special and important reasons that demand
authority to compel the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter into an amicable the exercise of our power of supervision and review. Furthermore, petitioner’s

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objections to the proceedings below encompass not only the Order of 8 September setting aside the dismissal without prejudice: submission of the compromise
2000 but include the cognate Orders of the trial court of 6 and 16 November 2000. agreement for the consideration of the trial court. Nothing in the second paragraph
This is evident from the prayer of the instant petition which seeks to reverse and do we read that the reconsideration is subject to two (2) qualifications. Certainly
set aside the Decision of the appellate court and to direct the trial court to proceed far from it, for in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[28] a similar
with the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 99-518. Evidently, the substantive directive, i.e., “[t]he parties are given a period of fifteen (15) days from today
issue involved herein is whether the proceedings in the civil case should progress, within which to submit a Compromise Agreement,” was held to mean that “should
a question which at bottom embroils all the Orders affirmed by the Court of the parties fail in their negotiations the proceedings would continue from where
Appeals. On the task at hand, we see no reason why RTC-Br. 135 of Makati City they left off.” Goldloop Properties, Inc. further said that its order, or a specie of it,
should stop short of hearing the civil case on the merits. There is no substantial did not constitute an agreement or even an expectation of the parties that should
policy worth pursuing by requiring petitioner to pay again the docket fees when it they fail to settle their differences within the stipulated number of days their case
has already discharged this obligation simultaneously with the filing of the would be dismissed. The addition of the second sentence in the second
complaint for collection of a sum of money. The procedure for dismissed cases paragraph does not change the absolute nullification of the dismissal without
when refiled is the same as though it was initially lodged, i.e., the filing of answer, prejudice decreed in the first paragraph. The sentence “[f]ailure on the part of
reply, answer to counter-claim, including other foot-dragging maneuvers, except plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall cause the imposition of payment of the
for the rigmarole of raffling cases which is dispensed with since the re-filed required docket fees for re-filing of this case” is not a directive to pay docket fees
complaint is automatically assigned to the branch to which the original case but only a statement of the event that may result in its imposition. The reason for
pertained.[25] A complaint that is re-filed leads to the re-enactment of past this is that the trial court could not have possibly made such payment obligatory
proceedings with the concomitant full attention of the same trial court exercising in the same civil
an immaculate slew of jurisdiction and control over the case that was previously case, i.e., Civil Case No. 99-518, since docket fees are defrayed only after the
dismissed,[26] which in the context of the instant case is a waste of judicial time, dismissal becomes final and executory and when the civil case is re-filed. It must
capital and energy. What judicial benefit do we derive from starting the civil case be emphasized however that once the dismissal attains the attribute of finality, the
all over again, especially where three (3) of the four (4) defendants, i.e., Magwin trial court cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and executory dismissal
Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy, have not contested petitioner’s although without prejudice divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil case
plea before this Court and the courts a quo to advance to pre-trial conference? as well as any residual power to order anything relative to the dismissed case; it
Indeed, to continue hereafter with the resolution of petitioner’s complaint without would have to wait until the complaint is docketed once again.[29] On the other
the usual procedure for the re-filing thereof, we will save the court a quo invaluable hand, if we are to concede that the trial court retains jurisdiction over Civil Case
time and other resources far outweighing the docket fees that petitioner would be No. 99-518 for it to issue the assailed Orders, a continuation of the hearing thereon
forfeiting should we rule otherwise. Going over the specifics of this petition and would not trigger a disbursement for docket fees on the part of petitioner as this
the arguments of respondent Anderson Uy, we rule that the Order of 8 September would obviously imply the setting aside of the order of dismissal and the
2000 did not reserve conditions on the reconsideration and reversal of the Order reinstatement of the complaint. Indubitably, it is speculative to reckon the
dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518. This is quite evident from its effectivity of the Order of dismissal without prejudice to the presentation of the
text which does not use words to signal an intent to impose riders on the dispositive compromise agreement. If we are to admit that the efficacy of the invalidation of
portion - o Acting on plaintiff’s “Motion for Reconsideration” of the Order dated 20 the Order of dismissal is dependent upon this condition, then we must inquire:
July 2000 dismissing this case for failure to prosecute, it appearing that there was from what date do we count the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period within which
already conformity to the restructuring of defendants’ indebtedness with plaintiff the alleged revival of the order of dismissal began to run? Did it commence from
by defendant Nelson Tiu, President of defendant corporation per “Manifestation and the lapse of the fifteen (15) days provided for in the Order of 8 September 2000?
Motion” filed by plaintiff on 22 August 2000, there being probability of settlement Or do we count it from the 6 November 2000 Order when the trial court denied the
among the parties, as prayed for, the Order dated 20 July 2000 is hereby set aside. holding of a pre-trial conference? Or must it be upon petitioner’s receipt of the 16
Plaintiff is directed to submit the compromise agreement within 15 days from November 2000 Order denying due course to its Notice of Appeal? The court a quo
receipt hereof. Failure on the part of plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall could not have instituted an Order that marked the proceedings before it with a
cause the imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing of this shadow of instability and chaos rather than a semblance of constancy and firmness.
case.[27] Contrary to respondent Uy’s asseverations, the impact of the second The subsequent actions of the trial court also belie an intention to revive the
paragraph upon the first is simply to illustrate what the trial court would do after Order of dismissal without prejudice in the event that petitioner fails to submit a

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compromise agreement. The Orders of 6 and 16 November 2000 plainly manifest Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If despite efforts exerted by the trial court and the
that it was retaining jurisdiction over the civil case, a fact which would not have parties the negotiations still fail, only then should the action continue as if no
been possible had the dismissal without prejudice been resuscitated. Surely, the suspension had taken place.[33] Ostensibly, while the rules allow the trial court
court a quo could not have denied on 6 November 2000 petitioner’s motion to to suspend its proceedings consistent with the policy to encourage the use of
calendar Civil Case No. 99-518 for pre-trial if the dismissal had been restored to alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution, in the instant case, the trial court
life in the meantime. By then the dismissal without prejudice would have already only gave the parties fifteen (15) days to conclude a deal. This was, to say the
become final and executory so as to effectively remove the civil case from the least, a passive and paltry attempt of the court a quo in its task of persuading
docket of the trial court. The same is true with the Order of 16 November 2000 litigants to agree upon a reasonable concession.[34] Hence, if only to inspire
denying due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal. There would have been no confidence in the pursuit of a middle ground between petitioner and respondents,
basis for such exercise of discretion because the jurisdiction of the court a quo over we must not interpret the trial court’s Orders as dismissing the action on its own
the civil case would have been discharged and terminated by the presumed motion because the parties, specifically petitioner, were anxious to litigate their
dismissal thereof. Moreover, we note the ground for denying due course to the case as exhibited in their several manifestations and motions.
appeal: the “Orders dated 8 September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are
interlocutory orders and therefore, no appeal may be taken from x x x.”[30] This We reject respondent Uy’s contention that Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of
declaration strongly suggests that something more was to be accomplished in the Appeals is irrelevant to the case at bar on the dubious reasoning that the complaint
civil case, thus negating the claim that the Order of dismissal without prejudice of petitioner was dismissed for failure to prosecute and not for the non-submission
was resurrected upon the parties’ failure to yield a compromise agreement. A of a compromise agreement which was the bone of contention in that case, and
“final order” issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the that the dismissal imposed in the instant case was without prejudice, in contrast
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, to the dismissal with prejudice decreed in the cited case. To begin with, whether
leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been the dismissal is with or without prejudice if grievously erroneous is detrimental to
determined by the court, while an “interlocutory order” is one which does not the cause of the affected party; Goldloop Properties, Inc. does not tolerate a
dispose of a case completely but leaves something more to be decided upon.[31] wrongful dismissal just because it was without prejudice. More importantly, the
Besides the semantic and consequential improbabilities of respondent Uy’s facts in Goldloop Properties, Inc. involve, as in the instant case, a dismissal for
argument, our ruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc., is decisive of the instant case. failure to prosecute on the ground of the parties’ inability to come up with a
In Goldloop Properties, Inc., we reversed the action of the trial court in dismissing compromise agreement within fifteen (15) days from notice of the court’s order
the complaint for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute its case, which was in turn therein. All told, the parallelism between them is unmistakable. Even if we are
based on its inability to forge a compromise with the other parties within fifteen to accept on face value respondent’s understanding of Goldloop Properties, Inc. as
(15) days from notice of the order to do so and held - o Since there is nothing in solely about the failure to submit a compromise agreement, it is apparent that the
the Rules that imposes the sanction of dismissal for failing to submit a compromise present case confronts a similar problem. Perhaps initially the issue was one of
agreement, then it is obvious that the dismissal of the complaint on the basis failure to prosecute, as can be observed from the Order dated 20 July 2000,
thereof amounts no less to a gross procedural infirmity assailable by certiorari. For although later reversed and set aside. But thereafter, in the Order of 6 November
such submission could at most be directory and could not result in throwing out 2000, the trial court refused to proceed to pre-trial owing to the “failure of the
the case for failure to effect a compromise. While a compromise is encouraged, plaintiff to submit a compromise agreement pursuant to the Order dated 8
very strongly in fact, failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural September 2000.” When the civil case was stalled on account of the trial court’s
sanction, much less an authority to jettison a civil complaint worth P4,000,000.00 refusal to call the parties to a pre-trial conference, the reason or basis therefor was
x x x Plainly, submission of a compromise agreement is never mandatory, nor is it the absence of a negotiated settlement - a circumstance that takes the case at bar
required by any rule.[32] As also explained therein, the proper course of action within the plain ambit of Goldloop Properties, Inc. In any event, given that the
that should have been taken by the court a quo, upon manifestation of the parties instant case merely revolves around the search for a reasonable interpretation of
of their willingness to discuss a settlement, was to suspend the proceedings and the several Orders of the trial court, i.e., as to whether the dismissal without
allow them reasonable time to come to terms (a) If willingness to discuss a possible prejudice was revived upon petitioner’s helplessness to perfect an out-of-court
compromise is expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it appears that one of arrangement, with more reason must we employ the ruling in Goldloop Properties,
the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding, offered to Inc. to resolve the parties’ differences of opinion. We also find nothing in the
discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer, pursuant to record to support respondent Uy’s conclusion that petitioner has been mercilessly

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delaying the prosecution of Civil Case No. 99-518 to warrant its dismissal. A appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would
complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff’s fault: (a) if he fails to appear during still amount to achieving the desired end.[38] In the absence of a pattern or
a scheduled trial, especially on the date for the presentation of his evidence in scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton failure to observe the
chief, or when so required at the pre-trial; (b) if he neglects to prosecute his action mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at
for an unreasonable length of time; or (c) if he does not comply with the rules or bar, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to
any order of the court. None of these was obtaining in the civil case. While there dismiss.[39] Clearly, another creative remedy was available to the court a quo
was a lull of about six (6) months in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 99-518, it to attain a speedy disposition of Civil Case No. 99-518 without sacrificing the course
must be remembered that respondents themselves contributed largely to this of justice. Since the failure of petitioner to submit a compromise agreement was
delay. They repeatedly asked petitioner to consider re-structuring the debt of the refusal of just one of herein respondents, i.e., Benito Sy, to sign his name on
respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation to which petitioner graciously acceded. the conforme of the loan restructure documents, and the common concern of the
Petitioner approved a new debt payment scheme that was sought by respondents, courts a quo was dispatch in the proceedings, the holding of a pre-trial conference
which it then communicated to respondent Corporation through a letter for the was the best-suited solution to the problem as this stage in a civil
conformity of the latter’s officers, i.e., respondent Nelson Tiu as President/General action is where issues are simplified and the dispute quickly and genuinely
Manager and respondent Benito Sy as Director thereof. Regrettably, only reconciled. By means of pre-trial, the trial court is fully empowered to sway the
respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his concurrence litigants to agree upon some fair compromise. Dismissing the civil case and
with the terms and conditions of the arrangement. The momentary lag in the civil compelling petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly and circuitous
case was aggravated when respondent Benito Sy for unknown and unexplained route that may end up aggravating, not resolving, the disagreement. This case
reasons paid no heed to the adjustments in the indebtedness although curiously management strategy is frighteningly deceptive because it does so at the expense
he has not opposed before this Court or the courts a quo petitioner’s desire to go of petitioner whose cause of action, perhaps, may have already been admitted by
ahead with the pre-trial conference. Admittedly, delay took place in this case its adverse parties as shown by three (3) of four (4) defendants not willing to
but it was not an interruption that should have entailed the dismissal of the contest petitioner’s allegations, and more critically, since this approach promotes
complaint even if such was designated as without prejudice. To constitute a the useless and thankless duplication of hard work already undertaken by the trial
sufficient ground for dismissal, the inattention of plaintiff to pursue his cause must court. As we have aptly observed, “[i]nconsiderate dismissals, even if without
not only be prolonged but also be unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court
of judicial processes. In the instant case, the adjournment was not only fleeting dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual
as it lasted less than six (6) months but was also done in good faith to judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the
accommodate respondents’ incessant pleas to negotiate. Although the dismissal absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a
of a case for failure to prosecute is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the
the court, that judgment however must not be abused. The availability of this court.”
recourse must be determined according to the procedural history of each case, the
situation at the time of the dismissal, and the diligence of plaintiff to proceed CITY OF ILIGAN, Represented by Hon. FRANKLIN M. QUIJANO in His Capacity as
therein.[35] Stress must also be laid upon the official directive that courts must City Mayor, petitioner, vs. PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC. (PMGI),
endeavor to convince parties in a civil case to consummate a fair settlement,[36] Represented by Its President & Chief Executive Officer, FERNANDO M. SOPOT,
and to mitigate damages to be paid by the losing party who has shown a sincere respondent. G.R. No. 145260. July 31, 2003 THIRD DIVISION
desire for such give-andtake.[37] All things considered, we see no compelling
circumstances to uphold the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint regardless of its FACTS: A MOA on a ‘turn-key’ arrangement was drawn by Mayor Quijano,
characterization as being without prejudice. In fine, petitioner cannot be said to representing the City of Iligan, with Land Bank Realty Development Corporation
have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A court may dismiss a case (LBRDC) as General Contractor and Principal Management Group, Inc. (PMGI) as
on the ground of non prosequitur but the real test of the judicious exercise of such Developer - Financing Manager. Project was the construction of a Sports Complex
power is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is chargeable with want of fitting which upon completion shall be turned over to Iligan City for acceptance and the
assiduousness in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless issuance of Certificate of Acceptance and Authority to Pay to enable Land Bank
a party’s conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to Realty-PMGI to call on the SLC Work on the project stopped due to the refusal
provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non- of some of the occupants to vacate the premises claiming that they have not been

361
paid x x x their disturbance compensation. o By then, PMGI had already good reasons must be stated in a special order.[9] Execution pending appeal is,
accomplished 78.27% of the contracted project equivalent to P10,957,800.00 of of course, the exception to the general rule.[10] Normally, execution cannot be
the total project cost of P14,000,000.00 City of Iligan refused to pay for the obtained until and unless (a) the judgment has become final and executory; (b)
reason that the mutually agreed price of P14 Million shall only be paid after the the right of appeal has been renounced or waived; (c) the period for appeal has
completion of the project and acceptance by it and since the project is not yet lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or (d) having been filed, the appeal
complete, no payment can be paid. PMGI filed a complaint against the City of has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of
Iligan for rescission of the MOA and damages City of Iligan filed an Answer origin -- in which case, execution shall issue as a matter of right.[11] On the
PMGI filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment o claimed that there was no other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a
genuine issue as to the fact of the obligation of the City of Iligan since it admitted judgment should not be allowed except if, in the court’s discretion, there are good
the accomplishment of 52.89% or equivalent to P6,958,861.59 of PMGI and that reasons therefor.[12] Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an
the City of Iligan had not specifically denied under oath the genuineness of the exception to the general rule, the existence of “good reasons” is essential. These
Letter of Credit and Memorandum of Agreement. RTC granted the Motion for reasons must be stated in a special order, because unless these are divulged, it
Partial Summary Judgment; ruled in favor of PMGI; denied City’s ensuing MR will be difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial discretion has been properly
City of Iligan filed a Notice of Appeal PMGI filed a Motion for Execution exercised by the lower court.[13] Good reasons consist of compelling
Pending Appeal RTC granted the motion o The Court is convinced that there circumstances that justify the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it become
are good reasons to allow the immediate execution pending appeal. Its adjudication illusory; or the prevailing party be u nable to enjoy it after the lapse of time,
is based on [petitioner’s] own admission hence, any appeal would be unmeritorious considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to delay
and would only serve to delay execution of the final order subject of the instant .[14] In the present case, the good reason relied upon by both the trial and the
motion. The fact that an appeal in this case if taken by [petitioner] will be a merely appellate courts was that the partial adjudication of the case was based on
dilatory tactic has been declared by the Supreme Court as a ‘good and sufficient petitioner’s own admission; hence, any appeal based on that point would be
reason upon which to issue execution’ of the order under Section 2, Rule 39 of the unmeritorious and merely dilatory. Indeed, both courts ruled that an appeal by
Revised Rules of Court City of Iligan filed a Rule 65 before CA CA petitioner would only serve as “a good and sufficient reason upon which to issue
dismissed the petition o Ruling that the trial court could grant executions pending execution.”[15] The ascertainment of good reasons for execution pending appeal
appeal, provided that a good reason therefor was stated in a special order, the lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will not
appellate court upheld “dilatory tactic” as one such good reason. City of Iligan normally disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be proper, if it is
filed a Rule 45 before the SC shown that there has been an abuse of discretion.[16] Like the CA, we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s grant of execution pending appeal. Indeed,
ISSUES: Was the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment correctly granted? YES. this Court has held that a good and sufficient reason upon which to authorize
Was the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal correctly granted? YES. immediate execution is when an appeal is clearly dilatory.[17] Normally, the
trial court is not allowed to assess its own judgment and to hold that an appeal
HELD: Executions pending appeal are governed by Section 2 of Rule 39 of the may not prosper, or that it would merely be dilatory. In the present case, however,
Rules of Court, which reads: o “SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.-- (a) Execution there are circumstances that undisputedly serve as cogent bases for arriving at
of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party such a conclusion. First, it is not seriously disputed that the judgment is
with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over anchored upon material facts as follows: (1) there is a Memorandum of Agreement
the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, (MOA) for the site development of Sports Complex Project No. 1 signed by the
as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its parties; (2) petitioner failed to pay the occupants of the project site on time,
discretion order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration thereby preventing respondent from fully complying with its obligation under the
of the period to appeal. “After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for MOA; (3) respondent admitted that the work accomplished was 52.89 percent,
execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court. “Discretionary which was equivalent to P6,958,861.59. Obviously, there is no genuine issue as
execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after to any material fact on this point. Second, Article 1191 of the Civil Code states:
due hearing.” There are three requisites for the execution of a judgment pending o “The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
appeal: a) a motion must be filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. o “The injured party
party; b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; and c) the may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the

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payment of damages in either case. x x x.” By failing to pay the occupants of another branch, in view of the appointment of the judge of the original branch as
the project site within the time required for the completion of the project, petitioner Chairman of the CHR RTC Br 231 modified the previous order o The trial court
did not comply with what was incumbent upon it. Applying the law to the issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply
undisputed facts, the trial court had prima facie bases for rendering its partial with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall
summary judgment holding that respondent was entitled to rescission and to the respondents to their mother unit until further orders by the trial court. Villaruel
payment of P6,958,861.59. Verily, the trial court committed no abuse of failed to comply with the writ Abarca and Cleofas filed a motion to declare
discretion in granting execution pending appeal. Its conclusion was upheld by the Villlaruel in default RTC granted the motion and declared Villaruel guilty of
CA, which found that “the appeal filed by the petitioner was a dilatory tactic and indirect contempt; issued a bench warrant against Villaruel Villaruel filed a
was not allowed in the first place.” Consequently, the appellate court did not err in Rule 65 before the CA o assailing the trial court’s order finding petitioner guilty of
refusing to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the trial court’s Order granting indirect contempt RTC rendered a judgment in default against Villaruel
execution pending appeal. Villaruel (represented by OSG) appealed to CA CA upon the motion of
Abarca and Cleofas, dismissed the Rule 65 petition for being moot and academic
PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR., petitioner, vs. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO, MODESTO OSG failed to file the memorandum, despite having been granted extension
ABARCA, JR. and MARILOU M. CLEOFAS, respondents. G.R. No. 136726. of time CA dismissed OSG’s appeal; denied ensuing MR Abarca and Cleofas
September 24, 2003 FIRST DIVISION filed a motion for execution OSG no opposition, despite having received a
copy RTC issued writ of execution Villaruel (represented by a new counsel)
FACTS: Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of the Air filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and to Suspend Sheriff’s Sale o
Transportation Office (“ATO”), Department of Transportation and Communication petitioner alleged that the trial court’s decision never became final and executory
(“DOTC”), issued a memorandum addressed to Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. as the trial court deprived him of his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that
Abarca, Jr. (“Abarca”), and Marilou M. Cleofas (Cleofas), Chief, Chief Administrative the OSG failed to file petitioner’s memorandum in CA-G.R. SP No. 42447 resulting
Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training in the dismissal of his appeal. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed
Center (“CATC”), an adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, to inform him of the dismissal of his appeal and of the trial court’s order granting
airway communicators and related civil aviation personnel for the local aviation respondents’ motion for execution. Petitioner further asserted that the Resolution
industry as well as for the Southeast Asian and Pacific region, detailing the 2 to the of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM 0-960090 superseded the decision of the trial
Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995 Abarca and court. RTC granted the motion to quash o because the Sheriff failed to follow
Cleofas wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The trial court, however, issued an Alias
T. Lichauco, through Villaruel, reconsideration of the detail order Abarca and Writ of Execution
Cleofas then reported to the Office of the Undersecretary Villaruel without Villaruel filed an MR o RTC denied Villaruel filed a Rule 65 before the
acting on the reconsideration, issued another memorandum on 19 July 1995 CA CA dismissed the petition; denied ensuing MR Villaruel filed a Rule
addressed to Abarca placing him under “preventive suspension” for 90 days without 45 before the SC
pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct Abarca and Cleofas
requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to their ISSUES: Was the motion for execution correctly quashed? YES Did the RTC
mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Abarca and Cleofas correctly issue an alias writ of execution after quashing the first writ? YES
also sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case Ombudsman
inquired from Secretary Garcia the action taken on respondents’ request for HELD: We begin by pointing out that petitioner failed to allege the essential
reconsideration of the detail order Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman requisites under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for a petition for certiorari
that he had issued a memorandum dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to to prosper. Specifically, petitioner never alleged that the trial court acted without
recall respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. Neither did
does not sanction the continuous detail of respondents Villaruel, however, still petitioner allege that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
failed to reinstate Abarca and Cleofas to their mother unit Abarca and Cleofas or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary remedy in the ordinary course of law. In other words, there is no issue that the
Mandatory Injunction against Vllaruel before RTC Pasay RTC granted the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction The case was then re-raffled to jurisdiction in handing down the questioned orders. On this score alone, the

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dismissal of the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals is in We agree and indeed consider it their bounden duty to do so, in order to ensure the speedy
with the OCA that respondent judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ of and efficient administration of justice.[14] A decision that is left unexecuted or
execution/possession. His action was consistent with the Decision of this Court in delayed indefinitely because of the sheriff’s inefficiency or negligence remains an
GR No. 123417 affirming that of the MTC as to damages. Besides, the latter’s empty victory on the part of the prevailing party . [15] For this reason, any
Order directing defendants not to molest complainants in their peaceful possession inordinate delay in the execution of judgment is truly deplorable and cannot be
was rendered moot when they were ousted from the disputed lots by virtue of the countenanced by the Court. There is no mistaking the mandatory character of
final and executory judgments in Civil Case No. 1920 and DARAB Case No. 2413. the period prescribed under Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court on
Indeed, the execution of a final judgment may be refused, as in this case, when the Return of a Writ of Execution, which reads: o “SEC. 14. Return of writ of
there has been a change in the situation of the parties that would make its execution. – The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
execution inequitable.[6] The delay in the resolution of complainants’ Motion, immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
however, is an altogether different matter. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the
trial court judges, as paragons of justice in the first instance, to dispose of the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall
court’s business promptly[7] and to decide cases and motions within the required continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by
periods.[8] Section 15(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution mandates them to do motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the
so within three months from the date of submission for decision or final resolution. proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity
This Court, through Administrative Circular No. 1,[9] also specifically requires all expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings
of them to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the
their courts.[10] Hence, it is well-settled that the unexplained failure of judges parties.” A similar rule is stated in Administrative Circular No. 12 dated October
to decide cases and resolve motions and incidents within the reglementary period 1, 1985, and incorporated in the Manual for Clerks of Court.[16] According to this
of 90 days, which is fixed by the Constitution and the law, renders them Circular, all sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall submit to the judge concerned a
administratively liable.[11] We have stressed often enough that delay in the report on actions taken on all writs and processes assigned to them within 10 days
administration of justice undermines the faith of the people in the judiciary, which from receipt. Per the records of this case, a Writ of Execution was issued on
is expected to hear their supplications promptly. Delay reinforces in the mind of November 22, 1999 in Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482.[17] Respondent Sheriff’s
litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.[12] As the Return of Service[18] of that Writ was filed only on May 25, 2000, however, or six
timehonored principle goes, “justice delayed is justice denied.” In this case, months thereafter. There is nothing in the records showing that he submitted
respondent judge never resolved the Motion, filed on June 6, 2000, to cite before then a periodic report on the actions he had taken on the Writ “every 30
Defendant Occidental for contempt. While it is true that the former immediately days from the date of receipt” as required. On the contrary, the Report indicates
conducted an ocular inspection of the area to determine if the Motion had any that the Writ was partially executed on December 15-28, 1999 and January 11,
basis, this act served only to mitigate his infraction, but not absolve him from it. 2000; and that the damages adjudged were partly paid in the amount of P3,500
The Sheriff’s Return of Service of the Writ of Demolition issued in Civil Case No. plus one unit of Karaoke machine. But it was only on May 25, 2000, that this
1920 would have clarified whether or not Occidental had already been fully restored matter was reported to the trial court. The excuse proffered by respondent
in possession. But while its absence was a valid reason to defer action on the sheriff -- heavy workload -- cannot absolve him from administrative sanctions.[19]
contempt Motion at the outset, it was certainly not an excuse for the prolonged As an officer of the court, he should at all times show a high degree of
inaction. Had respondent judge been so minded, he would have requested a professionalism in the performance of his duties.[20] He has failed to observe that
copy of the Sheriff’s Report, so that he could rule on the Motion with dispatch. He degree of dedication required of him as a sheriff. The charge of connivance is,
has not satisfactorily explained his failure to do so, considering that the Writ of however, dismissed for lack of basis.
Demolition issued in Civil Case No. 1920 had been fully executed as early as Although the OCA recommended that Respondent Judge Bagagñan be absolved
February 25, 1998, and the return thereon made on March 17, 1998.[13] With of all charges, we find him guilty of undue delay[21] in resolving a pending motion,
respect to the charges against respondent sheriff, we agree with the OCA that he an infraction that also constitutes a violation of a Court circular.[22] Under Section
was remiss in his duty to implement the Writ fully in Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482. 11(B) of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, this less serious charge[23] may
Time and time again, we have impressed upon those tasked to implement court be sanctioned by a fine of more than P10,000, but not exceeding P20,000. As
orders and processes to see to it that the final stage in the litigation process -- the to Sheriff Matias, we find him guilty of simple neglect of duty,[24] a less grave
execution of judgment -- be carried out promptly. They should exert every effort offense under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil

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Service. This infraction is punishable by a suspension of one month and one day interposed by defendant, the court resolves to grant the motion for the issuance
to six months.[25] But under the circumstances, we find it inadvisable to suspend of an Alias Writ of Execution Sheriff served a notice to vacate upon Heirs of
respondent sheriff, considering that his work would be left unattended in his Geli Heirs of Geli filed a Rule 65 before the CA CA issued a TRO o
absence. Instead, we adopt our previous ruling in Aquino v. Lavadia [26] imposing restraining the implementation of the alias writ of execution and the notice to
a fine equivalent to his one-month salary, so that he can finally implement the vacate issued by the trial court CA then granted Heirs of Geli’s petition o The
subject Writ and perform his other duties. appellate court ruled that since Emilio Geli paid the redemption price for the
property to the GSIS in 1987 while his appeal was pending in the CA, the said
SPOUSES ARTURO AND NICETA SERRANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS redemption was a supervening event which rendered the enforcement of the writ
AND HEIRS OF EMILIO S. GELI, respondents. G.R. No. 133883 December of execution issued by the trial court against them unjust and inequitable.
10, 2003 SECOND DIVISION Spouses Serrano filed a Rule 45 before SC

FACTS: Spouses Serrano, owners of the subject land located in QC, entered into ISSUE: Did the payment of Emilio Geli of the purchase price to the GSIS constitute
a deed of sale with partial assumption of mortgage over the parcel of land in favor as intervening even that would prevent the issuance of the writ of execution in
of Spouses Emilio and Eveyn Geli, for the consideration of P70,000. Spouses favor of Spouses Serrano?
Geli paid the amount of P38,000 in partial payment of the property, the balance of
P32,000 to be paid by them to the GSIS for the account of the Spouses Serrano HELD: NO. Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is a matter of right
Spouses Geli then took the possession of the property Evelyn Geli died intestate on the part of the prevailing party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of the
Emilio Geli and heirs, however, failed to settle the balance to the GSIS GSIS trial court to enforce its own judgment once it becomes final and executory. It may
filed an action before RTC QC for the rescission of the deed of absolute sale with happen, however, th at new facts and circumstances may develop or occur after a
partial assumption of mortgage. o RTC ruled in favor of GSIS; ordered Geli to judgment had been rendered and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new
vacate the property Geli appealed to CA During the pendency of the appeal, matters had developed after the appeal has been dismissed and the appealed
the GSIS foreclosed the real estate mortgage over the property for non-payment judgment had become final and executory, whic h the parties were not aware of
of the P50,000 loan secured by the said property GSIS then became the highest and could not have been aware of prior to or during the trial or during the appeal,
bidder Emilio Geli paid the purchase price GSIS issued a certificate of as they were not yet in existence at that time . In the first situation, any attempt
redemption in favor of Geli Emilio Geli did not inform Spouses Serrano CA to frustrate or put off the enforcement of an executory decision must fail. Once a
dismissed the appeal of Geli for non-payment of docket fees; this dismissal then judgment has become final and executory, the only remedy left for material
became final and executory The records were remanded to the RTC Spouses attention thereof is that provided for in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Serrano sought a writ of execution RTC issued the writ o The writ, however, There is no other prerequisite mode of thwarting the execution of the judgment on
was not implemented as the Spouses Serrano were then in the United States. equitable grounds predicated on facts occurring before the finality of judgment. In
RTC then issued an alias writ o This, too, was not implemented, because of the the second situation, the execution may be stayed, notwithstanding the affirmance
defendants’ change of address RTC then issued a 2nd alias writ Heirs of of the appealed judgment by this Court. It is required, however, that the
Geli filed an MQ the writ o claiming, for the first time, that defendant Emilio Geli supervening facts and circumstances must either have a direct effect upon the
had already redeemed the subject property in 1988 from the GSIS. According to matter already litigated and settled or create a substantial change in the rights or
the defendants, this constituted a supervening event that would make the relations of the parties therein which would render execution of a final judgment
execution of the trial court’s decision unjust and inequitable. RTC denied the unjust, impossible or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of
MQ o It noted that the payment by defendant Emilio Geli of the redemption price justice.16 The interested party may file a motion to quash a writ of execution issued
to the GSIS took place before the CA dismissed the appeal and before the decision by the trial court, or ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize
of the RTC became final and executory; hence, it did not constitute a supervening the same with justice and further supervening facts.17 Evidence may be adduced
event warranting a quashal of the writ of execution Spouses Serrano filed a by the parties on such supervening facts or circumstances. In this case, the
motion to issue another alias writ RTC granted the motion o The Motion to payment by Emilio Geli of the amount of P67,701.84 on October 30 and November
Quash Writ of Execution, filed by defendants having been earlier denied and, it 3, 1987 to the GSIS for the account of the petitioners was made while the appeal
being explicit under the New Rules of Civil Procedure (1997) that no appeals may of the private respondents from the summary judgment of the RTC was pending.
be taken from orders of execution, instead of giving due course to the appeal The summary judgment of the RTC had not yet become final and executory. It

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behooved the said respondents to prosecute their appeal and file their brief, where remains the owner of the property. The right acquired by the purchaser at public
they should have invoked the payment of the redemption price as a ground for the auction is merely inchoate until the period of redemption has expired without the
reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment in their favor. The respondents right being exercised by the redemptioner.27 Such right becomes absolute only
failed to do so, and even concealed the payment of the loan for the account of the after the expiration of the redemption period without the right of redemption
petitioners. Worse, the respondents did not pay the requisite docket fees for their having been exercised.28 The purchaser is entitled as a matter of right to
appeal, which resulted in its dismissal. The respondents even opted not to file any consolidation of title and to the possession of the property.29 Where redemption
motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the CA dismissing their appeal. is seasonably exercised by the mortgagor-debtor, what is actually effected is not
In sum, the respondents allowed the decision of the trial court to become final and the recovery
executory. Consequently, the enforcement of the summary judgment of the trial of ownership of his land, which ownership he never lost, but the elimination from
court can no longer be frustrated by the respondents’ payment, through Emilio his title thereto of the lien created by the registration of a mortgage thereon.30
Geli, of the amount of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in 1987. Irrefragably, the Spouses Upon the expiry of the redemption period without the mortgagor-debtor being able
Geli, as vendees-mortgagors under the deed of absolute sale with partial to redeem the property, the purchaser can no longer be compelled to allow the
assumption of mortgage, would have been subrogated to the rights and obligations former to redeem the property or to resell the property; and if he agrees to sell
of the petitioners under the said deed, including the right to redeem the property the property, it may be for a price higher than that for which he purchased the
from the GSIS.19 However, the CA dismissed their appeal for failure to pay the property at public auction.31 In this case, there is no showing in the records
requisite docket fees, and such dismissal became final and executory. Hence, the that the sheriff’s certificate of sale in favor of the GSIS had been registered in the
summary judgment of the trial court declaring the deed of absolute sale with partial Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and if so, when it was in fact
assumption of mortgage rescinded had also become final and executory. registered in the said office. It cannot thus be argued that when Emilio Geli
Generally, the rule is that to rescind a contract is not merely to terminate it, but to remitted the amount of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in full payment of the account of
abrogate and undo it from the beginning; that is, not merely to release the parties the petitioners, the one-year period to redeem the property had by then lapsed.
from further obligations to each other in respect to the subject of the contract, but Hence, the petitioners remained the owners of the property. The GSIS never
to annul the contract and restore the parties to the relative positions which they acquired title over the property and could not have conveyed and transferred
would have occupied if no such contract had ever been made. Rescission ownership over the same when it executed the certificate of redemption to and in
necessarily involves a repudiation of the contract and a refusal of the moving party the name of the petitioner Arturo Serrano. As the Latin maxim goes: NEMO DAT
to be further bound by it.20 With the rescission of the deed of sale, etc., the rights QUOD NON HABET. We are not convinced by the ratiocination of the respondents
of Emilio Geli under the said deed to redeem the property had been extinguished. that the enforcement of the summary decision of the trial court and the alias writ
The petitioners cannot even be compelled to subrogate the respondents to their of execution against them is unjust and unreasonable. The Spouses Geli and the
rights under the real estate mortgage over the property which the petitioners respondents, as heirs and successors-in-interest of the said spouses, were obliged
executed in favor of the GSIS since the payment of the P67,701.84 redemption under the deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage to pay to the
price was made without the knowledge of the petitioners.21 The respondents, GSIS the balance of the petitioners’ account. The Spouses Geli reneged on their
however, are entitled to be reimbursed by the petitioners to the extent that the undertaking. The petitioners were impelled to secure the services of counsel and
latter were benefited.22 Neither did the respondents acquire title to the property sue the Spouses Geli with the RTC for the rescission of the said deed with damages.
under the certificate of redemption executed by the GSIS on February 10, 1998. The respondent spouses nevertheless remained adamant and refused to pay the
First. In the certificate of redemption, the mortgagor-debtor in whose favor the petitioners’ account with the GSIS which impelled the latter to foreclose the real
certificate was executed was the petitioner Arturo Serrano and not Emilio Geli estate mortgage and sell the property at public auction. Emilio Geli and the
and/or the respondents Second. Case law has it that the one-year period within respondents did not inform the CA and the petitioners that Emilio Geli had paid the
which the mortgagordebtor or his successor-in-interest may redeem the property amount of P67,701.84 for the account of the petitioners. The respondents even
should be counted from the time the certificate of sale was registered with the allowed their appeal to be dismissed by the CA, and the dismissal to become final
Register of Deeds.24 Upon the lapse of the one-year period, the right to redeem and executory. The petitioners were impelled to spend money for their counsel and
becomes functus officio on the date of its expiry.25 The rule on redemption is for sheriff’s fees for the implementation of the writ of execution and the alias writ
actually liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the property. The of execution issued by the trial court. In the meantime, the respondents remained
purpose of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in the exercise of his right of in possession of the property from 1969, when the said deed of absolute sale with
redemption.26 Before the lapse of the one-year period, the mortgagor-debtor partial assumption of mortgage was executed, up to the present, or for a period of

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34 years without paying a single centavo. For the Court to allow the respondents are severally liable Fortune appealed to the NLRC D’Armoured did not
to benefit from their own wrong would run counter to the maxim: Ex Dolo Malo appeal NLRC dismissed the claim against Fortune o Decision became final and
Non Oritur Actio (No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own executory Records were then remanded to LA for execution LA issued a
wrongdoing).32 Equity is applied only in the absence of and never against statutory writ of execution against D’Armoured Sheriff served a writ of garnishment
law or judicial rules of procedure.33 We reiterate our ruling that: o Justice is done upon Chief Accountant of Foremost Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner
according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law.1âwphi1 There may be a moral has an existing services agreement The receivables of D’Armoured from
obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), Foremost Farms, Inc. were then garnished D’Armoured filed with the NLRC a
but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the “Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution and Garnishment” LA denied the
disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy. The choice between motion; denied ensuing MR D’Armoured appealed to NLRC NLRC affirmed
what is legally just and what is morally just, when these two options do not LA; dismissed appeal; denied ensuing MR o dismissed the appeal for petitioner’s
coincide, is explained by Justice Moreland in Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil. 769, 788 where failure to post a bond within the reglementary period D’Armoured filed a Rule
he said: o "Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome 65 before CA CA affirmed NLRC D’Armoured filed a rule 45 before the
by another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do SC
foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money
by them— indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law ISSUES: May D’Armoured still question the writ of execution at this point? NO.
intervene and restore. There must be in addition, a violation of law, the commission May the subject receivables be garnished? YES.
of what the law knows as an actionable wrong before the courts are authorized to
lay hold of the situation and remedy it." (Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. v. HELD: The petition lacks merit. We have ruled that an order of execution of a
Remolado, 62051, March 18, 1985) (135 SCRA 409, 412).34 In sum then, the final and executory judgment, as in this case, is not appealable, otherwise, there
respondents, as heirs of Emilio Geli, are obliged to vacate the subject property. would be no end to litigation.[2] On this ground alone, the instant petition is
However, since the petitioners were benefited to the extent of P67,701.84 which dismissible. Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to deny the instant
was the total amount paid by Emilio Geli to the GSIS as redemption price for the petition. Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment
foreclosed property, the petitioners are obliged to refund the said amount to the provides: o “Rule IV EXECUTION o SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution.
respondents. – Only the properties of the losing party shall be the subject of execution, except:
(a) The losing party’s family home constituted in accordance with the Civil
D’ ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs. Code or Family Code or as may be provided for by law or in the absence thereof,
ARNULFO ORPIA, LODUVICO ABUCEJO, ROWEL AGURO, EFREN ALMOETE, ROMEO the homestead in which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection
AMISTA, WARLITO BALAGOSA, ROMEO BALINGBING, RAMON BARROA, therewith, subject to the limits fixed by law; (b) His necessary clothing, and
MONTECLARO BATAWIL, ARNEL BON, RICARDO CAPENTES, DANILO DADA, JOEL that of his family; (c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
DELA CRUZ, HERNANO DELOS REYES, FLORENTINO DELOS TRINO, ROGELIO housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing party such as he may select,
DUERME, NONITO ESTRELLADO, JOSEPH FALCESO, ISIDRO FLORES, VICTOR of a value not exceeding the amount fixed by law; (d) Provisions for individual
GUNGON, SONNY JULBA, PATRICIO LACANA, JR., FELIX LASCONA, JUANITO LUNA, or family use sufficient for three (3) months; (e) The professional libraries
RAUL LUZADAS, ROMMEL MAGBANUA, ROGELIO MARIBUNG, NICOLAS MENDOZA, of attorneys, judges, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers, surveyors,
EZVENER OGANA, RICKY ORANO, REYNALDO OZARAGA, SAMUEL PADILLA, EDWIN clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed by
PARRENO, IRENEO PARTOLAN, JUAN PIGTUAN, GUILLERMO PUSING, RODEL law; (f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his personal services
SIBAL, SILVESTRE SOLEDAD, JOVENAR TEVER, VIRGILIO TIMAJO, ERMILIO within the month preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family;
TOMARONG, JR., VIRGILIO VERDEFLOR and JOEREX VICTORINO, respondents. (g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner
G.R. No. 151325. June 27, 2005 THIRD DIVISION growing out of any life insurance; (h) Tools and instruments necessarily
used by him in his trade or employment of a value not exceeding three thousand
FACTS: Respondents were employed as security guards by D’Armoured Security (P3,000.00) pesos; (i) Other properties especially exempted by law.”
and Investigation Agency, Inc. and assigned to the latter’s client, Fortune Tobacco, The above Rule clearly enumerates what properties are exempt from execution. It
Inc. (Fortune Tobacco) Respondents filed an illegal dismissal case against is apparent that the exemption pertains only to natural persons and not to juridical
Fortune and D’Armoured before the LA LA ruled that Fortune and D’Armoured entities. On this point, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner, being

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a corporate entity, does not fall within the exemption, thus: o “We cannot accede
to petitioner’s position that the garnished amount is exempt from execution. FACTS: Spouses Digos obtained a loan of P5,800,000.00 from the International
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties Exchange Bank to finance the construction project of townhouses on their property
are exempt from execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads: o in Tandang Sora, QC, secured by a REM over the said property The construction
‘SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. – Except as otherwise expressly was, however, delayed partly because some homeowners in the Pillarville
provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from Subdivision (which abutted the subject property) refused to allow them to build an
execution: (i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment access road through the subdivision to the property The loan was unpaid and
obligor for his personal services within the four months preceding the levy as are the mortage foreclosed The highest bidder was International Exchange Bank
necessary for the support of his family.’ The exemption under this procedural Spouses Digos requested from International Exchange Bank that they be given
rule should be read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the substantive law which an extension of 6 months to redeem the property o International Exchange Bank
proscribes the execution of employee’s wages, thus: o ‘ART. 1708. The laborer’s gave them one month Spouses Digos instead of redeeming, filed before
wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for the RTC an action for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.’ Obviously, the exemption under estate mortgage and sale at public auction and/or redemption of the property, with
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code is meant to a prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to
favor only laboring men or women whose works are manual. Persons belonging to enjoin the bank from consolidating its title over the property with damages o
this class usually look to the reward of a day’s labor for immediate or present alleged, inter alia, that they were denied their right to due process because the
support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any other [Gaa foreclosure of the real estate mortgage was extrajudicial; the sale of their property
vs. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 304 (1985)]. In this context, exemptions under at public auction was without prior notice to them; the property was sold for only
this rule are confined only to natural persons and not to juridical entities such as P4,500,000.00, the balance of their account with the bank, but about 400% lower
petitioner . Thus, the rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning from the ‘personal than the prevailing price of the property; the bank rejected their plea for a five-
services’ rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule further requires that such month extension to redeem, and their offer of P1,000,000.00 in partial payment of
earnings be intended for the support of the judgment debtor’s family. their loan account to reduce the same to P3,500,000.00, but the bank granted
Necessarily, petitioner which is a corporate entity, does not fall under the them an extension of only one month to redeem the property, designed to divest
exemption. If at all, the exemption refers to petitioner’s individual employees and them of the same and enrich some characters at their expense; because of the
not to petitioner as a corporation. x x x. Parenthetically, in a parallel case where foregoing acts of the bank, they suffered sleepless nights, nervous tension and the
a security agency claimed that the guns it gives to its guards are tools and rise in their blood pressure for which they were entitled to moral damages in the
implements exempt from execution, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule amount of P500,000.00, aside from the exemplary damages they were entitled to
that the exemption pertains only to natural and not to juridical persons, thus: o in the amount of P100,000.00. Spouses Digos caused the annotation of a
‘However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision notice of lis pendens RTC did NOT issue a TRO/ WPI International Exchange
involved is personal, available only to a natural person, such as a dentist’s dental Bank filed an MD and cancellation of notice of lis pendens o The action for
chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-15612, 30 Nov. 1962). As injunction has already been rendered moot and academic, title to the foreclosed
pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt from property having been consolidated in iBank’s name; o Assuming arguendo that title
execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be enforced to the foreclosed property has not yet been consolidated, still plaintiffs have no
against the business entity’ [Pentagon Security and Investigation Agency vs. cause of action for injunction against iBank RTC granted the MD o It found
Jimenez, 192 SCRA 492 (1990)]. It stands to reason that only natural persons that the spouses Digos admitted in their complaint that the period for the
whose salaries, wages and earnings are indispensable for his own and that of his redemption of the property was about to expire, and that they were given up to
family’s support are exempted under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. October 8, 1999 within which to do so. The court held that it had no authority to
Undeniably, a corporate entity such as petitioner security agency is not covered by extend the period for redemption, and since it had already expired, the spouses
the exemption. had no more right to redeem the property; as such, the defendant had the right to
consolidate its title over the property, and had, in fact, been issued TCT No.
ISIDRO PEREZ and NARCISO A. RAGUA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, 206979. The court also declared that the spouses Digos had no right to demand
HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG and SPOUSES GAUDENCIO DIGOS, JR. and RHODORA that they be allowed to redeem the property. o Finally, since the act sought to be
DIGOS, respondents. G.R. No. 157616. July 22, 2005 SECOND DIVISION enjoined – the consolidation of the bank’s title – was already fait accompli, the

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spouses Digos had no cause of action for injunction.[9] The trial court ruled that a or divided so as to be made the subject of two or more different actions.[26] A
writ of injunction cannot issue to enjoin a consummated act.[10] It, thus, ordered single act or omission may be violative of various rights at the same time, such as
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT when the act constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal obligations.[27]
No. 206979. Spouses Digos did NOT appeal; filed instead a Rule 65 before The violation of each of these rights is a cause of action in itself. However, if only
the CA CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time Spouses Digos one right may be violated by several acts or omissions, there would only be one
filed an MR o They then withdrew this via another motion CA granted the cause of action. Otherwise stated, if two separate and distinct primary rights are
motion to withdraw the MR Hence, the CA decision then became final and violated by one and the same wrong; or if the single primary right should be
executory International Exchange Bank then sold the property to Isidro Perez violated by two distinct and separate legal wrongs; or when the two primary rights
and Narciso Ragua RD then issued a TCT to Perez and Ragua, who then caused are each broken by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either case, two causes of
the subdivision of the property into 18 lots Spouses Digos then filed before action would result.[28] Causes of action which are distinct and independent,
RTC an action for the cancellation and annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure although arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of fact may be sued
of the real estate mortgage executed by them in favor of the bank, the sale at separately, recovery on one being no bar to subsequent actions on the others.
public auction as well as the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff, and the The mere fact that the same relief is sought in the subsequent action will not render
Torrens title issued to them (against Bank, Perez and Ragua) Bank filed an the judgment in the prior action as res judicata.[29] Causes of action are not
Answer Perez and Ragua filed an MD on the ground of res judicata, splitting distinguishable for purposes of res judicata by difference in the claims for
of a single cause of action and forum shopping RTC denied MD; denied ensuing relief.[30] Comparing the material averments of the two complaints, it would
MR o ruling that there was no identity of issue in the two actions because, in the appear that separate primary rights of the respondents were violated by the bank’s
second complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-0144227), the spouses Digos institution of a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and
assailed the legality of the extrajudicial foreclosure, on the sole ground that the the sale at public auction; hence, the respondents had separate and independent
bank had unlawfully increased their obligation, contrary to the terms and conditions causes of action against the bank, to wit: (a) the first complaint relates to the
of the loan contract. The court held that the causes of action in the two complaints violation by the bank of the right to a judicial, not extrajudicial, foreclosure of the
were not identical: in the first case, it was for the redemption of the mortgaged real estate mortgage and for an extension of the period for the respondents to
property, distinct and separate from their cause of action in the second case which redeem the property with damages; (b) the second complaint relates to the breach
is rooted on the erroneous computation of the balance of their loan account with by the bank of its loan contract with the respondents by causing the extrajudicial
the bank. The court also declared that in the first complaint, the spouses Digos foreclosure of the real estate mortgage for P4,500,000.00 which was in excess of
assailed the validity or regularity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate their unpaid account with the bank.
mortgage and the sale at public auction. Consequently, the court concluded, the However, we are convinced that the institution by the respondents of their
complaint was not barred by res judicata; nor are they guilty of forum shopping. second complaint anchored on their claim that the bank breached its loan contracts
Perez and Ragua filed before CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and with them by erroneously computing the actual and correct balance of their account
mandamus CA dismissed the petition; denied ensuing MR o The appellate when the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage was filed
court declared that there was no identity of causes of action in the two cases by it designed to avert the dismissal of their complaint due to splitting causes of
because the first action was one for injunction and redemption of the property, action and res judicata, following the dismissal of their first complaint and the
whereas the second action was for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure dismissal of their appeal through their negligence. The Court is constrained to
of the real estate mortgage and the sale at public auction due to the erroneous conclude that this was a last-ditch attempt to resuscitate their lost cause, a brazen
computation of the balance on the respondents’ account with the bank; hence, the violation of the principle of res judicata. Section 49(b)(c), Rule 39 of the Rules
spouses Digos were not estopped from filing their second action Perez and Ragua of Court provides in part: o SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. – The effect of a
filed a Rule 45 before the SC judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows: (b) In other
ISSUES: Was there res judicata? YES. Was there splitting of COA? NO. cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
HELD: Splitting a single cause of action consists in dividing a single or indivisible between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
therein.[25] A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up and under the same title and in the same capacity. (c) In any other litigation

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between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different
have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have and distinct issue arising in the second. In order that this rule may be applied, it
been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or must clearly and positively appear, either from the record itself or by the aid of
necessary thereto. Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata, competent extrinsic evidence that the precise point or question in issue in the
known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel by judgment, which refers to a theory second suit was involved and decided in the first. And in determining whether a
or matter that has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by a court of given question was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look behind the
competent jurisdiction without fraud or collusion. There ar e four (4) essential judgment to ascertain whether the evidence necessary to sustain a judgment in
requisites which must concur for the application of this doctrine: o (a) finality of the second action would have authorized a judgment for the same party in the first
the former judgment; o (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the action.[39] In the present case, before the private respondents filed their first
subject matter and the parties; o (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and o complaint, they already knew that the balance of their account with the bank was
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject P4,500,000.00. They even offered to make a P1,000,000.00 partial payment of
matter and causes of action.[31] A judgment or order is on the merits of the their loan to reduce their account to P3,500,000.00. These are gleaned from the
case when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the averments in the first complaint: o 7. That the long process of negotiation for
ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented for trial. It is not the right-of-way has unnecessarily delayed the project of the plaintiffs and has
necessary that a trial, actual hearing or argument on the facts of the case ensued. nearly caused the foreclosure of the mortgage property by the private defendant
For as long as the parties had the full legal opportunity to be heard on their Bank, however, the said foreclosure was held in abeyance when plaintiffs offered
respective claims and contentions, the judgment or order is on the merits.[32] An to pay the additional amount of P1,000,000.00 which should leave a balance of the
order of the trial court on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of loan in the amount of P3,500,000.00;[40] o 10. That as the auction sale was
action is a determination of the case on its merits.[33] Such order whether right highly irregular, obviously, the only bidder is the defendant Bank for the price
or wrong bars another action based upon the same cause of action.[34] The limited to the remaining balance of the loan in the amount of P4,500,000.00, no
operation of the order as res judicata is not affected by a mere right of appeal more, no less;[41] More telling is the private respondents’ failure to object to
where the appeal has not been taken or by an appeal which never has been the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale at public
perfected.[35] Indeed, absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine qua auction; they even pleaded to be allowed to redeem the property after it had
non for the application of res judicata. It is sufficient that there is a shared identity already been sold at public auction. Patently then, the respondents were
of interest.[36] The rule is that, even if new parties are found in the second action, proscribed from claiming that the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage was for
res judicata still applies if the party against whom the judgment is offered in an amount in excess of the balance of their account and that the sale at public
evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, a case can always be renewed auction was irregular/illegal. As the Court held in Aclon v. Court of Appeals:[42] o
by the mere expedience of joining new parties in the new suit.[37] The ultimate In the absence of evidence proving that a judgment debtor was merely trying to
test to ascertain identity of causes of action is whether or not the same evidence protect himself or save his property, and that no reliance could or should have
fully supports and establishes both the first and second cases. The application of been placed upon his action in so doing, an attempt to redeem from an execution
the doctrine of res judicata cannot be excused by merely varying the form of the sale has been construed as a waiver of defects or irregularities therein, precluding
action or engaging a different method of presenting the issue.[38] S ection 49(c) him from relying upon them for the purpose of challenging its validity. When Aclon
of Rule 39 enumerates the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. This is the sought to redeem his property from PNB he never made any reservation with
second branch, otherwise known as collateral estoppel or estoppel by verdict. This respect to his right to question the validity of the auction sale and to seek
applies where, between the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second alternative relief before the courts. In other words, there was no indication
case wherein such judgment is involved, there is no identity of causes of action . whatsoever that he does not recognize the validity of the sale. If petitioner indeed
As explained by this Court: o It has been held that in order that a judgment in one felt that the assailed foreclosure proceedings were attended with any irregularity
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the he should have filed the appropriate action with the court. Instead, he offered to
same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a repurchase the subject properties without any condition or reservation.
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will Nevertheless, Aclon failed to comply with his undertaking and instead defaulted in
depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former his subsequent payments. Redemption is inconsistent with the claim of invalidity
judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if of the sale. Redemption is an implied admission of the regularity of the sale and
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the would estop the respondents from later impugning its validity on that ground.[43]

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Thus, the private respondents’ pleas for extensions of time to redeem the subject necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second
property are of the same genre. The private respondents admitted in their would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve
complaint in the first case that the bank only gave a one-month extension to the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first, merely by having
redeem the property. If indeed the bank made an erroneous computation of the circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the
balance of their account as claimed by the private respondents in their second first.[50] It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for
complaint, this should have been alleged in the first complaint as one of their recovery.[51] A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues
causes of action. They failed to do so. The private respondents unequivocably existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal.[52] The plaintiff
admitted in their first complaint that the balance of their account with the bank is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to
was P4,500,000.00 which was the precise amount for which the bank sought the exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale of the property at public piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.[53] A
auction; they even sought judicial recourse to enable them to redeem the property party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court,
despite the lapse of the one-year period therefor. Relying on these admissions either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a
on the part of the private respondents, and the fact that the bank has already judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute
consolidated its title over the property, the Court thus dismissed their first it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief
complaint. The Order of the Court dismissing the first complaint is a judgment of is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails.
the case on the merits. The attempt of the respondents in their second complaint There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed
to avoid the application of the principle of res judicata by claiming the nature of
their account on the ground therefor and their legal theory cannot prosper. Case FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. (now BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS),
law has it that where a right, question or fact is distinctly put in issue and directly petitioner, vs. TOMAS TOH, SR., AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANDALUYONG
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a first case, between the same CITY, BRANCH 214, respondents. G.R. No. 144018. June 23, 2003 SECOND
parties or their privies, the former adjudication of that fact, right or question is DIVISION
binding on the parties or their privies in a second suit irrespective of whether the
causes of action are the same.[45] The ruling of the CA that the action of the FACTS: Tomas Toh, Sr. and sons executed a Comprehensive Security Agreement
private respondents and their legal theory in their second complaint were different in favor of FEBTC wherein the Tohs jointly and severally bound themselves as
from their causes of action and legal theory in the first complaint is not correct. A sureties for the P22 million credit facilities, denominated as Omnibus Line and Bills
different cause of action is one that proceeds not only on a sufficiently different Purchased Line, earlier granted by petitioner to CASICO. Said credit line expired
legal theory, but also on a different factual footing as not to require the trial of on June 30, 1998, but the parties renewed the same for another year, subject to
facts material to the former suit; that is, an action that can be maintained even if the following amendments: o (1) a reduction in the credit line from P22 million to
all disputed factual issues raised in the plaintiff’s original complaint are concluded P7.5 million; and o (2) the relief of Toh, Sr., as one of the sureties of CASICO
in defendant’s favor.[46] In this case, the private respondents’ second complaint Toh, Sr. filed before RTC an action seeking recovery of his bank deposits with
cannot be maintained without trying the facts material to the first case, and the petitioner in the amount of P2,560,644.68 plus damages o Toh claimed that
second case cannot be maintained if all the disputed factual issues raised in the petitioner had debited, without Toh’s knowledge and consent, said amount from
first complaint are considered in favor of the bank. The principle of res judicata his savings and current accounts with petitioner bank and then applied the money
applies when the opportunity to raise an issue in the first complaint exists but the as payment for the Letters of Credit availed of by Catmon Sales International
plaintiff failed to do so. Indeed, if the pleading of a different legal theory would Corporation (CASICO) from petitioner. Thus, when Toh issued two checks to Anton
have convinced the trial court to decide a particular issue in the first action which, Construction Supply, Inc., they were dishonored by FEBTCO allegedly for having
with the use of diligence the plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so, been drawn against insufficient funds, although Toh alleged as of February 4, 1999,
they are barred by res judicata.[47] Nor do legal theories operate to constitute a he had an outstanding withdrawable balance of P2,560,644.68. FEBTC filed
cause of action. New legal theories do not amount to a an Answer o averred that the debiting of Toh’s bank accounts was justified due to
new cause of action so as to defeat the application of the principle of res his surety undertaking in the event of the default of CASICO in its payments.
judicata.[48] Indeed, in Siegel v. Knott,[49] it was held that the statement of a Petitioner further claimed that the reduction of credit line does not relieve Toh, Sr.
different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of from his continuing surety obligation, citing the absence of a new surety
the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not undertaking or any provisions in the renewal agreement releasing Toh, Sr., from

371
his personal obligation. It pointed out that CASICO’s default in its obligations private respondent Tomas Toh, Sr. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
became inevitable after CASICO filed a Petition for Declaration in a State of erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it
Suspension of Payments before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). granted the motion for discretionary execution based on private respondent’s bare
Toh, Sr. filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings RTC granted the allegation that he was already 79 years old. Private respondent avers that
motion; rendered judgment on the pleadings against FEBTC Toh, Sr. filed a Section 2, Rule 49 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states the requisites for a
Motion for Discretionary Execution o invoking Section 2,[5] Rule 39 of the Revised grant of a motion pending appeal. All these requirements and conditions were
Rules of Court. He prayed that execution pending appeal be granted on the ground complied with as evidenced by respondent’s motion for discretionary execution,
of old age and the probability that he may not be able to enjoy his money deposited petitioner’s opposition to the motion and the special order issued by the Regional
in petitioner’s bank. RTC gave due course to FEBTC’s appeal RTC granted Trial Court stating the good reason for the grant of the motion. Hence, the Regional
the Motion for Discretionary Execution o held that discretionary execution may be Trial Court could not have committed any grave abuse of discretion.[14] In our
issued upon good reasons by virtue of Section 2(a),[7] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules view, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in sustaining the lower
of Court. Citing De Leon v. Soriano,[8] where we held that the approach of the court. Discretionary execution is permissible only when “good reasons” exist for
end of one’s life span is a compelling cause for discretionary execution pending immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even
appeal,[9] the trial court used the circumstance of Toh’s advanced age as a “good before the expiration of the time to appeal. “Good reasons” are compelling
reason” to allow execution pending appeal. FEBTC did not file an MR; went circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory,
directly to CA and filed a Rule 65 CA dismissed the petition; denied ensuing or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of time, become unable to enjoy it,
MR o ls pointed out that petitioner filed its petition for certiorari without filing a considering the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently have no case
motion for reconsideration. It held that the fact that the lower court already except to delay.[15] The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give
ordered the execution of its judgment did not constitute a situation of extreme examples of “good reasons” to justify execution. The determination of what is a
urgency as to justify petitioner’s by-passing the remedy of reconsideration. The good reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the sound d iscretion of the trial
appellate court declared it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court. In other words, the issuance of the writ of execution must necessarily be
trial court in granting discretionary execution. For the trial court had determined controlled by the judgment of the judge in accordance with his own conscience and
that Toh Sr. was already 79 years old and given his advanced age, might not be by a sense of justice and equity, free from the control of another’s judgment or
able to enjoy the fruits of a judgment favorable to him if he were to wait for the conscience. It must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard and fast rule
eventual resolution of the appeal filed by petitioner. FEBTC filed a Rule 45 .[16] In this case, the trial court granted private respondent’s motion for
before the SC discretionary execution due to his advanced age, citing our ruling in De Leon v.
Soriano.[17] It concluded that old age is a “good reason” to allow execution
ISSUES: Should CA have given due course to the Rule 65 petition, pending appeal as any delay in the final disposition of the present case may deny
notwithstanding the failure of FEBTC to file an MR? mooted May discretionary private respondent of his right to enjoy fully the money he has with defendant
execution be allowed in this case? YES. bank.[18] The Court of Appeals found said ruling in conformity with sound logical
precepts, inspired as it is by the probability that the lapse of time would render the
HELD: At the outset, it bears stressing that the first issue is now moot. We find ultimate judgment ineffective. It further stressed that the trial court was in the
that the appellate court did note petitioner’s procedural by-pass or oversight. vantage position to determine whether private respondent’s advanced age and
Nonetheless it proceeded to rule on the petition on its merits. The appellate court’s state of health would merit the execution private respondent prayed for. In De
action is not wanting in precedents as a special civil action for certiorari may be Leon, we upheld immediate execution of judgment in favor of a 75-yearold woman.
given due course, notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration has been We ruled that her need of and right to immediate execution of the decision in her
filed before the lower court under certain exceptional circumstances.[12] These favor amply satisfied the requirement of a paramount and compelling reason of
exceptions include instances where: (1) the issue raised is purely one of law; (2) urgency and justice, outweighing the security offered by the supersedeas
public interest is involved; (3) the matter is one of urgency; (4) the question of bond.[19] In the subsequent case of Borja v. Court of Appeals,[20] we likewise
jurisdiction was squarely raised, submitted to, met and decided by the lower court; allowed execution pending appeal in favor of a 76 yearold man on the ground that
and (5) where the order is a patent nullity.[13] Hence, the only relevant issue the appeal will take years to decide with finality, and he might very well be facing
for our resolution now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower a different judgment from a Court higher than any earthly tribunal and the decision
court’s Order granting execution pending appeal on the ground of advanced age of on his complaint, even if it be in his favor, would have become meaningless as far

372
as he himself was concerned.[21] In the present case, private respondent Toh litigation between CTDC and PROSECOR involving Block 40; and (3) other entities
is already 79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be denied that he like the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas and Provident Savings Bank have existing liens
is already of advanced age. Not a few might be fortunate to live beyond 79 years. over Block 40. HLURB ruled in favor of Bumatay; revived the NHA reso
But no one could claim with certainty that his tribe would be always blessed with CTDC appealed to HLURB Board of Commissioners HLURB Board of
long life. Private respondent obtained a favorable judgment in the trial court. Commissioners affirmed HLURB; denied ensuing MR CTDC appealed to OP
But that judgment in Civil Case No. MC-99-643 is still on appeal before the Court OP affirmed HLURB Board of Commissioners; denied ensuing MR CTDC
of Appeals. It might even reach this Court before the controversy is finally resolved filed a Rule 43 before the CA CA dismissed petition o for its failure to attach
with finality. As well said in Borja, “while we may not agree that a man of his years thereto a certification against forum shopping o also found that the petition was
is practically moribund, the Court can appreciate his apprehension that he will not not supported by certified true copies of such material portions of the records and
be long for this world and may not enjoy the fruit of the judgment before he finally other pertinent papers referred to in the petition. CTDC filed an MR; submitted
passes away.”[22] Petitioner avers that private respondent’s claim of old age to the Court of Appeals a certification of nonforum shopping as well as the pleadings
was unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. In essence, petitioner mentioned in its Resolution CA granted MR; reinstated petition CA then
wants us to re-evaluate this factual issue . Needless to stress, such re - reversed the decision of OP
examination is improper in a petition for review on certiorari. Here, only questions
of law should ISSUE: May the subject NHA Reso be enforced against CTDC?
be raised .[23] Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, bind this Court and are entitled to utmost respect.[24] No cogent reason HELD: NO. An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural
having been given for us to depart therefrom we shall stand by this salutary rule. means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become
dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of
ROGELIO (ROGER) PANOTES (thru ARACELI BUMATAY, as successor-in-interest), the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of
Petitioner, vs. CITY TOWNHOUSE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.6
G.R. No. 154739 January 23, 2007 FIRST DIVISION Here, the original judgment or the NHA Resolution sought to be revived was
between Rogelio Panotes and PROSECOR, not between petitioner Araceli Bumatay
FACTS: Panotes, then president of the Provident Village Homeowners and respondent CTDC.
Association, Inc., filed an action before the NHA against Provident Securities In maintaining that CTDC is bound by the NHA Resolution, petitioner claims that
Corporation (PROSECOR), owner-developer of the Provident Village in Marikina City CTDC is the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR and, therefore, assumed the
o alleges that PROSECOR violated Sections 19, 20, 21, 38, and 39 of Presidential obligations of the latter to provide an open space for Provident Village. CTDC
Decree (P.D.) No. 957.3 One of the violations complained of was its failure to purchased from PROSECOR Block 40 in the said village, not as an ownerdeveloper
provide an open space in the said subdivision. NHA conducted an ocular like PROSECOR, but as an ordinary buyer of lots. Even after the sale, CTDC did not
inspection; found that there was no such open space NHA then issued a become an owner-developer. The Deed of Sale executed by CTDC, as buyer, and
resolution directing PROSECOR to provide said open space o During the PROSECOR, as seller, shows that the subject matter of the sale is the unsold lots
proceedings before the NHA, an ocular inspection showed that the subdivision has comprising Block 40 within the subdivision to CTDC. The contract does not include
no open space. The NHA found, however, that Block 40, with an area of 22,916 the transfer of rights of PROSECOR as owner-developer of the said subdivision.
square meters, could be utilized as open space. PROSECOR did not appeal Clearly, there is no basis to conclude that CTDC is the successor-in-interest of
The NHA Reso then became final and executory Panotes filed a motion for PROSECOR. It bears stressing that when CTDC bought Block 40, there was no
execution of the NHA Resolution It was then found that the records of the case annotation on PROSECOR’s title showing that the property is encumbered. In fact,
were "mysteriously missing." o Thus, the case was provisionally dismissed the NHA Resolution was not annotated thereon. CTDC is thus a buyer in good faith
PROSECOR then sold several lots to City Townhouse Development Corporation and for value, and as such , may not be deprived of the ownership of Block 40.
(CTDC), including those comprising Block 40 CTDC was unaware of the subject Verily, the NHA Resolution may not be enforced against CTDC. Section 2 of P.D.
NHA Reso Araceli Bumatay (successor of Panotes to the position) filed with No. 1216 provides: o Section 2. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 is hereby
HLURB a complaint for revival of the NHA Resolutio, impleading therein CTDC amended to read as follows: Section 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open
CTDC filed its Answer o averred, among others, that (1) Araceli Bumatay has no Spaces. – The owner or developer of a subdivision shall provide adequate roads,
legal personality to file the action for revival of judgment; (2) there is a pending alleys and sidewalks. For subdivision projects of one (1) hectare or more, the owner

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shall reserve thirty percent (30%) of the gross area for open space. Clearly, expenses and to support her family. o Stronghold Insurance alleged that its liability
providing an open space within the subdivision remains to be the obligation of is limited only to P12,755,139.85 in accordance with its surety bond with Project
PROSECOR, the owner-developer and the real partyin-interest in the case for Movers, plus attorney’s fees of P200,000 as awarded by the trial court. However,
revival of judgment. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals: o Quintessentially, the the amount in the writ of execution pending appeal and notices of garnishment is
real party-in-interest in the revival of NHA Case No. 4175 is PROSECOR and not P56 million. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that Stronghold Insurance
CTDC. PROSECOR was the lone defendant or respondent in that case against whom failed to show that more than P12,755,139.85 had been garnished. Stronghold
judgment was rendered. To insist that CTDC is a successor-in-interest of filed a Rule 45 before the SC
PROSECOR may have some truth if we are talking about the ownership of the lots
sold by PROSECOR in favor of CTDC as a result of a civil action between the two. ISSUE: Are there good reasons in this case to justify execution pending appeal?
But then, to hold CTDC as the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR as the developer
of the subdivision, is far from realty. CTDC is simply on the same footing as any HELD: NO. Execution pending appeal is governed by paragraph (a), Section 2,
lot buyer-member of PVHIA. x x x. Furthermore, strangers to a case, like CTDC, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules") which provides: o SEC. 2.
are not bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not divest the rights of Discretionary execution. - (a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending
a party who has not and never been a party to a litigation. Execution of a judgment appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in
can be issued only against a party to the action and not against one who did not the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either
have his day in court. the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the
filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE NEMESIO judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
S. FELIX, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court, After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal
Makati City, RICHARD C. JAMORA, Branch Clerk of Court, and EMERITA GARON, may be filed in the appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue upon
Respondents. G.R. No. 148090 November 28, 2006 THIRD DIVISION good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Execution pending
appeal is an exception to the general rule. The Court explained the nature of
FACTS: Emerita Garon ("Garon") filed before RTC Makati an action for sum of execution pending appeal as follows: o Execution pending appeal is an
money against Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation ("Project extraordinary remedy, being more of the exception rather than the rule. This rule
Movers") and Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. ("Stronghold Insurance"). is strictly construed against the movant because courts look with disfavor upon any
RTC upon Garon’s motion, rendered a summary judgment in favor of Garon attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired finality. Such execution
Garon filed a motion for execution pending appeal Stronghold filed an MR affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal.13
against the RTC Order granting the motion for summary judgment o RTC denied The requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal are the
RTC granted Garon’s motion for execution pending appeal o The trial court following: o (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the
ordered Garon to post a bond of P20 million to answer for any damage that Project adverse party; o (b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; o
Movers and Stronghold Insurance may sustain by reason of the execution pending (c) the good reasons must be stated in the special order.14 As a discretionary
appeal. RTC (through its BCC Jamora) then issued a writ of execution execution, execution pending appeal is permissible only when good reasons exist
Stronghold Insurance filed a notice of appeal Stronghold Insurance then for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even
filed a Rule 65 before the CA CA issued a TRO enjoining the BCC and Sheriff before the expiration of the period to appeal.15 Good reasons, special, important,
of the RTC from enforcing the order issuing a writ of execution However, it pressing reasons must exist to justify execution pending appeal; otherwise, instead
turned out that notices of garnishment had been served before the Court of Appeals of an instrument of solicitude and justice, it may well become a tool of oppression
issued the temporary restraining order (TRO). Stronghold Insurance filed and inequality.16 Good reasons consist of exceptional circumstances of such
with RTC an Urgent Motion for the recall of the notices of garnishment. o RTC urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer
denied CA then dismissed Stronghold’s Rule 65 petition and lifted the TRO o should the appealed judgment be reversed later. In this case, Garon anchors
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in issuing the writ of execution the motion for execution pending appeal on the following grounds: o (a) any appeal
pending appeal on the ground of illness of Garon’s husband. Citing Articles 6810 which Project Movers and Stronghold Insurance may take from the summary
and 19511 of the Family Code, the Court of Appeals held that while it was not judgment would be patently dilatory; o (b) the ill health of Garon’s spouse and the
Garon who was ill, Garon needed the money to support her husband’s medical spouses’ urgent need for the funds owed to them by Project Movers and Stronghold

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Insurance constitute good reasons for execution pending appeal; and o (c) Garon the Court of Appeals ruled that Stronghold Insurance could not be held solidarily
is ready and willing to post a bond to answer for any damage Project Movers and liable with Project Movers. The Court of Appeals ruled that the surety bond between
Stronghold Insurance may suffer should the trial court’s decision be reversed on Project Movers and Stronghold Insurance expired on 7 November 1998 before the
appeal.18 In granting the motion for execution pending appeal, the trial court maturity of Project Movers’ loans on 17 December 1998 and 31 December 1998,
ruled: o A perusal of [t]he records of the instant case will sustain plaintiff’s claim respectively. Hence, when the loans matured, the liability of Stronghold Insurance
that defendants raised no valid or meritorious defenses against the claims of had long ceased. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 19 September 2000
plaintiff. The Court notes with interest the fact that defendants admitted the Order with modification by ruling that Stronghold Insurance is not liable to Garon.
genuineness and due execution of the Promissory Notes and Surety Agreement The 7 May 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is not yet final. It is the subject
sued upon in this case. The instant case simply turns on the issues of (i) whether of a petition for review filed by Garon before this Court. The case, docketed as G.R.
or not there was a valid, due and demandable obligation and (ii) whether or not No. 166058, is still pending with this Court. While this Court may either affirm or
the obligation had been extinguished in the manner provided for under our laws. reverse the 7 May 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the fact that the Court of
The Answers of defendants contained admissions that the obligation was valid and Appeals absolved Stronghold Insurance from liability to Garon shows that the
subsisting and that the same was due and unpaid. Founded as it is on Promissory appeal from the 19 September 2000 Order is not dilatory on the part of Stronghold
Notes and Surety Agreements, the authenticity and due execution of which had Insurance. We agree with Stronghold Insurance that Garon failed to present
been admitted, the Court is convinced that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in her good reasons to justify execution pending appeal. The situations in the cases cited
favor and that any appeal therefrom will obviously be a ploy to delay the by the trial court are not similar to this case. In Ma-Ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v.
proceedings (See Home Insurance Company vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 318). Cañete,24 Cañete filed an action for compensation for his illness. The Workmen’s
The second ground relied upon by plaintiff is also impressed with merit. In Ma- Compensation Commission found the illness compensable. Considering Cañete’s
ao Sugar Central vs. Canete, 19 SCRA 646, the Supreme Court held that the physical condition and the Court’s finding that he was in constant danger of death,
movant was entitled to execution pending appeal of an award of compensation, the Court allowed execution pending appeal. In De Leon, et al. v. Soriano, et al.,25
ruling that his ill health and urgent need for the funds so awarded were considered De Leon, et al. defaulted on an agreement that was peculiarly personal to Asuncion.
"good reasons" to justify execution pending appeal (See also De Leon vs. Soriano, The agreement was valid only during Asuncion’s lifetime. The Court considered that
95 Phil. 806). It is established that plaintiff’s spouse, Mr. Robert Garon, suffers Soriano’s health was delicate and she was 75 years old at that time. Hence,
from coronary artery disease, benign Prostatic Hyperplasia and hyperlipidemia. He execution pending appeal was justified. In this case, it was not Garon, but her
is undergoing continuous treatment for the foregoing ailments and has been husband, who was ill. The posting of a bond, standing alone and absent the good
constrained to make serious lifestyle changes, that he can no longer actively earn reasons required under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules, is not enough to allow
a living. As shown in plaintiff’s verified motion, she has urgent need of the funds execution pending appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a successful party is not a
owed to her by defendants in order to answer for her husband’s medical expenses good reason to justify execution pending appeal as a combination of circumstances
and for the day-to-day support of the family considering her husband’s ill health. is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution.26
The Court therefore finds and holds that there exists good reasons warranting an The bond is only an additional factor for the protection of the defendant’s
execution pending appeal.19 The trial court ruled that an appeal from its 19 creditor.27 The exercise of the power to grant or deny a motion for execution
September 2000 Order is only a ploy to delay the proceedings of the case. pending appeal is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.28 However,
However, the authority to determine whether an appeal is dilatory lies with the the existence of good reasons is indispensable to the grant of execution pending
appellate court.20 The trial court’s assumption that the appeal is dilatory appeal.29 Here, Garon failed to advance good reasons that would justify the
prematurely judges the merits of the main case on appeal.21 Thus: Well-settled execution pending appeal. The writ of execution pending appeal issued against
is the rule that it is not for the trial court to determine the merit of a decision it Project Movers and Stronghold Insurance is for P56 million.31 However, the Court
rendered as this is the role of the appellate Court. Hence, it is not within the of Appeals ruled that Stronghold Insurance failed to show that more than
competence of the trial court, in resolving the motion for execution pending appeal, P12,755,139.85 had been garnished. The ruling of the Court of Appeals unduly
to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and to rely on the same as the basis for burdens Stronghold Insurance because the amount garnished could exceed its
finding good reason to grant the motion.22 In a Decision23 promulgated on 7 liability. It gives the sheriff the discretion to garnish more than P12,755,139.85
May 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 69962 entitled "Emerita Garon v. Project Movers from the accounts of Stronghold Insurance. The amount for garnishment is no
Realty and Development Corporation, et al.," the Court of Appeals sustained the longer ministerial on the part of the sheriff. This is not allowed. Thus: Leaving
trial court in rendering the summary judgment in Civil Case No. 99-1051. However, to the Sheriff, as held by the Court of Appeals, the determination of the exact

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amount due under the Writ would be tantamount to vesting such officer with particular fact. o While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present
judicial powers. He would have to receive evidence to determine the exact amount case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
owing. In his hands would be placed a broad discretion that can only lead to delay parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen. o The Solicitor General
and open the door to possible abuse. The orderly administration of justice requires asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
that the amount on execution be determined judicially and the duties of the Sheriff events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
confined to purely ministerial ones. registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." The Japanese
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,
RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013 SECOND DIVISION FACTS: ISSUE # 1: Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable in the
Galela Marinay in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well present case.
with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the HELD # 1: NO. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a
in Quezon City, Philippines. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. For Philippine courts to
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy
of Marriage)." RTC dismissed the petition, citing the provisions of the Rule on of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) which provides that a petition for declaration of Court. A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, in status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
this case either Maekara or Marinay. Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. A petition to recognize a
3753) in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. o The Civil Register Law imposes foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." o Section 2 of Rule 108 the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. The petition in the RTC sought judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of
(among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. o Corpuz v. Santo Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
Tomas: The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.

376
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no doubt that the prior spouse
of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad There is therefore no reason to disallow instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void marriage. The case of Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Negros Occidental where the Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in the case at bar because
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. To be sure,
ISSUE # 2: Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. A direct
HELD # 2: YES. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to
of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule "where the corresponding civil registry is located." In other words, a Filipino citizen
108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public marriage in the civil registry. However, this does not apply in a petition for
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify
party or a particular fact." Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: o a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
register , may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied) Fujiki has the the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same

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RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, vs. FEDERICO A. the decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of
SERRA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 203241 July 10, 2013 SECOND DIVISION the Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year period to enforce through
a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the
FACTS: Serra and the Rizan Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) entered Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and RCBC’s motion for execution
into a contract of lease whereby the former agreed to lease to the latter the subject was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBC’s motion is deemed filed within the five-year
property for 25 years with the option to buy the land and improvement (property) period for enforcement of a decision through a motion. This Court has reiterated
within 10 years upon signing of the said contract. RCBC, after a few years, that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to
informed Serra that it will be exercising its option to buy, which the latter refused. prevent parties from sleeping on their rights.14 Far from sleeping on its rights,
RCBC instituted an action against Serra for specific performance. Serra RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in accordance with law. On
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). During the pendency of the appeal, the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of
Serra donated the subject land to his mother, Leonida Ablao, who, in turn, sold the technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
same to Hermanito Liok, who was issued a new title. RCBC was constrained interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not
to file a a Complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with serve the ends of justice.
Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra before the RTC Masbate
City. CA then affirmed the RTC order in the specific performance case. HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON,
RTC Masbate ruled in favor of RCBC in the annulment case, which decision was CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA,
affirmed by CA. Liok filed before the Supreme Court a petition for review Petitioners, v. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. “GAUDIOSO E. YPON,”
under Rule 45 Serra and Ablao filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, Respondents. G.R. No. 198680,
RCBC moved for the execution of the decision in the specific performance July 08, 2013 SECOND DIVISION
case, positing that the filing of the annulment case stayed the period within which
it should seek such execution. RTC denied the same and likewise denied FACTS: Magdaleno Ypon died intestate and without issue. Claiming to be his
RCBC’s ensuing motion for reconsideration. sole heir, Ricaforte executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
RCBC filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent
Supreme Court. transfer in his name Heirs of Ypon then filed an action for Cancellation of Title
and Reconveyance with Damages against Ricaforte before the RTC RTC
ISSUE: May the decision still be executed? dismissed the complaint for failure to state a COA against Ricaforte o It observed
that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno
HELD: YES. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this
be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory
after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in.11 This Court, however, heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary
five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between
or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter
or advantage.12 In Camacho v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that where the dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport Heirs filed an MR o RTC denied
delays were occasioned by the judgment debtor’s own initiatives and for her due to counsel’s failure to state the date of MCLE Heirs filed a Rule 45 directly
advantage as well as beyond the judgment creditor’s control, the five-year period to SC
allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed to have been
effectively interrupted or suspended. In the present case, there is no dispute
that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and executory on 15 ISSUES: Does the complaint sufficiently state a cause of action? NO. May
April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of RTC decide on who the lawful heirs are? NO
sale in favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred
the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serra’s action HELD: Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates
prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of a right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is

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determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue
face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24 In this case, none of the
that may be averred by the defendants.19 As stated in the subject complaint, foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies
petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the
heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self- heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case
Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer No. T-2246. Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining
certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions
allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant
for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in
heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of
in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out
same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein
other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As
heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this
case:cralavvonlinelawlibrary o Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of
who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special CITY OF CEBU, Petitioner, vs. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR., Respondent. G.R. No.
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and 172852 January 30, 2013 FIRST DIVISION
possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court FACTS: An action for eminent domain was pending before RTC Cebu City
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a During the pendency of the same, City of Cebu and Spouses Dedamo entered into
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of a compromise agreement whereby the former agreed to pay 1,786,400.00 as
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party provisional payment and to that just compensation in an amount to be determined
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or by a panel of commissioners Commissioners P20,826,339.50 as just
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks compensation. RTC approved CA affirmed SC affirmed When
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the the SC decision became final and executory, the case was remanded to RTC for
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the execution Spouses Dedamo moved for execution RTC granted the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. In the early motion; issued the writ Spouses Dedamo died and were substituted by Dedamo
case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must Jr. City of Cebu paid the difference between the just compensation due and
be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This the provisional payment Dedamo Jr. moved that City of Cebu be ordered to
doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:cralavvonlinelawlibrary pay interest on the just compensation computed from the time of actual taking of
o In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court the lands RTC denied the motion o ruled that it can no longer amend a final
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must and executory judgment that did not specifically direct the payment of legal
be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely interest Dedamo Jr. appealed to CA
for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, o asserting that the petitioner is liable to pay: (a) 12% legal interest on the unpaid
this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to balance of the just compensation computed from the time of actual taking of the
a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as property up to the date of payment of just compensation; and (b) 12% legal
in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring interest from the time the decision awarding just compensation became final and
supplied; citations omitted) By way of exception, the need to institute a separate executory on September 20, 2002 until its satisfaction on December 23, 2003.
special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the CA rejected first claim but upheld second claim o the CA rejected the

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respondent’s first claim since the issue was belatedly raised during the execution
stage and after the judgment of just compensation attained finality. o Nonetheless,
the CA found the respondent’s second contention meritorious. The CA awarded
legal interest accruing from the time the RTC Order dated December 27, 1996
awarding just compensation was affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court up to
the time of full payment thereof in line with the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals6 that when a court judgment awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, it shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum
reckoned from such finality until satisfaction. City of Cebu and Dedamo Jr.
both filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before SC

ISSUE: May the decision be amended as regards imposition of interest?

HELD: NO. A perusal of the allegations in the present case evidently shows that
the petitioner broaches the issues similarly raised and already resolved in G.R. No.
172942. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as
long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them.14 Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-
litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case.
The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the
petitioner who can no longer question the respondent’s entitlement to the 12%
legal interest awarded by the CA. The Court’s determination in G.R. No. 172942 on
the reckoning point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner
who cannot re-litigate the said matter anew through the present recourse. Thus,
the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the
latter is inextricably related to the ruling in the former.

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