This document discusses the legal principles of eminent domain and public use under Philippine law. It summarizes two Supreme Court cases - Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC, which found that compelling print media companies to donate free advertising space amounts to an unconstitutional taking without just compensation; and Manosca vs Court of Appeals, which upheld the declaration of a property as a historical landmark as a valid public use despite benefiting only one religious group. The document also discusses that public use requires a public need be met, not actual use by the public, and that not all members of society must directly benefit from the use.
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This document discusses the legal principles of eminent domain and public use under Philippine law. It summarizes two Supreme Court cases - Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC, which found that compelling print media companies to donate free advertising space amounts to an unconstitutional taking without just compensation; and Manosca vs Court of Appeals, which upheld the declaration of a property as a historical landmark as a valid public use despite benefiting only one religious group. The document also discusses that public use requires a public need be met, not actual use by the public, and that not all members of society must directly benefit from the use.
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EMINENT
DOMAIN Commission would be used not only for informing
the public about the identities, qualifications and Philippine Press Institute vs. programs of government of candidates for elective COMELEC office but also for "dissemination of vital election TAKING IN EMINENT DOMAIN. - To compel print information" (including, presumably, circulars, media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by dimensions specified in Section 2 of resolution No. Comelec). It seems to the Court a matter of judicial 2772 (not less than one-half Page), amounts to notice that government offices and agencies "taking" of private personal property for public use (including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended space, in the ordinary course of events, when their frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forth once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 need officially to be brought to the attention of the March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or general public. once a week? or has often as Comelec may direct during the same period? the extent of the taking or The taking of private property for public use it, of deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, the use of private property. The monetary value of Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying the compulsory "donation," measured by the compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, whether Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 is read as may be very substantial indeed. petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free The taking of print space here sought to be effected print space for Comelec purpose, or as an exhortion, may first be appraised under the public of or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free expropriation of private personal property for public print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to private property for public use need to be examined prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the the legal authority to effect the taking. The element purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. of necessity for the taking has not been shown by Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 does not, however, respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that provide a constitutional basis for compelling the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual at their normal rates to Comelec for election context here present, to provide free print space for purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been Manosca vs. Court of Appeals granted the power of imminent domain either by PUBLIC USE: This Court is asked to resolve whether the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent reasonable relationship between that power and Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the enforcement and administration of election the Republic of a 492-square- meter parcel of land laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to so declared by the National Historical Institute be assumed. ("NHI") as a national historical landmark. x x x (the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" Cristo) x x x The validity of the exercise of the power is not contested by petitioner PPI. We note only of eminent domain for traditional purposes is that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the beyond question; free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent it is not at all to be said, however, that public use circumstances brought about by an increase in should thereby be restricted to such traditional population and new modes of communication and uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 clear cases of "use by the public" has long been A.2d 579,586." discarded. Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996) Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) PUBLIC USE IN EMINENT DOMAIN. The term "public birthplace become so vital as to be a public use use," not having been otherwise defined by the appropriate for the exercise of the power of constitution, must be considered in its general eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia concept of meeting a public need or a public ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some exigency. Black summarizes the characterization religious perspective to the case deserves little given by various courts to the term: thus: consideration, for what should be significant is the "Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional principal objective of, not the casual consequences and statutory basis for taking property by eminent that might follow from, the exercise of the power. domain. For condemnation purposes, 'public use' is The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially one which confers some benefit or advantage to the to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather measured in terms of right of public to use proposed than to commemorate his founding and leadership facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that long as public has right of use, whether exercised by greater benefit may be derived by members of the one or many members of public, a 'public Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be advantage' or 'public benefit' accrues sufficient to true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to constitute a public use. be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from "Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the expropriation of property does not necessarily the exercise of the right to take private property in diminish the essence and character of public use. virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from EPZA vs. Dulay particular individuals. But each and every member DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION: It is of society need not be equally interested in such violative of due process to deny to the owner the use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax the object is to satisfy a great public want or documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to L.Ed. 1186. absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have The term may be said to mean public usefulness, actually viewed the property, after evidence and utility, or advantage, or what is productive of arguments pro and con have been presented, and general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants after all factors and considerations essential to a fair of a small or restricted locality, but must be in and just determination have been judiciously common, and not for a particular individual. The use evaluated. x x x P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the must be a needful one for the public, which cannot court's discretion to appoint commissioners be surrendered without obvious general loss and pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is inconvenience. A 'public use' for which land may be unconstitutional and void. EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA taken defies absolute definition for it changes with 305 (1987) varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A such amount. A return to the earlier well- POWER THAT BELONGS TO THE COURT. The established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping determination of "just compensation" in with the principle that the judiciary should live up to eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating executive department or the legislature may make constitutional rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Paño, the initial determinations but when a party claims a 134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of First violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing executive order can mandate that its own Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must determination shall prevail over the court's findings. necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Much less can the courts be precluded from looking Court's role as the guardian of the fundamental into the "just- ness" of the decreed compensation. rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and as the final arbiter over The method of ascertaining just transgressions committed against constitutional compensation decrees constitutes impermissible rights. encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court initial in a matter which under the Just compensation means the value of the property Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to court technically would still have the power to the condition of the property and its surroundings, determine the just compensation for the property, its improvements and capabilities, should be following the applicable decrees, its task would be considered. relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the In this particular case, the tax declarations assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be presented by the petitioner as basis for just useless for the court to appoint commissioners compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the municipal, later city assessor long before martial need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking law, when land was not only much cheaper but of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it when assessed values of properties were stated in cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not figures constituting only a fraction of their true had before the actual taking. market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It However, the strict application of the decrees purchased the lots for development purposes. To during the proceedings would be nothing short of a peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents mere formality or charade as the court has only to which are out of date and at prices below the choose between the valuation of the owner and that acquisition cost of present owners would be of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to arbitrary and confiscatory. the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination Realty Corp. of constitutional just compensation is concerned. CONDITIONS FOR THE VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENT We are convinced and so rule that the trial court DOMAIN BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. Petitioner correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may contends that a resolution approved by the only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors municipal council for the purpose of initiating an in determining just compensation but it may not expropriation case "substantially complies with the substitute the court's own judgment as to what requirements of the law" because the terms amount should be awarded and how to arrive at "ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for “the purpose of based on the fair market value at the time of the bestowing government unit through its chief taking of the property." executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings Thus, the following essential requisites must concur in court in the exercise of the power of eminent before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain." Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention domain: by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local Regulations Implementing the Local Government legislative council authorizing the local chief Code, which provides: executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation for public use, purpose, or welfare through proceedings over a particular private property. purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit its chief executive to initiate expropriation of the poor and the landless. proceedings." 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain Constitution, and other pertinent laws. is lodged in the legislative branch of government, 4. A valid and definite offer has been which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, previously made to the owner of the property other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not therefore exercise the power to expropriate private accepted. property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints imposed "through the law conferring the power or Republic vs. Lim in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA DOCTRINE: REPUBLIC VS. LIM RECOVERY OF 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of EXPROPRIATED LAND: In summation, while the eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for prevailing doctrine is that "the non- payment of just its exercise. It provides as follows: compensation does not entitle the private "Section 19. Eminent Domain. — A local landowner to recover possession of the government unit may, through its chief executive expropriated lots, however, in cases where the and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the government failed to pay just compensation within power of eminent domain for public use, or five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned the landless, upon payment of just compensation, shall have the right to recover possession of their pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and property. This is in consonance with the principle pertinent laws. that "the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment." To be sure, the five-year Provided, however, That the power of eminent period limitation will encourage the government to domain may not be exercised unless a valid and pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping definite offer has been previously made to the with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the owner, and such offer was not accepted: government, whenever it takes property from Provided, further, That the local government unit private persons against their will, to facilitate the may immediately take possession of the property payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as upon making a deposit with the proper court of at not only the correct determination of the amount to least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property within a reasonable time. Without of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, prompt payment, compensation cannot be That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated considered "just." property shall be determined by the proper court, TAXATION community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental Sison vs. Ancheta to the public or to the state, which results from the Limitation on due process. It is undoubted that it promotion of private interest and the prosperity of may be invoked where a taxing statute is so private enterprises or business, does not justify arbitrary that it finds no support in the their aid by the use public money. Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in property from abuse of power. Petitioner alleges the following language: In accordance with the rule arbitrariness but his mere allegation does not that the taxing power must be exercised for public suffice and there must be a factual foundation of purposes only, discussed surprasec. 14, money such unconstitutional taint. raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private Limitation on equal protection clause. It suffices individuals. that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus persons under similar circumstances, both in the Juris Secundum states: Generally, under the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. On express or implied provisions of the constitution, the matter that the rule of taxation shall be public funds may be used only for public purpose. uniform and equitable – this requirement is met
when the tax operates with the same force and The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is effect in every place where the subject may be correlative with its right to tax, and, under found.” Also, the rule of uniformity does not call constitutional provisions against taxation except for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because for public purposes and prohibiting the collection this is hardly unattainable.” When the problem of of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof classification became the issue, the Court said: to another purpose, no appropriation of state “Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all funds can be made for other than a public purpose. taxable articles or kinds of property of the same The test of constitutionality of a statute requiring class shall be taxed the same rate. The taxing the use of public funds is whether the statute is power has the authority to make reasonable and designed to promote the public interest, as natural classifications for purposes of taxation..” As opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of provided by this Court, where “the differentiation” individuals, although each advantage to individuals complained of conforms to the practical dictates of might incidentally serve the public. justice and equity it is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform. Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which apart from being Pascual vs. Secretary of Public patently sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of government, which, as such, Works exists primarily for the promotion of the general Public money may only be appropriated for public welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the purpose. As regards the legal feasibility of established jurisprudence in the US< after whose appropriating public funds for a public purpose, the constitutional system ours has been patterned, principle according to Ruling Case Law, is this: “It is said views and jurisprudence are, likewise, part and a general rule that the legislature is without power parcel of our own constitutional law. to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the The validity of the appropriation is determined direct object of the expenditure which must under the circumstances prevailing at the time of determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not appropriation and not on subsequent events. the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor The validity of a statute depends upon the powers the degree to which the general advantage of the of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with Revenue retrospective operation, the constitutional The tax exemption under Section 28(3), Art. VI, limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to the applies only to real property tax and not to excise P85,000,00 appropriation for the projected feeder taxes. roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property when the bill, which, latter on, Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, churches and convents, appurtenant all lands, or, when said bill was approved by the President and buildings, and used exclusively for religious the disbursement of said sum became effective, or purposes. The exemption is only from the payment on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). parsonages or thereto, and improvements of taxes Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder assessed on such properties enumerated, as roads were to be constructed belonged then to property taxes, as contradistinguished from excise respondent Zulueta, the result is that said taxes. appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and void. 4 The donation to the In the present case, what the Collector assessed was Government, over five (5) months after the approval a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, the properties, upon the exercise of the did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps vs. Com. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627). Manifestly, gift tax is not donation need not precede the declaration of within the exempting provisions of the section just unconstitutionality of said appropriation. mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of property used exclusively for religious purposes, Manila does not constitute an impairment of the CASE DOCTRINE: Double taxation is not prohibited Constitution. As well observed by the learned under the Constitution unless it is unduly oppressive respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from and violates equal protection clause. taxation," as employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from The argument against double taxation may not be all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley on petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied. Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted Abra Valley College vs. Aquino with respect to the same occupation, calling or Exemption extends to uses which are incidental to activity by both the state and the political the main purposes. As early as 1916 in YMCA of subdivisions thereof. (51 Am. Jur., 341.) Manila vs. Collector of lnternal Revenue, 33 Phil. 217 [1916], this Court ruled that while it may be true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house and maintains a restaurant for its members, still these do not constitute business in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but an institution used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine from taxation. Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial incidental to and reasonably necessary for the Board of Ilocos Norte, 51 Phil. 352 [1972], this Court accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise included in the stated, the use of the school building or lot for exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and commercial purposes is neither contemplated by another lot formerly used as a cemetery. It was law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the clarified that the term "used exclusively" considers second floor of the main building in the case at bar incidental use also. Thus, the exemption from for residential purposes of the Director and his payment of land tax in favor of the convent includes, family, may find justification under the concept of not only the land actually occupied by the building incidental use, which is complimentary to the main but also the adjacent garden devoted to the or primary purpose— educational, the lease of the incidental use of the parish priest. The lot which is first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing not used for commercial purposes but serves solely Corporation cannot by any stretch of the as a sort of lodging place, also qualifies for imagination be considered incidental to the purpose exemption because this constitutes incidental use in of education. religious functions. DUE PROCESS The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was further clarified by this Court in the Ichong vs Hernandez BALANCING OF INTERESTS IN DUE PROCESS. The cases of Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of conflict between police power and the guarantees assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961] and of due process and equal protection of the laws is Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bishop of the more apparent than real. Properly related, the Missionary District, 14 SCRA 991 [1965], thus — power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used The balancing is the essence, or the indispensable exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually indispensable' means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2,p. 1430), but of any democratic society. There can be no absolute extends to facilities which are incidental to and power, whoever exercises it, for that would be reasonably necessary forthe accomplishment of tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, "a for that would mean license and anarchy. So the school for training nurses, a nurses' home, property State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property, use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident provided there is due process of law; and persons doctors, superintendents, and other members of may be classified into classes and groups, provided the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for everyone is given the equal protection of the law. student nurses, interns, and residents' (84 CJS The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police 6621), such as "Athletic fields" including "a firm used power legislation must be firmly grounded on public for the inmates of the institution. (Cooley Taxation, interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must Vol. 2, p. 1430). exist between purposes and means. And if distinction or classification has been made, there On The test of exemption from taxation is the use of must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City Treasurer of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]). Corp. vs. Torres It must be stressed however, that while this Court THE RIGHT TO HEARING AS AN ELEMENT OF DUE allows a more liberal and non- restrictive PROCESS DOES NOT CALL FOR A TRIAL TYPE interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for HEARING. We do not see it the way PHILPHOS does educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, here. The essence of due process is simply an the ideal. In the case of the due process clause, opportunity to be heard or, as applied to however, this rule was deliberately not followed and administrative proceedings, an opportunity to the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a a proposal to delineate it more clearly was reconsideration of the action or ruling complained submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, of. Where, as in the instant case, petitioner but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained submitted for decision on the basis of the position by the body. papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as The due process clause was kept intentionally vague petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if was felt necessary because due process is not, like it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did rule" laying down an implacable and immutable not; instead, it opted to submit its position paper command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility with the Mediator- Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its elasticity of the due process clause was meant to appeal to the Secretary of Labor. make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and What is the essence of administrative due process? circumstances may require. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or adopt their own specific description of due process an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the that will deprive them of the elbow room they may instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the consider the case submitted for decision on the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to basis of the position papers filed by the parties, be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion there was sufficient compliance with the and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases requirement of due process, as petitioner was as they arise." Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, farther than to define due process - insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the andinsodoingsumsitallup—as nothing more and witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead, nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting it opted to submit its position paper with the idea of fair play." Mediator- Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal What are the minimum requirements of due to the Secretary of Labor. process? The minimum requirements of due process are Ynot vs. IAC notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as THE CONCEPT OF DUE PROCESS WAS NOT GIVEN EXACT DEFINITION FOR RESILIENCY. a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and Are Notice and Hearing imperative meaning unmistakable language to avoid controversies that indispensable? Yes. Absolute? No. What are the might arise on their correct interpretation. That is exceptions? 1. The conclusive presumption, for example, the jurisprudence of this country is rich with bars the admission of contrary evidence as applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to long as such presumption is based on human the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair experience or there is a rational connection play. We have consistently declared that every between the fact proved and the fact person, faced by the awesome power of the State, ultimately presumed therefrom. is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel 2. In the summary abatement of a nuisance per Webster described almost two hundred years ago in se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law be killed on sight because of the immediate which hears before it condemns, which proceeds danger it poses to the safety and lives of the upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." people. Pornographic materials, It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of inherently pernicious and may be summarily mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the destroyed. due process clause into a worn and empty 3. The passport of a person sought for a catchword. criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country This is not to say that notice and hearing are he has fled. imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a 4. Filthy restaurants may be summarily number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive padlocked in the interest of the public health presumption, for example, bars the admission of and bawdy houses to protect the public contrary evidence as long as such presumption is morals. based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact Reason for non-requirement of notice and Hearing? ultimately presumed therefrom. Because of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general There are instances when the need for expeditious welfare from a clear and present danger. action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS. mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight The closed mind has no place in the open society. It because of the immediate danger it poses to the is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, are inherently pernicious and may be summarily one side is only one-half of the question; the other destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a half must also be considered if an impartial verdict criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, is to be reached based on an informed appreciation to compel his return to the country he has fled. of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the two sides complement each other, as unto the the interest of the public health and bawdy houses bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after to protect the public morals. In such instances, examination of the problem not from one or the previous judicial hearing may be omitted without other perspective only but in its totality. vice of bias violation of due process in view of the nature of the or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in property involved or the urgency of the need to repressive regimes, the insolence of power. protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that What are the essential requirements of duly notified and his failure to appear is administrative due process? unjustifiable." 1. Right to hearing- it includes right to present one’s case and submit evidence to support Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in thereof; criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that 2. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must the court or tribunal trying the case is properly act on its own Independent consideration of clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the law and facts of the controversy; the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully 3. The tribunal must consider the evidence acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) Presented; Evidence presented must be that the accused is given an opportunity to be 4. substantial, which means relevant evidence heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon as a reasonable mind might accept as lawful hearing. adequate to support a conclusion; 5. The Decision must have something to The above constitutional and jurisprudential support itself; postulates, by now elementary and deeply 6. The Decision must be based on evidence imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are presented during hearing or at least mandatory and indispensable. The principles find contained in the record and disclosed by the universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in parties; and the oft- quoted statement that procedural due 7. The decision must be rendered in a manner process cannot possibly be met without a "law that the parties can know the various issues which hears before it condemns, which proceeds involved and the reason for the decision upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." rendered. Aniag vs COMELEC Alonte vs. Savellano THE RIGHT to preliminary INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL DUE INVESTIGATION, although does NOT EMANATE PROCESS. It does seem to the Court that there has FROM THE CONSTITUTION IS AN ESSENTIAL been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS. Moreover, proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have well the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against been avoided had not the basic procedures been, to petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Court's perception taken lightly. And in this the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the not among those charged by the PNP with violation trial court certainly is not alone to blame. Section of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation Constitution provides the fundamentals. for such offense. The non- disclosure by the City "(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a offense without due process of law. respondent in the preliminary investigation is "(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be violative of due process which requires that the presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and procedure established by law should be obeyed. shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the the accusation against him, to have a speedy, chance to be heard because he was invited to impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the face to face, and to have compulsory process to circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and secure the attendance of witnesses and the that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of production of evidence in his behalf. However, after explanation regarding the incident. This does not arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the satisfy the requirement of due process the essence absence of the accused provided that he has been of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support What is the Overbreadth Doctrine? of his defense. Due process guarantees the A facial challenge of the statute when a observance of both substantive and procedural governmental purpose may not be achieved by rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. In Go v. Court of Appeals, we held that — While the (Ibid) right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundamental, since it has in Does the two facial challenge applies to penal fact been established by statute, it is a component statute? Why? part of due process in criminal justice. The right to No. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have a preliminary investigation conducted before have special application only to free-speech cases, being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and and are not appropriate for testing the validity of hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penal statutes.It added that, at any rate, the penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a challenged provision, under which the therein substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity petitioner was charged, is not vague. to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation statute and to one which is overbroad because of would be to deprive him of the full measure of his possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. right to due process. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during construction suggests itself as a vehicle for the preliminary investigation of Arellano to rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, corroborate the latter's explanation. Petitioner then the transcendent value to all society of was made to believe that he was not a party constitutionally protected expression is deemed to respondent in the case, so that his written justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes explanation on the incident was only intended to with no requirement that the person making the exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation specificity." The possible harm to society in against him as he was not apprised that he was permitting some unprotected speech to go himself a respondent when he appeared before the unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the City Prosecutor. protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of What are the two facial challenge on the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. constitutionality of a statute? • Void-for-Vagueness Rule This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. • Overbreadth Doctrine Criminal statutes have general in terrorism effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial What is the Void-for-Vagueness Rule? challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State When a statute forbids or requires the doing of an may well be prevented from enacting laws against act in terms so vague that man of common socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning the law cannot take chances as in the area of free and differ as to its application, that law is deemed speech. void. Such kind of statute violates the first essential requisite of due process of law because it denies the accused the right to be informed of the charged against him (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No, 148560, November 19, 2001)