DISCLAIMER: ISSUES IN SOME CASES ARE NOT RELATED TO EVID.

BUT STILL INCLUDED FOR THE SAKE OF KNOWING

THE FACTS

1. People v Mallilin

2.People v Pagaduan

Facts: Buy-bust operation was conducted by PO3 Almarez, SPO1 Balido and Captain de Vera. Ruper Pagaduan was arrested and
plastic sachet of what appears to be shabu was marked, request for laboratory examination was done the same day. The plastic
sachet was turned over to PNP Crime Laboratory two days after. He was found guilty by the court and the same was affirmed by CA
Pagaduan contents among others that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized
drug. He claims that there was no evidence to show when the marking were done.

Issue: WON the integrity of the evidence was preserved

Decision: SC acquitted Pagaduan. The prosecution failed to show that the illegal drug presented in the court is the same illegal
drug actually recovered from the Pagaduan. Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drugs
unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering alteration or substitution either by
accident or otherwise.

We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under
field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last sentence of the implementing rules provides that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.] Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions
case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses,
however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police to conduct the required
physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to show why an inventory and photograph of
the seized evidence had not been made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the
Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the
prosecution explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been
preserved. In other words, the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the apprehending team to the police station. PO3 Almarez testified that
the appellant was brought to the Diadi Police Station after his arrest. However, he failed to identify the person who had control and
possession of the seized drug at the time of its transportation to the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we cannot
presume that PO3 Almarez, as the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachet to the exclusion of others during its transfer from the
place of arrest and confiscation to the police station. The prosecution likewise failed to present evidence pertaining to the identity of
the duty desk officer who received the plastic sachet containing shabu from the buy-bust team. This is particularly significant since
the seized specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after two days. It was not, therefore, clear who had
temporary custody of the seized items during this significant intervening period of time. Although the records show that the request
for laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet was prepared by Captain de Vera, the evidence does not show that he was
the official who received the marked plastic sachet from the buy-bust team.
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to
the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero.
However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified.
As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as well as the person who had temporary custody
of the seized items for two days, had not been established.
The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the
drugs confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and
eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of the
crime the corpus delicti has not been adequately proven. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime
charged, creating reasonable doubt on the appellants criminal liability.

3. Salas v. Matsusalem
4. People v Eric Rosario

G.R. No. 209588, February 18, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERIC ROSAURO Y BONGCAWIL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For the consideration of the Court is an appeal of the Decision1 dated 19 June 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00552-MIN, which affirmed the Judgment2 dated 24 November 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2004-856, finding accused-appellant Eric Rosauro y Bongcawil (accused-appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Sec. 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R. A. No. 9165) or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay
a fine of P500,000.00.

In an Amended Information dated 21 February 2005,3 accused-appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A. No.
9165, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on the 3rd day of July, 2004 at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, more or less, at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality
of Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law to possess and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly, willfully and feloniously,
did then and there, sell and convey to a third person, who acted as a decoy in a buy bust operation, one (1) sachet of shabu,
containing 0.04 grams (sic) of shabu, which when examined gave POSITIVE result to test for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.4
Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits
ensued.

Based on the records, the prosecutions version of the facts is as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On October 13, 2002, on the basis of unconfirmed reports that accused-appellant Eric Rosauro (Rosauro for brevity) was selling and
distributing drugs, the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of Misamis Oriental conducted a test-buy operation in the Municipality of
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental using a confidential agent. The confidential agent bought shabu from Rosauro at Purok 2, Barangay
Katipunan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The substance bought from Rosauro was examined by the PNP crime laboratory and
yielded a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (commonly known as shabu).

On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that again drugs were being distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion,
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus, at 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit
(PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot and PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned themselves in the house of their confidential
agent.

There, the PAID-SOTU elements saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential agent. In exchange for the one (1) sachet of shabu
given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked 100-peso bill with serial number YZ7 12579.

After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their hiding place and arrested Rosauro. Thereafter, the confidential agent
handed the sachet to Larot, who taped it, marked it with the marking Exhibit A, and placed it inside his pocket. He also took
pictures of Rosauro and the drugs. In the police station, he prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory
Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime laboratory.

On the basis of the request made by Larot, Police Chief Inspector Ma. Leocy Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime
Laboratory conducted a laboratory examination on the contents of the sachet, on accused-appellant, and the marked money. The
examination of the seized item yielded positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu); while the accused-appellant and
the marked money tested positive for the presence of ultra-violet fluorescent powder.6
For his part, accused-appellant claims that he was merely a victim of instigation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Accused-appellant Rosauro, on the other hand, tells a different tale. He testified that on July 3, 2004, the police asset went to his
house four (4) times and convinced him to do an errand for him. Rosauro refused to buy shabu as he did not know where to buy
one. It was the confidential informant who told him to buy the prohibited drug from a certain Kael and to deliver it to the formers
house. It was also the informant who gave the money to Rosauro to buy the shabu. But Rosauro was not able to meet or buy
directly from Kael because it was a young man who got and handed to him the shabu on the road. When Rosauro went to the house
of the confidential informant as instructed, he was arrested by SPO4 Larot and Dizon. The sachet of shabu was not even recovered
from him but from the confidential informant.7
Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant, the RTC rendered a judgment of
conviction, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby renders Judgment finding accused ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information for selling and delivering a sachet of shabu to the poseur
buyer a Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and imposes a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand (PhP 500,000.00) Pesos and to pay the cost.

The accused ERIC B. ROSAURO who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rule imposed upon convicted prisoners, except those
disqualified by law.

The sachet of shabu, Exh. A is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed in accordance with law. 8
Accused-appellant appealed before the CA, assigning a lone error:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.9
After a review of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment. The appellate court ruled that what transpired in the case at bar
was an entrapment and not an instigation;10 that all the elements of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs were duly
proven;11 that the non-presentation of the confidential agent in court is not fatal; 12 that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the lone
witness of the prosecution do not affect the result of the case;13 and that the apprehending team was able to preserve the integrity of
the subject drug and that the prosecution was able to present the required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject drug. 14 Thus,
the CA held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal
Case No. 2004-856 is hereby AFFIRMED.15
Accused-appellant is now before the Court seeking a review of his conviction.

After a thorough review of the records, however, we dismiss the appeal.

It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or
that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the facts and the credibility of the
witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that
the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing
that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of accused-appellant to be the result of a legitimate entrapment procedure, and we find
nothing in the records as to warrant a contrary finding. In People v. Bartolome,17 we had the occasion to discuss the legitimacy of a
decoy solicitation, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal
act was done at the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act
were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the office is one habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.

As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it
by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the appellant
to sell illegal drugs to him.cralawred
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-
dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant
from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informants identity is protected in
deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential
in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded. 18 In the present case, as the buy-bust
operation was duly witnessed by the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4
Lorenzo Larot (SPO4 Larot) and PO3 Juancho Dizon, their testimonies can take the place of that of the confidential informant.

As to whether accused-appellants guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt, we rule in the affirmative.

In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of offenses
involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Verily, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs were proven by the prosecution: the identity of
accused-appellant as the seller, and that of the confidential informant as poseur-buyer were established, as well as the exchange of
the sachet of shabu and the marked money. It was also ascertained that the seized item was positive for shabu, a dangerous drug,
and that the same item was properly identified in open court by SPO4 Larot. Moreover, the P100.00 bill with serial number
YZ712579, or the subject marked money, as well as the living body of the accused-appellant revealed a positive result for ultraviolet
fluorescent powder.

Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti, and that the statutory safeguards provided for
in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed.

Indeed, as we held in People v. Torres,20 equally important in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is
the presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral
certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust
operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R. A. No. 9165 (the chain
of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit
in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render
the accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. 21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized
drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. A. No. 9165 on the handling and
disposition of seized dangerous drugs states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.22 (Italics, emphasis, undescoring omitted)
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave the seized item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape
on the sachet and marked it Exhibit A. Upon reaching the police station, SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well
as the request for laboratory examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and accused-appellant were
then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2 Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of
the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory.23 Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open court as the
same item seized from accused-appellant.

Accused-appellants guilt having been established, we likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Under the law,
the offense of illegal sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), regardless of the quantity and purity of the
substance.24 Thus, the RTC and CA were within bounds when they imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED.

5. People v. Calantiao

Admissibility of Evidence

People of the Philippines vs. Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014

FACTS:

Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta was convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 by the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 127 on July 23, 2009. On appeal is
the decision dated January 17, 2012 of the court of Appeals affirming in in toto the decision of the RTC.

On November 11, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control two bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.

PO1 Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez were on duty; a certain Edwin Lojera arrived at their office and asked for police
assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck and traversing along
EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until
they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was
accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns.

PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan
City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards
them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a
black bag containing two bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3
Ramirez recovered from Calantiaos companion a .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 Pablo Temena, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police
Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, NM.
Thereafter, said specimens were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination
conducted by P/SINSP. Jesse Dela Rosa revealed that the same was positive for marijuana.

On Calantiaos defense the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost collided with another car. Reyes then
opened the window and made a fuck you sign against the persons on board of that car. That prompted the latter to chase them
and when they were caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano; one of the persons on board of that other car alighted and kicked
their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered some words, police officer poked his gun
against Reyes and when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and were brought to
the police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and their wallets and money were taken. PO1 Mariano then
prepared some documents and informed them that they will be charged for drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to
them and said police officer told them that it would be sufficient evidence against them.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not that the allegedly seized items are inadmissible evidence in accordance to plain view doctrine.

2. Whether or not the arresting officers patent non-compliance with the requirements for the proper chain of custody of the
seized dangerous drugs.

HELD:

1. In People v. Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of a valid warrantless search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz: When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the
latters reached. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the
person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase within the area of his immediate
control means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a
table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested. In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from him
could not be used against him because they were discovered in a room, different from where he was being detained, and
was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not be considered as one within his immediate control that he
could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against him. In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in
Calantiaos possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped
it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiaos possession, it was within
the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because
objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure. The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation because the police officers purposely
searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in
Calantiaos possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiaos lawful arrest.

2. SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending officer/team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the police officers
confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both
found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from
Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.

Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity
of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police
officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately,
Calantiao failed to discharge such burden. It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He
himself admits this. 23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being framed for having
offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up. However, those defenses have always
been frowned upon by the Court, to wit: The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs
Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the cases
before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible
proof was presented to bolster his allegations.

Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or
failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.

6. People v. Constantino

7. People v. Mercury de la cruz

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2016/sep2016/pdf/gr_212171_2016.pdf

1. SPS. Silos v. PNB

G.R. No. 181045 July 2, 2014

SPOUSES EDUARDO and LYDIA SILOS, Ps,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, R.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Doctrine: In loan agreements, it cannot be denied that the rate of interest is a principal condition, if not
the most important component. Thus, any modification thereof must be mutually agreed upon; otherwise,
it has no binding effect. Moreover, the Court cannot consider a stipulation granting a party the option to
prepay the loan if said party is not agreeable to the arbitrary interest rates imposed. Premium may not be
placed upon a stipulation in a contract which grants one party the right to choose whether to continue with
or withdraw from the agreement if it discovers that what the other party has been doing all along is
improper or illegal.

Facts:

Ps have been in business for about two decades of operating a department store and buying and selling
of ready-to-wear apparel.
To secure a one-year revolving credit line of P150,000.00 obtained from PNB, Ps constituted in August
1987 a Real Estate Mortgage over a lot in Kalibo, Aklan. In July 1988,the credit line was increased to P1.8
million and the mortgage was correspondingly increased to P1.8 million.

And in July 1989, a Supplement to the Existing Real Estate Mortgage was executed to cover the same
credit line, which was increased to P2.5 million, and additional security was given in the form of a 134-
square meter lot. In addition, Ps issued eight Promissory Notes and signed a Credit Agreement. This July
1989 Credit Agreement contained a stipulation on interest which provides as follows:

1.03. Interest. (a) The Loan shall be subject to interest at the rate of 19.5% per annum. Interest shall be payable in advance every
one hundred twenty days at the rate prevailing at the time of the renewal.

(b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate in the Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank may adopt
in the future, including without limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate system to the fixed interest rate system, or vice
versa. Where the Bank has imposed on the Loan interest at a rate per annum, which is equal to the Banks spread over the current
floating interest rate, the Borrower hereby agrees that the Bank may, without need of notice to the Borrower, increase or decrease
its spread over the floating interest rate at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future.

The eight Promissory Notes, on the other hand, contained a stipulation granting PNB the right to increase
or reduce interest rates "within the limits allowed by law or by the Monetary Board."

The Real Estate Mortgage agreement provided the same right to increase or reduce interest rates "at any
time depending on whatever policy PNB may adopt in the future."

In August 1991, an Amendment to Credit Agreement was executed by the parties, with the following
stipulation regarding interest:

1.03. Interest on Line Availments. (a) The Borrowers agree to pay interest on each Availment from date of
each Availment up to but not including the date of full payment thereof at the rate per annum which is
determined by the Bank to be prime rate plus applicable spread in effect as of the date of each
Availment.

The 9th up to the 17th promissory notes provide for the payment of interest at the "rate the Bank may at
any time without notice, raise within the limits allowed by law x x x.

On the other hand, the 18th up to the 26th promissory notes including PN 9707237, which is the 26th
promissory note carried the following provision:

x x x For this purpose, I/We agree that the rate of interest herein stipulated may be increased or
decreased for the subsequent Interest Periods, with prior notice to the Borrower in the event of changes
in interest rate prescribed by law or the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the Philippines, or in the
Banks overall cost of funds. I/We hereby agree that in the event I/we are not agreeable to the interest
rate fixed for any Interest Period, I/we shall have the option top repay the loan or credit facility without
penalty within ten (10) calendar days from the Interest Setting Date.

R regularly renewed the line from 1990 up to 1997, and Ps made good on the promissory notes,
religiously paying the interests without objection or fail. But in 1997, Ps faltered when the interest rates
soared due to the Asian financial crisis. Ps sole outstanding promissory note for P2.5 million
PN 9707237 executed in July 1997 and due 120 days later or on October 28, 1997 became past
due, and despite repeated demands, Ps failed to make good on the note.

Incidentally, PN 9707237 provided for the penalty equivalent to 24% per annum in case of default.

PNB prepared a Statement of Account as of October 12, 1998, detailing the amount due and demandable
from Ps in the total amount of P3,620,541.60.

Despite demand, Ps failed to pay the foregoing amount. Thus, PNB foreclosed on the mortgage, and on
January 14, 1999, the lots were sold at the auction. The sheriffs certificate of sale was registered on
March 11, 1999.

More than a year later, or on March 24, 2000, Ps filed Civil Case No. 5975, seeking annulment of the
foreclosure sale and an accounting of the PNB credit. Ps theorized that after the first promissory note
where they agreed to pay 19.5% interest, the succeeding stipulations for the payment of interest in their
loan agreements with PNB which allegedly left to the latter the sole will to determine the interest
rate became null and void. Ps added that because the interest rates were fixed by R without their prior
consent or agreement, these rates are void, and as a result, Ps should only be made liable for interest at
the legal rate of 12%. They claimed further that they overpaid interests on the credit, and concluded that
due to this overpayment of steep interest charges, their debt should now be deemed paid, and the
foreclosure and sale of TCTs T-14250 and T-16208 became unnecessary and wrongful. As for the
imposed penalty of P581,666.66, Ps alleged that since the Real Estate Mortgage and the Supplement
thereto did not include penalties as part of the secured amount, the same should be excluded from the
foreclosure amount or bid price, even if such penalties are provided for in the final Promissory Note.

In addition, Ps sought to be reimbursed an alleged overpayment of P848,285.00 made during the period
August 21, 1991 to March 5, 1998, resulting from Rs imposition of the alleged illegal and steep interest
rates. They also prayed to be awarded P200,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.

In its Answer, PNB denied that it unilaterally imposed or fixed interest rates; that Ps agreed that without
prior notice, PNB may modify interest rates depending on future policy adopted by it; and that the
imposition of penalties was agreed upon in the Credit Agreement. It added that the imposition of penalties
is supported by the all-inclusive clause in the Real Estate Mortgage agreement which provides that the
mortgage shall stand as security for any and all other obligations of whatever kind and nature owing to R,
which thus includes penalties imposed upon default or non-payment of the principal and interest on due
date.

RTC: Ruled in favor of R

CA: Ruled in favor of R

Issue/Held:

WoN the interest rates imposed by R are null and void- YES

WoN P is estopped from questioning the interest rates because of their continuous payment thereof w/o
opposition- NO
Ratio:

SC cited and discussed numerous cases but the main point of all the cases is the doctrine stated above.

Any modification in the contract, such as the interest rates, must be made with the consent of the
contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed modification,
especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In the case of loan agreements,
the rate of interest is a principal condition, if not the most important component. Thus, any
modification thereof must be mutually agreed upon; otherwise, it has no binding effect.

In the present case, the stipulations in question no longer provide that the parties shall agree upon the
interest rate to be fixed; -instead, they are worded in such a way that the borrower shall agree to
whatever interest rate R fixes. In credit agreements covered by the cited cases, it is provided that:

The Bank reserves the right to increase the interest rate within the limits allowed by law at any time
depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future: Provided, that, the interest rate on this
accommodation shall be correspondingly decreased in the event that the applicable maximum interest
rate is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. In either case, the adjustment in the interest rate agreed
upon shall take effect on the effectivity date of the increase or decrease in maximum interest rate.

Whereas, in the present credit agreements under scrutiny, it is stated that:

IN THE JULY 1989 CREDIT AGREEMENT

(b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate on the Loan depending on whatever
policy the Bank may adopt in the future, including without limitation, the shifting from the floating interest
rate system to the fixed interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has imposed on the Loan
interest at a rate per annum, which is equal to the Banks spread over the current floating interest rate, the
Borrower hereby agrees that the Bank may, without need of notice to the Borrower, increase or decrease
its spread over the floating interest rate at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the
future.86 (Emphases supplied)

IN THE AUGUST 1991 AMENDMENT TO CREDIT AGREEMENT

1.03. Interest on Line Availments. (a) The Borrowers agree to pay interest on each Availment from date of
each Availment up to but not including the date of full payment thereof at the rate per annum which is
determined by the Bank to be prime rate plus applicable spread in effect as of the date of each
Availment.87 (Emphasis supplied)

Plainly, with the present credit agreement, the element of consent or agreement by the borrower is
now completely lacking, which makes Rs unlawful act all the more reprehensible.

Re estoppel:

Accordingly, Ps are correct in arguing that estoppel should not apply to them, for "[e]stoppel cannot be
predicated on an illegal act. As between the parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel
if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy."
It appears that by its acts, R violated the Truth in Lending Act, or Republic Act No. 3765, which was
enacted "to protect x x x citizens from a lack of awareness of the true cost of credit to the user by
using a full disclosure of such cost with a view of preventing the uninformed use of credit to the
detriment of the national economy."89 The law "gives a detailed enumeration of the specific information
required to be disclosed, among which are the interest and other charges incident to the extension of
credit."90 Section 4 thereof provides that a disclosure statement must be furnished prior to the
consummation of the transaction, thus:

SEC. 4. Any creditor shall furnish to each person to whom credit is extended, prior to the consummation
of the transaction, a clear statement in writing setting forth, to the extent applicable and in accordance
with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board, the following information:

(1) the cash price or delivered price of the property or service to be acquired;

(2) the amounts, if any, to be credited as down payment and/or trade-in;

(3) the difference between the amounts set forth under clauses (1) and (2);

(4) the charges, individually itemized, which are paid or to be paid by such person in connection
with the transaction but which are not incident to the extension of credit;

(5) the total amount to be financed;

(6) the finance charge expressed in terms of pesos and centavos; and

(7) the percentage that the finance bears to the total amount to be financed expressed as a
simple annual rate on the outstanding unpaid balance of the obligation.

Under Section 4(6), "finance charge" represents the amount to be paid by the debtor incident to the
extension of credit such as interest or discounts, collection fees, credit investigation fees, attorneys fees,
and other service charges. The total finance charge represents the difference between (1) the aggregate
consideration (down payment plus installments) on the part of the debtor, and (2) the sum of the cash
price and non-finance charges.

By requiring the Ps to sign the credit documents and the promissory notes in blank, and then
unilaterally filling them up later on, R violated the Truth in Lending Act, and was remiss in its
disclosure obligations.

1. mcmp v monark

G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014

MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP., Petitioner, v. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP., Respondent.

MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from Monark Equipment
Corporation (Monark) for various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract
(Contract). Thus, Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP in
Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon, the delivery evidenced by invoices as well as Documents and
acknowledgment receipts received and signed by representatives of MCMP, namely, Jorge Samonte on
December 5, 2000 and Rose Takahashi on January 29, 2001, respectively. The latter failed to pay rental
fees for the use of five (5) pieces of heavy equipment as stated in their Rental Equipment Contract, as
started in the agreement and so, SUIT FOR SUM MONEY was filed against MCMP.

During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior
Account Manager. Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original copies of the Contract, one retained
by Monark, while the other was given to MCMP. He further testified that Monark's copy had been lost
and that diligent efforts to recover the copy proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the
Contract which he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no diligent efforts to search for the original
copy. Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract notwithstanding the directive of the trial
court to produce the same.

The lower court ruled in favor of Monark, on appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue: Whether or not the presentation of the secondary evidence should not be allowed.

Ruling: The petition has been denied by the SC. The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the
production of the original document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in
Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:"Section 3. Original document must be
produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original
consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d)
When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
(Emphasis supplied)"

In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC
gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has
been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has
remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, "findings of facts and assessment of
credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court." 12 Hence, the Court will respect the
evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.
2. LOON

WILGEN LOON,, v. POWER MASTER, INC., TRI-C GENERAL SERVICES, and SPOUSES
HOMER and CARINA ALUMISIN, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the
petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money
claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their officers, the spouses Homer
and Carina Alumisin collectively, the respondents. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that
they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and
thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll
sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal
dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from
service in retaliation for the filing of their original complaint.

Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter except
on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondent's
behalf. The respondents counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July
5, 2001. However, the respondents neither filed any position paper nor proffered pieces of
evidence in their defense despite their knowledge of the pendency of the case.

In a decision dated March 15, 2002, the Labor Arbiter partially ruled in favor of the petitioners.
The LA awarded the petitioners salary differential, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month
pays. In awarding these claims, the LA stated that the burden of proving the payment of these
money claims rests with the employer. The LA also awarded attorneys fees in favor of the
petitioners, pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code.

However, the LA denied the petitioners claims for backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium
pays. The LA observed that the petitioners failed to show that they rendered overtime work and
worked on holidays and rest days without compensation. The LA further concluded that the
petitioners cannot be declared to have been dismissed from employment because they did not
show any notice of termination of employment. They were also not barred from entering the
respondents premises.

Both parties appealed the LAs ruling with the National Labor Relations Commission. The
petitioners disputed the LAs denial of their claim for back wages, overtime, holiday and premium
pays. Meanwhile, the respondents questioned the LAs ruling on the ground that the LA did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons because they were not personally served with summons
and other processes. They also claimed that they paid the petitioners minimum wages, service
incentive leave and thirteenth month pays. As proofs, they attached photocopied and
computerized copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum on appeal. They further maintained
that the petitioners were validly dismissed. They argued that the petitioners repeated defiance to
their transfer to different workplaces and their violations of the company rules and regulations
constituted serious misconduct and willful disobedience.

On January 3, 2003, the respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached
photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine (ATM)
cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the
employees ATM cards. They also attached documentary evidence showing that the petitioners
were dismissed for cause and had been accorded due process.

On January 22, 2003, the petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion where they asked
for the deletion of the supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered from
infirmities. First, the supplemental appeal was not verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six
months from the filing of the respondents notice of appeal with memorandum on appeal. The
petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the respondents filing of a responsive pleading
until December 18, 2002. Third the attached documentary evidence on the supplemental appeal
bore the petitioners forged signatures.

Subsequently,thepetitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation with Reiterating Motion to Strike-Off

the Record Supplemental Appeal/Reply, Quitclaims and Spurious Documents Attached to
Respondents Appeal dated August 7, 2003. The petitioners argued in this last motion that the
payrolls should not be given probative value because they were the respondents fabrications.
They reiterated that the genuine payrolls bore their signatures, unlike the respondents
photocopies of the payrolls. They also maintained that their signatures in the respondents
documents (which showed their receipt of thirteenth month pay) had been forged.

In a resolution dated November 27, 2003, the NLRC partially ruled in favor of the respondents.
The NLRC affirmed the LAs awards of holiday pay and attorneys fees. It also maintained that
the LA acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents through their voluntary
appearance.

However, it allowed the respondents to submit pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal on
the ground that they had been deprived of due process. It found that the respondents did not
actually receive the LAs processes. It also admitted the respondents unverified supplemental
appeal on the ground that technicalities may be disregarded to serve the greater interest of
substantial due process. Furthermore, the Rules of Court do not require the verification of a
supplemental pleading.

The NLRC also vacated the LAs awards of salary differential, thirteenth month and service
incentive leave pays. In so ruling, it gave weight to the pieces of evidence attached to the
memorandum on appeal and the supplemental appeal. It maintained that the absence of the
petitioners signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable factor for their authenticity. It
pointed out that the payment of money claims was further evidenced by the list of employees
with ATM cards. It also found that the petitioners signatures were not forged. It took judicial
notice that many people use at least two or more different signatures.

The NLRC further ruled that the petitioners were lawfully dismissed on grounds of serious
misconduct and willful disobedience. It found that the petitioners failed to comply with various
memoranda directing them to transfer to other workplaces and to attend training seminars for
the intended reorganization and reshuffling.

The NLRC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 28, 2006.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA.

The CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling. The CA held that the petitioners were afforded substantive
and procedural due process. Accordingly, the petitioners deliberately did not explain their side.
Instead, they continuously resisted their transfer to other PLDT offices and violated company
rules and regulations. It also upheld the NLRCs findings on the petitioners monetary claims.

The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated August 28, 2009,
prompting the petitioners to file the present petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it did not find that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondents appeal?
2. Whether or not the respondents were estopped from submitting pieces of evidence for the
first time on appeal?
3. Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed and are thus entitled to backwages?
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to salary differential, overtime, holiday, premium,
service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays?
5. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

REMEDIAL LAW: prospective application of bonding company authority

Paragraph 2, Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that in case of a judgment involving a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash
or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

Contrary to the respondents claim, the issue of the appeal bonds validity may be raised for the
first time on appeal since its proper filing is a jurisdictional requirement. The requirement that
the appeal bond should be issued by an accredited bonding company is mandatory and
jurisdictional. The rationale of requiring an appeal bond is to discourage the employers from
using an appeal to delay or evade the employees' just and lawful claims. It is intended to assure
the workers that they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the
employers appeal.

In the present case, the respondents filed a surety bond issued by Security Pacific Assurance
Corporation(Security Pacific) on June 28, 2002. At that time, Security Pacific was still an
accredited bonding company. However, the NLRC revoked its accreditation on February 16,
2003. Nonetheless, this subsequent revocation should not prejudice the respondents who relied
on its then subsisting accreditation in good faith. In Del Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc.,
we ruled that a bonding companys revocation of authority is prospective in application.

However, the respondents should post a new bond issued by an accredited bonding company in
compliance with paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule 6 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. This provision
states that a cash or surety bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting,
until the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated or the award satisfied.

REMEDIAL LAW: verification

The CA also correctly ruled that the NLRC properly gave due course to the respondents
supplemental appeal. Neither the laws nor the rules require the verification of the supplemental
appeal. Furthermore, verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. It is mainly
intended for the assurance that the matters alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not
of mere speculation. Also, a supplemental appeal is merely an addendum to the verified
memorandum on appeal that was earlier filed in the present case; hence, the requirement for
verification has substantially been complied with.
The respondents also timely filed their supplemental appeal on January 3, 2003. The records of
the case show that the petitioners themselves agreed that the pleading shall be filed until
December 18, 2002. The NLRC further extended the filing of the supplemental pleading until
January 3, 2003 upon the respondents motion for extension.

REMEDIAL LAW: delay in submission of evidence

We cannot accept the respondents cavalier attitude in blatantly disregarding the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. The CA gravely erred when it overlooked that the NLRC blindly admitted and
arbitrarily gave probative value to the respondents evidence despite their failure to adequately
explain their delay in the submission of evidence. Notably, the respondents delay was anchored
on their assertion that they were oblivious of the proceedings before the LA. However, the
respondents did not dispute the LAs finding that Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on their behalf
on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001. The respondents also failed to contest the petitioners
assertion that the respondents counsel appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July
5, 2001.

Indeed, the NLRC capriciously and whimsically admitted and gave weight to the respondents
evidence despite its finding that they voluntarily appeared in the compulsory arbitration
proceedings. The NLRC blatantly disregarded the fact that the respondents voluntarily opted not
to participate, to adduce evidence in their defense and to file a position paper despite their
knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings before the LA. The respondents were also
grossly negligent in not informing the LA of the specific building unit where the respondents
were conducting their business and their counsels address despite their knowledge of their non-
receipt of the processes.

REMEDIAL LAW: failure to prove allegations

Furthermore, the respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
Why the respondents photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not
presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners
claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally
admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative
proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present
the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the
originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures.
Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and
controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left
with no option but to rule that the respondents failure to present the originals raises the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRCs proposition that it is of common
knowledge that there are many people who use at least two or more different signatures. The
NLRC cannot take judicial notice that many people use at least two signatures, especially in this
case where the petitioners themselves disown the signatures in the respondents assailed
documentary evidence. The NLRCs position is unwarranted and is patently unsupported by the
law and jurisprudence.

Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employees. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that the employers cause can only succeed on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the employees evidence.

3. Dimaguila v mointero

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, ALL SURNAMED DIMAGUILA v. JOSE
AND SONIA A. MONTEIRO. G.R. NO. 201011, January 27, 2014

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records
are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The documents trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity
of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department
tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. As such, they are exceptions to the
hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

4. Republic mupas

1. Ortanez v ca

Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence. However, the
trial court admitted all of private respondents offered evidence and later on denied her
motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA
to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and
any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on
how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest
of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition
for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence
adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on
jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the
judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error,
assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly
correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by
the petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained
or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act
No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge
an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress.

2. Lapu lapu foundation

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and
ALLIED BANKING CORP.
G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004
By: Dianne D. Salto

DOCTRINE:

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict
or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or
mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1977, Elias Q. Tan, then President of Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from
Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the amounts of P100,000 each. As of 23
January 1979, the entire obligation amounted to P493,566.61 and despite demands made on them by
the Bank, Tan and the foundation failed to pay the same. The Bank was constrained to file with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15, a complaint seeking payment by Tan and the foundation,
jointly and solidarily, of the sum of P493,566.61 representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests,
penalty charges, attorneys fees and costs. In its answer to the complaint, the Foundation denied
incurring indebtedness from the Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by Tan in his personal
capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the strength of the personal information he furnished the
Bank. The Foundation maintained that it never authorized Tan to co-sign in his capacity as its President
any promissory note and that the Bank fully knew that the loans contracted were made in Tans personal
capacity and for his own use and that the Foundation never benefited, directly or indirectly, therefrom.

The Foundation then interposed a cross-claim against Tan alleging that he, having exceeded his authority,
should be solely liable for said loans, and a counterclaim against the Bank for damages and attorneys
fees. For his part, Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the Bank in his personal capacity. The
parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of Tans shares of common
stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered by promissory
notes which were automatically renewable (rolled-over) every year at an amount including unpaid
interests, until such time as Tan was able to pay the same from the proceeds of his aforesaid shares.
According to Tan, the Banks employee required him to affix two signatures on every promissory note,
assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in accordance with their agreement. However,
after he signed and delivered the loan documents to the Bank, these were filled out in a manner not in
accord with their agreement, such that the Foundation was included as party thereto. Further, prior to
its filing of the complaint, the Bank made no demand on him.

RTC RULING: Requiring Tan and the Foundation to pay jointly and solidarily to the Bank the amount of
P493,566.61 as principal obligation for the four promissory notes including all other charges included in
the same, with interest at 14% per annum, computed from 24 January 1979, until the same are fully
paid, plus 2% service charges and 1% monthly penalty charges.

CA RULING: Affirmed with modification the judgment of the court a quo by deleting the award of
attorneys fees.
ISSUE/S:

a. Whether or not the Court erred in holding that the loans are already due and demandable despite the
absence of prior demand. NO
b. Whether or not the Court erred in applying the Parol Evidence Rule and the Doctrine of Piercing the
Veil of Corporate entity as basis for adjudging joint and solidary liabilty on the part of petitioners. NO

HELD:

There is no dispute that the promissory notes had already matured. However, the petitioners insist that
the loans had not become due and demandable as they deny receipt of the respondent Banks demand
letters. When presented the registry return cards during the trial, petitioner Tan claimed that he did not
recognize the signatures thereon. The petitioners allegation and denial are self-serving. They cannot
prevail over the registry return cards which constitute documentary evidence and which enjoy the
presumption that, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, these were regularly issued by
the postal officials in the performance of their official duty and that they acted in good faith. Further, as
the CA correctly opined, mails are presumed to have been properly delivered and received by the
addressee in the regular course of the mail. As the CA noted, there is no showing that the addresses on
the registry return cards were wrong. It is the petitioners burden to overcome the presumptions by
sufficient evidence, and other than their barefaced denial, the petitioners failed to support their claim
that they did not receive the demand letters; therefore, no prior demand was made on them by the
respondent Bank.

The Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner Tans allegation that he was made to sign blank loan
documents and that the phrase IN MY OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY was superimposed by the
respondent Banks employee despite petitioner Tans protestation. The Court is hard pressed to believe
that a businessman of petitioner Tans stature could have been so careless as to sign blank loan
documents.

In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes clearly showed upon their faces that they are the
obligation of the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan in his official and personal
capacity. Moreover, the application for credit accommodation, the signature cards of the two accounts in
the name of petitioner Foundation, as well as New Current Account Record, all accompanying the
promissory notes, were signed by petitioner Tan for and in the name of the petitioner Foundation. These
documentary evidence unequivocally and categorically establish that the loans were solidarily
contracted by the petitioner Foundation and petitioner Tan.

As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans claim
regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of
the obligation.

Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that: [w]hen the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence
of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict
or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or
mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.

3. Leoveras v. valdez

MODESTO LEOVERAS, Petitioner, vs.CASIMERO VALDEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169985 June 15, 2011

BRION, J.:

Facts:

Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-fourths () and one-fourth
() pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land. Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths () share to Benigna
Llamas. The sale was duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695. When Benigna died in 1944, she
willed her three-fourths () share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. 8 Thus,
Alejandra and Josefa each owned one-half () of Benignas three-fourths () share. Alejandras heirs
sold their predecessors one-half () share (roughly equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to the
respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Also, Josefa sold her own one-half () share
(subject property) to the respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale.
The respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject property.
The petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the subject property. The
parties took possession of their respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their name
for taxation purposes.

The respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the requirements for the
transfer of title over the portion allotted to him on the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent
learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two transfer certificates of title.

The respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the
petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion (disputed property) covered by
TCT No. 195813, on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in
the parties Agreement.

The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioners titles by contesting the authenticity of the
petitioners documents. Particularly, the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting Benignas
death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed, which purports to
convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already died in 1944. The
respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the parties her three-fourths () share in
1969 because she had already sold her share to Benigna in 1932. 22

The petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and for a declaration that he is the lawful owner of
the parcels of land covered by his titles.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity
of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. As the totality of the evidence presented sufficiently sustains [the
respondents] claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner] were based on forged and spurious
documents, it behooves this Court to annul these certificates of title. Hence, this petition for revie.

Issues:

Whether the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the parcel of land covered by the petitioners titles.

Held:

We partially grant the petition.

An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land
was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner to
transfer or reconvey the land to him. 33 The plaintiff in this action must allege and prove his ownership of
the land in dispute and the defendants erroneous, fraudulent or wrongful registration of the property.

The petitioners argument confuses registration of title with ownership. 52 While the petitioners ownership
over the land covered by TCT No. 195812 is undisputed, his ownership only gave him the right to apply
for the proper transfer of title to the property in his name. Obviously, the petitioner, even as a rightful
owner, must comply with the statutory provisions on the transfer of registered title to lands. 53 Section 53 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that the subsequent registration of title procured by the
presentation of a forged deed or other instrument is null and void. Thus, the subsequent issuance of TCT
No. 195812 gave the petitioner no better right than the tainted registration which was the basis for the
issuance of the same title. The Court simply cannot allow the petitioners attempt to get around the proper
procedure for registering the transfer of title in his name by using spurious documents.

Reconveyance is the remedy of the rightful owner only

While the CA correctly nullified the petitioners certificates of title, the CA erred in ordering the
reconveyance of the entire subject property in the respondents favor. The respondent himself admitted
that the 3,020- square meter portion covered by TCT No. 195812 is the petitioners just share in the
subject property.54 Thus, although the petitioner obtained TCT No. 195812 using the same spurious
documents, the land covered by this title should not be reconveyed in favor of the respondent since he is
not the rightful owner of the property covered by this title.

4. PAras v. Kimwa

SPOUSES PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVOLPMENT CORP

G.R. No. 171601 April 8, 2015
Leonen, J.

FACTS:

Lucia Paras was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan,

Toledo City. Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete aggregates to
contractors and haulers in Cebu. Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract
denominated "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates" where 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates were allotted by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the
allotted aggregates at Lucia's permitted area in Toledo City at P240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates.
However, after this Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates and allegedly transferred to
the concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre in violation of their
Agreement.

Spouses Paras sent demand letters to Kimwa. As these went unheeded, Spouses
Paras filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Kimwa. In its
Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates. It argued that the 40,000 cubic meters represented is only the maximum
quantity that it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the May 15, 1995 which was the
expiration of the Special Permit of Lucia was never set as a deadline. Invoking the
Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from introducing
evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.

The RTC rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. On appeal, CA

reversed the RTC's Decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred for basing its findings on the basis of evidence
presented in violation of the parol evidence rule.
2. Whether or not Kimwa is liable to petitioners Spouses Paras for Breach of
Contract.

RULING:

(1) No. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The
validity of the written agreement; (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agree.

There are 2 things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first,
that the existence of any of the 4 exceptions has been put in issue in a party's
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol
evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed
by the presenting party.

In the present case petitioners pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the
trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement's
failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through
its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras' pleading of these issues. This
is , thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence.

Proof of how petitioners Spouses Paras successfully pleaded and put this in
issue in their Complaint is how respondent Kimwa felt it necessary to respond to it or
address it in its Answer. Thus, the testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought
to be introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws
and what they aver to have been the parties' true intent, may be admitted and
considered.

(2) Yes. Petitioners have established that respondent Kimwa was obliged to
haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. Considering its
admission that it did not haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates, respondent Kimwa is
liable to petitioners.

Having been admittedly furnished a copy of this Special Permit, respondent

Kimwa was well aware that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
may be extracted by petitioner Lucia from the permitted area, and that petitioner
Lucia Paras' operations cannot extend beyond May 15, 1995, when the Special Permit
expires.

The condition that the Special Permit shall be valid for only six (6) months from
November 14, 1994 lends credence to petitioners Spouses Paras' assertion that, in
entering into the Agreement with respondent Kimwa, petitioner Lucia Paras did so
because of respondent Kimwa's promise that hauling can be completed by May 15,
1995. Bound as she was by the Special Permit, petitioner Lucia Paras needed to make
it eminently clear to any party she was transacting with that she could supply
aggregates only up to May 15, 1995 and that the other party's hauling must be
completed by May 15, 1995. She was merely acting with due diligence, for otherwise,
any contract she would enter into would be negated; any commitment she would
make beyond May 15, 1995 would make her guilty of misrepresentation, and any
prospective income for her would be rendered illusory.

5 PNB. V Pas imio