Baytan vs. COMELECG.R. No.

153945 February 4, 2003CARPIO,

J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo
Baytan and Adrian Baytanwere on their way to register for the
May 1998 elections when they met thenewly elected Barangay
Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City,
who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay
18.U p o n r e a l i z i n g t h a t t h e i r r e s i d e n c e i s s i t u a t e d w i t
h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f Barangay 28 not Barangay 18,
petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and
registered
anew.S u b s e q u e n t l y , p e t i t i o n e r s s e n t a l e t t e r t o f
o r m e r C O M E L E C A s s i s t a n t Executive Director Jose Pio
O. Joson requesting for advice on how to cancel their
previous registration.Petitioners Voters Registration Records
were forwarded to the ProvincialE l e c t i o n S u p e r v i s o r
, A t t y. J u a n i t o V. R a v a n z o , f o r e v a l u a t i o n ,
w h o , subsequently, recommended fi ling an information for
double registrationagainst petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed
Ravanzos resolution. Petitionersmoved for reconsideration, which,
was denied by COMELEC en banc.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when itrecommended the prosecution of petitioners for double
registration despitelack of intent and substantial compliance with
the requirement of cancellationof previous registration.HELD: No.
There is no question that petitioners registered twice on
differentdays and in different precincts without canceling their
previous registration.Since "double registration" is malum
prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the law
is inconsequential. Neither is the letter to Joson
anapplication to cancel their previous registration. This
letter was sent aftertheir second registration was
accomplished and after the election offi cer of Cavite City
had already reported their act of double registration to a
higherofficial.Moreover, petitioners claims of honest
mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with the
Election Codes requirement of cancellation of previousregistration
are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper
rathert h a n a t t h e p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T
h e e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e i s t h a t a p re liminary inve s
tigation is not the occasion for the full and exhausti
v e display of the parties evidence. It is for the
presentation of such
evidenceo n l y a s m a y e n g e n d e r a w e l l - g r o u n d e d b e l i e f

t h a t a n o ff e n s e h a s b e e n committed and the accused is

probably guilty thereof.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No.
119694; 22 May 1995]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772
directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less
than one-half page for the common use of political parties and
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them
to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be
used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the
Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor
General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the
information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible
election.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held: The
Supreme
Court
declared
the
Resolution
as
unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to
donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in
expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the
taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is

authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just

compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench,
there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take
private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

181 SCRA 529
Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic
act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law.
The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by
virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the
plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview
for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their
opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite
periods.
Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted
to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use
and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor
Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any
elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work
during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the
Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate

the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to

expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising
their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither
the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.
Coquilla vs. COMELEC
Posted on October 3, 2012
G.R. No. 151914; 385 SCRA 607
September 17, 2002
____________________
Facts:
Petitioner Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern
Samar, where he grew up and resided.
In 1965, he joined the US Navy and subsequently naturalized as a
US citizen.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took
out a residence certificate, albeit continued making several trips to
the US.
On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines subsequently after his application for repatriation was
approved.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of
Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his COC stating therein that he has
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
On March 5, 2001, respondent incumbent mayor of Oras who was
running for re-election, sought the cancellation of petitioners COC
on the ground that the latter had resided in Oras for only about 6
months since when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On May 14, 2001, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes
and was subsequently proclaimed mayor of Oras.

Issue:
WON petitioner satisfied the residency requirement for the position
of mayor.
Held:
No. Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA
7160) provides that an elective official must be a resident
therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year
immediately preceeding the day of the election
The term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to
domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin
is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where
the childs parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile (domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by
becoming a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy in 1965. From
then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired
Philippine citizenship, he was an alien.
LOONG vs. COMELEC
Facts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent
Commission his certificate of candidacy for the position of ViceGovernor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held
on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the
election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent
Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office
of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.
Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground
that the respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to
dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the
subject of this petition.
Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of

time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period
prescribed by law.
Held: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with
the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the
ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate
of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds
of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly
covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing
petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3,
Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than
the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by
respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has
no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES,

JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL
SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.
G.R. No. 124893
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Qualification of Elective Officers (SK)
FACTS:
Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order
dated May 2, 1996 of respondent COMELEC en banc suspending
her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the SK of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
- On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member
and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo.
The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on
the ground that she being then twenty-one years and ten (10)
months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824.
- On April 2, she filed a Petition for Inclusion as Registered
Kabataang Member and Voter with the MCTC. In a decision dated

April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered
her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional
Trial Court. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however,
inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close
association with petitioner.
- On April 23, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the
position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San
Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter
dated April 23, 1996, Election Officer Rios, per advice of Provincial
Election Supervisor, disapproved petitioners certificate of
candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to
COMELEC Regional Director Asperin who set aside the order of
respondent Rios and allowed petitioner to run.
- On May 2, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner
informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain
why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved.
- Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials,
private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en
banc a Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her
age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was
sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the
Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day acting on the facsimile, respondent
Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc
issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of
Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation
of petitioner in the event she won in the election.
- On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as
against private respondents votes of 76. In accordance with the
May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election
Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant
petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
- On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed
petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was without
prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or
any other interested party.
- On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng
mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos

Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected
officials of the Pederasyon.
ISSUES: 1) WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on
the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy. (not
pubcor)
2) WON cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground
that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective
official of the SK is valid
HELD:
1) Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides
that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the
COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code.
The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the
procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law
Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has
made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition
may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by
the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the
COMELEC itself and that the jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a
certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division,
not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by
the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach
a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division.
Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders
or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC
en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can
hear and decide election cases.
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to
any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the
petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of
pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Every pleading
before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or
typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10)
legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk

of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form.
Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC.
[19] Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis
of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
2) The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in
1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization
composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15
years but less than 18 years of age. RA 7160 changed the
Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however,
retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15
but not more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected
by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically
becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. A
member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless
sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated,
dies or resigns from office.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual
resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not
more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the
Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428
of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang
Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years
but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e)
able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted
Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in
Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official
voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981,
inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1)
year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must:
(a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident
in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
elections; and (c) able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications

of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a

candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan.
Petitioners age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b]
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that
Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and
beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide
that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She
urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old,
she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore
qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and
as candidate for the SK elections.
Section 424 of the Code sets a members maximum age at 21
years only. There is no further provision as to when the member
shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428
provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21
years old on the day of his election. The addition of the phrase
on the day of his election is an additional qualification. The
member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on
the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The
elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on
the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering
that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK
official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when
there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more
than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The
Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days.
When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of
365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is
consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his
birth the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is
reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th
day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. The phrase
not more than 21 years of age means not over 21 years, not
beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21
years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that
would be more than 21 365-day cycles. Not more than 21 years
old is not equivalent to less than 22 years old, contrary to
petitioners claims. The law does not state that the candidate be
less than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a

candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy

and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be
declared ineligible.
Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds
enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it
necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member
chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves.
The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and
duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said
office.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette
G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification
for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang
Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple
majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan
members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall
assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the
term.

National Press Club Vs. Comelec

201 SCRA 1
G.R. No. 1026653
March 5, 1992
Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the
mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space
and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are
candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial
office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters
who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of
credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally
argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461
invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising

freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition

imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it
selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal
sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, mediabased election or political propaganda during the election period of
1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's
role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further,
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of
speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based
campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the
Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio
and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting
the right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
constitutional.
Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the
Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of
expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction
with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision
applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the
election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to
proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly
an important value. One of the basic state policies given
constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not
the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
operations of communication and information enterprises during an
election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone
outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to

election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to

restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations
of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government.
Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates,
their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as
such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements
for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is
not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates
for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid
political advertisements of particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech
of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or
unreasonable.
FLORES vs. COMELEC Case Digest
FLORES vs. COMELEC
184 SCRA 484
Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of
canvassers as having the highest number of votes for kagawad on
the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and
thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of
R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private
respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one
vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in
place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the
latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the
challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes
cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or
initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being
divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores,
another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner
was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on
the ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC,
based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a
protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay
elections on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable.

In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking
cognizance of the petitioners appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan
Courts in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A.
No. 6679?
Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely
different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section
2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal or
Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their
decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted
section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not
to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it
provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in
a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be
declared unconstitutional.

Montejo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The province of Leyte is

composed
of
5
legislative
districts. Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was made its
sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into
a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed
the new province. As a consequence, the composition of the third
district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting
inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and
municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the

second district and the municipality ofPalompon of

district to the third district of Leyte.

the

fourth

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer

municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative
district

Held: The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the

1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting
which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make
laws. But based on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of
legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the
power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the
COMELEC
to
make
minor
adjustments
of
the
reapportionment made.Consistent with the limit of its
power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance
did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another
district.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to
a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of
voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the
issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts
and petitioners remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of
the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to

reapportion.The Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated
a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the
second district and themunicipality of Palompon of the fourth
district to the third district of Leyte.

SWS VS COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election
survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the
media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election
survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and
exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass
media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a
direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.