G.R. No. L-1337, Lo Ching and So Yun Chong Co v. CA and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 81 Phil.

601,

46 Off. Gaz. 399

The facts, according to the Court, are as follows: On August 30, 1940, the
Archbishop of Manila by the Bank of the Philippine Islands in lease ceded Lo and So
Yun Ching Chong Co. farm with Nos. 1095 to 1101 R. Hidalgo Street, Manila, under a
monthly income of P500 for the term of three years from the first of September
1940, extendable to two years (two years upon agreement of the parties). The
tenant occupied the property establishing therein an hotel. In February 1942, the
Japanese army burst into the farm tenants handing the German Otto Schulze who
occupied until the month of January 1945, the arrival of the army of liberation. In
the first days of February 1945, reoccupied the farm tenants, paying the appropriate
monthly rent. Before the end of the month of August of the same year, he required
landlord to tenants to vacate the property, and they refused. Therefore, the lessor
September 8, 1945 presented the eviction action in the Municipal Court of Manila,
which on October 8, 1945, condemned the tenants to vacate the property and pay
rent monthly P625 from the first September 1945, more damages in the amount of
P500 and court costs. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Manila dictate
condemning judgment to vacate the property, pay their rent of P625 per month
from the first of September 1945 until the evicted without ruling on costs. The Court
of Appeals in its decision of January 30, 1947, confirmed this judgment with costs.
Tenants, appellants in this acting, by certiorari, appeal this decision to the Court,
alleging that the Court of Appeals he committed five errors, two of which, the third
and fourth, raise questions of law.
In addition to the allegations made by the appellants and appealed, lawyers Mr.
Dewitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile, as amici curiae, submitted its memorandum on
October 21, 1947, and attorneys Messrs. Sese Nabong and also as amici curiae, the
in his March 18, 1948.
The review of judgments and decrees of the Court of Appeals is limited only to cases
in which it is not more than of errors or questions of law. (Rule 46, Art. 2 in
connection with Art. 2 Title VIII of the Constitution of the Republic.) (Against
Matthew and Court of Customs Appeals, 63 Phil., 500.) The jurisdiction of the Court
Supreme is limited to review and examine the errors of law that may be incurred by
the Court of Appeals. (Guico against Mayuga and others, 63 Jur Fil, 352;. Mamuyac
vs Abena, [[1]] 38 Off Gaz, 84,... Meneses against the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, [[2]] 40 Off Gaz.. (7th Supp.) 41; Onglengco vs Ozaeta [[3]], 40 Off Gaz
(7th Supp.), 186,... Hernandez vs. Manila Electric Co., [[4]] 40 Off Gaz 10th Supp... ),
35; Gerio against Gerio, [[5]] 40 Off. Gaz. (10th Supp.), 53; Garcia Ramos against
Yatco, [[6]] 40 Off. Gaz. (10th Supp.), 124; Zubiri vs. Quijano, [[7]] 2 Off. Gaz, 389.;
People vs. Benitez, [[8]] 1 Off. Gaz, 880.; De las Alas against The People of the
Philippines, RGR No. 49212.)
Only try therefore errors III and IV that raise issues of legal hermeneutics.

A paragraph of the lease signed by the parties is as follows:

1. The party of the second part Shall Have and hold the said premises for the full
term of three years to be reckoned from September 1, 1940, but May said period be
extended to another two years upon agreement of the parties. (Record on Appeal,
p. 22.)
Regarding the first three years, the terms of the contract are so precise and so clear
that no doubt result. As for the second term of two years, declare that this
extension of the contract two additional years is optional for lessees may continue
to occupy the property without the landlord give his consent again because it has
already given at the time of granting Contract Exhibit "C"; but are not required to
occupy, if not for them. . Similar in subject, with Alberto Cruz, 39 Jur Fil, 1015, this
Court said:
We believe that the court a quo was in a whole correct in his interpretation of the
contract in question; and, even if it could be accepted that the interpretation makes
superfluous the words "agreed by both parties," however, this does not give any
power to the significance of the whole sentence. If true the interpretation that the
appellant wishes to adopt, all relative to the extension of the term would be
superfluous clause, because if the extension would have to only take place under a
new agreement that the parties give the expiry of the original term, to say anything
about extending? Those who are free to grant a lease, you are certainly also to
provide a new one when the previous one has expired, without having to remind
them of their power to do the same by the insertion of a clause of this kind in the
first lease . This would not only be superfluous, but devoid of meaning. Must the
clause relating to the extension of the lease, if possible, in the sense of attributing
some force.
As we interpret the contracts before us, the parties proposed expressar that had
already agreed that there could be an extension of the lease, and they had agreed
as to the duration of this, thus giving the defendant the right to option to continue
the lease for a further period, or not to continue the contract on expiry of the
original term.
On account of lease that expired in August 31, 1945, the tenants stopped having
the right to continue occupying the property. This contract has the force of law
between the parties (Article 1091, Civil Code). "If the lease is made for a fixed
period, concludes the preset day without request." (Article 1565, Civil Code.) The
decision, therefore, the Court of Appeals ordering the tenants to vacate the property
and pay rent of P625 monthly as from the first of September 1945 until the vacate
this match law. (Article 1569, Civil Code.)
The appellants contend that they are entitled to occupy the property for three full
years; your occupation must be effective, continuous material; they should not be
deprived of the use and enjoyment of the property; that the appellants are entitled
to deduct from that period of three years, all the time they have left to enjoy the
lease disposition of the Japanese army.

Clearly perfectisimo tenants have the right to occupy the property for all time and
not just lease for three years but for five, according to the two agreed deadlines,
and indeed the landlord received it and established a business of hotel, and had the
full use and enjoyment of the property before being driven out by the Japanese.
Even more, the landlord is obligated to keep the tenants in the peaceful enjoyment
of the lease for the entire time of the contract (Article 1554, paragraph 3 Civil
Code). But this obligation does not extend to the end to defend the tenants from the
depredations of the invading hordes. This item is out of power and the legal
obligation of the lessor. Assuming, for a moment, before the outbreak of war, had a
cool smuggled in a hotel room of the appellants and that despite requests not
dislodge wanted, was it forced the landlord to take the farm to possessor? That
intruder was no holder of the property or holder of the property but the possession
of the tenant peaceful enjoyment. No pretensions occupied the room with domain:
illegal or just wanted to fill the room for free. Tenants debian direct their action
against the possessor who invaded his right of possession, which the owner had
nothing to answer.
Only if the owner responds that disturbs possession alegal title to the property. If a
third party claiming to have purchased the property of the landlord, the tenants
want to take, they may require the landlord to defend them. The obligation of the
landlord to ensure the peaceful enjoyment is not in all cases: those in which only
the title of the property has something to do with the disturbance, when it comes to
disturbance of law. When a person by judicial action you want to deprive them of
possession of the property to tenants, the landlord is obligated to defend them. So
has the 1560 article of the Civil Code: "The landlord is not required to respond to the
perturbation of a third fact merno wounds the use of the leased property, but the
tenant will take direct action against the disturbing fact there is no disturbance.
when the third party, whether the Administration, as an individual, he has worked
under a law that suits you. "
Manresa, commenting on this provision says:
What do we mean by mere perturbation?, What by disturbance of law?
The French Code, in its art. 1,725, says the landlord is not required to ensure the
tenant for any inconvenience caused by third parties who are not entitled to the
thing leased, without prejudice to any claim which the tenant can do on their own
behalf; Article 1,726 and that if, on the contrary, the tenant or lessee has been
disturbed in his enjoyment result of an action on the ownership of the property, is
entitled to a proportional reduction in the price of the lease, having reported that
nuisance the owner.
It appears from these provisions that the disturbance caused by a person not
entitled to the thing leased (although it can hold over different things to keep her
relationship), estimate as mere fact, and that other consisting of the exercise of an
action affecting the ownership of the property, it must be considered as law.
Laurent, explaining these precepts, he says, that what characterizes the
disturbance of law, is that the third party attempts or affirm that the leased
property does not belong to the landlord. However, he adds, it is possible that a

third party exercising a right that applies to you, disturb the enjoyment of the
tenant: the third party does not intend to have any rights on the leased property,
and in this sense there is no disturbance of law; the law under which the lessor has
leased not attacked, and yet the enjoyment of the lessee is disturbed. To clarify if
the latter course the landlord should the tenant respondar disturbance, said
according to author distinguishes disruptive acts come from the Administration or
an individual.
If from the Administration, we will have to distinguish again if this has worked within
the circle of his powers, and exceeded or if the act is illegal, if it happened last, the
answer is not doubtful for Laurent; an illegal act is a way of fact, and the ways of
practice are to be held accountable to the landlord.
Otherwise, that is, the Administration has acted within its powers, the right of the
tenant to go against the landlord and his lack of action against the Administration,
are obvious.
If the disruptive acts come from individuals, Laurent makes the same distinction
when coming from the Administration, if an individual has acted in the exercise of a
right that belongs, or has overstepped on: the solutions proposed are identical and
under the same grounds. From this it follows that there was no great need to
distinguish between acts of the Administration and individual acts, to reach such a
result.
Later the same Laurent welcomes the following distinctions Pothier: no disturbance
when in fact the third made are not intended to have any rights in the premises, or
with relation to the property, for example, if they graze their flocks in the leased
property, although without stating who are authorized to do so: it is legal
disturbance, which was the result of a lawsuit brought before the courts; Judicial
disturbance is also, by way of exception, which takes place when the chase
arrendatarioa authors of a disturbance in fact, they oppose having a right in the
thing leased.
Pacifici Mazzoni announces the difference between fact and disturbance of law,
saying that the first occurs when materially prevents or reduces the enjoyment of
the lessee, without the disturbing claims about the thing or right on your
enjoyment, and second, if has the same aim, along with judicial, extrajudicial acts
well with the tenant's right to the enjoyment answered claiming legal claims on the
thing.
Ricci says two requirements to discomfort in fact to be borne by the tenant: first,
that the cause does not hold any rights to the leased property, and second, that
neither is entitled to that where the nuisance or disturbance is ; missing any of
these two requirements is disturbance of law.
Our Goyena, commenting on art. 1491 Project 1851, says that in any contract there
liability for acts of God, and such must be deemed the perturbation of mere fact,
like flocks of others are introduced into the meadow that I have for rent, or I can
snatch night fruit , or violently expelled me from the house I occupy. Later he adds,
that while the attack is not directed against the same property of the thing and

judicially, the tenant is only attacked and defend the mere touch. (10 Manresa 511513).
The appellants argue that reoccupied the farm in February 1945 and only resumed
business hotel in June because it had to take 400 refugees; repaired the destroyed
parts of the building by spending at least P5, 000, to put it in condition for the hotel
business; the landlord allowed them to do all these things. For such circumstances the appellants argue - the landlord has made them believe that they could occupy
the farm for more than seven months and operate the hotel business for more than
2 months to recover your investment, and if there was no express, at least , there
was a tacit authorization. They conclude. Was the landlord estoppel to claim the
completion of the new lease that began in 1945 Februaro This theory is untenable. If
the landlord did not object to the reoccupation by the tenants of the property in
February 1945 and received rent for, has done nothing but respect the right that
had tenants occupy the property because according to the second additional period,
had option undisputed occupy the property until August 31, 1945. consented If
therefore the landlord that tenants reoccupy the property, was not under the
understanding that the new occupied under tacit agreement but under the
agreement and agreed by the Exhibit "C". If tenants have made investments that
have not been recovered until August 31, 1945, no one but themselves to blame
should lie. Debian was aware that the contract law between the parties and debian
end on August 31 of that year. There is no such estoppel.
Nor is meritorious the claim of the appellants that the reoccupation by them from
the farm in February 1945 for having the landlord received rent and for having
allowed them to make repairs on the building, there arose a new legal relationship
of lease for a period of over two months and ask the Court determined that the
circumstances attending. In support cited Article 1128 of the Civil Code which
provides that "If no such indication term obligation, but its nature and
circumstances it is apparent that he wanted granted to the debtor, the court will
determine the length of that."
As already mentioned, the reoccupation of the property in February was but the
continuation of the lease ending in August 31, 1943, consistent with the second
additional period of two years.
Article 1128 of the Civil Code refers to the obligations in general and does not refer
to deadlines on leasing this class because there is already a contract and special
provision is Article 1565 which reads: "If the lease has been made by given time,
the day concludes default without request. "
In this case, term fixed by the parties - Three years from the first of September
1940 until August 31, 1943, and an additional two-year period ending on August 31,
1945 If there were. been a further period of two years, the reoccupation by tenants
in February 1945 had been a new lease for automatic renewal; but as the payment
of rent per month was to be understood that the contract ended at the end of the
month. Article 1581 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "If it had not fixed
term lease means done for years when it has set an annual rent for months when
monthly, monthly for days when, for days when daily. In any case ceases lease
without special requirement, fulfilled the term. "

The launch of the tenants of the estate by the invading army, putting in place the
German Otto Schulze, few words are enough. The Hague Convention of 1907 does
not authorize an occupying army to seize private property in the invaded territory.
On the contrary, provides that. "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected
Private property can not be confiscated." (Article 46.) And even the farm was used
as army barracks, and there are indications that it seized by military necessity, it
can be deduced that the Japanese soldiers placed the farm, not in the legitimate
exercise the authority of an occupying army, but spurred on by excessive and
uncontrollable desire to seize other people. Tenants therefore should have directed
his claim against the German Otto Schulze and the soldiers gave him possession of
the property. If the occupation of Otto Schulze was a simple case of detainer for
possession, what right have the tenants of the lease term discount it? Is not this
shifting the liability Otto Schulze and Japanese soldiers, who are the true bearers in
the landlord? Nor is there anything in the record to show that the soldiers occupied
the farm with pretensions domain. If the Japanese told the German Otto Schulze
income should pay the owner of the property, it proves to who had not wanted to
hurt you; the action was directed to the tenant, the owner of the possession, use
and enjoyment of the lease. The deprivation of possession of tenants by Japanese
soldiers was a simple perturbation and the mere fact that the landlord does not
respond, according express provision of Article 1560 of the Civil Code. Under no
conceptio should be reduced, therefore, the period of illegal occupation of Otto
Schulze, the lease term agreed by the parties.
The appellants argue that the invasion of the Japanese can not be regarded as a
mere disturbance in fact, that did not affect only the leased property but also to
other properties in the Philippines. That is true; but is no legal reason for tenants
not suffer a corresponding share of the depredations caused by pjaponeses hordes;
is no reason for tenants to move weight will damage them shoulder the lessor.
In support of the theory that the court may extend the term of the occupancy of the
property by the tenant to a period of time equal to the time they were deprived of
possession by the Japanese army, the appellants rely on the Act No. 720
Commonwealth that provides for extension of time within which you can make,
perform or comply with any term, condition or stipulation expressed in the mineral,
forest and public land concessions. Without this law, any extension of the term
would be illegal: the terms of the grant are inflexible and must be met. In this case,
the law between the parties is the lease Exhibito C. If the landlord fails to grant
paves a third term, by tacit agreement or expressly, the eviction of the appellants is
forced.
The appellants contend that in this case, the Court is to grant additional time dbe
accordance with Article 1124 of the Civil Code. This contention is erroneous. The
Court is not the landlord or agent of the landlord; therefore can not extend the lease
term in contravention of the precise terms of the Exhibito C. The lessor or the
Archbishop of Manila, as the government in the matter of mineral, forest and
mineral concessions, which may be granted is another term and not the Court.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Paid recurring costs in all instances....